Peace and Security: Keys to Stability and Sustainable Development in the Horn of Africa

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Lund, May 2013

Abdillahi Jama,
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Introduction

Abdillahi Jama and Ulf Johansson Dahre

The 11th annual SIRC/LuHAF conference on the Horn of Africa focused on the issue of peace and security in the Horn. The main objective of the conference was to provide a forum for those engaged in this issue and bring the agonizing and violent situation in the Horn of Africa to the attention of the Swedish public and key stakeholders in the international community. Knowledge and understanding of critical issues concerning the conflicts in the Horn of Africa should encourage stakeholders to become engaged and actively support local peace processes at track II and track III levels in the Horn.

More than 300 participants visited the conference and took an active part in the discussions inside and outside the conference facilities during these three days. The governments of the Horn of Africa countries were strongly represented, by both ministers and ambassadors. Representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, civil society organisations, international academia, think tanks and media contributed actively, giving statements, reporting on current research and participating in workshops. Their committed participation gave the conference depth and validity.

The conference started on a positive note when Augustine P. Mahiga, from the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) reported on the progress that has been made, specifically in the political/constitutional process and the security sector. These on-going developments in the political and security landscape indicate a new reality for the Somali people. This is not to deny that the challenges facing the country are enormous. Much needs to be done in promoting outreach and reconciliation initiatives between and amongst clans and also with allies of the insurgents. The willingness of the business community to invest in the immediate post-war environment is another challenge to maintaining peace and stability in the country. Among other things it is necessary to intensify public and civic education for the Somali people to be made aware of the advancement on the political landscape and the security gains in various parts of the country, by harmonizing and disseminating messages on the achievements made so far through the printed word and electronic media.

These themes of political/constitutional processes, development of the security sector, the position of civil society, business interests and education formed the red threads running through the conference, with the addition of the role of religion and environmental issues. Interesting follow-ups to the conference of 2011 on the role of women in promoting peace and development were given in statements by Ms Lilla Schumicky från UNDP, who described the Women Civilian Protection Unit, which
is strengthening security in Mogadishu and by Addei Sidi Nur Manguay on the bottom-up approach in enabling women to play a greater part in conflict resolution. Dr Shukria Dini put forward the importance of uniting female parliamentarians and women NGO activists in the struggle for gender equity and durable peace in Somalia.

The role of religion in state and constitution building was expounded by Dr Markus Böckenforde, while Dr El Haj Hamed Mohamed Kheir Hag Hamed elaborated on the relationship between fundamentalism and security in Sudan. The importance of good relationships and cooperation between the countries of the Horn was also made clear by the Minister of the Interior and Decentralization of the Republic of Djibouti, Hassan Darar Houffaneh, who spoke on the role of Djibouti in fostering security in the Horn of Africa. Other important areas where cooperation is essential are closer economic ties and environmental issues, such as the question of water supply and shared rivers.

The workshops of the conference focused on three different themes:

1. Local and community peace building and its effects on state-building in the Horn of Africa
2. The role of the media in peace-making vs. conflict-making
3. The role of the international community in local peace processes in the Horn of Africa.
Recommendations of the Conference

Kontie Mussa

The conference was concluded by Dr. Kontie Mussa, summarizing and presenting the recommendations from the workshops. The recommendations were:

1. Establish economic or state institutions that will enable civil society to play an effective role in peace-building.
2. Strive to create a public or protective sphere where civil society can engage.
3. Find ways to accommodate the new hybrid transnational Somali identities resulting from the Diaspora and which sometimes lead to tensions within Somalia.
4. Somalis should pursue transnational civic engagement that could potentially combine indigenous social professionalization with transnational civic engagement supporting developmental initiatives.
5. Focus on improving education, social, health and economic sectors that create opportunities for communities across the country and beyond.
6. Establish institutions to uphold national standards for the inclusion of women in civil society.
7. Involve women also at middle and top level negotiations so that women’s empowerment can continue to contribute to national security.
8. Ensure women’s access to education as a route to empowerment.
9. Provide resources for women to organize to ensure that their voices will be heard.
10. Regard the issue of the two shared rivers not only from the aspect of hydro energy but also regarding the ecological diversity of the region.
11. Somalia and Ethiopia should discuss issues concerning resources and climate change and not only issues of politics and security.
12. Intensify public and civic education for the Somali people, making them aware of the advancement on the political landscape and the security gains in various parts of the country, by harmonizing and disseminating messages on the achievements made so far through the printed word and electronic media.
13. Acknowledge the importance but also the delicate position of the media-
14. Establish a voluntary media association that observes and maintains standards of good journalism.
15. The international community should wait with further initiatives until local representatives have formulated their needs. High priority should be given to needs formulated by women.
Welcoming and Opening Remarks

Jörgen Forsberg

Ladies and Gentlemen, Esteemed Delegates, Dear Friends,

My name is Jörgen Forsberg, and I am the Deputy Mayor of Lund.

It is my pleasure to welcome you all to our beautiful city – a city that prides itself for its rich cultural and historical heritage, state-of-the-art scientific research & development and a prosperous business climate.

In our city, academia, business, culture and nature thrive within walking or bicycle distance from each other.

And from within a radius of just over a kilometre from this – the historic centre of Lund – many innovations have been created that have changed the lives of many people around the world – including most of you in this room I should imagine!

Lund is the birthplace of Tetra Pak paper packaging, Ericsson’s modern mobile telephony, Bluetooth, the Inkjet printer, Axis network cameras and many more things that have changed peoples’ lives to the better.

This is also a city where many important medical breakthroughs have been made, like for instance Ultrasound diagnostics, AstraZeneca’s asthma medication and turbulhers, the Gambro artificial kidney etc.

The Lund university excels in cutting edge research areas like nanotechnology, neuroscience, diabetes- and cancer treatment.

And in a few years’ time, Lund will be the home for the very large advanced research facilities Max IV and the European Spallation Source, the ESS. These new facilities will push the boundaries of scientific research even further, making Lund a global leader in advanced materials-, environment- and medical research.

To my mind, the City of Lund – one of the oldest cities in Sweden – in many ways offers a “peep hole” into the future. Here the potentials in working across borders and boundaries, to think outside the box and to turn innovative ideas into reality have been realized to a large degree.

This makes Lund, to my mind, a perfect venue for events like the “Horn of Africa Conference”.

Now, turning to the topic of the 2012 conference – “Peace and Security – Key to Stability and Sustainable Development”, I want to share with you some thoughts
of the former President of Ghana and African Union Envoy to Somalia, Mr Jerry Rawlings, and his lectures on the theme “Security and Democracy in Africa”.

“It is important to first identify what security is. Security is the ability of a people to feel safe and comfortable within a certain socio-cultural framework. In this regard we can all understand the two modern security structures – National Security and Human or Political Security. National security involves protecting the state, its institutions and sovereignty. Human or political security entails issues of poverty, basic amenities, employment, and abuse of human rights and a host of others. How can we have security without genuine democracy? Since freedom and justice anchor democracy, how can you have the security of peace and stability when there is no freedom and justice?”

Ladies and gentlemen, what President Rawlings problematizes – among other things – is the classic saying: “you cannot eat democracy”.

And yet, democracy and security is absolutely essential for the ordinary citizens in order to be able to provide for themselves and their families.

This is the formidable challenge for the Horn of Africa. We must create democracy and security – but democracy and security must very quickly deliver what people need and want.

We – in this room, at this time – cannot prevent droughts from happening. If only we could! It is also difficult for us to play a direct and practical role in armed conflicts 6 000 kilometres away.

But – we have the ability to build and spread knowledge, to form human bonds, to build networks for peace and to lay the foundations for a prosperous, independent, forward-looking and successful future in the Horn of Africa

And on the theme of building and spreading knowledge – let me take this moment to underline the uniquely important role of journalists and free media. Without the work of journalists, we would be ignorant of the many problems and opportunities in the Horn of Africa – and around the globe. Arresting journalists in order to prevent inconvenient reporting is unacceptable.

Ladies and gentlemen – I want to thank you all for coming here, and I wish you success in your important work and a pleasant and inspiring stay in the City of Lund!
Statements
The Role of Djibouti to foster Security in the Horn of Africa

Hassan Darar Houffaneh

1. Regional Dilemma: The region under discussion is the Northeastern part of Africa. It is composed in a narrow sense of the countries Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. However when considering the spread of the people, their history, language and culture, Kenya, Sudan (the North and the South) and Uganda also belong to this Region. This region has a population of about 178 million and a combined coast of 6962 km. Of the eight States, Somalia has with over 3000 km the longest and Djibouti with 314 km the shortest coast.

Two contradictory perceptions dominate the minds of people about this region. To start with the negative, the Horn of Africa is a conflict dominated region. One observes both inter- and intrastate conflict, the diehard ones being the conflict between North and South Sudan, between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the conflict in Somalia, now lasting for more than 30 years. These conflicts have caused deaths, internal displacement and refugees across the borders, human misery and the destruction of social and economic infrastructure. Besides conflict this region is frequently plagued by drought and famine, killing each time millions of people and large number of animals, forcing millions of others to abandon their way of life and seeks refuge in camps. It is also fair to mention that this region belongs to the most economically underdeveloped parts of Africa.

On the other side of the coin the region has a rich historical heritage, possesses a geostrategic location, is endowed with mineral resources, owns a high profile touristic attraction, has enough sources of water that could be used for power generation as well as for irrigation for food security and is inhabited by people who share a long history, cultural heritage and languages. Member states in this region belong to three different Regional Economic Organizations (COMESA, EAC and IGAD) which allows them to maximize the synergies and advantages offered by these organizations. These opposing dilemmas make it difficult to define an easy strategy for this region. What is easy to capture though is the security threat that should define security problems of the region.

2. Peace and Security in the context of Djibouti: It is important at the beginning to state clearly our understanding of Security. When classically ‘Security needs and policy’ is tackled from the perspectives of the state, we also consider human security. Therefore in our security threats we look closely down to the point of what endangers
the life and livelihood of the individual. Here are among others the main threats we have identified:

- **Economic underdevelopment**: Even though in the last couple of years our region is experiencing a remarkable development growth it is still true that our region is one of the poorest in the world. The various conflicts destroy many of the achievements and divert the benefits of the development effort into unproductive sectors. The high unemployment rate, lack of prospects for young people and poverty pose a challenge to peace and hence are a security threat to our young democracies. Here I would like to underline the interdependence of ‘PEACE’, ‘SECURITY’ and ‘DEVELOPMENT’. The region has made a tangible development effort in the past ten years, but the fruits of this development do not reach the various regions equally so that unequal development is the consequence. It is the mandate of the politicians to promote development evenly and include all the people and more importantly all nationalities. Such an all-inclusive development approach prevents the creation of extremist ideas and groups.

- **Undemocratic Institutions**: We have inherited our institutions from the colonial powers. They served foreign interests and the ownership of the institutions as well as adjusting them to the needs of the people is the main concern of the government. But for whatever reasons there could be groups of people that are unhappy about the performance of our institutions. This is even more critical when our institutions are seen as being undemocratic. It is true that undemocratic institutions could encourage the formation of extremist ideas and groups. People unhappy with their institutions can opt for measures that could be dangerous, cause conflict, disrupt peace and ultimately cause insecurity.

  Undemocratic institutions and bad governance are the source of inequality, corruption, regional disparity and the dissatisfaction of the people with their governments. That is why we invest a lot of energy and effort to improve the service delivery of our institutions and to make these services accessible to everybody. By doing this we avoid major security threats.

- **Migration**: In the last two decades the people of our region have left their homes for various reasons (civil war and armed conflict in their countries, economic underdevelopment, drought and famine, undemocratic regimes etc). This is a very sad chapter of our history. We know that organized criminal groups exploit the plight of the people (mostly young people) who leave their country in search of a better life in a second or third country. It is these young people, led by criminals into hazardous routes, who perish in the Red Sea, the Mediterranean or the Sahara Desert. Some of those who succeed sometimes fall into the hands of organized criminal groups, taking them hostages for ransom or forcing them to join their ranks.

  The fact that these young people take these risks just to leave their country is a vivid indicator that they felt insecure in their homes. We therefore cannot be indifferent about this phenomenon. The countries of the Horn have to deal with the root
causes of this issue. Equally important is the fact that our development partners have to assist our countries in order to find a sustainable solution (promoting economic growth, investment in productive sectors, introducing fair trade, improving the terms of trade of our products etc) instead of building fortresses in order to deter migrants from entering their countries.

- Drought and famine: The Horn of Africa is periodically affected by drought and famine that destroys the livelihoods of millions of people. When drought is accompanied by conflict and the conflicting parties use it as weapon it turns into deadly politics. The fact that drought and famine become a part of our way of life and that we witness year after year that they kill our people and destroy their livelihood without our governments developing resilient strategies was and is the result of disoriented politics.

It goes without saying that both our countries and our development partners follow the wrong politics and implement instruments that serve vested interest of both groups. One of these instruments is food aid. The developed countries are interested in food aid in order to support their farmers and agricultural policy. This on the other hand destroys the livelihood of our farmers and more importantly their markets. Our countries on the other hand are not able to support the farmers and pastoralists, improve rural infrastructure, modernize their mode of production, provide them with the necessary implements, offer them essential training, enable them to get a decent price for their products etc.

Within the region we have countries with high agricultural potential. It is beyond human comprehension that people die for the lack of food in countries like Ethiopia and Kenya. Both countries have a rich potential in the south and west of their countries. Together with Uganda, once called the bread basket of Africa, indeed the region has the potential to contribute to the food security of our continent. When food aid coming from various corners of the globe finds its way to our needy population, it is hard to understand that the food surpluses produced in parts of our region cannot reach the food deficient regions.

Our integration into the world economy implies that we exploit our comparative advantage. This makes us exporters of agricultural products (coffee, tea, cotton, flowers etc) as well as camels and cattle. The paradox is the fact that it is within such a region that people die due to the lack of food. The worst threat to peace and security in any region or country is food insecurity. This endangers the entire existence of the nation and its sovereignty.

Our leaders (IGAD Head of States) met last September in Nairobi and worked out and elaborated the “Nairobi Strategy”. They stated out clearly that drought and famine as natural calamities can come and go but no more in the future should either people or animals die because of it. They mandated IGAD to take the lead and work out resilience strategies. IGAD took the challenge and established the “Drought Resilience Platform”. The Government of Djibouti is fully committed to supporting IGAD in order to successfully implement this endeavor. We sincerely hope that this is an important step forward to overcome food insecurity in our region.
• Extremist ideas: For years our region has been known to be the home, hiding place or even the center of regional and international extremist groups. This has attracted the attention of external powers that made our region a battle ground against international terrorism. The two well-known groups are the Al Shabaab of Somalia and their international allies, Al Qaeda. The root cause of this is the failed state reality of Somalia. Without going into details about the complexity of the Somalia issue, it is important to mention that the region has taken a clear stand on these two groups. The IGAD member states fully support the “Transitional Federal Government” of Somalia.

The two groups are determined to spread their terror politics to the whole region. The region suffers from the fact of being highly militarized. For our people and our region in general, it would have been good to be known instead for foreign direct investment, a growth and development center that could have had a positive impact on the lives of our people.

• The Somali Pirates: The pirates off the Somali coast are another threat that contributes to the militarization of our region. IGAD member states and Djibouti in particular have taken a clear position against all kinds of piracy, whether in the Horn, Western Africa, the America or the China Sea. But it is essential to point out two additional factors. Somalia in particular and the region in general suffer from two other forms of criminal activities carried out by citizens of those same countries that claim to combat the pirates. The first is the illegal fishing of Europeans and Asians off the Somali coast ever since the collapse of the Siyad Bare regime. Equally important is the illegal dumping of toxic waste off the Somali coast by the same countries. One destroys the economic bases of the Somali fisher communities and robs us of millions of dollars’ worth of marine resources every year. The other poisons the marine life of our coasts.

Allow me one last remark on this issue. The Somali pirates are not born in the sea. They come from the mainland where due to the prevailing political and economic situation they face unemployment, lack of essential services that could be rendered by a functioning government and lack of infrastructures which make it easy for people to build a base for their survival. What the international community should understand is that the solution is not just to fight and kill the young people. Why not spend a fraction of the amount used for the buildup of the foreign naval forces at our coastal sea for employment generation, vocational skills and economic and social infrastructure? We are convinced that such politics, namely assisting the young people and communities to build a sustainable livelihood is a better strategy to successfully fight the pirates and even Al Shabaab.

• Environmental degradations: The last point I would like to deal with concerning security threats is environmental degradation. Among the causes are a high population growth rate, local traditions of the pastoralist community that favor the keeping of huge numbers of animals that exceed the carrying capacity of the pasture land in
arid and semi-arid land, and for example erosion. The global climate changes also show their effect in our region by frequent droughts and at times torrential rain and devastating floods. Here again we entrust to IGAD to take up the challenge and develop and implement a region-wide strategy.

3. Visible regional role of Djibouti in peace and security in the Horn of Africa: Since its independence Djibouti has adopted policies that are regionally oriented. Djibouti opted for regional policies that are oriented towards the peaceful resolution of local and regional conflict. We are convinced that there is no conflict that cannot be solved on the negotiation table. Let me give a brief account of our position on a few important issues:

• Somalia: Somalia played a key role during the struggle for the independence of Djibouti. After independence the two countries maintained a brotherly and peaceful relationship. After the collapse of the Siyad Regime, Djibouti followed an active policy to restore the statehood of the Somali nation. Djibouti has supported all international efforts and plays a leading role in the engagement of regional organizations like the AU and IGAD.

Two special efforts ought to be mentioned. The very first peace negotiation for Somalia was organized in Djibouti in 1991, like the ARTA one in 2000 and the one in 2008 -2009 that brought the current TFG to power. The Djibouti policy is clear. It supports the Uganda Political Roadmap for Somalia, Garowe 1 & 2 principles and the Galkaayao declaration as well as the London and Istanbul agreements. Djibouti gives its full support to all the efforts of IGAD, the AU and the UN to bring peace, stability and development to Somalia.

• Ethiopia: The Relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia is a model for the region in terms of economic integration. Djibouti functions as a corridor for Ethiopian export and import. Just to mention few there are joint projects like the fiber optic network interconnection, Ethio-Djibouti power interconnection, new railway connections, and the Tadjoura port construction that will serve Ethiopia’s expanding export needs.

Such enormous economic efforts by the two countries serve regional peace and development.

• Eritrea: Djibouti and Eritrea do not only share a border but also history, culture, languages and a common regional faith. The border between the two countries should not be a cause for an armed conflict. Such conflicts always destroy hopes, separate kith and kin and avert efforts for the economic development of our region. It is our people, the same people that suffer from such conflicts. It is the declared politics of the Republic of Djibouti that borders in our region should UNITE and should not DIVIDE. We believe neither the people of Eritrea nor the people of Djibouti will support any armed conflict. We ask the leaders of Eritrea to engage
themselves for PEACE, DEVELOPMENT and REGIONAL INTEGRATION and come back to our IGAD community.
Do Horn of Africa Governments Promote Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa Region?

Yonas Manna

Mr Chairperson, dear participants, allow me to express my heart felt appreciation for the invitation to take part in this symposium and present highlights of my country’s views on this extremely important and urgent topic. The topic we are addressing is, indeed, very broad and exceeding complicated. In order to save time, I would say that a short version of my answer to the question that the symposium has put to us is, sadly enough, that Horn of Africa Countries are far away from promoting peace and security in the region. Allow me now to briefly present the salient aspects of Eritrea’s views and actions in relation to the promotion of regional peace, stability and security in our region.

Eritrea’s principled and constructive role in the Horn of Africa Region

1. Most recently, despite efforts to escalate the sudden eruption of the Djibouti-Eritrea issue, Eritrea chose to calm the situation and its prudent handling has prevented the outbreak of violent hostilities as Ethiopia had envisioned.

2. In Sudan, Eritrea has supported the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and despite Eritrea’s desire to see a united Sudan in which all its citizens could live in peace, Eritrea supported the wishes and aspirations of the South Sudanese people and their vote for independence during the referendum.

3. Eritrea has been calling on external non-interference in Somalia and has called for Somali solutions for Somalia’s internal problems. Unfortunately, Eritrea’s principled position has been labelled as being that of a “spoiler” by Ethiopia and its handlers. Eritrea has been falsely accused by Ethiopia and its handlers of supplying arms to Al Shabbab and to date, there has not been any evidence to support these erroneous and dangerous accusations.
Peace and human Development

Peace is a prerequisite for human development—without peace, there can be no stability and without stability there can be no security. Therefore, peace, stability and security are essential conditions for sustainable development. Conflict can only continue to exacerbate the problems faced in the region, as it impacts directly on economic potential and human well-being, shattering the very foundations of society.

The role of the African Union

The AU Constitutive Act states that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to its socioeconomic development and highlighted the need for the following responses:

Promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementing the region’s development and integration agenda.

Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa.

Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states.

Promote peace, security, and stability in Africa.

Peaceful resolution of conflicts among members through appropriate means decided upon by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among members. Peaceful coexistence of members and their right to live in peace and security.

The role of regional economic communities: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The regional economic communities, RECs, such as IGAD in the Horn of Africa, were supposed to actively engage in promoting cooperation with a focus on economic development. Principles and motivations underlying their formation included the respect for sovereign equality; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, mutual benefit; and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Ruthless counter-insurgency strategies employed by Ethiopia, including allowing the use of its territories for launching drone attacks into Somalia, have led to forced displacement and the destruction of vital Somali infrastructures including homes, crops and food stocks, exacerbating extreme poverty and food insecurity and creating the greatest humanitarian disaster in Somalia’s history. As a result of the targeting of civilians, large areas can become depopulated and output of agricultural or pastoral production reduced, and local livelihoods and the national economy have been greatly affected.

As the Wiki leaks documents have exposed, Horn of Africa leaders, with the exception of Eritrea, have colluded with external forces to advance their own domestic and foreign policy agendas as opposed to promoting good neighbourliness, peace, security and stability. These cables show a pattern of backstabbing, lying, colluding and undermining of Africa’s leadership in general and those in the Horn in particular.

The collusion of IGAD states at the behest of Washington to bring sanctions against Eritrea is a perfect example of this servitude and I don’t have time, but for those of you who do, I will be happy to provide you with hundreds of cables that show the extent to which IGAD Foreign Ministers and Heads of States, have been reduced to serving the interests of Europe and the United States instead of their own people.

To Eritrea’s credit, there is not a single instance of any such activity by Eritrean officials. To his credit, the President of Eritrea has shown utmost restraint and respect for his counterparts and has never engaged in such un-diplomatic and un-brotherly behaviour. Unfortunately, I cannot say the same about the leaders of Ethiopia, Djibouti or Somalia.

**Ethiopian occupation of sovereign Eritrean territory – key factor in regional turmoil and instability**

It should be recalled that this year marks 10 years of Ethiopian occupation of sovereign Eritrean territories, including Badme. When the independent Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission delivered its final and binding delimitation and demarcation decisions, the Ethiopian regime, to the dismay of the entire world community, refused and continues to refuse to live up to its treaty obligations and allow the Commission to fulfil its mandate by placing pillars on the ground. This is one of the root causes of instability and war in the region. The Border Commission was forced to implement its demarcation decision by placing coordinates on a map. This “virtual demarcation” of the Eritrea Ethiopia Border was completed on 30 November 2007.
Our deliberations in Lund this year again will remain futile until such blatant breaches of international law are rectified

It is not possible to have peace in the region if individual nations cannot maintain peace in their own countries. In Ethiopia, the regime’s violence against its own people, the genocides in Gambela, Ogaden and Oromia regions of the country is threatening to ignite civil war. The cross border incursions by Ethiopia into Kenya and neighbouring states is a cause of great concern and does not bode well for peace in the region. Ethiopia continues to try to divert our attention from its destructive actions by habitually fabricating accusations against Eritrea – a practice that is now so transparent that it is verging on the ridiculous. They do not even believe their stories themselves.

Collective efforts are undermined when individual countries use terrorism as a tool for suppression of their own people. The Ethiopian minority regime’s labelling of all political opponents, journalists and individuals as “terrorists” undermines the international and regional efforts to fight terrorism. The regime and its partners have also falsely accused Eritrea of supporting terrorism, a country that has been the victim of terrorism and Bin Laden long before Ethiopia and others jumped on the bandwagon after the September 11 attacks on the United States. The minority regime in Ethiopia has falsely accused Eritrea, Sudan and others in the region of promoting terrorism so that it could align itself with the United States.

The Kenyan Deputy Speaker of the House recently officially and correctly deplored in an interview that IGAD’s mandate has been hijacked by Ethiopia and so has Kenya’s Foreign Policy. This is a serious accusation that we must take to our hearts in this important meeting.

The minority regime in Ethiopia is also holding peace, stability and security in the region hostage as it pursues illicit myopic domestic and foreign agendas.

We must learn call a spade a spade.
Thank you for your attention.
Statement on Sudan

Abu Bakr Hussein Ahmed

It is a great honour for me to have this opportunity to address you at this important conference. I would like at the outset to express my gratitude to the organizing committee for extending to me an invitation to take part in this great event. The importance of this meeting emanates from its themes, which are peace and security and their impact on the stability and the sustainable development of the Horn of Africa Region. In fact these themes are important elements in our quest to achieve our strategic objective, which is sustainable development in our Region for the benefit of our peoples and States.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There is no doubt that the Greater Region of the Horn of Africa with its unique location on the coast of North-East Africa, bordering the Red Sea in the north and the Indian Ocean in the south, is of special importance. It has overlooked the strategic water corridors and other trade roads since early in history, and still plays a major role in combatting terrorism, which threatens peace and security in the Region and hinders the efforts exerted by its States to achieve sustainable development.

Sudan, which is an integral and influential member of the group of States of the Horn of Africa, has played a prominent role in the events which the Region has witnessed since the eighties in the last century, when the Region saw a series of catastrophes of drought and desertification which pushed the States of the region into working together to affront these dangers.

The creation of the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Desertification “IGADD” in 1986 with its objectives to deal with the impact of these disasters was considered to be the first collective effort to seek humanitarian assistance from the International Community and the non-governmental organisations. Sudan, which is considered a linking point between the African States in the north and Sub-Saharan Africa and a place where peoples from all parts of the continent regardless of their ethnic groups, colours or religions live together in harmony, played an important role in the initiative of establishing IGADD. This was done in full coordination with the other States of the region, which suffered a lot from the shortage of food due to climatic change and its consequences of drought and desertification. These effects led to another phenomenon, which was the mass exodus of displaced peoples to other States of the Region and Sudan was the state most affected by this migration. When in April 1995 the mission of IGADD had been extended by the addition of issues related to peace and development to the mandate of the Organisation and denominated the Intergovernmental Authority for Development “IGAD”, Sudan
participated actively in redefining the role of the Organisation. We insisted on giving priority to issues related to food security, environment, conflict prevention and resolution, economic integration among member States in collaboration with the International Community and therefore a new division of contributions was made and accordingly Sudan became the biggest contributor in the budget of the IGAD.

Sudan replied positively to the IGAD’s request to start negotiations with the rebel movement in South Sudan, SPLM, under the auspice of the Organisation and accepted the declaration of principles issued by the IGAD mediation including the right of self-determination for the citizens of South Sudan so as to attain peace and put an end to the prolonged war.

Sudanese diplomacy participated actively in all meetings and conferences held at the IGAD forums and Sudan hosted two successive Summits of the Organisation in Khartoum in November 2000 and January 2002 and acted as President of the IGAD for that period.

During Sudan’s Presidency of the IGAD the Khartoum Declaration, which was a landmark in the history of the Organisation, was issued. The declaration added to the principles and objectives of the Organisation some important issues such as empowerment of democracy, good governance, human rights and the right to development. A protocol for the creation of a mechanism of conflict prevention, CEWARN, was endorsed, with the anticipation of establishing a modern system of finding and analysing information by basic committees, which include old and young generation, women, official departments, civil society organisations and academic and research institutes. The recommendations of these sub-committees should be sent to national and regional authorities to decide on the necessary arrangements and measures to prevent the conflicts and try to solve them from the very beginning.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Sudan is determined to use peaceful means to solve its internal problems via negotiations and dialogue by trying to address the real causes of the problem. That is its approach in dealing with armed conflicts in some parts of its territory, the philosophy of this behaviour being to achieve political and social harmony, to guarantee stability, and prepare a convenient climate for the development of the country and the prosperity of its people.

The government of the Republic of the Sudan proved its determination and its good will to attain peace whatever the cost by even accepting the risk of relinquishing a cherished part of its history and a valued part of its territory.

The same tenacity was exercised by this government during the phase of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA, when it handed back all kinds of governance in the South to its partner in the agreement, the SPLM and voluntarily withdrew all its troops from the south and fully redeployed them north of the 1956 borders as a clear reflection of a political will, not to go back to war. Furthermore the Sudan government has fully honoured all other commitments stipulated in the agreement and the records of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) witness all these facts. Our full conviction is that sustainable
peace in our country and our region is the most important goal and a valuable principle that cements a foundation of a shared prosperous and brotherly future for the peoples of the Region of Horn of Africa.

We renew, in this forum, our confidence and readiness to continue our cooperation with the African High Level Panel, AHLP, headed by President Thabo Mbeki, which was an initiative of the AU to mediate between Sudan and South Sudan. We confirm that Sudan is willing to see all the outstanding issues with South Sudan solved and the relations between the two countries normalized to restore peace and security along our common borders and enable our peoples to resume their normal economic activities and contribute thus in the development of our respective countries and the region at large.

We welcome all genuine international assistance offered to support the effort exerted by the Sudan government to achieve sustainable development. We appreciate the support offered by the UN and its specialized agencies and programs in humanitarian, health and education domains. We are looking forward to receiving more support from other members of the International Community to the government’s plans to achieve economic and social development so as to meet the goals of the millennium development and the eradication of poverty in our country.

Sudan confirms its readiness to promote cooperation and coordination with all partners and International and Regional organisations to support its efforts to achieve sustainable development. We hope to witness the International Community honouring its commitments to support the efforts of construction and rehabilitation in Sudan. That would be considered as an example of fruitful cooperation between developed and developing nations which could enable the latter to use their potentials and exploit their resources to achieve their goals and meet their aspirations in a brilliant future prosperous and secure life.

It goes without saying that Sudan is in need of cooperation with the International Community in its quest to achieve sustainable development, with regard to the considerable resources that Sudan possesses and which make Sudan a potential capable partner in a useful cooperation, beneficial for all. We hope in this connection to see positive initiatives from the International Community vis-à-vis Sudan, such as relieving its debts in accordance to criteria applied to all other least developed countries or lifting the unfair economic sanctions imposed on it. Similar initiatives will be welcomed by our country and our people, who have a lot of good to reciprocate and to respond positively to the dynamics of such a spirit.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Wishing your conference all success, I hope that your discussions and deliberations will be concluded by useful recommendations, which could be a real addition to the efforts exerted by researchers and experts of our region regarding these important themes and which could be adopted and executed by the governments of our respective countries.

Thank you.
Top Ten Critical Success Factors in Somalia

Augustine P. Mahinga

Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Lund Conference has an outstanding international reputation for bringing together the key players in the Horn of Africa, and for encouraging fresh thinking on relevant policy issues. I am therefore extremely grateful to the organisers for their kind invitation to attend, and look forward to interacting with each of you over the course of the next few days.

I am aware that many of you take a very close interest in Somalia, and know a great deal about the current situation. For the next few minutes, however, I intend to step back from the details of what is happening at the moment and focus instead on some of the general lessons. In particular, I am going to propose a list of the top ten factors that we need to get right in order to maximise the prospects for success in Somalia … or ignore at our peril.

Legitimacy

The first key requirement is, of course, to strengthen institutional legitimacy. Pending elections, which are at best still a couple of years away, the legitimacy of Government and other state institutions can only be relative. It must be earned by action. It cannot be claimed by right, let alone by force. Unfortunately, Somalia has in the past suffered too often from predatory and rent-seeking governments. There are signs that this may now be changing. We should encourage the trend towards better and more open governance.

As we approach the end of the Transition in Somalia, we must also make sure that the foundations for the next political dispensation are firmer than before. Hence the importance of ensuring that the traditional leaders, who have been given the crucial responsibility for selecting the members of the Constituent Assembly and of the new Parliament, are the authentic and accepted representatives of their clans. Hence also the need for the Technical Selection Committee to make sure that the candidates for
the Constituent Assembly and the new Parliament meet the relevant qualifications, especially in terms of education and a clean criminal record.

More generally, institutional legitimacy extends beyond the state to include a variety of religious, clan-based and other civil society organisations. Collectively, these represent society’s “immune system” for coping with the range of internal and external stresses that the country faces. If we want to reduce the likelihood of future violent conflict, we must nurture that capability at the same time as trying to tackle the underlying causes of conflict.

Inclusivity

A large part of the strength of the peace process over the past year has been its inclusivity. Previously, there had been repeated attempts by one or other body – the Presidency, the Prime Minister or the Speaker of Parliament – to monopolise power. UNPOS therefore deliberately brought together the Government, Parliament, two of the regions (Puntland and Galmudug) and the major pro-government militia (Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a) as separate stakeholders in the preparatory process leading up to adoption of the Roadmap last September.

At that stage, there were practical reasons for limiting involvement to the five major stakeholders. But inclusivity itself knows no bounds. We therefore convened a further meeting in November with representatives of the main elements of civil society, including the business community, clan elders, diaspora, intellectuals, NGOs/professional associations, religious leaders, women and youth. And we continue to engage with these groups – both as part of the formal process – for example, by inviting them to participate in the Garowe Consultative Meetings – and, informally, by way of routine contacts.

More importantly, the principal Somali stakeholders have themselves embraced a similar approach. The President and Prime Minister have made unprecedented visits to various parts of the country as part of a programme of national outreach and reconciliation. Presidents Farole and Alin have been to Mogadishu. And Speaker Sharif Hassan and other Members of Parliament have spent long periods of time in the newly-recovered areas of the South.

There is a lot more one could say about the importance of inclusivity. But I want to stress one particular aspect – that of gender. As several UN Security Council Resolutions have noted, women have a key role to play in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding. This is not simply a question of human rights. Women bring an alternative perspective to understanding the causes of, and proposing solutions to, conflict. They are also crucial partners in shoring up economic recovery and maintaining social cohesion. By including women in the peace process, they can expand the range of domestic constituencies and thereby help to enhance its credibility. Part of immediate challenge is therefore to ensure that women constitute at least 30
per cent of the Constituent Assembly and of the new Parliament and that they are empowered to fulfill their vital role.

Momentum

*Momentum* is my next critical factor for success. This can be conceived analogously with the physical concept as a function of mass and velocity (that is, movement in a particular direction). There can be no doubt that Somalia as a whole will benefit from the peace process. But the effects of change – such as elections or a constitutional shift towards federalism – are often uneven. There will be winners and losers. The latter are sure to resist. The trick therefore is to generate sufficient momentum to carry the peace process forward even in the face of resistance.

How? In countries with a track record of violent conflict, expectations are often either too low – governments are not believed – or too high – for example, when all hopes are pinned on the outcome of elections. In the case of Somalia, the Roadmap has helped. By identifying a number of early and relatively easy deliverables (“quick wins”), we have been able to generate a sense of confidence among both the Principals and the wider Somali public which will help to overcome the bigger challenges ahead. Similarly, repeated insistence that the Transition must end in August has instilled a palpable sense of urgency – and, dare I say it, inevitability – among the main protagonists.

Prioritisation and Sequencing

Certainly, you can’t solve the problems of Somalia overnight! It takes time and patience. But careful *prioritisation* and *sequencing* can help. The Roadmap contains a total of fifty-five tasks. Not all are as important as each other. Indeed, over the past few months, part of my task as Special Representative has been to forge a consensus among the Principals and international partners as to what really matters and the order in which to tackle the problems. I think there is now widespread agreement on the three minimum essential conditions for ending the Transition, namely adoption of the new Constitution, establishment of a new, smaller and more representative Parliament and elections for the positions of President and Speaker. Successive consultative meetings in Mogadishu, Garowe, Galkayo and, most recently, Addis have mapped out the critical path.

We should not ignore the long-term, however, in our determination to end the Transition in August. I have in mind here particularly the need to prepare for popu-
lar elections during the course of the next Parliament, to stabilise newly-recovered areas of the South, to develop Somalia’s own indigenous security forces – not least, as part of the exit strategy for AMISOM – and to develop the much-neglected justice sector. These are all issues, in my view, which warrant greater attention than they are currently receiving.

Community Involvement

Many of us, despite our best efforts, still suffer a tendency to judge the situation in Somalia excessively by reference to what is happening in the capital. We should always remember that what matters is the impact on ordinary people throughout the land. We need, in my view, to become better at engaging with individual communities across the country – first, to understand their concerns, which invariably focus on security, justice and jobs; secondly, to explain what the Government is trying to achieve; and, thirdly, to find better ways to support them. Community involvement is essential. The process needs to occur both bottom-up and top-down. For this to happen, in my view, more effort needs to focus on defining the federal structure so that everyone can agree which are the legitimate district, regional, state and national entities with which they should be working.

Synergy

We also need to overcome our natural tendency – reinforced by current institutional arrangements – to see the political, security and development agenda as separate tracks. This is a serious mistake not only because it results in inefficient implementation, but also because it fails to capture the potential synergy arising from coordinated and, possibly, combined interventions. This is especially true at the local level. There is, of course, no magic bullet. But we should look to see whether there are lessons to draw from experience elsewhere, for example with the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan.
Scale

Of course, I am delighted to see how over the course of the past year Somalia has risen – rightly – up the list of priorities of the international community. But I will not hide my frustration over the fact that the scale of resources has not always matched its stated importance. Last year, according to Global Humanitarian Assistance, total international investment in Somalia was USD 3.2 billion (excluding remittances). Most of that was in the form of humanitarian and security including anti-piracy assistance. Very little was for long-term development or to support the political process. Neither the absolute amount nor the balance between different activities seems to match the importance of Somalia or the prospective returns.

Coordination

Part of the answer, I accept, must be to improve international coordination. This is an area, where as Special Representative, I have devoted a great deal of effort in engaging the widest possible range of interlocutors from Somalia, the region and further afield. Next month’s meeting of the International Contact Group in Rome will consider some suggestions for restructuring, including the possibility of establishing inter-sessional working groups. While I doubt very much whether we will ever achieve complete unanimity, I would very much welcome your continued support in making these mechanisms as effective as possible and in providing the heavy-lifting required to achieve progress particularly on the security, justice, development and stabilisation agenda.

Ownership

Last but by no means least, I want to stress the importance of Somali ownership. Somalis must lead the process. As I said earlier, there are encouraging signs that the Government is taking its responsibilities seriously. But it is crucial, too, that they are willing to work openly and collaboratively with the full range of other domestic stakeholders. The international community should be there to support – both politically and, within current economic stringencies, financially. But not to impose its own views.

Our role, as the United Nations, is to facilitate, to ensure as far as possible that the path chosen by Somalia conforms to international norms and standards and to help give the process the best chance of success by adhering to these ten critical factors:
legitimacy, inclusivity, momentum, prioritisation, sequencing, community involvement, synergy, scale, coordination and Somali ownership.

Thank you very much.
Facilitating the Political and Security Processes for Stability and Development in Somalia

Albert Charles French

1. Chairpersons, ladies and gentlemen, organizers of this eleventh Horn of Africa Conference, UNPOS wish to thank the organizers and facilitators for giving our office the opportunity to provide this briefing. The theme for this year's conference “Peace and Security – Key to Stability and Sustainable Development in the Horn of Africa” is attuned to the changing dynamics in the political and security landscape and how such changes could contribute to sustainable peace and development in the Horn of Africa with specific reference to Somalia that has been at war for over two decades.

2. From a civil affairs perspective, this statement briefly looks at elements of the political/constitutional process, gains in the security sector, political outreach and reconciliation, capacity building for the youth and some of the challenges that we collectively face in advancing the peace process.

3. UNPOS is pleased to inform this body that as a result of the collective efforts of the International Community, the Transitional Federal Government, International and Local NGOs, Civil Society Organisations and well-intentioned Somalis, there has been incremental progress on some of the transitional tasks since the signing of the Djibouti Agreement in 2008, specifically in the political/constitutional process and the security sector.

4. On the political landscape there is ongoing progress in the processes of drafting and delivering a provisional constitution and related activities leading to its adoption; the convening of a National Constituent Assembly and a new slimmer Parliament is being conceptualized; the political outreach and reconciliation initiatives, especially to the recovered areas from Al Shabaab are the hallmarks that incremental progress is being made to end the transition and to usher in a new dispensation post August 20, this year.

5. One of the main priority tasks in the political process is to finalize and adopt the provisional constitution through the National Constituent Assembly as articulated in the Garowe II principles. In pursuance of this, and in view of the fact that
the Parliament is in abeyance, 135 Traditional Elders from all over the country convened in Mogadishu to deliberate and select the 825 members that will make up the National Constituent Assembly, in line with the traditional system of 4.5 clan representation.

6. In the absence of a direct popular referendum or elections as stipulated in the Transitional Federal Charter, the Traditional Elders epitomize the closest semblance of a legitimate and all inclusive body for selecting the members of the Constituent Assembly to adopt the provisional constitution. They are a symbol of national unity and have demonstrated a commitment to support the process that would lead to ending the transition.

7. Members of the Constituent Assembly will come up with a new, leaner Federal Parliament, on more merit-based criteria. In turn, the new Parliament will proceed to elect a new political leadership for Somalia.

8. The political outreach and reconciliation benchmark of the Roadmap is deeply rooted in the Somali society, without which conditions for peace and security cannot prevail.

9. Efforts to advance reconciliation initiatives to the newly recovered areas remain a top priority of the Government. Engagement with local authorities in these areas is ongoing with the aim of setting up and establishing local administrations, which would also include previously elected leaders who were displaced by the insurgents; establish peace committees to advance reconciliation at the local level; and, consolidate security through the establishment of district security committees.

10. The recovery of new territories from the insurgents must be accompanied with the provision of basic social services, economic and infrastructure development, the rule of law and governance as they form part of the peace dividends. The government and partners are thus putting modalities in place to stabilize the recovered areas.

11. Successes of AMISOM forces, the government forces and other allied militias in recovering areas that were hitherto controlled by the insurgents; the free movement of the people to and from those recovered areas are manifestations of the gains in the security sector.

12. At the recently concluded Consultative Meeting in Addis Ababa the Principals recommended that the President approves the National Security and Stabilization Plan 2011-2014 (NSSP) through a Presidential decree. The plan has been developed to ensure that the priority security tasks as articulated in the Roadmap are implemented in a holistic, coordinated and timely manner thus creating an enabling environment for the protection of civilians and completion of the remaining transitional tasks. The plan further defines the process by which the Government, in collaboration with regional entities and the international com-
munity, will lead in re-orienting policies, structures and operational activities for security and justice institutions in compliance with international humanitarian standards and respect for human rights.

Peace and security and its linkages to stability and sustainable development

13. Peace and Security are the cornerstones to stabilization and development of a nation state. Though the security situation in the country for the past two decades has negatively impacted on its socio-economic development, the ongoing developments in the political and security landscape indicate a new reality for the Somali people. The inconveniences hitherto suffered by the Somali people as refugees and/or internally displaced persons would soon be a thing of the past.

14. In like manner, the citizens would once more be opportuned to have access to basic services such as education and better health care services within the country. The collective budget spent on refugees and internally displaced persons could be spent on other developmental priorities for the country and its citizens.

15. In November 2011, the Civil Affairs Unit convened a three-day meeting in Mogadishu with ninety representatives of Somali Civil Society Organisations (CSO) on the 4.5 clan formula to deliberate on the Roadmap, which was later endorsed by the group. In March of 2012, the CSO representatives met in Entebbe where they developed a detailed work plan to work in partnership with the Government to ensure the successful accomplishment of priority transitional tasks. The group also established a coordinating committee of 30 representatives of the main Somali CSO networks, Non State Actor platforms from Puntland and South Central Somalia. The group has since met in Mogadishu to brainstorm and analyze the associated activities and tasks of the roadmap.

16. In 2010, the erstwhile SRSG in collaboration with the Turkish Government convened a meeting with eminent Somali businessmen and women to gain their buy-in on public-private partnership to “…underpin the development … regulatory frameworks,” as a step forward to support the ongoing peace and reconciliation initiatives. Since then, two other meetings have been convened with the Somali business community in 2011 in Dubai and more recently in Istanbul this year.

17. As indicated by the SRSG in the recently concluded conference in Istanbul (20120, “…Somali people need sustained long term investments...which will build the resilience of Somali households, communities and local institution

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1 SRSG’s opening statement at the Istanbul II conference on 31 May.
Such magnanimous initiatives could create a massive turnaround in the socio-economic development of the country through human capital development coupled with the availability of jobs.

18. Putting into perspective the adage that “an idle mind is a devil’s workshop,” investments by the Somali business community and their partners, through integrated programmes and projects that focus on but are not limited to provision of vocational education, access to functional literacy programmes, skills training and provision of simple tools and grants for trainees to immediately access the job market could transform the “idle mind” from being the “devil’s workshop” to successful small scale entrepreneurs that would gradually contribute to the peace, stability and development of not only the individuals, but also the country, her neighbours and beyond the Horn of Africa Region.

19. In addition, some of these development strategies could help address issues relating to land based piracy and the developmental needs of the disengaged fighters, especially the youths who were part of the fighting forces.

Challenges

20. Despite the commitment and collective efforts by well-intentioned Somalis and the International Community, the challenges facing the country are enormous.

21. The implementation of the Roadmap is faced with tight timelines against the 20 August 2012 deadline to end the transition. The unavailability of immediate financial resources to fund the associated activities has its implication on the timelines of the Roadmap.

22. Despite the gains in the security sector, the asymmetrical warfare on the citizens by the insurgents is a cause for concern. UNPOS therefore urge all well-intentioned Somalis to embark on neighbourhood watch and for all to be committed to the peace process by reporting to the authorities anything they perceive to be suspicious.

23. The end of the transition and recovering the country from the insurgents will not transform the country overnight. Much needs to be done in promoting outreach and reconciliation initiatives between and amongst clans and also with allies of the insurgents. Formation of peace committees and district security committees are integral to maintaining and stabilizing peace, as well as promoting sustainable development in the post era. They form the building blocks of

2 Ibid
sustaining the peace initiatives at grassroots level, especially in the early stages of the end of hostilities.

24. The willingness of the business community to invest in the immediate post-war environment is another challenge to maintaining peace and stability in the country. Such ventures will contribute to enhancing skills development and creating jobs for the youth and other unemployed persons. The challenge is that it will take time to realize the socio-economic benefits of such investments to the citizens and the country.

25. I cannot end this presentation without talking about the role of the “civilian anti-government elements” who also pose a threat to the peace, stability and development of the country. Their behaviour is not different from the armed opposition groups, except that they have different weapons and strategies to destabilize the country. They hold the view that the end of the transition will jeopardize their privileged positions and standing in their communities and hence employ various strategies to obstruct and reverse the gains made so far. In as much as UNPOS will continue to dialogue with them to join the peace process, punitive measures will be enhanced if their actions so demand, with support by the Security Council.

26. The greatest challenge is for all well-intentioned Somalis to raise their voices to deplore the inhuman acts that are perpetrated by a few disgruntled citizens; for the International Community and the donors to continue to provide unwavering support to the peace process, in order for the country to regain her past status.

Conclusion

27. In concluding, I must emphasize that as Somalia faces the greatest opportunity to end the transition, we must collectively complete the tasks at hand with whatever resources we can amass. It is necessary to intensify public and civic education for the Somali people to be made aware of the advancement on the political landscape and the security gains in various parts of the country, by harmonizing and disseminating messages on the achievements made so far through the printed word and electronic media.

28. On that note, I hope that the deliberations and outcome of this conference will cultivate ideas for advancing the peace process, as well as for maintaining stability and promoting development in the country and beyond.

I thank you all for your attention.
Regional Perspectives on the Horn of Africa
Introduction

The Horn of Africa has long faced and continues to face enormous political-security and economic challenges. In a continent that has had a disproportionately high share of global conflicts and political instability, it stands out as the most conflict-ridden, often infamously known for the indignities its peoples have gone and continue to go through. These conflicts include the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia that started a few years after the latter's independence in 1960, the civil war in Somalia in the latter half of the 1980s, the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991, and the near anarchy and statelessness in the country that followed. They also include the war of independence in Eritrea (1961-1991) and the establishment of an independent Eritrea in 1993; the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1974 by the military, and the civil war that continued until President Mengistu Haile Mariam was overthrown in 1991; and the conflict in Sudan that started in the early 1960s and continued until South Sudan became independent in 2011, and directly or indirectly contributed to the overthrow of various governments in Sudan, including that of President Jaafar Numeiri in 1985. And at present, there are interstate conflicts between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea, violent inter-state conflicts in Somalia and Sudan, and lower level of intra-state conflicts in Ethiopia and South Sudan.

As a consequence of the conflicts, the region has been synonymous with unending conflicts where external powers, on bilateral or multilateral basis, have intervened frequently. First, of the 16 current UN peace operations worldwide, three are in the region (Darfur, Abyei, and South Sudan). These operations followed three previous peace operations of which two were in Somalia and the third in Ethiopia-Eritrea. Each country (except for Djibouti), therefore, has the unenviable distinction of hosting a high number of UN peacekeepers in the last 20 years. Equally important, the region has the distinction of being the only one, where the two current African

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1 The Horn of Africa refers to the region consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Djibouti does not exhibit much of the violence characteristic of the region and is, therefore, not included in much of the discussion.
Union peace operations are operating in the region (Darfur and Somalia). Nowhere in the world has the UN/African Union intervened with such frequency. And in terms of bilateral intervention, the region has “hosted” Soviet and Soviet-allied intervention in the 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia war, the scale and intensity of which has never seen before even when compared to the massive intervention by South Africa, the Soviet Union, and Soviet-allied forces in Angola between the latter half of the 1970s and the early 1980s.

Second, the region is well-known for the deaths and the maiming of hundreds of thousands, the internal displacement of millions, and the flight of refugees across borders in the millions. For example, at the beginning of 2009, the number of refugees who fled their countries of origin was estimated at 1,095,900 out of about 2,692,100 African refugees, and this represented about 40.7 per cent of all refugees in the entire continent (USCRI 2009). And out of an estimated 3,113,000 African refugees at the end of 1986, about 1,623,000, or 52 per cent, were refugees from the Horn of Africa (Respondanet, undated). In terms of conflict-related internal displacement, at the end of 2008, there were about 4,576,250 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan alone, and additional IDPs in the millions in Somalia, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. The deaths and wounding of combatants and war-related deaths of innocent civilians also runs in the millions. For example, between 1955 and 1972, it is estimated that there were 750,000 war related deaths in Sudan and a further 2 million between 1983-and 2000 (Leitenberg 2006). The conflicts in Somalia and in Eritrea-Ethiopia have also caused deaths in the hundreds of thousands.

Third, each country finds itself in the lowest ranks for many consecutive years in terms of its Human Development Index (HDI) and Ibrahimi Index of Governance. Suffice to observe that in 2011, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan, ranked 177th, 174th, and 169th, respectively, out of the 187 countries and territories included in the ranking. And in the Ibrahimi Governance Index, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan ranked 47th, 34th, 53rd and 48th among 53 African countries included in the Index. It is hard to attribute such a poor showing on both indices on anything other than the conflicts in each of the countries. In short, the conflicts have each been intractable, a term understood to mean that each has been “highly destructive, enduring and particularly resistant to attempts to resolve them” (ICCC, undated) Indeed, in terms of their spatial dimension, they have each been expansive because they encompassed entire regions. In terms of their temporal dimension, they have each been extensive, ranging from a minimum of about 16 years to a maximum of about 50 years of war duration. In addition, they have each been resistant to peaceful attempts at conflict resolution because of zero-sum calculations that left little or no zone of agreement (Ibid).

But what are the factors that made the conflicts in the region intractable? Why have the conflicts been difficult to resolve despite (1) the rich cultural traditions of their peoples – including traditions in conflict resolution – anchored in antiquity; (2) their enormous economic and manpower resources and complementarity of their econo-

2 In Sudan alone, there were about 4,000,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) at the end of 1997 and this made it the top IDP-generating country in the world. Please see USCRI, 1998:6.

3 Somalia was not included in the ranking because there was no data.
mies, all of which augur well for the rapid advancement of the peoples in the region; and (3) the obvious devastating economic, social, and other effects as outlined above.

I argue that the intractability of the conflicts in the region is better explained by examining the political role the elites have played. In particular, I argue that the elites in various countries have been unable to establish sufficient control over their followers and this, in turn, has created a situation whereby a succession of elites have emerged promising to deliver peace and prosperity only to be themselves thrown out by a new group because they have not delivered much. When this happens, they form their own faction and, as necessary, enter into an alliance with other factions in order to further their interests. Whatever the case, the result has been endless cycles of conflicts the region finds itself because no leader had the time, the courage, and the attention necessary to focus on resolution of existing conflicts.

Democratic (In)stability in Multi-cultural Societies

As early as the 1970s, many scholars have attempted to explain why it had become difficult to maintain stable and democratic political system in the newly independent multi-ethnic states (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Young 1976; Lijphart 1977). Lijphart (1977) has also provided a possible formula for group accommodation in such societies. He argues that the question of peace and democratic stability in a multi-ethnic society, such as the ones found in the Horn of Africa, in large part depended on the consensus of the major segments of the society rather than on the majoritarian democracy, such as those found in the United States. Successful application of this approach, which Lijphart (1977) referred to as consociationalism, depended on seven favorable conditions, of which elite control of followers was one. Pappalardo (1981), in a critique to Lijphart’s seven favorable conditions, suggests that not all of them may be important; rather, he argues that elite control of followers was the most “unambiguously favorable” condition for the successful application of consociational democracy in plural/multi-ethnic/multi-cultural societies.5

While the above has been the general focus of the literature on elite leadership in the plural society, a more focused area of study on leadership deals with the elite and how they maintain their following during times of equilibrium/stability as well as during negotiations for peace settlement in conflict situations. The former deals with patron-client relationships, or clientelism, where the leader’s ability to elicit loyalty and compliance of the followers depended on the degree to which he/she is able to provide something of value to the followers. That is, followers follow leaders in so far as they received benefits in return for their loyalty. As Owusu (1970) has cogently put it, “The relationship [holds] so long as the patron honored his material and economic

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4 Consociational democracy is based on four important tenets or institutional arrangements – grand coalition, proportional representation, mutual veto, and group autonomy.

5 As stated in Kelles 1998: 181.
obligation, and the client [honored] his duty to vote at elections and perform various other services for the patron, including ritually praising him in public” (251). If the benefits were to stop, then the followers would no longer be bounded by their “contractual” agreement to comply with the demands of the leader. This results a disequilibrium and final collapse of the existing arrangement in favor of a new patron-client relationship based on mutual needs – that is, the leaders’ need for followers in order to remain in power and the followers’ need for economic benefits in exchange for their loyalty. One such example is Tolbert’s rule in Liberia, where he maintained his rule by dispensing rewards to his followers. Indeed, when the economy suffered because of low commodity prices on the world market in the 1980s, he could not keep his end of the “contract” and was overthrown. Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule of Ethiopia may also be referred to as clientelist because of its fundamentally feudal characteristics.

The second line of research on political leadership deals with the ability of leaders to maintain their following during negotiations for coalition formation as well as during negotiations to end violent conflicts. To illustrate the former, for example, Herbst (1997) writes that during the political negotiations to end apartheid there were questions about the South African leaders’ ability to “deliver their constituencies” – that is, for them to command the compliance of their followers with the agreements they had brokered. Burton and Higley (1987) write similarly on agreements between elites and focus on the precarious situation the negotiating elites find themselves because of the need to mobilize overwhelming support for their positions while at the same time cognizant of the fact that any compromise they make could cost them followers, especially if unyielding elites are waiting on the sides.

Within this area of research, elite role during negotiations to end violent conflicts has received a lot of attention probably because of the rich history of failures of peace negotiations. Indeed, the stake is not just loss of support for the leader but also the success or failure of a peace agreement and potential devolution back into violent conflict. Stedman (1997), for example, writes that the degree of elite control over followers is one of the factors that determines the chances of success in a given peace process and the dangers of failure because of disruptive actions taken by fringe elements, or spoilers, opposed to the peace process. Doubts about the ability of a leader to deliver his followers may make other parties to the negotiations unwilling to make concessions. At the same time, the leader could be willing to compromise, but actions by fringe elements who are opposed to settlement could derail the process and result in the leader’s removal. Similarly, leaders may be unwilling to implement a peace agreement for fear of retaliation by hardliners, or spoilers, who will willfully interpret any agreement reached as non-optimal and harmful to the group. In such cases, promises of a better deal by the same disgruntled elements could mean any of the following: the splintering of followers and the formation of another group, the removal of the leader, or the formation of a new alliance. Whatever the outcome, return to a state of conflict becomes highly probable. Controlling rogue individuals or groups within one’s rank is of equal, if not more, importance as that of reaching a deal with the other party.

Therefore, the central issue in the literature on political leadership revolves around the ability of the leader to extract loyalty of the followers and to go along with the
leader under any condition, including conditions of peace and stability, conflict, and negotiations to end the conflict. The absence of these is of singular importance in whether or not there will be stability in the plural society and whether or not conflicts are resolved. As will be shown, this was the case when one examines elite leadership in the Horn of Africa.

The Extant Literature on Conflicts and Conflict Intractability in the Horn of Africa

Most of the literature on conflicts in the region and why they have become intractable may be divided into two categories: interventions by countries within the region and interventions by powers from outside the region in a country’s civil conflict. The former assumes that each country has demands a neighboring country is not willing to meet and support of the opposition was an easy and cheap way of advancing one’s objectives. For example, Somalia has a long-running territorial claim on Ethiopia and support of the opposition to attain this goal was imperative, even ethical. Hence, it supported the Eritrean quest for independence from Ethiopia. While for obvious geographical reasons, Somalia did not provide military bases for Eritrean liberation movements nor served as refuge to a large number of Eritreans, it did provide leaders of the liberation movements with a safe haven to conduct their businesses. Moreover, “It made available documents necessary for travel to foreign capitals in order to solicit diplomatic, material and other support, and to make contacts with the Eritrean Diaspora and seek their support for the Eritrean cause” (Bariagaber, unpublished manuscript). And with regards to the Ogaden, Somalia intervened on the side of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in the 1970s to advance its aspirations of bringing all Somali-speaking peoples under a single sovereign entity. In return, Ethiopia played critical role in organizing and arming groups opposed to President Barre, including the Somali National Movement (SNM). And after President Barre was overthrown, Ethiopia intensified its support of groups opposed to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in order to bring to power a more compliant government. The height of its involvement came when it intervened in 2006 with a sizable military force to drive the UIC out of Mogadishu.

Sudan, however, did not have historical or territorial claims against Ethiopia that Somalia had. But it did much more than Somalia with regards to its support of Eritrean liberation forces because of its geographical proximity to Eritrea. It provided safe conduit for the leaders to travel to foreign capitals; gave them access to Eritrean refugee camps in order to conduct political activities and to recruit fresh combatants; allowed overland pass for food and medical supplies, and in some cases, provided medical care to wounded combatants. As a consequence, Ethiopia had lodged formal protests with the Government of Sudan and had issued warnings on many occasions.
Moreover, Sudan had provided asylum to hundreds of thousands of Eritreans for more than two decades.

In return to Sudan's actions, Ethiopia has provided various support to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in its armed challenge of the Government of Sudan. It not only provided important diplomatic and political support but also availed its territory for use as conduit for armaments destined for the SPLA/M. It also gave the SPLA/M unrestricted access to Sudanese refugee camps in Western Ethiopia, where it successfully organized the refugees in support of the Southern cause. Indeed, in the late 1980s, the refugee camps hosting those who fled Sudan to seek refuge in Ethiopia had become “one of the most highly politicized camps in the world” (Bariagaber 2006) Therefore, any domestic conflict in the Horn of Africa cannot be seen independent of the open, reciprocal intervention of neighboring states.

It is particularly interesting to note that the two newest states on the continent – Eritrea and South Sudan – have also become important participants in the reciprocal interventions in the region as seen above. Only a few years after Eritrean independence, Eritrea and Ethiopia found themselves locked in a conflict. Eritrea now openly supports Ethiopian opposition movements and has provided them with moral, diplomatic, and possibly material support. Ethiopia, in turn, has provided Eritrean opposition groups with the similar kind of support. Regarding Somalia, Eritrea has acknowledged its support of the UIC in its opposition to Ethiopia's intervention and, as the UN has indicated, “Huge quantities of arms have been provided to the Shabab by and through Eritrea.”

Eritrea has also provided Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), a base for diplomatic and other operations to force Ethiopian troop withdrawal from Somalia. With regard to Sudan, Eritrea has also supported the Beja opposition movement that fought for more inclusion in the political system in Sudan, in a tit for tat response for the support Sudan gave to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, a movement opposed to the Government of Eritrea, in the first half of the 1990s.

The same may be said of Sudan and the now independent South Sudan and their reciprocal support of opposition movements. South Sudan has repeatedly made accusations against Sudan for its support of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), an armed movement in opposition to the existing government. Sudan, in turn, has made similar accusations against South Sudan for supporting the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), which operates in South Kordofan, Abyei, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan. At present, Sudan and South Sudan find themselves in a state of full-scale war, especially after South Sudanese forces occupied the contested area known as Heglig/Panthou. To prevent an all-out war, the United Nations Security Council has adopted a resolution demanding that both countries they halt violence and return to negotiations because the situation was a serious threat to international peace and security. Therefore, any domestic conflict in the Horn of Africa may not be seen independent of the open, reciprocal intervention by one or more countries in the region. As Ewing (2008) has stated,

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6 As quoted in Reuters, July 26, 2007.
the Horn of Africa is a “regional security complex”, where each country has used all means necessary, including direct indirect wars to advance its objectives (p. 3 and p. 7). In particular, “proxy war [has been] an important and enduring feature of the political dynamics of the Horn, and is not likely to end until a wide regional conflict resolution structure is developed” (Ewing 2008:3).

While endemic intervention is only one of the modalities of intervention in the various conflicts, it is equally important to note that foreign powers have also frequently intervened in the existing conflicts at a level higher compared to their intervention in other parts of Africa. Because of its location in strategic waterways, where oil from the Persian Gulf passes on its way to Europe, foreign powers have found it irresistible not intervene in order to effect outcomes favorable to their interests. This second line of explanation, therefore, looks at external factors to explain the prevalence of conflicts in the region (Gorman 1981; Habte Selassie 1980; Farer 1976). Examples of these interventions abound: With regard to the conflict in Sudan, Egypt has supported the government(s) of Sudan against the SPLM/A because of its interest in the waters of the Nile. As indicated earlier, the Soviet Union and Cuba had intervened in support of Ethiopia in the Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977-78, and the Soviet Union and Yemen had intervened in Eritrea in support of Ethiopia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Similarly, the United States, West Germany, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia had offered political, diplomatic, military or economic support to Somalia after the Soviet Union threw its full weight behind Ethiopia during the 1977-78 Ogaden War (Gorman 1981). Uganda has lately indicated that it will intervene on the side of South Sudan should Sudan invade the former. Hence, foreign intervention in the Horn of Africa has been frequent as well as massive.

It is, therefore, important to treat the various conflicts in the Horn as organically-related. Hence, one may talk about the intractable conflict in the Horn of Africa, and seek a variable or variables whose explanatory power extends beyond a single country. While some scholars have emphasized the significance of internal factors (such as intervention by one on the affairs of the other or the effects of colonialism on state formation in the region) and others the significance of external factors (such as foreign intervention), as briefly explained above, not much has been said as to why the conflicts would persist despite a succession of leaders who seized power promising to bring peace to their respective countries. I suggest that elite particularistic interests and the inability to control their followers is the most plausible explanation for conflict intractability in the region.

Sudan and South Sudan

Many have written on why the civil war in Sudan defied peaceful resolution and lasted long. Some attribute this to the failure of the elite to appreciate the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of Sudan, where all of its population segments
had an equal stake on how it is governed (Johnson 2003; Khalid 2003; Wai 1981). The northern dominant elite have seen and continue to see Sudan as essentially composed of an Arab-Islamic population. Other population groups are viewed as candidates to bring into the Arab-Islamic fold through cultural acculturation, as they were unable to offer a “superior” alternative. While there may not be much debate as to how the National Islamic Front views Sudan and its society, the views of other parties, such as the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma Party, were not much different. For example, in his address to the Constituent Assembly of Sudan in 1966, Sayed el- Mahdi, leader of the moderate Umma Party, had stated that “the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this Nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival” (as quoted in Alier 1973:24).

This statement contrasts strongly with the Southern elite view that the South was more “racially akin to tropical Africa...” and the people’s cultural identification with Africanism (Wai 1981: 19). Accordingly, the South (and now Darfur, South Kordofan, Beja, etc.) did not see any solution short of complete remaking of the state. This included recognition of Sudan as multi-ethnic and multi-religious, the establishment of secular state, and a real and significant devolution of power. In short, the southern elite saw the need for a complete overhaul of the state if the South is to remain within Sudan.

Because of the contrasting views, progress during peace negotiations has been hard to come by. The northern elite have seen negotiations on the demands of the marginalized as something desirable but not as a necessarily vehicle to tackle the perennial question on the nature of the Sudanese state. Accordingly, any demand for more rights could be handled not through fundamental changes in the political, social, and cultural milieu of the country but through elite co-optation. This has resulted in a situation where (1) negotiations did not include all the parties with a stake in the future of the country and (2) any agreement an existing government has reached was not applied in good faith because they saw the “southern question” as contingent. In fact, more often than not, this issue has been sinisterly used by the competing elite to weaken an existing government and to gain power. For example, the Umma Party supported the Koka Dam Declaration of 1986 while it was in opposition but abandoned it when it came to power.8 Similarly, the Democratic Unionist Party had conducted negotiations with the SPLM/A in 1998 without the knowledge of its coalition partners in the government of which it was a member of. Such backdoor inter-elite dealings and back stabbings, if you will, has made it easier for the armed forces to seize power allegedly because the incumbent government had not done much.

This meant that no government has lasted long enough to resolve the conflict either through defeat of the armed groups or through negotiations. Indeed, many incumbent governments have been hesitant to tackle the issue seriously lest they are accused

8 The Koka Dam Declaration was reached in Koka, Ethiopia, in 1986 among various opposition political parties and organizations both in the North and in the South. It included a “practical programme for the cessation of hostilities, and guidelines for the political restructuring of Sudan.” A full text of the Declaration may be found in Garang 1992: 142-44.
by the opposition as having been soft on the South. For example, Prime Minister el-Mahdi came to power in 1986 on the promise to end the civil war; however, he was overthrown because he was accused of “[holding] real policy decisions, including the ‘Southern Question’ in abeyance” (Simone 1994:150). Indeed, almost all of the governments in Sudan since independence have been forcefully replaced because of reasons that have to do with the civil war. These include governments before the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement governments, such as those of Prime Ministers Khalil, Khalifa, Mahgoub, and el-Mahdi, and General (President) Abboud.

One can also observe similar forceful government changes after the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, including those of Numeiri, al-Mahdi, and al-Bashir. For example, and that is only one of many, General Numeiri overthrew Prime Minister al-Mahdi in 1969 on the promise that he would give priority to the solution of the “Southern Problem” (Khalid 2003: 135). And he did accomplish this when he concluded the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and his good faith efforts to implement the agreement thereafter, even though he was under great pressure from al-Mahdi and al-Turabi, who saw the “relative independence of the South as an impediment to the creation of a religious state in a unified Sudan” (Ibid. 152). However, when he faced mounting economic difficulties, Numeiri succumbed to the pressures from Islamists and promulgated the 1983 September (Sharia) Laws in an effort to cling to power. There cannot be any more credible explanation for the higher frequency of governmental changes in Sudan – constitutional or otherwise – when compared to other countries in the region than is the “southern question.” For example, even after the rather stable period following the coup d’ etat that brought the National Islamic Front to power in 1989, there were 11 changes in the composition of Sudan’s governments (Lesch 1998).

The southern elite also had their own problems. Although they were united in their opposition to the North, intra-South elite competition has also contributed to the intractability of the conflict. More often than not, many were willing to break ranks with fellow southern parties to advance their particularistic interests. For example, when a faction known as the “Nasir” group (led by Machar, Kong, and Akol) failed in its efforts to remove John Garang from his leadership position in 1991, Machar splintered and founded the Nuer-dominated Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) in 1994. This led to conflict between the Nuer and Dinka. Later, the SSIM/A made peace with the Government of Sudan and opposed the SPLM/A. The new organization later split into various Nuer-dominated militias and Machar rejoined the SPLM/A (Hutchinson 2001).9 Therefore, not only was there intra-South conflict but also intra-Nuer conflict and conflicts between other southern factions. More importantly, Machar went on with the split because of the support he had from the largely Nuer combatants under his leadership, who followed him probably because he was from their ethnic group. The insidiousness of such fractionalization within the South meant constant shifting alliances not only

9 Reik Machar, who then opposed to Garang’s vision of a secular and democratic united Sudan, now serves as Vice President of the newly independent Republic of South Sudan.
within southern parties but also alliances with the Government against southern parties and this contributed to the longer duration of the conflict.

Exclusivity of the peace processes, elite opportunism within the North and South, and the shifting alliances this has engendered have, therefore, been the most important reasons for the failure of the various peace agreements between the North and the South (Woodward 2004; Shinn 2005; Blaydes and De Maio 2010). They were either peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A and disregarded others, or they left out the SPLM/A. For example, the series of talks that took place from 1997-2005 that culminated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement were criticized for only involving the SPLM/A and the Government. The majority of opposition groups that had banded together to form the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) were excluded from the process (Woodward 2004: 478; Blaydes and De Maio 2010: 10). Furthermore, some opposition groups, such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Beja Congress that weren’t specifically from the South were ignored when the negotiations with the SPLM/A were in full swing. And more often than not, the included groups seldom raised objections at the non-inclusion of other parties primarily because of the zero-sum scenario under which they saw the outcomes of negotiations. The past behavior of the governments of Sudan to negotiate with only a select group continues with the present government as well. Just a few weeks back, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of the Sudanese rebels, … said “it is seeking international support for ‘inclusive settlement’ for the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile and that it would not accept ‘selective’ settlement” because the Government would rather talk to each separately (Sudan Tribune May 10, 2012).

The exclusivity of the peace processes may also have inadvertently spurred more violence, as neglected rebel groups, such as those in Darfur and in the Beja area in the east, as well as some of the splintered factions in the South could only watch from a distance the seriousness with which the SPLM/A was taken at the negotiating table. They felt that perhaps if they were able to show that they can mount some military challenge to the Government, they too would be included (Woodward 478; Shinn 257; Blaydes and De Maio 11). In particular, Blaydes and De Maio write that the Beja Congress took up arms because they were frustrated at their exclusion from the peace process (13).

Somalia

The North-South conflict in Sudan that began as soon as the country became independent in 1956, and the more recent conflicts in Darfur, the Beja East, South Kordofan, and others were rooted in the deep societal segmentation in the country and the contrasting visions of the state that arose from this. However, the intractability of the conflict is explained in terms of elite inability and/or unwillingness to
accept this fact, and the opportunistic role they have played when confronted with a deep rooted issues such as this. Had the elite accepted this objective fact, the search for appropriate institutional mechanisms to accommodate ethnic and cultural pluralism would have been undertaken seriously. The elite in Somalia, on the other hand, had remarkable consensus on the nature of the state early on – a state that will have authority over all Somali-Speaking peoples of the region. The latter, however, was externally focused and put the country on a collision course with other governments in the region. As a result, successive Somali leaders allocated a disproportionate amount of attention to this at the expense of other state tasks, including institution-building. Therefore, the inordinate attention allocated to realize the “completeness” of Somalia and the frustration at the inability to accomplish this are directly associated with the state in which Somalia finds itself at present. As a result, the remarkable consensus on the nature of the Somali state has come under great strain as evidenced by the conflict that began in the late 1980s and the emergence of the self-proclaimed “Republic of Somaliland” and the absence of central authority in Somalia since 1991.

Numerous attempts to reconstitute the Somali state have been made. However, none came to fruition because of many factors, including what Samatar (1994: 66) referred to as the “pursuit of self-interest on the part of the elite…”, the centralization of the means of production that increasingly made the producers poorer, and the interference of outside powers on the side of one or the other conflicting party. As a result, the numerous peace conferences could not produce a workable framework for peace and the reconstitution of the Somali state. Indeed, a functioning Somali state would undoubtedly contain or regulate the powers of clan leaders and warlords, and may vigorously pursue the issue of Somali-inhabited territories in neighboring countries once more again. Therefore, it was not easy to seal an agreement because it has to obtain the blessing of traditional clan leaders, warlords, and neighboring governments. Other major powers have also shown interest in the peace process because they see some stake in a strategically important Somalia.

Over the last decades, therefore, there have been at least nine conferences convened to chart the future of Somalia. The first was held in 1991 in Djibouti and included six factions where Ali Mahdi (of the Abigal sub-clan of the Hawiye) became the President. However, he was challenged by General Aideed, who came from the Habir Gadir sub-clan of the Hawiye. Both were important members of the United Somali Congress (USC), however, they could not agree on the mechanism for power sharing and on who should be the President. They later went their separate ways and formed two rival alliances – General Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Mahdi’s Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), both with strong support from the Hawiye, and each with satellite factions. The second major meeting took place in 1993 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with 15 factions taking part, although only three of the original six had remained intact. According to Warsan Saalax and Abdulaziz Ibrahim (2010), the jump in factions who took part is explained in terms of the

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10 Saalax and Ibrahim (2010) talk about a peace conference in March 1994, where only the two factions took part in a UN sponsored peace conference. However, the attendees represented a number of “sub-factions” carrying names such as USC/SSA, USC/SNA, SPM/SSA or SPM/SNA, where SPM stands for Somali Patriotic Movement.
splintering of old factions, although some minority parties who did not take part in Ethiopia two years back have also been included. Therefore, there was a rapid proliferation of new factions brought about by both the formation of new factions and the splintering of existing factions. While the former indicates the increasing appeal to yet smaller units of affiliation, the latter strongly suggests the inability of the leader to control followers. Indeed, a leader of a new and a faction can only be viable so long there are followers willing to switch over their loyalty to the new leader.

In a third attempt held in early 1997 in Sodere, Ethiopia, the number of factions rose to 27, although some factions, including the influential USC of General Aideed, did not take part. And less than a year later, in late 1997, 28 factions met in Egypt and signed an agreement, although faction leaders closer to Ethiopia, including Abdullahi Yussuf, did not. Thus, Egypt and Ethiopia were attempting to project their influence in Somalia through “client” faction leaders. It appears, therefore, that the continued instability in Somalia was not only a function of factional alliance shifts and splintering of factions into smaller ones, but also a function of the role of outside powers, such as Ethiopia and Egypt. Ethiopia, in particular, had vested interests in seeing to it that any government that emerges in Somalia had its blessing. For example, the much talked about Arta Declaration in 2000 and the Transitional National Government (TNG) that came out of it did not make much progress partly because of Ethiopia’s behavior as a spoiler based on its understanding that the TNG was dominated by Islamists (Makhubela 78).

Nonetheless, the Arta Conference was the “first meaningful attempt to create a form of [national] authority in Somalia” (Makhubela 4). The conference involved some 2000 delegates representing nearly every group from all over the country, although some of the leaders claiming to represent a group were simply self-appointed (Makhubela 78). The sponsors of the process chose Abdulqasim Salat Hassan as President of the TNG because of his membership in a prominent clan in Mogadishu (Hawiye) would enable him to control his fellow clansmen who continued their violence in the city (Makhubela 78). Makhubela, however, writes that this assumption by the sponsors failed to account for Hassan’s political background as cabinet minister in Barre’s government. Also, the fact that over 60 per cent of the TNG came from the parliament when Siad Barre was the President did not sit well with many. Consequently, the TNG lacked any legitimacy and authority over the city of Mogadishu, let alone the country (78).

In addition, the Arta Declaration and the TNG that resulted from it, did not garner the necessary international backing because of Ethiopia’s support of Abdullahi Yussuf, who objected to the Declaration because of “lack of federal structure (Saalax and Ibrahim 2010). Rather, a rival conference was convened in Awasa, Ethiopia, where 17 factions formed the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). The final peace conference was convened in Kenya in 2002 in which 24 faction leaders agreed on a power-sharing mechanism “whereby the four and a half major Somali clans’ traditional leaders as well as faction leaders would reach consensus” (Center for Research and Dialogue 2004: 26).
Therefore, while the Sudanese peace process has been too exclusive, Somalia has had the opposite problem (Woodward 478). With peace talks having hundreds, even thousands, of delegates, it was unclear who spoke for which party. Another problem in the Somali peace process was that no one was sure who exactly should be invited. Nonetheless, there was a consistent lack of understanding on the part of outside parties as to what the most important political unit in the country was – clans, sub-clans, warlords, religious leaders, etc. This made it problematic to agree on the mechanisms of how power should be distributed among the regions and various leaders within them. Indeed, the more people have to agree on an issue, the less the likelihood of an agreement, especially if one seeks to avoid the “spoiler problem.”

As mentioned earlier, the interference by of outside parties is attributed the lack of success of Somali peace processes. In particular, Ethiopia did not endorse the Arta Declaration because it believed the talks to be dominated by Islamists and because it called for a unitary state, both of which were of major concern (Makhubela 78). There were also criticisms that Somalia’s other neighbors, Egypt, the U.S., Italy, and others were trying to force peace talks on the country that fed their own national interests. Also, interference by such powers had contradictory aspects: on the one hand, outside powers had been active and willing to facilitate the peace talks, and on the other, they did not show the necessary will and determination to see to it that the agreements are implemented. Because Somalia lacks government institutions and funds, international support would be essential to implement anything, and this was simply not offered. The reluctance of the UN to intervene alongside of the Africa Union forces and the difficulties the TFG is facing at present is case in point.

In addition to outside spoilers and problems with the framing of the peace processes, there were also internal factors that contributed to the failure of peace efforts. Because of the collapse of central authority in Somalia, warlords and factional leaders had established war economies and profits from selling weapons, commandeering food aid, and exporting scrap metal (Makhubela 80). Thus, they have been reluctant to agree to a peace that would potentially cut in on their illicit incomes or control of various regions. The same goes for their followers, mostly young men, who don’t see any other livelihood for themselves other than participating in these war economies, where they can keep whatever they can take, thus prompting them to continue the conflict regardless of an agreement their leaders may have made (World Bank 2005). And consistent with the characteristics of a patron-client relationship, they would not hesitate to switch allegiance if they can get a better “deal” from another leader.

It is important to observe that the rise in the number of factions who took part in peace conferences had increased because of formation of new parties and the splintering of existing parties. Suffice to note that six factions had taken part in the Djibouti conference in 1991, 15 in the UN-organized reconciliation meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1993, 27 in Sodere, Ethiopia, in early 1997, and 28 in Egypt in late 1997. The serious need to avoid the “spoiler problem” and reach a negotiated settlement has encouraged the elite to come up with yet smaller factions because it pays-off to participate. Moreover, foreign powers have not only organized and facilitated peace conferences in their territories but have also pushed for representation of friendly fac-
tions. Given this, it may come as no surprise that the conflict in Somali continues to persist the way it did since President Bare was overthrown in 1991.

Ethiopia

When it came to Ethiopia, it is important to recognize that open political affiliation – whether based on ethnicity, religion, ideology, or anything else – had not been allowed during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie. However, there was group sentiment among the population partly because of the rather exclusive nature of the state and the policies that followed from this, and partly because of the political activities of university students during his reign. And when the armed forces overthrew the Imperial Government in 1974, various ethnic-based movements were established and group rights took a center stage. The military regime took some steps to address the “question of nationalities,” including the adoption of the National Democratic Revolution Programme (NDRP) that recognized corporate rights. But it was unable to stem the tide of cultural pluralism, as ethnic elites started mobilizing their co-ethnics on the basis of escalating communal demands. As I have noted elsewhere, “by first creating high expectations of a truly democratic, multi-ethnic state and later suppressing the forces that were unleashed by such expectations, the revolution only helped reify ethnic solidarities: ethnic movements proliferated in many parts of the country [to press] their demands for self-determination, many through armed revolt (Bariagaber 1998: 1061). This was the beginning of the descent into ethnic-based political arrangement, or ethnic federalism, that we see in Ethiopia today.

Although there was remarkable consensus among the victorious forces on the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia in 1991, some withdrew from the newly-formed Transitional Government a few years later because they resented the control of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). These include the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). They have now opted to bring about a full measure of self-determination to the Oromo and Somali peoples of Ethiopia through the force of arms. On the other hand, there were those who opposed the constitution because, in theory at least, it includes the right to secession. Hence, it cannot be said that there is a unified vision on the nature of the Ethiopian state, with some opting to secede, others opting to maintain an ethnic federal state, and yet others looking for a different model of federalism. Although the extent of disagreement on the nature of the state is less compared to that in Sudan, it nonetheless represents one of the problems that Ethiopia continues to face. Is Ethiopia still an empire-state or ethnic-federalist state? Is the present arrangement so detrimental to the future of Ethiopia that it must be overturned in favor of territorial federalism?

In addition, there is a high degree of fractionalization among elites of the same ethnic group, with some favoring participation in the political process while others challenging the political system with force of arms. Such inter-ethnic divisions have
now manifested themselves in the form of parties that are part of the EPRDF or affiliated to it, such as the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDM), and those that are not, such as the OLF. In fact, the OLF has now splintered into two, with one of them renouncing its secessionist agenda. Such divisions are also apparent in the Somali and Afar populations of Ethiopia.

Therefore, we have two layers of divisions in Ethiopia: parties that are “multi-national,” such as the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party, Ethiopian Democratic Union, and Unity for Democracy and Justice Party; and parties that are regional and ethnic, such as the Oromo National Congress, the Oromo National Congress, Afar National Democratic Party, Afar Revolutionary Democratic Front, etc. The degree of party fractionalization – whether “national” or “ethnic” – is indicative of elite inability to present a “national” or even “regional” vision. This is evident from the number of parties that participated in the 2005 elections. According to the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, 79 parties had registered to take part in the 2005 elections, many of them ethnic-based and competing for support from members of the same ethnic group (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia 2010). For example, there were approximately ten different parties with the word “Oromo” in their name; four with the word “Afar”, three with the word “Somali,” and so on.

It is important to note that the electoral and party landscape in Ethiopia had dramatically changed between the 2005 and 2010 elections. Except for the EPRDF, which had remained stable during the period, the opposition parties and the coalitions they had formed cannot be more different both with respect to the names of the parties and the names of the coalitions to which they belonged. Also, in terms of the number of major opposition coalitions, there were four in 2005 as opposed to only two 2010. As the European Union Election Observation Mission has stated, the new face of the parties and the coalitions that took part in 2010 may be due to the “dismemberment, … splits, mergers and the emergence of new parties, of the leading opposition coalitions from the 2005 elections…” (p. 6). Whatever the reason, there was remarkable fluidity in party/coalitions structure in the time between the two election periods. This, coupled with the ongoing narrowing of the political space in the country, has surely contributed to the low level conflict that we see in Ethiopia today.

Eritrea

Of the governments in the Horn, perhaps with the exception of Djibouti, the Eritrean elite appear to have shown less fractionalization and more control of followers, perhaps because of the unity required to conduct a successful war of independence. Similarly, after the successful efforts to liberate Eritrea, many showed deference to the EPLF to lead the country because of the need and the longing for a stable environment to rebuild the country. This, however, does not mean that elite fractionalization did not exist. In fact, prior to independence, factionalism within
the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) led to the splintering and the formation of the EPLF in the early 1970s. A decade after its formation, the EPLF succeeded in defeating the ELF and its ejection from Eritrea if the early 1980s. What remained of the ELF further splintered into many parties and their influence during the 1980s remained minimal. And when Eritrea became independent they did not make much progress partly because all political parties, except for the PFDJ, were outlawed. Similarly, they cannot garner the necessary popular support after the country became independent. Hence, their lack of large number of followers in a one-party state that Eritrea has turned out to be continued up until the border war with Ethiopia.

Ethiopian victory in the war meant a much-weakened EPLF, and this created a situation conducive for more energized factions as well as for the splintering of the EPLF. Even the group that splintered from the PFDJ itself splintered into factions. Nonetheless, concerted efforts to form an opposition coalition did not come to fruition until March 14, 2011, when about 11 opposition political parties formed the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) to bring about “democratic change” in Eritrea (EDA 2011). Some of the signatories are ethnicity/religion-based, and include the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama, Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization, Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development, and the Eritrean Nahda Party, while others are secular and include the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Democratic Front. There are also parties that have not joined the EDA, such as the Eritrean People’s Democratic Party. After the apparent weakening of the PFJD and the support the opposition is getting from Ethiopia, it is still hard to say the individual parties or EDA have sufficient following to seriously destabilize the Government. Nonetheless, the continued closure of the political space is slowly leading to more fractionalization along ethnic and religious lines that may be hard to control.

Conclusion

So what do we make out of the fractionalization, shifting alliances, and the political role of the elites in the region? First, shifting alliances and elite lack of control of followers has undoubtedly been at the center of the intractability of the conflict(s) in the region. When the state is weak – both in terms of its capacity to control its territory and in terms of the robustness of the institutions it has -- it is easy for any challenger to central authority to wreak havoc on the populations and the infrastructure. Indeed, it would be very difficult for the authorities and the international community to bring about the needed pressure on somebody who may not be in his/her position of leadership for a long time. If, on the other hand, there are well-identified leaders with sufficient following, the international community may find it easy to apply the needed pressure to bear upon individual leaders to change course. This could be done through some form of sanctions or rewards. However, the expected effects of sanc-
tions or rewards can only be entertained when there are individuals secure in their leadership position. When there are no established leaders – and hence no objects of pressure – however, the likelihood of the continuation of a conflict gets higher.

The unenviable task is, therefore, to identify factors associated with the fluidity of alliance formation and to focus on their stabilization. As risky as it may be, the international community should identify more “responsible” faction leaders and provide all the necessary support so that they would continue as undisputed leaders with sufficient and stable following. Even if they turn out to be tyrants with no regard to the well-being of their people, the chances of effecting the desirable change are higher compared to the chances in a Hobbesian-like environment of alliance dynamics. This may be easy said than done, but a policy geared towards that may succeed, albeit over a longer time duration

References


How can women play a greater role in conflict resolution?

Addei Sidi Nur Manguay

Theoretical framework

No one denies that conflict is a universal feature of human societies. Specialists in the field define conflict as “pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups” and violent conflict consists of “one-sided violence against unarmed civilians”\(^1\). Conflict resolution suggests the process (intention) and the realization of the process (transformation), undertaking that “the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed”.

Historically, during the 50-60s, conflict resolution as a field included the combination of analysis acknowledged by scholarly institutions such as diplomats and politicians (cold war). At some point in the 80s, factual conflicts were changing the climate of conflict resolution (South Africa, Middle East, Northern Ireland, Africa and South-East Asia). During the 90s, internal conflicts such as ethnic conflicts and power struggles became the norm with mercenary armies, criminal international networks and groups that have interest in sabotaging the process of peace. In this new climate, international organizations specialized in development, social justice and social transformation became interested in conflict resolution. To set up peace neighborhoods and assess crossways divided communities became a central goal for the international community.

More recently, there is an additional shift towards considering conflict in its environment. The field of conflict resolution defined itself in relation to the challenge of understanding and transforming destructive human conflicts. In the context of the region of Horn of Africa, cruelly dazed by violent conflicts, civil society has experienced significant trauma. Conflict resolution approaches are facing fundamental new challenges as state failure linked with serious international crimes threaten the concept of peace and security.

To understand the structural and cultural roots of violence, specialists have observed conflict as a dynamic process. According to Johan Galtung’s model\(^2\), three components characterized by attitude – behavior – contradiction (A-B-C), explain how conflicts can shift from constructive to destructive actions. The parties to the conflict pursue incompatible goals and interests. This contradiction manipulates the

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2. Handbook of peace and conflict studies (Edited by Charles Webel, Johann Galtung, 2007)
attitude and behavior. The parties tend to develop humiliating stereotypes of the other, influenced by emotions. Hostile attitude develops additional fear, anger and hatred that involve violent conflict behavior making other destructive attacks and more contradiction and so on. This explains how violence and counter-violence are perpetuated and how conflict resolution is considered a thorny task. The violence at the core conflict increases, intensifies and extends at a fast pace.

In the Horn of Africa region the high levels of violence are characterized by long-standing animosities deep-rooted in three components: direct violence – cultural violence – structural violence.

- **Direct violence** (behavior) has local settings such as poverty and injury. People experience atrocities: children are killed and crimes such as rape are committed against women as a war strategy and deliberate aggression.

- **Cultural violence** (attitude) is the validation of the violence. All parties believe they are victims. The struggle for survival and death results in hostility, loss of well-being and alienation.

- **Structural violence** (contradiction) is characterized by the inequality such as the distribution of income, education or opportunities. When children are not killed by war, they die of starvation and women are discriminated on several grounds.

This typology of violence is related to Galtung’s idea that conflict resolution must involve a set of dynamic changes: the key to end direct violence it is to overcome the structural and cultural violence.

**“Bottom-up” process**

Building sustainable peace is also a dynamic process. To address the original core conflict, John Paul Lederach’s model emphasizes a “bottom-up” process that is a people-centered approach. To end high levels of violence and to support reconciliation in divided societies, it is crucial to build citizenry aptitude. Local actors and parties to violent conflict are helped to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways and handle conflicts in a sustained way over time. Mediators and facilitators play a pivotal role.

The efforts to engage and unite individuals at the community level are also described as “track three” level diplomacy or multitrack. This conceptual framework for building peace puts the focus on the need to transform conflict towards sustained and peaceful relationships and is more than supporting a peace agreement. The reconciliation process is the balancing of four concepts: truth – mercy – justice – peace.

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• **Truth** represents the desire of understanding the oversight or the conflict and the validation of painful losses and experiences.

• **Mercy** expresses the amnesty or the forgiveness and welcomes the letting go and a new beginning.

• **Justice** calls for the respect of human rights (individual and group rights) and at the same time the support for social restoration and rehabilitation.

• **Peace** emphasizes the call for interdependence, well-being and security.

The reconciliation process represents also the social space where parties come across and appoint the process. Lederach recommends providing a three level structure: top-level, middle-range and grassroots.

• **Top-level:** political and military leaders meet for cease-fire negotiations and peace accords.

• **Middle-range:** academic, religious leaders, other professionals and non-governmental organizations come together for problem-solving workshops, training in conflict-resolution skills and for peace commissions.

• **Grassroots:** refugee-camp leaders, health officials and other members of indigenous non-governmental organizations come across to achieve agreements to end fighting, implement policies made at higher levels and set the step towards peace for a group.

A “bottom-up” approach encourages a community ownership to conflict resolution without directly challenging established power relations, with the suggestion that the middle level can serve to link the other two. The facilitators attempt to relay appropriate and coordinated conflict resolution strategies as conciliation, mediation and peacekeeping.

### The role of women

The losses and damages from violent conflicts are dramatic. The thousands of people both internally and as refugees displaced in situations characterized by deep insecurity are mainly composed of women and children.

Women are particularly vulnerable during violent conflicts, but also discriminated on several grounds. Women are left out of most decision processes in their communities and they are subject to cultural stereotypes based on gender or traditions.

Throughout violent conflicts, women and children increasingly happen to be targets of deliberate aggression and hostility. Not being able to provide security to women and children is one of the greatest failures in the region.
Frequently, attacks do not come from an unpredictable foreign enemy. In Somalia, the most serious threats to the life and security of women come from within their society and the behavior of their own countrymen. The issue can be addressed through dialogue and dissemination of a general culture of human rights in trying to establish their universal nature and being committed to the concrete implementation of the international tools regarded as pillars for strategic action plans.

To put the focus on the role of women in conflict resolution and peace-process, the Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security adopted in 2000 by the Security Council of United Nations is indeed a step forward from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. It is followed furthermore by the Resolution 1820 adopted in 2008 to counter impunity for conflict-related sexual violence and highlight the importance of the protection of the rights of women and girls.

Resolution 1325 recognises the vulnerability of women and the unique impact of the changing nature of warfare in which women are increasingly targeted and continue to be excluded from participation in peace processes. It is primary to the issue for the recognition of the need to ensure women’s security in violent conflicts and for the acceptance of the essential role of women in conflict resolution and peace-processes. The wide-ranging resolution to address gender issues and the role of women is summarized by the “3P” formula:

- **Protection** of the human rights of women and girls during times of armed conflict
- **Promotion** of personal development and deterrence of gender-based violence
- **Participation** (equal) of women in peace-building and reconstruction processes.

The full implementation of Resolution 1325 is not an easy process, in particular without a State and viable institutions to support and put into practice the inclusion of women at all levels of decision processes and conflict resolution; though it is a commitment that must be honoured.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

Women have a deep understanding of the cultural issue. For example, in Somalia they can play a greater role as facilitator, since they could be insider neutrals bringing together civil society and characterize a bridge between parties. Because of their cross-clan loyalty, women have a large role in conflict resolution. They maintain close relationships within their own clan as well as the clan into which they marry.

Yes, women can play a greater role in conflict resolution for viable solutions to the core issues. As many of them have experienced discrimination and human rights abuses, they bring greater recognition of the discrimination and mistreatment. As
many of them have been dislocated and displaced in difficult conditions, women are credited for speaking effectively about the impact of violence on daily life.

Seats at the negotiation table given to women help to recognize the rights of women and the need for a broad peace process. In this matter, women’s contributions are essential component of the process and help to overtly address women’s and children’s rights in the post conflict reconstruction.

Women’s participation will possibly help ending gender inequality rooted in some local culture and male-dominated societies. Some may argue that women are not inherently more peaceful or pro-peace than men. Indeed, this may be true in some instances. But it is still the case that male warriors need women. In other words, women play a key role and deserve to win the respect of their male counterparts. Sharing power with women is a national security issue.

As individuals or united, women can facilitate the peace process. Women’s power and influence can have direct results. An example in Somalia is the success of the women working for the inclusion of the “Sixth Clan”, made up exclusively of women from different clans and united in opposition to war.

**Recommendations** to ensure a greater role of women in conflict resolution, the best way is a cultural change with the emphasis on “bottom-up” processes:

- **Power links** (inland/abroad) in training programs as catalyst for escalating peace-culture
- **Ensure access to education, economic and social rights and build self-confidence**
- **Address power discrepancy and the root causes in the constitutional reform**
- **Consolidate participation at all three levels and call for a “gender quota”**
- **Empathize and communicate to raise awareness and reliance.**
Improving International Engagement in the Horn of Africa

A Chatham House Africa Programme Project

Ahmed Soliman

Introduction

Chatham House, also known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs is an independent international affairs think-tank and membership organization based in London. The institute was founded in 1920, and this year we are celebrating the tenth Anniversary of the Africa Programme at Chatham House.

The Africa Programme aims to develop foreign policy-orientated research on issues affecting individual states of Africa, the African continent as a whole and relations with the outside world.

Following two successful projects on the Horn of Africa – Getting to Grips with the Horn of Africa (2007-2009) and The Economics of Conflict and Cooperation in the Horn (2009-2011), we are embarking on a project to deepen international understanding of the region and to provide analysis that will allow for more effective joint international engagement in the Horn entitled The Horn of Africa – Improving International Engagement.

The project is organized into three thematic areas; ‘The Horn and Regional Bodies’, ‘Diasporas and Politics in the Horn’ and ‘The Internal Dynamics and Relations between the Countries of the Horn’.

The Horn of Africa and Regional Bodies

This strand of work examines the role of regional organizations in the Horn. This includes bodies such as IGAD, the EAC and the AU, all of which include countries of the Horn region as members, and also regional organizations which engage with the Horn from an external position, such as the Arab League, OIC, the European Union and the United Nations. The project will propose ways to maximize the positive impact of these organizations in the Horn and ways for international partners to work effectively with or through them.
Diasporas and Politics in the Horn of Africa

The growing economic influence of diaspora communities in the Horn has been well-remarked on, but less attention has been paid to the increasingly important role that diasporas play in the politics of their home countries. This theme will help policymakers to understand these dynamics, and to develop ideas to aid host governments seeking to benefit from the influence that their citizens carry in the Horn.

Internal Dynamics and Relations between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan

The conflicts of the Horn of Africa frequently spill over borders and there is a long history of countries in the region interfering in each other’s internal affairs. At the same time, new relationships are developing around economic interaction and through international forums. Understanding how these relationships are developing and their wider consequences will be the focus of this area of research. It will provide international partners with valuable information to inform their engagement with the region.

Why are we focusing on these issues?

The Horn of Africa is one of the most volatile regions in the world and the next three years present a set of circumstances that could either worsen existing instability or offer opportunities for a more stable region. The emergence of a new state in South Sudan has altered regional dynamics and created what is currently an incendiary new international border. The increase in tension results from a failure to implement the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement before South Sudan’s independence. Demarcation of the North-South border and reaching a deal with Sudan on sharing oil revenues are arguably the most pressing issues. The Horn of Africa’s history serves as a warning of the potential danger to fledgling states. The optimism that followed Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993 was checked by a devastating border war between the two countries from 1998-2000, and hostilities remain today. Renewed war between Khartoum and Juba could lead to a military and humanitarian crisis that would eclipse what has been seen in Darfur.

In Somalia, the Transitional Federal Institutions, whose self-approved, extended mandates are drawing to a close at the end of August, have not achieved significant
positive impact within Somalia and have faced increasing internal and international disillusionment. Somaliland has emerged as a stable and relatively democratic entity but its future is far from secured, likewise the economic success of Djibouti is threatened by wars and disputes amongst its neighbors. The heavy military presence of Uganda, Burundi and now Kenya through AMISOM and recurrent Ethiopian incursions into Somalia demonstrate how the nations in the region are responding to perceived common security threats and cooperating as a security block, despite the lack of a common Peace and Security Policy. Regions evolve depending on common interests. Peace and security is emerging as the most pressing concern in the region and may be the driver of the future direction of regional integration.

Understanding the dynamics of the region continues to be of great importance to governments concerned with peace and stability. The threat of terrorism, as seen in Kampala in 2010 and with incidents in Nairobi this year, and the danger of diasporas from Europe and North America being drawn into conflicts in the region demonstrate that while the problems of the Horn may be geographically confined, the consequences are not. For example, in October 2011, Abdirhman Haji Abdallah from Cardiff got on a plane to bring his son and his friend home when they were captured crossing into Somalia from Kenya hoping to join al Shabaab.

The Horn of Africa suffers from interlinked disputes and conflicts, and so taking a regional view of the problems faced is crucial if realistic solutions are to be found. This project aims to provide policymakers at the local and international level with information and ideas that will allow for considered and effective international engagements for peace in the region.

How are we going to achieve our aims?

Chatham House has developed a reputation as an important place for individuals from the Horn to speak. So far this year we have convened 20 public meetings, roundtables and private briefings related to Horn countries. Our current work involves regular events at Chatham House in London, and our aim is to provide space to share new knowledge and inform policymakers on different perspectives.

Since the beginning of the year prominent speakers from the region have included Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, the Prime Minister of Somalia; Pagan Amum, SPLM Secretary-General and Chief Negotiator for South Sudan; HE Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda; and Jean Paul Adam and Joel Morgan, Foreign Minister and Minister for Home Affairs respectively, of the Republic of Seychelles. Last week Dr Lam Akol Ajawin, Leader of SPLM-DC, South Sudans main opposition party, gave his thoughts about democracy and pluralism and the most pressing internal issues for his country.
Later in the month Professor George Saitoti, Kenya’s Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, will be talking about some of the threats to East Africa’s security such as food insecurity, terrorism and piracy. We will also be holding an expert roundtable on *Turkey and the Horn of Africa: Emerging Interests and Relations* to explore where the Horn of Africa fits into Turkish foreign policy objectives and identify how Turkish engagement fits with the interests of leaders in the Horn region.

The project’s meeting series provides an important opportunity for policy makers to interact with members of the diaspora. Our public meetings have been very well attended by members of the diaspora communities and have benefited from their insights and recent experiences in the region. As part of the British government’s engagement with the Somali diaspora, and ahead of the government’s London Somalia Conference in February 2012, Rt Hon William Hague MP, UK Foreign Secretary, delivered a speech at Chatham House on UK and international engagement with Somalia, to an invited audience of key thinkers and activists within the UK Somali diaspora and UK officials. The summary report of this event produced by the Africa Programme was included in the delegate’s packs at the London Conference on Somalia.

**Conferences**

In 2012, the Horn project conference will focus on *South Sudan’s International Engagement*, aiming to identify how international actors can best engage with South Sudan as it establishes itself as an independent state and establishes new bilateral, multilateral and regional relations.

**Publications**

The Horn Project has published two papers this year so far. In January, Chatham House launched *Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy* by Anja Shortland. This programme paper seeks to understand the on-land impacts of piracy in order to suggest approaches to a land-based solution to Somali piracy. It uses recent forms of nightlife emissions and high resolution satellite imagery to look at the effects of piracy on the Somali economy and establish which groups benefit from ransoms.

*Peace, Bread and Land: Agricultural Investments in Ethiopia and Sudans* by our Associate Fellow, Jason Mosley was also published in January 2012. This briefing paper assesses the highly sensitive issue of foreign investment in land in the Horn, setting out the key trends and risks associated with recent developments. Focusing on Ethiopia, the author illustrates that land deals and large-scale agricultural investments are strategically situated in contested regions, to increase state control in areas with limited political influence and over populations with traditionally fluid
movements across borders. Jason Mosley finds that, in a region prone to violence, land deals have the potential to aggravate historically rooted local disputes, with implications for regional stability.

A significant project output for this project will be the major Chatham House report authored by Jason Mosley, on *Regional Bodies in the Horn*. This paper will examine the relations and rivalries between the AU, the EAC and IGAD. Regional organizations will continue to play a growing role in the Horn. Increasingly, the international community is looking to the AU and regional bodies to take a leading role on issues such as Peace and Security. This report will examine the economic, diplomatic, peacekeeping co-ordination (or lack of co-ordination) between regional bodies with overlapping remits in the Horn.

Linking up expertise and undertaking activities within interested European countries and in the region sits at the core of this project. With this in mind we aim to work more closely with contacts in Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands on areas of strategic importance such as the influence of the diaspora. Chatham House’s Horn of Africa work depends on an extensive network of collaborators and supporters, and we hope to build new relationships with other organizations and experts on the Horn of Africa.
Peace, Human Security & Sustainable Development through Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century: The Role of Ethiopia

Sisay Asefa

1. Introduction

In a conference of African Development Forum III held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on March 3-8, 2002 under a theme of “Defining Priorities for Regional Integration” a consensus was reached on the critical need for unity in Africa, as expressed in the following statement. “Unity is the overwhelming demand of Africans across the continent. Africa’s political and economic integration promises to fulfill the aspirations of Africans of all walks of life for unity”. This paper is based on the premise that a similar desire for unity and integration is present at the domestic or country level, and that political and economic integration and development must first take place in each African state before the dream of African integration and development can be realized. In other words, neither success in regional economic integration nor the achievement of African Union (AU) in practice is possible, before economic and political integration and development takes place at the domestic or country level. Moreover, successful and sustainable integration is only possible on firm institutional
foundation of economic development, democratic governance, and peace with justice at each individual African country level, a process which will take time. It is an evolutionary process that took European countries some 50 years of successful in internal or domestic level economic growth and development, before the European Union (EU) became a reality.

African states have recently committed themselves to a New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), an initiative aimed at rebuilding the Continent by attracting foreign domestic investment (FDI). This initiative has been compared to the Marshall plan for Europe. NEPAD has the potential to reverse the marginalization of African economies from the global economy, if external capital becomes available and domestic institutional environment, and capacity allows it be efficiently and equitably used. In order for NEPAD and regional related initiatives to succeed, they must be broadly embraced and owned by all constituent groups or stakeholders of individual African states such as civil society groups, intellectuals, farmers, the private sector, and trade union groups. The success of NEPAD initiative also depends on addressing the following key questions such as: Why Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular cannot attract FDI? What are the key policies needed to create the necessary or an enabling environment for FDI?

What does it take for African economies such as Ethiopia to achieve economic growth of at least 7 percent to significantly reduce poverty by half by 2015 aimed at improving the quality of life of the population? Significant flow of FDI that will reverse the de-capitalization of Africa is possible under an enabling economic environment. Such an environment only possible by enhancing efficiency, capability and effectiveness of governments aimed at improving the business climate, reducing transaction costs, and creating a transparent legal and regulatory framework that will promote private investment. Success in capacity building for policy implementation is also not possible without the proper democratic structural and institutional environment. The current reality is that Africa is globally marginalized due to various internal and external factors. The internal factors include the practice of misguided domestic policies and instability at state and regional levels, while the external factors include, the unequal global trade system which militates against the primary products and commodities that Africa produces.

The prices of the primary and mostly agricultural commodities such as coffee, tea, cocoa, and livestock products continue to decline due to lack of market access to industrial economies, who protect their agricultural sectors from imports. African economies are also faced with the challenge of diversifying their economies, to reverse the rising poverty and food insecurity and to become successful partners in the global and information economy.

The central thesis of the paper is that Ethiopia and the other African countries need to overcome internal challenges to economic and political development and democratic good governance before effective integration aimed at sustainable development and poverty reduction in the long run. The paper is divided into the following sections. Section 1. will provide the critical role economic and political freedom and good governance including various measures Governance, Freedom and Poverty,
Section 2 discusses the basic concepts of economic development and globalization, and economic integration, including an account of the extent of Africa’s integration into the global economy. Section 3 presents multilateral integration drives and recent regional integration efforts and experiences in Africa. Section 4 provides an econometric examination of Ethiopia’s trade link with other countries as a case study. The final section provides conclusions on the challenges and prospects for integration for Ethiopia with implications for other African economies.

Economic and Political Freedom and Good Governance

It is impossible for any country to achieve sustainable development and peace without Good Governance that promotes economic and political freedom. Good governance requires transparency and accountability to citizens. Governance quality of the Horn of Africa states in comparison of other African states they are behind. Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia are ruled by autocratic rulers that came to power by violent capture of power with little legitimacy among citizens. The state of Somalia collapsed by abuse of power of former dictator Seid Barre who bombed northern Somalis that led to collapse of Somali state by clan conflict. Eritrea after breaking away from Ethiopia in 1993 became a rogue state that represses freedom of its people. After Military Dictatorship of Colonel Mengistu, the TPLF/EPRDF moved Ethiopia’s political development backward into tribal territories from the top down. Transparency International correctly categorizes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti as “Not Free”. The other states of the Greater Horn such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are labeled as “Party Free” as well as Nigeria, The only countries labeled are Botswana and Ghana due to its democratic governance and peaceful democratic transition of heads of states through free elections. The other measures of governance such as level of corruption, and Ibrahim Governance Index show evidence of poor governance correlated with poverty. For example, in spite of claim of high Growth by current Ethiopian Regime, Ethiopia’s Multipoverty Index (MPI) is among the worst in Africa at level of 56%. The primary reason for lack of political and economic freedom is the ethnocratic dictatorial rule that uses Ethnicity as a political instrument of divide and rule policy imposed from the top down, practiced under the Apartheid South Africa before 1994.

Ethiopia lost the opportunity to be federalized under the 14 provinces that had cultural, economic and historical basis when TPLF/EPRDF captured state power in 1991. This type of governance is unsustainable and is likely to collapse or implode just like previous dictatorship of Colonel Mengistu collapsed in 1991. Colonel Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe given shelter by another African state destroyed by one man rule Robert Mugabe. Zimbabwe is saddest African case where one of most educated citizens is today in shambles by one man rule that ruled too long, while Zimbabwe’s neighbor Botswana in the south, is vibrant African democracy.
Comparative Freedom, Development & Poverty Indicators of Horn and other African states: 2011

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FH/(Rank)</th>
<th>HDI(Rank)</th>
<th>CPI (Corruption/ Rank)</th>
<th>IBX (%)/Rank</th>
<th>Poverty line/(MPI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>51(144)</td>
<td>0.36 (174)</td>
<td>2.7 (120)</td>
<td>46 (34)</td>
<td>39% (MPI=56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>7 (176)</td>
<td>0.35 (177)</td>
<td>2.5 (134)</td>
<td>35 (47)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>0.41 (169)</td>
<td>1.6 (177)</td>
<td>48 (33)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.0 (182)</td>
<td>8 (53)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>55(125)</td>
<td>0.43 (165)</td>
<td>3.0 (100)</td>
<td>49 (29)</td>
<td>19% (MPI=29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>59 (95)</td>
<td>0.54 (118)</td>
<td>3.9(69)</td>
<td>72 (6)</td>
<td>30% (MPI=31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>57 (106)</td>
<td>0.51 (143)</td>
<td>2.2 (154)</td>
<td>53 (23)</td>
<td>20%(MPI=49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>69(40)</td>
<td>0.63 (118)</td>
<td>7.6 (32)</td>
<td>76 (3)</td>
<td>30 (MPI=NA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>57(108)</td>
<td>0.47 (152)</td>
<td>3.0 (100)</td>
<td>58 (13)</td>
<td>33% (MPI=37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>56.7(111)</td>
<td>0.46 (156)</td>
<td>2.4 (143)</td>
<td>41 (41)</td>
<td>64% (MPI=31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>62(80)</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2.4 (143)</td>
<td>55(20)</td>
<td>29% (MPI=37%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Human Development Index (HDI) Ranges: 0.7-1.00 (High), (0.52-0.69) (medium), (0.29-0.51) Low: Only Botswana and Ghana are in medium HDI range. The rest are all in low HDI based on ranges given above.

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Ranges: 10 (zero corruption) and CPI=1:00 (100% corrupt). CPI ranking is (1 to 182). The world is New Zealand at CPI=9.5, Denmark, & Finland among top three least corrupt states. North Korea and Somalia tie the most corrupt at CPI=182 (tie)

The Ibrahim Index (IBX) of African Governance score (0 to 100%) and the ranks African states from 1 to 53. Based on IBX, Botswana is best governed ranking #3, followed by Ghana ranking #7. Ethiopia ranks #34 and Eritrea ranks #47 followed by Sudan at #48. Somalia ranks 53rd or last as collapsed state. In Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) measure, Ethiopia is the poorest at MPI at 56%.

Economic Freedom is measured by Freedom House (FH) that calculates overall score Economic Freedom of countries that comprises of business, Trade, Fiscal, Financial, Property rights, labor and Freedom from Corruption shows overall score rank of 174 for Ethiopia compared to Botswana (40), Kenya (57), Uganda (62) and Tanzania (57). Eritrea is ranked at 176 out of 179 countries in 2009. Interactive Freedom map can be accessed at website: http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa. FH also classifies Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia as Not Free (NF), but Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya as partly Free (PF) and Botswana and Ghana as Free (F)
Economic Development, Globalization, & Regional Integration Issues in Africa

Economic Development is defined as a sustained increase in per capita income that involves a significant number of a country’s population engaged in producing that income. Broadly conceived, economic development deals with the socio-economic, political, and institutional mechanisms needed to bring about a significant reduction of poverty in a country.

It comprises of economic growth and structural change. Structural Change refers to economic diversification that enables the participation of the majority of a nation’s population. Historically, structural change involved a gradual movement of people from agriculture to other sectors of the economy as economies diversify. For example, about 100 years ago some 50% of the U.S. population was in agriculture, while today less than 2% of it is engaged in farming, and produce enough to feed the rest of the Country’s population as well as for exports and food aid.

This is a direct result of increases agricultural productivity made possible by technical and institutional changes supported by appropriate public and private investment in agriculture.

What is globalization? Globalization is a somewhat charged term, and means different things to different people. It can be defined as a rising economic activity in the world among people who live in different countries. It involves cross-national border economic activities and transactions that takes three forms: growth in international Trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and capital markets or financial flows. The growth in international trade involves imports and exports of goods and services, primarily among industrial nations of the world but increasingly among developing economies. The share of trade (exports + imports) among Industrial Countries (ICs), the share rose from 27% to 40% between 1987-1997, and among developing countries (DCs) rose from 10% to 17% during the same period. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) refers to cross-country investments, which has tripled from 1988 to 1998. Developing countries received about 25% of the FDI inflows during this period, making FDI to be the largest form of private capital inflow to developing countries. FDI will be increasingly important for economies like Ethiopia as a major form of attracting capital in the future. Africa’s current share of FDI is about 1% and that of trade is 2%, both of which need to increase if the Continent is to effectively participate in the global and information economy. Capital or Financial market flows refer to the means by which people across nations save and invest through increasingly diversified portfolio that includes various foreign assets (bonds, equities, loans), and borrow from foreign sources. International financial markets are more volatile than FDI, although such inflows to developing economies have risen sharply in the 1990s.

The liberalization of financial or capital markets under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank has adverse impacts on African countries. It increases investor risk.
by leading investors to demand a higher risk premium in the form of higher than normal profits.

One of the most adverse effects of globalization has arisen from the liberalization of financial markets. This has led some economies to be victims of hot money pouring into a poor country that fuels speculative real-estate booms followed by a quick financial flight, as soon as investor’s confidence and sentiments changes (Stiglitz, 2001). On the other hand, those countries that have managed globalization on their own have greatly benefited from it. The economic success of East Asian economies is based on sharing the benefits of global markets from exports in their societies through investment on human capital, physical infrastructure, and poverty reduction. East Asian countries also took advantage of the globalization of knowledge and information by closing the global gap in knowledge and technology. Thus, the problem is not with globalization, but how it has been managed or governed with a human face. Properly managed and governed, international trade and FDI have a great potential to contribute to economic development and poverty reduction (ibid). As the home of the largest number of low per capital income and one of the highest incidences of absolute poverty in the World, Africa can significantly gain from trade and investment aspects of globalization.

Globalization is also driven by increasing internationalization of production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. In this sense, globalization is increasingly becoming part of everyday economic life as more and more people participate in the global economy by consuming various traded goods and services. The challenge is to enable the income and productive employment generation of the majority of Africans, and to widen the benefits so they can also participate in the global economy as customers and producers or exporters. In addition to its potential benefits, globalization has undesirable aspects such as cultural homogenization, environmental problems, the spread of global terrorism, and even more poverty and inequality in the short-run, if its effects are poorly managed or governed. But, an effective and equitable national and regional development strategy can mitigate these darker sides of globalization through appropriate policy instruments and regulations. These elements can also regarded as the costs of globalization, which otherwise has a great potential to reduce poverty, if properly managed and not imposed by international development agencies such as the IMF and World Bank. Indeed, there is a critical need to govern globalization in order to create a global economy aimed at promoting global social justice and reducing absolute poverty in low-income countries such as Ethiopia.

The Total volume of world trade has been increasing since the globalization drive in the late 1980s. Most developing countries of Asia took the advantage of globalization by diversifying their economies and becoming more competitive in world markets. In spite of a promising start in the post independence period of the 1960s and early 1970s, Africa economies experienced a decline in the 1980s, a period which has been termed “Africa’s lost decade”. In the 1960s, African economies were experiencing an average growth of 5 to 6 percent. In 1960-75, 10 to 15 percent of GDP was accounted for by manufacturing industries. Today, Africa’s industrial contribution
is less than 5 percent, and the Continent has gone through massive process of de-industrialization and de-capitalization.

The liberalization imposed by structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the Britton Woods Institutions opened African markets to manufacturing imports from Industrial Countries, inhibiting the infant African industries to compete. In spite of the waves of economic reforms and democratization that began in early 1990s, the share of Africa in the global economy is has been declining. The prices of primary products in which African economies have comparative advantage, and the volume of production and export has also been declining due to a combination of internal structural problems and external factors. With the exception of few countries that show an increasing trend in the export of partially processed manufactured goods, most African countries are exporters of traditional agricultural primary products. Although many African states have comparative advantage in primary products most of which are agricultural commodities, economic development and global competitiveness cannot be achieved without economic diversification.

Economic integration involves regional trade agreements (RTAs) among countries in defined geographic areas aimed at facilitating greater trade and factor flows by reducing trade barriers among the member states. There are various levels and degrees of integration, involving four stages: Free Trade Agreements, Customs Union, Common Markets, and Economic Union. A free trade agreement is the simplest kind of formal agreement. A customs union involves a free trade areas plus a common set of tariffs toward nonmembers. A Common market is a customs union combined with free mobility of labor and capital. Economic union is the final stage of economic integration which involves a common market plus coordinated macro-economic policies such as currency and harmonization of standards and regulations.

Economic integration can also be shallow or deep. Shallow Integration involves changes in the rules of trade at the border such as reduction in tariffs, quotas and customs procedure among members. Deep Integration, is a more recent form of integration that goes beyond border-related trade matters and involves harmonizing or adopting similar rules and mutual recognition. Africa has a large number of regional economic groups, many of which have been created since the 1990 Abuja Treaty. In spite of strong political impetus and rhetoric for integration, the results of economic integration has been disappointing so far. Actual trade among African states is very minimal despite the large number of regional integration agreements established during the last half the century. This lack of intra-African trade is related to the lack of physical infrastructure, and other inherent institutional and structural features that hinder intra-regional trade.

Moreover, the import and export patterns make African economies less complementary to justify large-scale trade among each other. Even in areas of where trade complementarity exists, differences in language, currency convertibility, and inadequate institutions, and poor infrastructure impede regional trade in Africa.

For example, between 1970-1999, only three regional trade blocks show an increase in intra-regional trade out of some 18 overlapping regional trade blocks in Africa: These are: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
Southern African Development Community (SADC), and West African Economic Community and Monetary Union (UEMOA). The three trading blocks are relatively better integrated in Africa (Table 1). SADC went significant changes in the 1990s. ECOWAS is an umbrella group of 16 West African countries which includes the Union Economique et Monetaire Quest-Africaine (UEMOA), a group of francophone states that belong to the CFA zone. However, even for these relatively more successful regional trading blocs, total export as a percentage of world exports has declined steadily. Others such as the 20-country regional trading agreement known as Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are more recent. Each of the 54 African states are currently a member of at least one regional trade agreement. Many are members two or three trading blocs at the same time.

In spite of the potential comparative advantage in the production of primary and agricultural commodities, African economies are experiencing a deteriorating terms of trade.

Africa is also hindered from taking full advantage of the comparative advantage due to lack of market access imposed by industrial countries of the North to their primary exports. One issue here is to what extent is the comparative advantage of each country is complements regional integration.

For economic integration to be beneficial for countries involved, member states must experience economic growth in their own right. Individual states must have their house in order. The Nigerian economist, Professor Adedeji who is a leading proponent of economic integration in Africa puts the prospects of integration as follows: “First you must have a dynamic state. If you have a stagnant, contracting state, forget about regional integration. When a state finds itself in a crisis, it does not see beyond its nose. If you can’t provide enough transport facilities at home, how can you be thinking of West African or pan-African transport facilities?…”

There are African states that can’t even pay the salaries of their civil servants. How can you expect them …...to contribute to regional organizations. …...If you look at the 1950 to 1970s, the European economies were moving fast, expanding. Therefore, the environment for regional integration was there. That is what has been absent in Africa. We do not have an enabling environment for integration, because of we have stagnant or declining economies.”

The index of trade complementarity of a sample SSA countries shows significant only for a very few countries. If regional integration within the SSA is not beneficial, in terms of its potential for future success and welfare improvement for an African economy, it may be worthy to pursue trade liberalization agreement with other countries outside the Continent. For example, it may be beneficial for African economies to open up markets for the developed countries and in return get access to markets and technology of those countries.

Access to the markets of industrial countries for the export of African primary and partially processed agricultural products is essential. However, polices that these countries follow to protect their agriculture makes it difficult for Africa to gain market access. Currently, the presence of Africa in the multilateral trade negotiation under WTO is insignificant. Only South Africa and Nigeria have a significant presence
in the WTO, and about 20 African states has no presence or representation in WTO trade negotiations.

The flows of capital and FDI are important areas that needs to be investigated in terms of the potential benefits and costs to the member countries in regional integration. Capital flows in the form of FDI is long-term investment and cannot easily be reversed once it is established in a better off country in a region. This implies that relatively poorer countries in RTA may not benefit due to the diversion of investment in the region to those better off member states. This may require designing some compensation schemes to address the issue of uneven distribution of benefits of FDI flows to a regional trading block. Most of the literature on economic regionalism and multilateralism focus on the role that trade plays in enhancing economic growth. The impact of investment from within the region or from outside regional block is not well understood. There is also some apprehension by an individual country in a given regional block towards the role of foreign investment.

The share of intra-regional capital flow in Africa is not significant. But, the share of capital outflow or capital flight from Africa is growing in recent years, most of which goes to Asia and developed economies.

Moreover, according to recent World Investment Report, the total FDI outflows from Africa declined in 2001 by $2.5 billion compared with $1.4 billion outflow in 2000. The report shows a negative FDI inflow (more inflows than outflows) for the first time in the past 30 years. A few countries have contributed to the capital outflows.

The top ten countries with the highest FDI outflows are, Nigeria, Morocco, Libya, Kenya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana, Gabon, Cote divorie, and Mali. Even though there are flows of FDI within African economies show an improvement, it is not clear as to how much of the recent decline in outflow from the region is due to within region capital flow. Capital flight from African economies is the other side of the coin. There are studies that show huge inflows of external debt. There is also larger capital flight than the external debt that SSA is currently experiencing. Economic and political reasons are identified as causes for the capital flight (Boyce and Ndikuman, 2001). There is a large magnitude of capital flight observed for a group of African economies. Is this a real concern for policy makers in these countries? What is the role of regional integration and multilateralism in affecting capital flight? What is needed is an enabling institutional environment to attract for foreign capital. But, Africa is marginalized in terms of capital flow due to several factors such as high political and economic risk. The basic determinants of FDI such as stable political environment, market size, dynamic growth, and good infrastructure are missing. There is also general a consensus among scholars that the most critical element impediment to attracting FDI is the absence of governance that is capable and effective in designing appropriate economic policies. Building confidence to attract private investment takes time, and it will not get easier in an increasingly integrated and competitive global economy.

Another measure of the degree of integration into the global markets is the movement of labor across borders. One of the gains from international migrations for developing countries is the flow of financial capital in the form of remittance. But, there
is no evidence that Africa is benefiting significantly from remittances of its Diaspora population. Capital flight also includes the flight of human capital or the brain drain. A large number of highly trained and skilled Africans live in Western countries, and are not going back to their countries due to unfavorable political and economic environment, and lack of economic opportunities in their native countries.

One of the requirements for the successful economic integration is the free flow of labor and capital. But, many African countries have policies that discourage a free mobility of labors within and among countries in search of better jobs and opportunities. Much of the flow of labor is forced migration due to push factors such as political conflict, civil conflict, economic and political instability in various countries. There is no significant cross-border labor mobility in search of opportunity within Africa. Labor migrations are motivated by search for better opportunities. But, for most African states there is no economic benefit from migration with a few exceptions. There is tendency of labor flow from relatively poor countries to countries with large mining sectors that need more unskilled labor, such as the migration of labor to a wealthier and better managed economy of Botswana from poorer and mismanaged economies of African states.

Multinational and Regional Agreements and Initiatives in Africa

Under the United Nations Programs for Africa, five institutions have special targeted programs to promote growth of African economies. These are: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition to providing temporary financial assistance to African countries, the IMF is also increasingly engaged on the issues of poverty in the context of the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiatives, which began in 1996. The plan is to reduce poverty through debt relief in collaboration with World Bank. The IFC is engaged in assisting member countries in promoting indigenous enterprises, improving the investment climate, and enhancing capacity. The World Bank provides loans for medium to long-term adjustment of economies focused on structural and financial sector reforms, social policy reforms improved public sector resource management, reducing poverty and improved governance in Africa. MIGA works with the rest of the World Bank Group to formulate and integrated approach to private sector development. It provides hands-on support needed by African investment promotion agencies to identify and attract foreign investors. WTO provides technical cooperation to help African policy makers understand the WTO agreements and expand their capacity to use the multilateral trading system in order to advance their economic growth and to meet their development objectives.
WTO also collaborates with other international organizations in providing technical assistance to African and the developing countries. In spite of such efforts, the principle under which these institutions operate to provide financial and technical assistance is problematic. The adoption of one size fits all of free market approach also known, as the Washington Consensus appears to be inadequate to help these countries to move toward sustainable growth. The development problem of African economies is multi-dimensional involving economic, social, political and institutional factors. There are interrelated problems that require a coordinated effort involving national, regional and global partnerships. The crucial area of democratic institutional development is not considered by these multi-lateral development agencies.

What role do these international development agencies and initiatives play in addressing the problem that African economies faces due to globalization and regional integration? The flow of aid, grants and loans needed to finance development projects is commended. However, monitoring and evaluation of these funds is not stressed enough to see the proposed effects of the money on African people. One of the key policy questions in this regard is: What role can African people and civil society groups play in mounting the pressure and voicing their bargaining power to negotiate on the areas that most benefit the people? In addition to the multi-lateral efforts, these North-South initiatives are intend to strengthen the trade and investment like under agreements such as NEPAD aimed at attracting capital to African economies. An important issue is whether the current wave regional integration in Africa is complementary with globalization in the context of African economies. Can African economies benefit more from multinational agreements by integrating regionally? There is no simple answer to this question, although from the perspective of African states, regional integration has a potential to strengthen their bargaining power in multi-lateral negotiations (Teshome, 1998). Moreover, for the smaller African economies, regional integration has the potential to provide the momentum needed to help them to integrate and to benefit from global markets (Foroutan 1998).

On the other hand, regional integration may also create another layer of protection to inefficient firms and makes it difficult for these economies to competitive in the global economy or to benefit from multilateral negotiations. Geared to overcome the economic disadvantages of fragmentation, African countries have created a large number of regional trading blocs most of which have come to existence since 1990s, aimed at enhancing self-reliance through economic cooperation. To date, there are 14 RECs of varying stage, scope and objectives. The RECs and their membership number and inception dates include: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU, 1989, 5 members), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, 1995 formerly PTA, 1981, 20 members), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS,10 members), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, 1975, 15 members), Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1992, 14 members), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, 7 members). Most countries in the continent belong to two or more blocks. Of the 53 African countries, 27 are members of two RECs and 18 others are members of three RECs. For example, one country (DR Congo) is member of four RECs.
Only seven countries belong to one REC (ECA, 2002). Although the ultimate goal of the establishment of these regional cooperation schemes is aimed at enhancing economic and political unity in Africa, the formation of the RECS is also focused on the need to strengthen regional political stability.

The recent establishment of the African Union (AU) that recently replaced Organization of African Union (OAU) is believed to be a positive step for economic and political integration. But, Africa has a long way to get there. First, individual countries need to get their own house in order to achieve a sustainable and stable form of democratic governance that can lead to a dynamic and poverty-focused economic growth. This is a critical requirement to create a successful regional economic cooperation and political/economic union in Africa. A key challenge is that of building a sustainable democratic institutional foundation and the rule of law at country and regional level that can enforce any economic and political agreements reached on by the domestic and regional constituents and stakeholders. The number of organizations and guidelines on paper does not really matter. What matters is the presence of the domestic structural institutional environment based on checks and balances, and separation of power agreed upon by the stake holders such as civil society groups, farmers, traders, government, following an open dialogue on policy issues at each country level. African states must first get democratic institutions right before they can succeed in getting policies right to support free and dynamic market economies.

The concentration of power has allowed authoritarian states of various ideological persuasion to mismanage the economic and human resources of Africa. As a result, the peoples of Africa have suffered so long and they continue to do so with varying degrees.

Ethiopia’s Economic Relations with the Horn and other African economies

Ethiopia is a country with a significant resource wealth potential. It is strategically located in the Horn of Africa, as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. With a population of about 80 million, it is the second most populated country in Africa that can serve as focal point for economic and regional integration in the region, with a potential to be a major source of investment destination for exports in the Middle East under enabling policy environment.

In spite of disappointing experiences with regional integration in Africa, what are the potential gains for Ethiopia from region integration? This section provides some empirical determinants of Ethiopia’s bilateral trade with other African economies. Table 6 of the appendix shows Ethiopia’s trade partners in Africa, where the mean values of imports and exports over the period 1976-1998 are reported. Not surpris-
ingly, the Country's export and import partners are different. This is due to the nature of goods that Ethiopia imports (manufactured and finished durable goods) and exports (agricultural raw materials). An important question is whether these products reflect the comparative advantages of Ethiopia. Exports that has revealed comparative advantage in terms of its trade with the rest of Africa. But, Ethiopia needs to focus more on the processing of its primarily agricultural raw products to add value and to benefit from the regional trade. Ethiopia must also push forward to diversify its exports and enhance its manufacturing capability in addition to processing its exports such Livestock into value added products such as leather, shoes, purses, leather coats, belts, etc. Currently live cattle are exports to other Horn States and the Middle East. Based on the trade data, Djibouti, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria and Egypt top the list of countries that serve as destinations of Ethiopia’s exports. On the hand, the origins of Ethiopia’s imports are from Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea and Zimbabwe. Over the period considered in this study, Ethiopia seems to have more import trade partners outside Africa, and greater imports compared to exports within the region. Ethiopia’s products are more destined to North African and Arab speaking countries. An important issue is whether Ethiopia can benefit from membership in regional integration schemes such as COMESA and IGAD.

Concluding Remarks: Challenges and Prospects for Peace, Sustainable Development through regional integration in the Horn of Africa

What lessens can be learnt from the experiences and trends of regional integration in Africa in particular, and the globalization of world economy in general? Ethiopia, most populated and diverse county needs to overcome internal institutional challenges that retard domestic political and economic integration, in order to capture the benefits of regional integration and globalization. Ethiopia also needs to diversify its economy and to enhance its export competitiveness in order to exploit its comparative advantage from regional and global trade.

Evidence shows Ethiopia is far behind in terms of trade diversification and processing of export commodities, in order to fully exploit its comparative advantage.

What should Ethiopia do to successfully integrate and benefit from globalization and regional integration? First, Ethiopia and other African states should pursue vigorous broad based economic growth aimed at economic diversification away from the dependence on a few unprocessed primary products such as Coffee and other agricultural commodities. It must also continue to improve its policy environment that integrates its own internal economic and institutional structure, aimed at creating a dynamic economy. To try to pursue regional integration before this happens will be like putting the horse before the cart, since the achievement of a dynamically
integrated and growing economy is a necessary condition for any country to benefit from regional integration and globalization.

In general, four broad policy areas are required to build a dynamic economy in Ethiopia and other African states to enable a viable economic integration and development in the long run: 1. Strengthen democratic institutions of governance and conflict management, 2. Invest on people (i.e. on education, health, and on combating HIV/AIDS pandemic), 3. Diversify exports aimed at enhancing global and regional trade competitiveness, 4. Foster partnerships, reduce debt and dependency on foreign aid and promote private investment. These are interrelated development policy areas that complement each other. If vigorously pursued and properly implemented, they are likely to lead to an equitable economic growth necessary to reduce poverty and to reach the other components of the Millennium Global Development Goals by 2015.

Specifically, Ethiopia must undertake policy reforms that will lead to peaceful and orderly move to democratization on a non-ethnic basis and adopt system of land policy that provides a greater security of land aimed at improving agricultural production, reducing poverty, and food insecurity, and protecting natural resources. These reforms must be based on an open and inclusive policy dialogue among all stakeholders such as civil society groups, farmers, the business community, and policy makers.

One of the major independent private magazines in Ethiopia, the Reporter speaks to this point in its recent editorial entitled, “First things first” as follows:

“As we have repeatedly stated, what really actuates our economic development is the behavior of the government towards business people and the policies pursued by it in that sector. Our success in joining the benefits of COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), and ADB (African Development Bank) hinges on strengthening our domestic market. Otherwise, we would never be able to benefit from whatever advantages we have through these organizations ……..

Before committing ourselves to work with COMESA, IGAD, and ADB, we need to do some house cleaning. There is no point in talking about foreign engagement without strengthening internal aspects except perhaps, and empty showing off to the IMF/WB and the developed world.”

The 21st century is the era of knowledge-based and information economies. Ethiopia needs to investment in quality education, research and human capital development at all levels, on order to avoid being marginalized from the global and information economy. Such investment must also include the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that can be used for technology and knowledge transfer in the areas of education and research. Greater competition within the private sector should be promoted, and the use of satellite technology should be accessible to businesses, individuals and institutions of higher education and research, in order to take advantages of the benefits of information technology.

For example, the development of private institutions of higher education in Ethiopia is a promising start, but it must be combined with a serious public support
and commitment to the public national universities such as Addis Ababa University as well as the various regional universities and colleges.

The investment on human capital and knowledge must include the institutions of *agricultural knowledge triangle*\(^1\) that comprises of three interlinked institutions (teaching, research, and extension) needed to transform the Country’s agriculture aimed at reducing poverty and achieving sustainable level of economic development.

In spite of the desirable claim of current policy focus on agriculture and the rural economy, Ethiopia’s agriculture cannot be transformed without a massive injection of capital to agriculture aimed at diversifying the economy. The primary impediments of the economic transformation and diversification required to win the battle of reducing poverty, food insecurity and recurrent famines are primarily structural and institutional. The most important of these constraints are land insecurity that discourages investment on land and agriculture, and a unique form of decentralization based on ethnicity that retards the mobility of labor and capital. Moreover, the “brain drain” (international out-migration of professionals) is a special challenge for Ethiopia and several African states such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. For example, Ethiopia loses professionals in medicine and scientists to countries such as Botswana. It is estimated that there are more African scientists and engineers in the United States than there are in the whole of Africa, and some 300,000 professional live and work in Europe and North America. On the other hand, some 100,000 expatriates (some without qualification) replace the loss of professionals at the cost of about $4 billion to Africa. (Shinn, 2002)

The reasons for brain drain include “push” factors (low opportunities, low pay, inadequate work environment, and lack of political freedom, etc.. at home), and “pull” factors (higher salaries, greater opportunities for professional advance, and better educational and employment opportunities for migrants and their families, etc..). While there is not much that can be done about the “pull” factors, a great deal can be done about the “push” factors. For example, a young Ethiopian professional is unlikely to leave his/her $50,000 a year job in the US and return home to work for $500 a year in Ethiopia. But, some targeted improvements can be made on the “push” factors. In the long run, improvements in the “push” factors would require institutional reforms aimed at valuing, rewarding skilled professionals in particular, and creating an enabling environment for growing dynamic economies in general. In the short run, simple initiatives such as subsidized decent housing, making research funds available, improving Internet connectivity, and improving learning, teaching, and research environment can go a long way in getting the benefits of migrant professionals. Improvements in the quality of primary, secondary, and university education can also retain young professionals. Significant improvement in health and medical services is crucial, in attracting professionals at near or at retirement age to return home, and to make significant contribution in various areas.

\(^1\) For full discussion of the term "agriculture knowledge triangle" see Institutions and the African Farmer, by Carl K.Eicher Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), 1999.
There have been some recent initiatives in using information technology to move from the “brain drain” to “brain gain”. One recent initiative is the African Virtual University (AVU), which is an independent non-profit organization located in Nairobi, Kenya that began in 1997 as “university without walls”. AVU uses Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to provide direct access to high quality education. It is estimated that more than 24,000 students have completed a semester long courses in technology, business and the sciences, and over 3500 professional have attended management seminars.

It is reported that 21 African universities in 11 countries are involved in this collaborative effort, and Addis Ababa University is among 5 partner institutions selected to run the computer science degree (Shinn, 2002). There are also some efforts at individual state level. The Ghanaian Diaspora has created a Ghana Distance Learning and Computer Literacy Program, with full support from the Government. Ghanians remit about $400 million to the national economy of Ghana, constituting the 4th largest source of foreign exchange (Shinn, 2002). Nigeria has established the office of Special Assistant to the President on Diaspora Activities to tap the talents of its large Diaspora population.

Nigerian Diaspora in order to engage in a serious dialogue during his overseas travels (ibid), some of which can contribute to policy changes or improvements in Nigeria. Ethiopia can also take some of these initiatives.

But, for Ethiopia to take advantages of the benefits of its skilled professionals from overseas requires the need to take responsibility both by the Government and the Diaspora. It is also necessary for the government to remove some of the inhibiting policies such as the tribal or ethnic politics that discourage the contribution of the Diaspora population that can be regarded as a potential source of financial and human capital.

Whether Ethiopia and Horn Economies can create a dynamic domestic economy that can enable it to benefit from regional integration, globalization including the brain drain, primarily depends on whether it can face up to the challenge of peaceful and democratic removal of the Country’s institutional and structural road blocks to freedom and progress. Sustainable cannot possible without freedom as Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has explained in his book entitled Development As Freedom.

Final Remarks on role of Ethiopia in peace and progress of the Horn

Ethiopia is key country by virtue of its long history, demographic power of 90 million, and cultural and religious diversity, that can be a great strength as well as natural wealth including a huge potential in agriculture and livestock in the Horn. But, it is not there yet due to dysfunction politics and leadership that appears to move
backward in political and social progress including in human rights record. Ethiopia needs to get a government that its great people deserve. Ethiopia includes all the peoples of the Horn including large number of Somalis estimated to be the 3rd linguistic group and with half of its population who are Muslims. Ethiopian needs a regime that respects its people's freedom in the areas of freedom of expression, religion and other freedoms such economic and political including free movement of people in search improvement. If Ethiopia fails and does not get a democratic government in the near future, there will no peace and progress in the entire Horn of Africa and beyond, since autocratic government cannot lead effective regional integration in the Horn of Africa toward peace and sustainable development for the benefit of all.

References

Sen, Amartya: Development as Freedom,
Towards the Abolition of African Official Armies

Abdullahi Osman El-Tom

Introduction

In this article, and taking the case of Sudan as an example, I argue that African governments should simply disband their armies. The reasons are plain and simple. These official armies are founded on erroneous politico-cultural convictions – namely that without them, the country would be gobbled up by hostile neighbours. However, Africa’s post-colonial history has shown the inability of official armies to protect political borders.

Having failed to carry out their mandate of protecting political borders, these armies have become a real menace to democratic evolution in the continent. Almost every single African country has horrific stories to tell about official armies sidestepping their mandate to become involved in topping elected governments, meddling in politics, committing massacres, rape and harassing the very citizens they are meant to protect.

The article argues that Africa is better off without its official armies. While border conflicts can be addressed through different channels, politics, maintenance of law and order and protection of constitutions all lie outside the mandates of official armies. Africa has nothing to lose and a lot to gain by getting rid of its official armies. Meagre resources that are now spent on weapons, most of which become obsolete before their use can be rechanneled for better use in education, housing, food and medicine.

Why Armies?

It is a common held view in many parts of the world that war is part and parcel of humanity, that a modern nation-state must have an army to protect it against hostile outsiders. Almost every country on earth now possesses an army with the exception of less than 20 nation-states, many of whom are too small to warrant the term “country/state”. These views are misconceived and are part of our unfortunate modern
cultural heritage. As a matter of fact, war, as distinct from homicide and feud, is an oddity throughout perhaps 99% of human existence (Fry 2007:70).

Institutions of war, including professional armies, have also been absent through most of human history. Scanning through 50,000 years of the history of modern humans, the first professional armies appeared along with clear evidence of war only 1200 to 9000 years B.C. in River Nile Sudan and some parts of the Near East (Ibid:53, 56). There can be no doubt that conflicts exist in all societies, past and present. Nonetheless, it is a fact that humankind is not innately violent as the erroneous term “warrior man” presupposes. Far from it, history shows that mankind gravitates towards peaceful co-existence and has, over the centuries, evolved imaginative non-lethal ways of settling their differences. The image of “man, the warrior” is a product of unfortunate modern western cultural discourse, itself responsible for generating a portrait that glorifies war and celebrates violence.

Let us leap-frog through history and come to modern times in which it is assumed within an almost global wisdom package that a nation-state must have an official professional army whose prime function is to protect borders from external threats and a police force to maintain law and order within the country. I have no problem with the need for a police force but I prefer to limit my focus here on the army as such.

The British recolonized Sudan in 1898. The colonisation of Sudan itself was an embarrassing part of the history of the country, necessitating the collaboration of many Sudanese, some of whom later masqueraded as protectors of Sudan’s nationhood. Throughout the last colonial period of 1898-1956, a national army was formed for the purpose of protecting British colonial rule over Sudan and certainly not for serving the interests of the Sudanese people as such. I must concede here that Sudan was no exception to other European African colonies whose armies excelled and sacrificed their lives to subjugate their own people; not a glorious history for any institution. In 1958, the Sudan Military Academy was established, mainly to train senior national army officers to replace the then over-stretched and departing British personnel (El-Tom 2012). Following independence in 1956, graduating officers filled out the vacuum left by British officers while maintaining the same distance from the average Sudanese citizen. Their new jobs reflected only a little shift, from supporting colonial rule to propping up the power of a narrow based elite, the new rulers of independent Sudan.

Sudan now has one of the biggest armies in Africa, trailing only behind Algeria, Angola, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa (SIPRI 2010). The Sudan Armed Force (SAF) is 110,000 strong, and as if that is not enough, it is backed by perhaps 40-50,000 personnel of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Popular Defence Force (PDF). Recent ethnicisation of Sudan’s politics has done away with the national composition of the country’s regular forces. Much more so than the SAF, the NSA is now strongly controlled by a handful of ethnic groups from River Nile Sudan. This aspect of the NSA came to the forefront during the JEM invasion of Omdurman in 2008, when the NSA successfully defended the capital to the total exclusion of the SAF.

Since its independence, Sudan has been acquiring every conceivable military arsenal from every corner of the globe: USA, Russia, Germany, UK, Iran, South Africa
and now China. Recently, Sudan has gone on to develop its own Military Industry Corporation at a huge cost to its impoverished population (MIC), an establishment that has risen to become a jewel of pride for Al-Bashir, the current President of Sudan. In a recent visit to the MIC HQ, instead of detailing his achievements in what benefits his own people, Al-Bashir lauded the MIC and its success in achieving military self-sufficiency in conventional weapons such as ammunition, machine guns, mortars, artillery, rockets and armoured vehicles and tanks. The President of a country that subsists on foreign aid told his people with pride that their nation is now manufacturing (assembling) un-manned military airplanes.

Given the poverty of Sudan, the cost of keeping an official army is colossal to say the least. Just prior to the disruption of its oil flow, Sudan had been spending 60% of its oil revenue on security. In 2011, Sudan spent a whopping $2.8 billion on defence, amounting to 3% GDP, while its allocations for health and water did not exceed 1.6% and 0.3% GDP respectively (El-Tom 2008;Seisi 2007). With all of this colossal expenditure on armaments, Sudan’s name remains synonymous with famine, poverty, starvation and food aid.

As we mentioned earlier, the prime job of the army is to safeguard political borders against foreign intruders. Measured in terms of delivery on this mandate, the SAF have so far demonstrated their astounding failure to retrieve even an inch of territories “illegally” occupied by Sudan’s neighbours. As matter of fact, clumsy decolonisation of Africa left the continent with many zones whose status are yet to be established. It is therefore necessary to refer to these zones as “disputed” rather than “occupied” territories. However, and following Sudan’s official logic, the country has several territories allegedly occupied by its neighbours and that have remained so despite the periodic threat of Khartoum to resort to war. Sudan’s disputed lands are numerous but the most publicised of them are, Red Sea Halaib and Wadi Halfa Salient under Egyptian control; North-West Desert Triangle under Libyan rule; Al-Fashaqa under Ethiopian occupation and the Ilemi Triangle in Kenyan-Ethiopian hands (Mburu 2003). Needless to say, the SAF has stood idle and has not been able to honour its duty to keep the sovereign borders intact. Negotiations with Ethiopia delivered some success in agreeing to hand over some of Al-Fashqa back to Sudan, a promise yet to be honoured but that is all (Addis Tribune 2012).

The separation of South Sudan, July 2011 has added a new strain to Sudan’s border problems. According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which paved the way for the independence of the now Republic of South Sudan (RSS), a new country is to reign over its borders as defined on the day of Independence, January 1st 1956 (UNAMIS 2004). Other areas of contention outside this zone are to be handled through different processes. However, as it turned out, January 1956 borders are much clearer on paper than on the ground. The original delineation of boundaries was based on unreliable maps and poor understanding of traditional land ownership. Lack of clarity of the 1956 borders, stretching over 1,950 kilometres and involving tens of nomadic groups has produced at least six disputed territories. In April 2012, conflicts over the disputed town of Heglig brought the CPA to a near collapse, and the problem was only contained following a swift Resolution from the UN Security
Council. The situation still remains volatile with both countries claiming ownership of the following territories: Safaha, Kafan Bibi; Samaha, Al –Amud Al-Akhdar; Hufrat Al-Nahas; Kafia Kingi; Helig, Abyei (Al Tawil 2011; Douglas 2010).

In discharging its duty of border protection against the encroachment of greedy neighbours, Sudan’s army performance can justifiably be rated as a grand ZERO. But what has the army been doing with its time since independence? The answer is perplexing but equally embarrassing. Throughout its post-independence history, the SAF has excelled in killing its own people under the guise of the suppression of uprisings, thwarting democracy, manufacturing and propping up dictators and wasting meagre resources and borrowed funds that could otherwise be used for the development of the country and its people.

Rather than fighting foreigners, the SAF claim with extreme pride to have lost thousands and thousands of martyrs in their effort to suppress uprisings in the country. But how successful have the SAF been in accomplishing this important job? Not very, I would say! Like many African countries, Sudan inherited a deformed structure in which a tiny regional minority controlled the state to the detriment of its majority population. The legacy of colonialism does not simply lie in its partition of the continent into 50 plus countries. As Kapuscinski states, its legacy is that it lumped several thousand nations into the current 50 plus African countries (Kapuscinski 2001). Unfortunately, many African leaders replaced colonialism by its national counterpart: internal colonialism replete with injustice, inequality, corruption and utter neglect of their own people and hence the uprisings.

Sudan’s army has indeed spearheaded the fending off of civilian and armed uprisings, first in the south, then in Darfur and later in the east of the country. In all of these, the army has failed miserably, not to mention the human cost that accompanied that failure. So spectacular was the failure of the army that it has had to commission many other proxy armies ranging from the Popular Defence Force, to local militias and now the thuggish cavalry, known in Darfur as Janjaweed, all to no avail. Sudan’s war against the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/ Movement of the predominantly Christian south (SPLM/A) ended in a near total defeat of the government army, forcing it into signing the so-called Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). So much for the army preserving the unity of Sudan and suppressing armed uprisings – rather the CPA led to the secession of the south and the birth of the Republic of Southern Sudan.

Other attempts of the SAF and their allied militia to end rebellions in other regions in Sudan have also been a failure. The armed insurrection in Darfur which started in 2003 is still going on. Much more, the rebels of Darfur have now allied themselves with others in the Blue Nile Province of south-east Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, and the circle is growing. In effect, the current armed uprisings mirror the problems of southern Sudan where simple legitimate developmental demands escalated into an armed uprising, a call for self-determination and later secession.

The horrendous cost of the military approach to uprisings has been apocalyptic. It is estimated that 2 million lives were lost in the war against the south. A further 300,000 to 500,000 people perished in Darfur. To this one may add 4 million IDPs
in Darfur and 150,000 in the Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile provinces and the number is growing by the day. Thus, the involvement of the army in dealing with popular uprisings has demonstrated its failure.

A bizarre myth that has evolved in Sudan’s political culture is that the army can protect the national constitution. Like a wolf pledging to guard a flock of sheep, military officers graduating at the National Military Academy swear an oath to protect the constitution of the country. It goes without saying that our current President Al-Bashir, together with his preceding military dictators, Aboud and Nimeiri had all sworn the same Koran oath and proceeded to topple legitimately and constitutionally elected governments. Since its independence, Sudan had only three democratically elected governments, 1956-1968, 1965-1969 and 1986-1989; all of whom were destroyed by the very army that had vowed to protect them. These military dictators have ruled Sudan for 45 of its 56 post independence years and the clock is still ticking. Their actions show beyond a doubt that armies in Africa are a threat to the constitution and cannot be entrusted with its protection. The very presence of the army headquarters in Khartoum, rather than at the border of the country, encourages them to meddle in politics and become a real obstacle to the arduous process of democratization.

It is both easy and legitimate to argue that all dictators in Sudan as indeed in the rest of Africa have been kept in power for so long by conniving armies. Members of the SAF have always been all too happy to play this role in return for lucrative pay. However, armies do not only keep dictators in power, they manufacture them afresh. In the absence of war, idleness spans the army and corrupts its spirit as an institution. No wonder then that soldiers can easily be lured by the glamour of involvement in politics and its lucrative rewards. Idi Amin, Gadhafi Husni Mubarak, Samuel Do, Al-Bashir and many others are a product of this defective institution, a quintessential hatching machine for African dictators and this is more evident in countries with weaker political structures and undeveloped civic societies. Had it not been for the existence of official armies, there would certainly be far fewer dictators around in the continent.

Rebel armies too pose a similar danger if transformed into official forces. Africa’s history of decolonisation has left us with numerous unsavoury examples such Kenyatta, Mugabe, Jawara, Mobutu, Mangisto and Mubarak. Hence, they should equally disband as soon as their legitimate job is accomplished. While causes of armed insurrections are understandable and often legitimate, the transformation from rebel into official armies is a dangerous affair that must be addressed.

Finally in this section, I would like to draw attention to a disturbing element in military culture and which is pushed to its limit in countries controlled by military dictatorships. Namely, that military personnel are superior to their civilian counterparts in everything including the rule of law. It is possible to argue that this is almost international whereby excesses of combatants including extra-judicial killings are often not punished in the same way as those committed by civilian personnel. This is possible to verify in the recent history of European and American military
operations in Afghanistan, Somalia and Central America. However, due to the focus of this article, I will remain focused on Sudan.

In the case of Sudan, military as well as para-military personnel are somewhat above constitutional law. Current laws in Sudan make it impossible for law enforcers to arrest army personnel and this is extended to para-military including the notorious Janjaweeds of Darfur. Their crimes can only be investigated by their commanders and/or with their explicit approval. Military culture maintains a dubious rationale behind this phenomenon centred around an alleged superiority of the soldier over the civilian citizen. During his reign in the 1970s, Dictator Nimerie mesmerised his nation with his usual humorous and often illogical sensibilities when breaking free of his written script. When an Arab journalist asked him about his inability to rein in the excesses of his military personnel and apply the law to them, the president protested:

“A military personnel is incomparable to a civilian citizen. You cannot equate a piastre coin (girish) with a two-piastre coin (Abu girshain). They are different. A civil person is just a citizen while a soldier is a citizen but on top of that he is military personnel. They are not the same and cannot be in front of the law.”

The president has spoken. Members of the SAF remain to this day above the law. They can kill, maim, loot and flaunt the law of the land, all in the line of duty without fear of the very constitution they vow to uphold.

What is to be done?

In the above paragraphs, we identified three main spheres of action that supposedly justify maintaining an official army in Sudan. The first pertains to the protection of political borders against external intrusion. As the reader may have realised, the SAF and its allied armies have not lived up to their expectations and have not succeeded in retrieving even an iota of the so-called occupied territories. Fortunately, and with the current globalised world, there are better and non-violent ways of resolving political border disputes. There are many structures that support negotiated settlement of disputed lands either on lateral or bilateral bases. A formidable organisation working in this field is the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague (PCA), formed as far back as 1899 but which has gained much more clout in recent years. The PCA has over xxx listed members including Sudan and most of its neighbours. Moreover, the PCA conducts its mediation with little or no financial cost to the conflicting parties. Given the nature of disputed lands, often with fluid populations spread over political borders, a peaceful resolution of the conflicts creates a better environment for trade, nomadism and peaceful co-existence in the area; a win-win for the conflicting countries and their people. Thus, removal of this function from the list of mandates given to official armies makes perfect sense but there is no such thing as a free lunch. Conflicting parties must be willing to abide by the decision of the mediators. The
childish response to the Hague Ruling on Abeyei between RSS and Khartoum must not be repeated, a situation in which both parties were not happy with the resolution. Africans must grow up and to do that, they need go no further than learning from their heritage. A prime African example here is the Judia, a traditional council of mediators called by conflicting parties to mediate between them. According to the Judia, an opponent is allowed to dismiss a member of the jury on the account of bias before the onset of deliberation. But once the process has started, a conflicting party loses the right to doubt the integrity of a councillor or dismiss him or her and must abide by the final ruling the council. Let the Africans, Sudanese or otherwise apply this principle to all global arbitrators on their border conflicts, no more, no less (for Judia see El-Tom 2012b).

The second sphere in which the official army has traditionally been involved is the suppression of uprisings. Uprisings normally start with peaceful demonstrations of ordinary and law-abiding citizens. With eugenic army responses and delays on addressing simple but legitimate demands, the protest escalates into an armed struggle. During my student time, the army occupied the University of Khartoum where I was enrolled as a student several times. Sudan’s army boasted some success in quashing some demonstrations, more often than not with fatalities among the demonstrators. However, the army failed to prevent the success of the popular and peaceful uprisings that brought down the governments of Dictator Aboud in 1964 and Nimeiri in 1985. It equally had to back off from many other demonstrations that proceeded to realise their objectives through other means.

The success of Sudan’s army has, however, been catastrophic when it comes to armed insurrections. With the SPLA of south Sudan, the SAF lost the war and had to give way to a negotiated settlement, the CPA. It is not a secret that many of Sudan’s top commanders find the CPA humiliating to say the least, leading to the breakup of Sudan, a reality they worked hard to prevent. Much more recently, after ten years of fighting the Darfur rebellion, the war is still going on and some movements are getting stronger by the day. To this, one may add the insurrections of the Nuba Mountains and later Blue Nile Province which restrict the presence of Sudan’s official army to a few major military garrisons. These examples suffice to conclude that uprisings are political in nature and do not respond well to military solutions. All uprisings in Sudan, armed or otherwise, have been purely developmental in their demands and primarily due to grievances against political, economic and cultural marginalization. This is a job for politicians and the armies should have nothing to do with it (see Hasan and Ray, 2009; El-Tom 2009).

The third sphere which has been appropriated by the army is the protection of Sudan’s constitution. While it is important for any country to preserve and honour its constitution, it is preposterous to entrust that to its army. In the case of developing countries, that duty falls on people led by their civic and political organisations. As the recent history of Sudan shows, leaving the preservation of the constitution to the army is akin to putting a wolf in charge of a flock of sheep. Since independence, hardly a decade has passed without a move from the army to topple the government.
The only three democratic and genuinely elected governments in the Sudan were destroyed by military interventions.

For all of the above, I think Sudan has no compelling reason to keep an official army. We must resist the idea that we have to have an army to qualify as a country. There is no reason to suppose that in the absence of an official army, the country will be gobbled up by its neighbours, that there will be popular and perhaps armed uprisings in every town and that the constitution of the country will never be upheld. These are all fictitious ideas that do not stand serious scrutiny.

Practical steps towards the abolition of the army

It is important to note that the abolition of a country's official army is not an easy job that can be accomplished with a stroke of pen. Rather, it is a long process that requires bringing the people on board, securing the cooperation of the army itself and taking the necessary steps for the country to live in peace within itself and with its neighbours. Moreover, we should caution against expecting economic dividends from day one.

There is at least one stunningly good model for Sudan to emulate in dismantling its official army, or rather armies. That model does not come from the west with its different settings. Instead, it is a product of an environment Sudan is familiar with. Half a century ago (1948), President Figueres of Costa Rica did the “unthinkable”. He courageously and perceptively announced the abolition of Costa Rica’s State Army. Of course the decision was controversial but sense prevailed and the neighbours did not devour Costa Rica’s territory, as some had feared. The abolition of the army in Costa Rica released needed funds for meeting genuine developmental needs. Surrounded by poverty stricken countries, Costa Rica is now the envy of other Latin American countries. It is stable, prosperous and 3 to 5 times wealthier than its neighbours. Furthermore, Costa Rica now enjoys a 93% literacy rate, 80% homeownership and a life expectancy of 76 years. With a US literacy rate of 77%, the mighty super power is certainly shamed by – Third World – Costa Rica (El-Tom 2008).

Costa Rica is not the only country that has made the bold move to subsist without an official army. There are around 20 countries which have opted not to waste their meagre resources on armaments, although one has to concede that half of these countries are dependencies, reliant on other powers for their protection. Despite this, these unarmed states manage to preserve their territories unmolested by their neighbours as is commonly anticipated.

My option for a Central American state instead of an African one as a model for Sudan to follow must be bewildering for some readers. Why not take Mauritius, the only African country that has no army? The reason is plain and simple: Mauritius is an isolated island far away and relatively sheltered against the usual demands of proximate neighbours. With its small size of 2040 square kilometres and a tiny
population of 1.3 million, Mauritius hardly compares well with Sudan. However, Mauritius is a shining star in Africa and the only nation-state classified as running a “real” democracy. All others within the continent, including South Africa, fall under categories such as “flawed”, “hybrid” or “authoritarian” democracies (AFDB 2012; Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2012; Wikipedia 2012b).

In recent years, peacekeeping has risen to become a prime issue in keeping armies busy across the world. Thus, it is not war itself but peace in distant countries that lies behind keeping any army. We must remember Switzerland has not had any war for over 200 years. Yet it boasts a world-class trained army consuming 1.0% of its GDP, translating into $3.1 billion. Sweden has escaped war for over 170 years but despite this it spends 1.5 GDP on its army costing its taxpayers $5b a year (Fry 2007:18; Global Security 2012). Switzerland and Sweden maintain official armies even though the possibility of deploying them in war situations is very remote. Indeed with a decreased listing of European soldiers who witnessed WWII, there is now a whole generation of army generals who have risen to the top of military ranks without experience of even a single combat. Ireland provides a different example of an army that is not quite kept for combat purposes. Ireland spends €1.5 billion, an equivalent of 0.9 GDP on an army that has little to do in justification of its combat existence. Since the Independence of the country in the 1920s, it has not been tested in the protection of its borders with UK and it’s unlikely that it will be of any use if they decide to invade. It is hard to think of a better employer than the Irish army where its recruits spend their entire career without discharging a single lethal bullet or finding themselves at the receiving end of one. To keep them busy, the army is contracted by big banks to move money from one location to another, a task that involves low to non-existent risks but not that much. In addition, the Irish army partakes in lucrative peace-keeping missions. These too involve exceptionally low risks for most peace-keeping mandates restrict the use of arms only for defensive purposes and discourage lethal means of civilian protection. For example personnel of the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) established by UNSC Resolution No. 1769 of July 31st 2007, are armed but have no mandate to shoot except in self-defence. Over the years, UNAMID not only failed to protect civilians, it equally failed to protect its own members as is evident from the loss of nearly 40 of its soldiers.

At the other extreme, we have the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNAMIS), Resolution 2043 of April 2012. Its mission consists of military personnel whose mandate is restricted to the monitoring of compliance with cessation of violence and supporting implementation of the Resolution. It is possible to attach some value to such missions and even claim they help in reducing fatalities. However, it is difficult to argue that these missions succeed because its members are drawn from professional armies, trained in handling lethal weapons, let alone use that as a justification for keeping professional armies.

It is possible to contemplate a symbolic value for having an official army independent of involvement in war including self-defensive combat in peacekeeping. After all, armies are often paraded to epitomize nationhood, its unity, strength, pride, self-sacrifice, struggle for certain ideals and so forth. In the context of new
nation-states, the army can be projected as a national institution that defies ethnic, regional, linguistic and religious divides. Having said that, this is an idealized proposition as the army often mirrors divisions in societies like class, ethnicity, regionalism, colour and religion. While I concede that the army has the potential to generate national symbolic values, the gains are hardly worth the cost. These symbolic values can equally be entertained in other institutions like the civil service, the legal system, civic organisations, the educational system or even national soccer teams etc. Those who are interested in personnel wearing uniforms to salute the flag, parade to patriotic songs and sing the national anthem can turn to the police force, youth scouts and school children for these functions. The symbolic dividends of an army simply cannot justify its upkeep.

Practical steps

In an African nation-state like Sudan, the army is a powerful institution capable of guarding its interests, a matter that is poorly served by its abolition. Periodic toppling of governments, elected or otherwise, stands testimony to the might of official armies in Africa. Thus, the armies themselves must be approached as major stakeholders in the process. The starting point here must be the entrenchment of a new culture that glamourizes peace and demonizes collective violence as a means towards resolving conflicts within the country and with its neighbours. Such a move will do away with most of the clout given to the army and demote the status that goes with it, thus making the army less desirable as a career than before.

The army is not only a career of bravado and heroism. Like other professions, it is a source of income where people earn their living and feed their families. This is where the attraction of the army lies, much more so than in the glory of fighting wars. The evidence is very clear in the deployment of harsh penal rules against soldiers who fail to respond when they are ordered into the battlefield. It is a common rule across the world that soldiers who disobey orders to go to war are court martialed and often executed. While not all, the absolute majority of soldiers want to be in the army but hope they are never called to the battlefield. Hence, it is the need for making a decent and dignified living and of course self-actualisation that attracts young people to join the army. And mind you, the majority of soldiers are low ranking, with little pay and with little opportunity for job-satisfaction.

It follows from the above that in order to cajole the soldiers to support the abolition of the army, we must first find decent and rewarding alternatives, a substitute that enables them to feed their families and live with dignity and respect. Fortunately, many divisions in the army are already trained for civilian work. For example, with little or no retraining at all, most members of military logistical support, medical, engineering and musical corps and air force can immediately be transferred to civilian institutions. Officers possess valuable skills in engineering, medicine, survey and
mapping, logistics, aviation, construction of roads and bridges, security etc. With little effort, these skills can be upgraded and tuned for civilian duties. Top commanders who belong to older cohorts can be offered lucrative early retirement, retrained to join the police force or simply redeployed to help in the process of demilitarization.

In Africa, the army offers great attraction for the young and poor and those who have missed out in schooling. Well, it is easy to spot the dream in this class of youth. Their lack of education destines them to a life of unemployment, poverty and destitution. This cohort can be sent back to school while retaining their pay until they are able to stand on their own. Needless to say, not every poorly educated soldier would want to go back to school, particularly for academic studies. This category may prefer learning a craft like building, car mechanics, carpentry, metal work, music, trade and agriculture, prior to their transfer to a relevant public department. While the cost of all this might look prohibitively high, it pales into insignificance when compared to retaining an army and providing them with guns, tanks, fighting jets and land mines. Moreover, the rechanneling of warfare energy and resources into safe civilian work is a clear win for the entire society and people involved in the work.

Conclusion

In this article, I have mustered my courage to take a huge risk. I have opted to look forward. The world has changed and there is little wisdom in looking backwards to the past. Africa is unlikely to see another Gadhafi, Amin, Bokasa or Nimeiri but only if we make our rightful contribution. Yes, there are still far too many dictators in Africa, all of whom are struggling to stay in power and are unlikely to succeed in remaining for long, let alone cloning their successors. In proposing a new future for Sudan and Africa without official armies, many fellow Africans will undoubtedly spring out to accuse me of being naïve, idealistic and perhaps cocooned in an academic cage devoid of practical sensibilities. There is nothing I can say in response except to remind them to design their way forward based on future prospects, not on the vilest memories in our history. Whatever their choice, I appeal to them to be open for debate, no more no less.

Others may see the matter from a different angle. I am a senior member of an armed rebel group, a connection that makes the gist of this article sound somewhat hypocritical. Well, rebel movements too have to dismantle and there is nothing wrong in an army general calling for the dismantling of armies and for alternative ways of resolving conflicts. In fact many of them do and that is why most wars end peacefully instead of being concluded by clean defeats. History affirms the impossibility of reasoning with dictators like Amin, Bokassa, Gadhafi, Al-Bashir, Mugabe and many others and hence, removing them from power and yes by force could pave the way for new structures that renders armies unnecessary institutions (for an extended list of early African dictators see Ayittey 1991).
Admittedly, my call for the abolition of official armies does not constitute an original vision. As far back as 1795, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant called for a similar arrangement in his influential article “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (Kant 1795). The world has since moved on but some of the points raised by Kant in his essay are still pertinent and relevant to our current debate. Kant maintains that to employ a person to kill or get killed is to use him/her as a tool or a machine and that is incompatible with his/her autonomous right as a human being. He further states that it is flawed for conflicting parties to enter into a peace accord while still retaining their armies. Such a situation amounts to no more than a temporal peace that allows a reprieve for rebuilding the army and preparing for future violence. Kant however sees war as legitimate when ordinary civilians rise up and engage in war against an invader. With that, Kant’s call for the abolition of official armies does not extend to the mobilisation of citizens to defend themselves within what we now call civil defence (Ibid).

Since Kant’s time, the philosophy of peace and non-violence has progressed and inspired the concept of non-violent movements popularized at a global level by Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther king. This school is currently represented by Gene Sharp of the Albert Einstein Institute, USA (Sharp 1974; 2010). Sharp is not interested in the role of the army as such, nor is he in the question of its abolition. However, he is adamantly opposed to the use of violence such as armed rebellion against dictators. In his seminal book, “From dictatorship to democracy”, he criticises the use of a military struggle against dictatorship as an attack on the strongest front of the unjust system, meaning its army. Instead, Sharp outlines about 100 forms of actions aimed at toppling dictatorship. These actions are based on a fundamental principle, passionately argued by Sharp. Generally speaking, dictators stay in power because of the cooperation of the populace. His suggestions of civil disobedience manifested in forms of actions like strikes, not showing up for work, graffiti, demonstrations, etc. will eventually paralyse and destroy the dictatorship. Irrespective of whether one takes Sharp’s recipe as capable of toppling mature dictatorships, his views lend credibility to Fry’s proposition regarding infinite human ingenuity for finding peaceful alternatives for resolving our conflicts (Fry 2007).

It goes without saying that the abolition of official armies that I am proposing is contingent to the presence of genuine or to use a more established term “full” democracy. I hasten to add here that the term “democracy” is a much-abused word. I am yet to come across a dictator who shouts: “hey look, I am a dictator”. Instead, dictators claim be democratic and so do all totalitarian leaders. For this reason, it is important to define what we mean by democracy or full democracy. Here we need to go no further than Mo Ibrahim’s foundation to define “full democracy”. Mo Ibrahim himself is a philanthropist from Sudan and thus his choice complements the search for an African solution to our problems. To assess the democratic performance of a country, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation has developed a set of measurable indices for the purpose. The test rests on rating four broad categories, each divided into several sub-categories. As the information is readily and freely available in the internet, it suffices to list the four categories which have to be satisfied:
1. Safety and rule of law
2. Human development
3. Participation and human rights
4. Sustainable economic opportunity (Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2012)).

The 2011 evaluation of African democratic performance gives food for thought to all Africans. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation and another reputable and stringent organisation, the Economic Intelligence Unit put the African continent to shame. The entire continent boasted only one country which scored the category “full democracy” and that is Mauritius. The rest including Africa’s flagship, South Africa with its quackery about leadership of democracy in the continent fell under “flawed democracy”, “hybrid democracy”, “authoritarian regimes”, and below (Ibid; The Economist 2012; AFDB 2012).

It is fortuitous to debate the abolition of official armies at an era endowed with tremendous development in social media. Africa boasts 400 million mobile phones and almost every African activist has access to potential supporters both at home and abroad via Twitter, Facebook, e-mails, etc. (Barboza 2012). These channels have already demonstrated their power during the uprisings of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Social media can be used to spread the culture that upholds the abolition of official armies but much more for the prevention of military takeovers as well as the emergence of new dictators.

The same forces that have ushered in the evolution of social media, called globalisation by some, have also turned the world again in our favour. The world now is better united against oppressive and authoritarian regimes than ever before. Dictators are now besieged by numerous global organisations like the ICC, the UNSC, Amnesty International and human rights institutions. Citizens in African countries can draw on the experience and might of these organisations and can equally use the social media to forge direct connections with like-minded citizens abroad.

The euphoria about new social media should not lure us into forgetting the role of conventional media like newspapers, radio and TV debates and pubic rallies in this debate. Journalism in particular has been a powerful force for democracy, rule of law, and the prevention of emerging dictators in prolonging their stay in power beyond constitutional limits of terms of service. The heroic struggle of African journalists is highlighted by the killing of 102 of them in the year 2010 alone (Ijioma 2011). Journalism in Africa is a major stakeholder and a powerful force in the campaign to rid Africa of its official armies.

Bibliography

Introduction

I have been considering a question for some time, which is how to explain the apparent stability that has prevailed in the Horn since 1991. The overthrow of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and the de-facto independence of Eritrea paved the way for a period of stable government that had been absent for the many years. By stability I do not mean peace, but one is struck by the fact that for more than two decades the key countries in the Horn have remained essentially under the same administrations or forms of government. The fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 left Somalia without a centralised, effective government. Despite the best efforts of the international community and a number of costly conferences and mediations Somalis still are without a government worthy of the name. Ethiopia has remained under the TPLF and Eritrea under the EPLF (even if the parties now have different names) while Somalis still live in a patchwork of administrations. For more than twenty years now this has been the prevailing reality across the most important countries in the Horn.

If one compares this situation to the previous two decades one sees a very different picture, with major rebel groups overthrowing the Emperor and then the Dergue, while Eritrea was torn away from Ethiopia. So why is this no longer the case? It is not because the governments are more just or any less repressive, as one can observe by reading the many reports of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. Why did movements come into being after 1960 which finally dismembered the Ethiopian empire, yet no similar forces have arisen in the last two decades to challenge the governments in both Eritrea and Ethiopia?

Why has no state structure been found for Somalia? After more than 20 years without a central administration one has to conclude that this acephalous state of affairs may suit the Somali people better than a formal state structure. Somalia has remained without a stable administration, yet its people have survived – even if they have paid a terrible price for the absence of an effective state.

The current state of affairs cannot be considered permanent. Human rights abuses abound, famine continues to plague the peoples of all three countries and there are constant tensions between them. All have attempted to undermine each other. Ethiopia and Eritrea are in a state of near-conflict along their common border. Ethiopian troops are inside Somalia while Eritrea is accused of putting resources behind rebel movements operating in Ethiopia and Somalia.
The apparent stability is held in place, at least in part, by foreign actors. Without American aid, the Ethiopian government would be routinely incapable of feeding millions of its own people. Without international backing the Transitional Federal Government would have been swept from Mogadishu. Even Eritrea could not have survived without support from Libya, China, Iran and some Gulf states. For outside powers (from the United States to al-Qaeda) the Horn has been an arena of intensifying contest since the War on Terror erupted with the attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Yet international assistance alone is not a sufficient explanation for the current state of affairs. This paper attempts to explore these questions rather than pose a clear answer to the issues raised.

Perception of instability

Even the most cursory trawl through the literature on the Horn provides a rich vein of material detailing the instability of the region. These thoughts by the former US Ambassador in Ethiopia, David Shinn, entitled: “Challenges to Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa” are just one example of this line of argument:

In the post-World War II era, the Horn of Africa has consistently been the most conflicted corner of the world. That is a bold assertion, but hear me out and then tell me if there is another region of the world that has consistently been more conflicted. Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea recovered from wartime Italian military occupation only to confront soon thereafter a series of internal and inter-state conflicts.

In the case of Ethiopia, this included a rebellion in Eritrea province, the violent overthrow of the Haile Selassie government by a military junta followed by an expanded internal war that in 1991 removed the military government that had deposed Haile Selassie. This event coincided with the hard fought independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia. A bloody border war then broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998. Although it ended two years later, it did not resolve the border disagreement and the leadership in the two countries remain implacably at odds. The government of Ethiopia faces opposition from elements of several armed ethnic groups clamoring for more political power or even independence. There is also a growing Eritrean exile community opposed to the government in Asmara.

Somalia engaged in periodic conflict with Ethiopia and occupied nearly a quarter of the country in the late 1970s before Somalia collapsed and became a failed state in 1991. Somalia has been in constant turmoil ever since; the northwest part of the country —Somaliland—declared independence but no country has recognized its status. The weak Somali Transitional Federal Government faces a severe threat from an extremist organization allied with al-Qaeda. The government’s lack of control over most of the country has resulted in the worst outbreak of high seas piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean since the days of the Barbary Coast pirates.\footnote{David H. Shinn, Challenges to Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa, World Affairs Council of Northern California, 12 March 2010.}

It would be hard to disagree with anything that the ambassador has said, was it not for the suggestion that the region was facing “challenges” to its stability. I would sug-
suggest that this is a misperception. Similarly, the word crisis is frequently linked to the region, as evidenced by the home page of the normally considered Social Science Research Council entitled: “Crisis in the Horn of Africa.”

For all its conflict and despite the misery inflicted on so many of its citizens, the Horn appears to be a zone of considerable stability in recent years. This is not to suggest that it does not contain tensions and conflicts but rather that since 1991 these have been contained by the states concerned, with or without the help of formal state structures. I will look at a number of elements of this thesis.

Somalia: no ‘failed state’

For the international community there is little disputing that Somalia is the epitome of the failed state. It ranks first in the listing produced by the authoritative Foreign Policy magazine for 2011, as it has done for several years. The magazine defines the failed state in this way:

A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of elements of the risk of state failure, such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time periods.

Somalia appears to fit the bill perfectly. The Somali government certainly has no monopoly of legitimate force and provides few services for the public. The country displays large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, a brain drain, and environmental decay. Yet by other measures this is a skewed perception. As my colleague, Mary Harper, has pointed out in her recent book, “Somalia does not fit into any particular paradigm of ‘statehood’ but this does not mean that it is in a state of total disintegration.”

She goes on to argue that there are, in effect, many Somali states ranging from Somaliland (now effectively independent and almost fully functioning) to almost fictive mini-states, like Azania, with its capital in al-Shabaab controlled Kismayo and its president living in Nairobi.

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2 http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/
This perspective is supported by the findings of the UN Sanctions Committee Monitoring Group. In its latest report their experts found that:

More than half of Somali territory is controlled by responsible, comparatively stable authorities that have demonstrated, to varying degrees, their capacity to provide relative peace and security to their populations. Without exception, the administrations of Somaliland, Puntland, Gaalmudug, and “Himan iyo Heeb” evolved independently of centralized State-building initiatives, from painstaking, organic local political processes. Much of Galguduud region is controlled by anti-Al-Shabaab clan militias loosely unified under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ), but lacks a functional authority.

Harper quotes the Independent Institute to indicate that the Somali economy is also not the disaster many assume it to be. As the authors put it:

Although all data from Somalia must be treated with some caution, when looking at these 13 measures of living standards, the overall picture seems clear. Somalia may be very poor, but the loss of its government does not appear to have harmed standards of living. On many measures Somalia compares favorably with the other 41 sub-Saharan countries, the peaceful nations, and those who warred at approximately the same time as Somalia. Since losing its central government, we find that Somalia improved measures of well-being both in absolute terms and relative to other African states. This study was carried out prior to the emergence of al-Shabaab as a major force, but anecdotal evidence indicates that it still has some validity. If this is the case then it would appear that Somalia is more prosperous and more governed than the international community generally surmises. It may be more appropriate to suggest that attempts to establish a centralised state have, at least in part, been responsible for upsurges in violence. This argument has some support from Peter Haldén:

A great deal of violence is generated by projects to capture the state or by counter-projects to resist the establishment of a state, either by groups who fear that they would be left outside its exploitative system (e.g. rival clans) or by groups who oppose any state since they are not interested in being neither outside nor inside an exploitative state (e.g. the business community).

A Somali businessman whom I interviewed summed up this position. I asked him whether he would feel more secure if there was a national police force. He pondered this for a while before asking: “but who will own it?” For him, as for many other Somalis, a return to a centralised state might reduce rather than increase his freedom. If this analysis is correct then Somalia is at least a partially functioning political system, with an effective economy. In the past few weeks African Union troops, supporting Somali government forces, have pushed out of Mogadishu and have managed to displace al-Shabaab in central and southern Somalia. International support for the transitional government has been bolstered by donors at conferences in London and Istanbul. There are clearly many pitfalls ahead, but it would appear that

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despite years of conflict, Somalia is more robust than many would give it credit for. Although this semi-formal system of states has been associated with immense suffering for many of its inhabitants, who have either died or fled abroad, it is not unique in inflicting this misery on its people. One only needs think of Rwanda, which has a powerful, unitary state with a functioning government, recognised and hailed by the international community, to see that this is the case.

There was something special about the highland rebels in both Ethiopia and Eritrea

A second possibility is that the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front were, in the true sense of the term, peculiar. Did they possess unique characteristics that other movements have been unable to replicate? Or was there something about the era in which they were formed which was unique? If this was true, it might explain why other rebel groups in both countries have been incapable of building sufficient support or momentum to threaten either regime.

Certainly the period in which these movements came into being was extraordinary — even in the complex history of both countries. The movements were shaped by the revolution that overthrew the Ethiopian empire, whose roots stretched back into the mists of time. This is not the place to revisit these events in detail, which were traced by the late Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux. They portrayed a student movement, radicalised by the international protests of 1960s, which brought these debates from Europe and North America and attempted to apply them to Ethiopian realities. By the early 1970’s their ideas had been taken up by sections of the military and played a key role in the formation of the Dergue and the rise of Haile Mengistu Mariam in September 1974. There then followed the bloodbath of the Red Terror, in which thousands were killed, but the seeds of revolution had been planted and with them concepts of Marxism-Leninism, which continue to shape the policies of Ethiopia and Eritrea to this day.

Without tracing the development of the TPLF and EPLF in detail, it is worth noting that Isaias Afeworki attended the Haile Selassie University in Addis Ababa in late 1965 and early 1966, prior to the most radical period of student politics. Other key early members of the EPLF were at university in Addis during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. These included Mesfin Hagos and Hailemariam Woldeyensae. The TPLF’s subsequent leader, Meles Zenawi, joined the Medical Faculty of Addis Ababa University after completing his schooling in 1972 and remained at the university for two years, during the height of the radical period.

Marxist works and Leninist practices became embedded in both movements giving them both intellectual steel and a ruthless belief in the legitimacy of the use of force to reach their goals. The radical impulse, which swept across the student world of the 1960’s and 70’s has long passed. In its place have come other intellectual movements, but few – apart from radical Islam – have so successfully attempted to reshape the world.

It must, of course, be recognised that it was not just Tigrayans or Eritreans who were caught up in these events; other Ethiopian nationalities were swept along as well. However, there are suggestions that the nature of Ethiopian society was such that they were not involved to the same extent. John Young wrote: “While Oromos and others more recently incorporated into the Ethiopian empire suffered the greatest oppression under the imperial regime, it was the Tigrinya speakers of Eritrea and Tigray who were the most ethnically conscious: Tigrayans, who inhabited the heartland of the historic Ethiopian state were resentful of their subordination to an Amhara-dominated state, and Tigrayan students increasingly embraced the view that the best approach would be to engage in a national liberation struggle.”

Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux point to the “geographical extension and fragmentation of Oromo areas” to explain the obstacles to successful mobilisation against the Ethiopian state. Certainly the Oromo, Ethiopia’s most numerous people, are diffuse and complex. They are spread from the far West through the centre of the country and down to the Kenyan border. Attempts by the Oromo Liberation Front to confront the Ethiopian state have met with only limited success. While the Ethiopian government has failed to eradicate the movement, it has managed to contain the OLF’s operations. The same can be said of other opposition movements in Ethiopia, like the Somali based Ogaden National Liberation Front, which came to international attention after its troops killed Chinese oil workers in 2007, and then in December last year, when two Swedish journalists travelling with the rebels were jailed for entering Ethiopia illegally.

None of these movements appear to currently pose any real threat to the Ethiopian government. Much the same can be said of the groups attempting to overthrow Eritrea’s President Isaias Afewerki. Both governments appear well entrenched and able to meet the threats posed by rebel movements and opposition parties. A mixture of covert surveillance, ruthless repression and fragmentation has rendered these movements incapable of mounting a real challenge to either government. While it is impossible to predicted coups or assassinations, since they involve such small, covert groups, there are few indications that either government is about to be removed.

12 Halliday and Molyneaux, op cit. p. 198.
14 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/27/uk-ethiopia-sweden-journalists-idUKTRE7BQ08P2011227
What about Sudan?

Sudan (North and South) is an integral part of the Horn of Africa. Anyone who has travelled across its vast territory can be left in no doubt about the interconnections between its peoples. Sudanese markets are full of traders from across the region making a living by their wits and hard work. It would be difficult to miss the ubiquitous Somali trucker or the Eritrean merchant purveying everything from soap to flour. Much the same can be said of the shelter and support these countries give to refugees, whether they are Sudanese who fled to Ethiopia; Ethiopians who travelled in the opposite direction or Eritreans who crossed into Sudan to escape conscription. In the past the Sudanese played critical roles in the lives of their neighbours, allowing both the Eritreans and Tigrayan rebels to operate from their soil, while Ethiopia played host to the South Sudanese rebels of the SPLM.

Today, by contrast, Sudan is less involved with the rest of the Horn. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Kenya in 2005 the country has been more concerned with its internal affairs than its relations with the region. Relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum appear to be on a more even keel. Ethiopia is keen to export electricity to Sudan and recently completed a power transmission line that links its grid with neighbouring Sudan. Funded by the World Bank, the $41 million dollar power project will enable Ethiopia to export an initial 100 MW of electricity to Sudan. This could be substantially increased once Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile is completed.

Sudan’s relations with Eritrea have also improved. Although Asmara used to host Darfur groups like the Justice and Equality Movement this is a thing of the past. With Eritrea having lost its ally in Colonel Gaddafi, President Isaias has had to mend fences with President Omar al Bashir. In October 2011 the Eritrean leader paid a three-day visit to Sudan in an attempt to cement ties. South Sudan is too concerned with attempting to build a state and find a modus operandi with its northern neighbour to pay much attention to the rest of the Horn. As a result, both Sudan and South Sudan are for the moment less interested in regional issues. Both Khartoum and Juba are keener to woo their neighbours than undermine them. At least for the present the Sudanese are a force for stability in the Horn.

Is the real problem Eritrea?

It is not difficult to construct a narrative that suggests that Eritrea is the major source of instability in the Horn. This case is eloquently made by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea established under the United Nations Sanctions Committee.

15 Sudan Tribune, 19 February 2012.
16 Sudan Tribune, 21 October 2011.
Since 2002 the Monitoring Group have spelled out in extraordinary detail the complex web of links that tie Eritrea to the major rebel movements operating in the Horn, and to al-Shabaab in particular.\textsuperscript{17}

In the course of the current mandate, the Monitoring Group obtained firm evidence of Eritrean support for armed opposition groups throughout the region, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan. Support for these groups also involves Eritrean diplomatic, intelligence and PFDJ-affiliated networks in Kenya, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere. The Government of Eritrea acknowledges that it maintains relationships with Somali armed opposition groups, including Al-Shabaab, but characterizes these linkages as political (and, in one particular case, as "humanitarian"), while denying that it provides any military, material or financial support. Evidence and testimony obtained by the Monitoring Group, including records of financial payments, interviews with eyewitnesses and data relating to maritime and aviation movements, all indicate that Eritrean support for Somali armed opposition groups is not limited to the political or humanitarian dimensions.

The report provides a list of those movements being supported by the Eritrea authorities in violation of Security Council resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009).\textsuperscript{18}

These groups include the:
- Ogaden National Liberation Front
- Oromo Liberation Front
- Afar Liberation Front
- Afar Revolutionary People’s Democratic Front, also known as Ugugumo
- Sidamo Liberation Front
- Tigrayan People’s Democratic Movement
- Unidentified fighters from the Amhara and Gambella regions of Ethiopia

The report implicates Libya, Iran and a number of Gulf states in assisting Eritrea in financing these operations, while arms are imported and equipment serviced by Russia, Ukraine and Romania in violation of a UN arms embargo against Eritrea that has been in place since 2009. UN Security Council resolution (1907) should have resulted in sanctions being imposed against the violators. However, as the Monitoring Report notes, this has not taken place.\textsuperscript{19}

Perhaps most tellingly of all, the UN Monitoring Group found that these operations are controlled by President Isaias Afworki’s office.\textsuperscript{20} “Eritrean support for armed opposition groups is directed by a small but efficient team of officers from the National Security Office, the Eritrean military and the PFDJ leadership under the direct supervision of the President’s Office.”

This evidence of Eritrean involvement in and support for rebel movements operating across the Horn is compelling. What it does not indicate is how effective these

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. para 278.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. para 254. “Violators of this resolution face possible targeted measures, including an assets freeze and travel ban. However, as of the time of writing, the Security Council has yet to designate any individuals or entities for such measures.”
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. para 261.
measures have been. The movements President Isaias has backed are generally weak and ineffective. This is not to suggest that they could not be destructive. There is strong evidence that Eritrea attempted to bomb targets around Addis Ababa during the African Union summit in January 2011 by training and supporting members of the Oromo Liberation Front.\textsuperscript{21} The attacks were halted through the vigilance of the Ethiopian police and intelligence services. But elsewhere there is little evidence that the groups working out of Asmara pose a real threat to the governments of the region. The exception is al-Shabaab, which still controls large swathes of central and southern Somalia. Yet even here the Islamist group is on the retreat, with Kenya, Ethiopia and the African Union force removing them from many of their strongholds. At least as important has been the gradual development of movements inside Somalia itself that oppose al-Shabaab. Of these Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a – supported by Ethiopia – is the most powerful.\textsuperscript{22}

If Eritrean supported movements are generally ineffective or on the back foot, what can be said of movements backed by the Ethiopians? Here the evidence is less compelling, but this is at least in part because there is no counterpart to the UN Monitoring Group probing Addis Ababa’s activities with a fine toothcomb. There is certainly support for Eritrean opposition groups from Ethiopia, which regularly allows these movements to meet and plot against the government in Asmara. There have also been attacks across the border by Ethiopian forces, even though these have been relatively small scale.\textsuperscript{23}

This is not to suggest that Ethiopia is not attempting to destabilize Eritrea. Addis Ababa has repeatedly refused to implement the Boundary Commission report on the disputed border between the two countries, following their war of 1998-2000. The Commission issued its finding on the border on 13 April 2002.\textsuperscript{24} For the next four years it attempted to place concrete pillars along the newly designated border. Although Eritrea accepted the ruling as final and binding (as both countries were required to do by the Algiers Peace treaty that ended the border war) Ethiopia has consistently said it will not do so.\textsuperscript{25}

These contrasting positions were recorded in the UN Secretary General’s report of January 2008, which clearly contrasts the two positions:

\begin{quote}
In a letter dated 19 November 2007, addressed to the President of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, the President of Eritrea accepted the boundary demarcation by map coordinates, ”as an important step forward towards the demarcation on the ground”, and urged the Commission to persist until the erection of pillars, ”to bring the process to its natural conclusion”. Since then, President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea has repeatedly stated that the border issue has been ”legally resolved”, and that Eritrea considered the border demarcated. For its part, Ethiopia has maintained its position that demarcation by map coordinates has no legal force or effect. In a letter addressed to the President of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission on 27 November 2007, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia stated that the “demarcation
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] Ibid. para 286 ff.
\item[22] Ibid. para 15.
\item[23] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17433871
\item[24] The Boundary Commission decisions can be found on the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1150
\end{footnotes}
coordinates are invalid because they are not the product of a demarcation process recognized by international law.  

Ethiopia has insisted that further discussions on the border should take place with Eritrea before implementation of the ruling. Eritrea has insisted that the demarcation is final and binding in international law and that demands for further discussions are an Ethiopian ploy to re-open the issue. In an attempt to put pressure on the United Nations to ensure the implementation of the Boundary Commission’s ruling Eritrea put in place a series of increasingly severe restrictions on the UN monitoring force along the border (UNMEE). The troops finally had their mandate terminated in July 2008. While Eritrea has played its cards ineptly, Ethiopia must carry most of the blame for the border impasse. Eritrea complains continually that it has abided by its legal requirements and that Addis Ababa would not take this stand without Washington’s support – a complaint that has considerable justification.

From the evidence cited above it is clear that Eritrea is a force for instability in the Horn. At the same time Ethiopia is also ready to meddle in its neighbour’s affairs and blocks progress on the border with Eritrea. It is the key issue dividing the two countries, resulting in continual tension between them. It is a conflict that is played out across the Horn through proxies and if Asmara must take the blame for this, then so too must Addis Ababa.

Real change takes place outside of the political sphere

While this paper has looked at the political changes that have caused instability in the Horn it may be that this overlooks the real area of change: the economic situation in countries in the region. Here the story is clear. Ethiopia has enjoyed rapid economic growth in excess of 10% a year since 2004.

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<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ethiopia and Eritrea
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, Sub-Saharan Africa, October 2011.
Table: Table SA2. Real Non-Oil GDP Growth
Somalia: CIA World Factbook, Somalia, estimates

26 Ibid. para 16
27 Ibid. para 10-14
This summary of growth is also reflected in GDP per capita growth. Ethiopia is among the top four African states in the period 2009-2012. Poverty is also on the decline. The proportion of people below the poverty line at national level measured by the poverty head count index declined from 44.2% in 1999/00 to 38.7% in 2004/05. Development was initially led by agriculture, with a rapid increase in flower production. However, growth is increasingly moving towards the service sector. This has been driven by the rapid expansion in banking, public administration and retail business activities.

By contrast, Eritrea has gone into decline. There are few reliable statistical indications of what is really happening in Eritrea and even fewer for Somalia. The UN’s Economic Commission for Africa fails to provide data for either country. This summary of the impact of having the nation on a war-footing as a result of the on-going confrontation with Ethiopia paints a dismal picture of the economic problems facing Eritreans.

A high level of mobilisation has been maintained, with crippling economic effects. Hundreds of thousands of the most productive citizens – men and women between their late teens and 40s – are trapped in national service, unable to contribute significantly to economic growth. In the meantime, hundreds of young people illegally flee every month, a brain and skill-drain that is a socio-economic catastrophe. The government appears not to appreciate the full implications of this, or if it does, appears not to know what to do about it.

The upshot is that the economy has been in suspended animation for several years. GDP growth has been declining steadily; foreign currency reserves are close to depleted; and the banking sector is crippled. One of the chief problems is that Ethiopia constituted about two thirds of Eritrea’s export market; the closure of that market has been devastating, and factories and labour have been idle as a result. Sudan now accounts for the vast bulk of Eritrea’s exports; imports – mostly machinery and transport equipment, food and live animals and manufactured goods – come from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with smaller amounts from Italy and other European Union (EU) countries. There is scarcely an internal market, as ordinary Eritreans increasingly struggle merely to survive.

Without payments from the Eritrean diaspora it would be hard to see how the country or its people could survive. The one bright spot in the economy has been the mining of gold, which has taken off in recent years.

The picture that emerges from this cursory look at the economic situation is one of a rapid divergence. Ethiopia is enjoying successful growth while Eritrea is at best registering little or no growth at all. From Addis Ababa’s perspective the loss of Eritrean markets and ports following the border war has had only a limited effect on the country, while it has been devastating for Eritrea. Prime Minister Meles can sit back and wait while President Isaias’s situation becomes increasingly difficult. Both leaders have in the past predicted that the other will inevitably fall, but the Ethiopians must be considerably more sanguine about the current situation. If this is accurate then there is little reason for Ethiopia to provoke a confrontation, while

28 African Economic Outlook, Economic Commission for Africa, Fig. 1.9
29 The African Development Bank Group, Economic Brief, Volume1, Issue 5, 17 September, 2010
30 International Crisis Group, Eritrea: the siege state, Africa Report No 163, 21 September 2010
Eritrea may be too poor to afford one. This may be another reason for the current apparent stability in the Horn.

US relations with the Horn since the end of the Cold War

It is often forgotten that the Horn was once among the most divisive issues in international politics, with competition between the United States and the Soviet Union being played out in the region. The US’s traditional relationship with Ethiopia was disrupted by the overthrow of the emperor in 1974 and the Soviets gradually (and rather reluctantly) established a relationship with the new government. The Somalis, who had been a Soviet client, were dumped in 1977 when they invaded Ethiopia, with the US finding a new client in the region. Ambassador Shinn has provided an admirable summary of just how this developed.\textsuperscript{31}

The United States concentrated its economic and military support on Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie, who was a reliable ally of the United States. The U.S. military maintained a critical communications station known as Kagnew outside Asmara, which at the time was part of Ethiopia. In the late 1960s, Ethiopia was the location of the United States’ largest economic and military assistance program and largest embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa. When Ethiopia was threatened by Somali irredentism or Eritrean separatism, the United States strongly backed the Haile Selassie government.

In 1974, when the military junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power, the United States tried initially to maintain cordial economic, political and military relations with the new left-wing regime. The United States refused to provide all of the military assistance requested by Mengistu and Ethiopia turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for support. As Ethiopia slipped into the Soviet camp, the United States looked for a new ally in the Horn…

Somalia had relied heavily during the 1960s and early 1970s on the Soviet Union for military assistance and was aligned with Moscow. As the Soviet Union turned its attention to Ethiopia, however, this opened the door for the United States to replace Soviet influence in Somalia.

Somalia invaded the Somali-inhabited parts of Ethiopia in 1977 and briefly captured most of the south-eastern part of the country. Soviet military equipment and advisers and Cuban troops helped Ethiopia to push the Somalis out. While the United States was not providing military equipment to the Somalis during the war, it initiated the delivery of military aid not long thereafter. Ethiopia and Somalia became classic examples of pawns in Cold War policies with the Soviet Union supporting the former and the United States the latter.

It is worth recalling just how fierce the competition for influence in the region really was. The former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Gates, said in his memoirs that for a 3 month period Soviet aircraft were landing in Ethiopia.

every twenty minutes.\textsuperscript{32} Cuba poured in 11,600 troops and 6,000 advisers.\textsuperscript{33} By early 1979 the Soviet experts in Ethiopia and other socialist countries reached more than 7000 and were directing and participating in military operations against rebellions in Eritrea and Tigray.\textsuperscript{34} It was, says one authority on the period, “the largest foreign assistance programme the Soviets ever undertook after China in the 1950’s.”\textsuperscript{35} Zbigniew Brzezinski, US National Security Adviser under President Jimmy Carter declared that détente between the superpowers “…lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden.”\textsuperscript{36}

The end of the Cold War halted this rivalry. It also reduced American interest in the Horn. In 1995 the US Department of Defence outlined its view of the continent, asserting that: “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”\textsuperscript{37} The attacks on American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 changed this perspective. The new threat from al-Qaeda put the Horn firmly on the map in the war on Terror. The result was the formation by US Central Command in 2002 of what was called “Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).” Its role was to focus on: \textsuperscript{38}

“…detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region,” and to provide a forward presence in the region. Under AFRICOM, the task force’s mission has evolved to more broadly reflect a strategy of “cooperative conflict prevention.” Between 2,000 and 2,500 short-term rotational U.S. military and civilian personnel make up CJTF-HOA, which covers the land and airspace in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

The Combined Joint Taskforce operates from Djibouti. It has been used by Washington to wage a quiet but effective war against al-Qaeda and its local Somali affiliate, al-Shabaab. It is not possible to give an accurate picture of the extent of this operation, but from time to time there are press reports of naval gunfire directed at Somali locations and drones being fired at targets.\textsuperscript{39} The Washington Post reports that the US runs some of its drone operations from a base inside Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{40} “The Air Force has been secretly flying armed Reaper drones on counterterrorism missions from a remote civilian airport in southern Ethiopia as part of a rapidly expanding U.S.-led proxy war against an al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa, U.S. military officials said. The Air Force has invested millions of dollars to upgrade an airfield in Arba Minch, Ethiopia, where it has built a small annex to house a fleet of drones that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows, Simon and Schuer, New York, 2006, p.122
\item \textsuperscript{33} Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, p. 276
\item \textsuperscript{34} See Dan Connell, Taking on the Superpowers, Collected articles on the Eritrea revolution, Red Sea Press, 2003
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid. p. 279
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid. p. 282
\item \textsuperscript{37} Lauren Ploch, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Congressional Research Service, 22 July 2011, p. 13
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid. p. 20 – 21.
\item \textsuperscript{39} See for example: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/22/british-al-qaida-suspect-drone-somalia, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15052484
\end{itemize}
can be equipped with Hellfire missiles and satellite-guided bombs.” There are also reports that the CIA has a covert interrogation centre at Mogadishu's Aden Adde International Airport.\textsuperscript{41}

The priority given to the War on Terrorism has influenced US relations with the Horn in general and Ethiopia in particular. As Human Rights Watch commented in 2008, the international community is prepared to downplay allegations of what it described as war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Somali regional because of concerns to continue good relations with Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{42} “Ethiopia is viewed by many western governments as a reliable and strategically important regional partner on counter-terrorism efforts. The counter-terrorism partnership, particularly with the United States, has assumed increasing importance amid growing concerns over the instability in neighboring Somalia.”

The historic, if sometimes difficult, relationship between Washington and Addis Ababa has skewed American relations with the Horn as a whole. Given the centrality of these links it is hardly surprising that Eritrea finds its interests marginalised, particularly when it behaves with such lack of regard for international norms. Other US allies in the region, such as Kenya, have to work hard for American backing.\textsuperscript{43} Having said this, it is not the intention of this paper to argue that the US is the determinant factor in events in the Horn. It is, rather, the most influential international actor in the region. Its long standing relations with Ethiopia and its importance in the fight against al-Qaeda means Addis Ababa generally receives a friendly reception in Washington. But it would be wrong to suggest that this implies that Ethiopia is the only voice that is heard or that the US decides policy in the Horn. Like all nations, the countries of the region give priority to their own interests, particularly when faced with military threats, even though they will take into account the views of foreign actors.

\textbf{Is stability illusory?}

This article began by asking whether the Horn of Africa was as crisis-ridden as many commentators suggest. Having reviewed some elements of this question it is possible to conclude that the region is indeed relatively stable while at the same time being far from conflict-free. There is a full-scale war under way in Somalia and ongoing

\textsuperscript{41} The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia, The Nation, 1 August 2011. http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia. It is worth noting that the war against piracy has not extended to operations on land, with the European Union attacking a pirate base in May 2012 as part of ‘Operation Atlanta’. http://www.eunavfor.eu/2012/05/eu-naval-force-delivers-blow-against-somali-pirates-on-shoreline/

\textsuperscript{42} Human Rights Watch, Collective Punishment; War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State, June 2008, p. 118-119

\textsuperscript{43} The US telexes available on Wikileaks provide an insight into Kenya’s increasingly desperate attempts to win American support for its planned operation inside Somalia.
low levels of rebellion in other Horn countries. These conflicts, including the war in Somalia, show few signs of resolution. The Islamists of al-Shabaab, like other movements before them, are adept at retreating when they come under pressure and of reforming to strike once more when danger has passed. It may be that the link between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is a spur to the outside combatants. These include the African Union, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the USA, with some support from some other western powers. All have strong interests in staying the course and defeating the Islamists. Given the performance of their local allies in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), this will be no easy task. TFG forces have been accused of selling arms and equipment to al-Shabaab and of absenting themselves from the battlefield prior to major conflicts. The TFG’s mandate ends in August. Finding a replacement for the TFG and implementing a new Constitution for Somali will not be easy.

Having pointed to the stability of these governments it is also important to acknowledge that these regimes are not immune to the stresses and strains that afflict all administrations. They may be sufficiently capable and repressive to bottle these up, but in the end no regime has been able to resist its own population forever. Change frequently comes with little warning. Who would have predicted the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt or the end of the Soviet Union? Indeed, in Ethiopia the military committee or Dergue, which took power in June 1974, at first had no intention of ending Imperial rule, yet by 12 September of that year Haile Selassie was overthrown.

Perhaps rather than using the term ‘crisis’, which uses the medical analogy to suggest a point at which a patient may recover or die, it would be better to look to geography and the movement of tectonic plates. Tension builds up until it is unbearable and is then released in a devastating shock or in a series of smaller, less dramatic movements. Earthquakes are impossible to predict and their outcome and severity cannot be foreseen. This would appear to be a rather gloomy view, since it denies the Social Sciences their predictive powers, but perhaps it paints a more accurate picture of the state of our knowledge in the political affairs of closed and repressive regimes.

What remains is our ability to consider the interests of the states that make up the region. Ethiopia is clearly the most powerful actor in the Horn, even if it is not hegemonic. Its interests have been to keep its enemies weak, while building links with friendly neighbours. So Addis Ababa has been determined that Somalia (which has a claim on the Ogaden) remains fragmented. It is equally determined that Eritrea will continue to be weak and impoverished until a more friendly regime replaces President Isaias’s rule. At the same time Ethiopia will mend fences and keep lines of communication open with Kenya, Sudan and Djibouti (on whose ports it is critically dependent.) Eritrea is likely to sulk in international isolation while attempting to deal whatever blows it can to Ethiopia across the region. Somalia will struggle forward, with its various administrations attempting to gather strength and facing the challenges of radical Islam, climatic insecurity and the rise of piracy. Kenya is now

45 Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears, Red Sea Press, 1989, p. 12-16
wrapped up in Somalia’s conflict and may find it difficult to extricate itself. Sudan and South Sudan are so concerned with their own issues they have little opportunity to play a major role in the region at present. The international community will continue to be sucked in to the Horn by the threat of terrorism and piracy. At present there seems little obvious way forward, but then this region has a habit of taking all observers by surprise.
Regional Economic Relations: Can Closer Economic Ties Reduce Conflict in the Horn of Africa?

Sally Healy

The question I want to explore is whether economic drivers have the potential to transform endemic conflict in the Horn of Africa or whether political stability is in fact a precondition for enhancing economic cooperation.

Regional economic integration is widely seen as a development priority, based on two key assumptions. The first is that economic integration will enhance the development of small economies and increase their bargaining power in the world economy. The second is that more economic activity between states means less conflict. These ideas help to inform a wide range of international efforts to support regional economic integration, particularly in Africa, including support for the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD).

As one of Africa’s sub-regional economic groupings, IGAD provides the institutional framework for regional economic integration, designed to achieve greater prosperity and integration into the global economy. Better regional security is widely assumed as a by-product: the classic peace-building argument holds that economic interdependence raises the opportunity cost of going to war and therefore acts as a form of deterrence.

The international template for economic integration revolves around tariff reduction to increase trade and create larger markets to attract investment, all with the aim of speeding economic growth and reducing poverty. However, there are significant structural obstacles to the attainment of this in the Horn of Africa. These are poor countries with small economies, highly dependent on exports of primary commodities, often in competition with one another. Overlap exists in key export products, including coffee, livestock and oil seeds; Ethiopia and Eritrea both export gold and have substantial potash deposits. Sudan and South Sudan are the only oil producers. The region’s imports consist overwhelmingly of manufactured goods from outside the region. Historically, this pattern of trade has produced very low levels of formal intra-regional trade and limited scope for trade-led integration.
The Horn of Africa lacks several other necessary components required for successful integration: many of its states are fragile; the regional institutions are ineffective, the private sector mostly weak and political will very questionable.

The greatest political challenge, however, is conflict. For the Horn, a long history of conflict and poor political relations makes closer economic co-operation extremely difficult. Military rather than economic considerations dominate national security debates. The imperative to weaken potentially hostile neighbours by all means possible denies the prospects for mutually beneficial economic integration. For Ethiopia and Eritrea, where cultural affinities and historic trade ties are strong, the legacy of distrust following violent conflict has blocked the restoration of economic ties.

War is a very persistent tendency in this region. Usually large in scale and long in duration, they typically involve neighbours playing a highly interventionist role, often drawn in to support their own protégés. Ethiopia’s interventions in Somalia date back many years. Lately the cast of regional players has expanded with Ugandan and Burundian troops in Mogadishu to support the TFG, now joined by Kenyan and Djiboutian forces inside Somalia in various capacities.

Although widespread regional intervention is particularly obvious in Somalia at the moment, this kind of activity is characteristic of conflict in the Horn and makes it a regional security complex. At the minimum this means that there are very high levels of security interdependence and conflict inside any one country or between any two will always have important ramifications for all the rest.

Apart from its regional character, another very striking feature of conflict in this region is its tendency to produce fragmentation and disintegration. This started with the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1991 and its formal independence in 1993; next came the separation of South Sudan during the CPA transition, followed by its independence in 2011. Somaliland has also been running its affairs separately from the rest of Somalia for over 20 years now. And although there is no “process” in place to formalise its independence, it could go the same way as neighbouring Ethiopia and Sudan have done.

One interesting consequence of these separations – the disintegration of existing states – is that they tend to accentuate the geo-political dependencies among the countries of the region. In both cases they have produced new land-locked countries, of which there are now three in the IGAD sub-region. The other noteworthy is point it that although these separations appear to solve the problem of how to live together politically, they don’t provide solutions to the underlying problems of how to live together economically.

In most cases the challenge is made much worse because the countries involved are wary of their neighbours and do not necessarily want them to prosper. Post separation conflict and tensions in the cases of both Eritrea and South Sudan suggest that the embedded history of regional conflict and its legacy of distrust can still present overwhelming obstacles to meaningful economic integration. Recent trends suggest as much economic disintegration as integration and a bewildering picture of economic reconfiguration in different parts of the region.
An underlying logic of economic interdependency persists nonetheless. Three major areas of interdependence help to illustrate this, namely

- Access to Ports
- Energy and Water resources
- Livestock production and trade

Access to Ports:

Ethiopia, in population terms, is the biggest landlocked country in the world. It has recorded tremendous economic growth in the last ten years. Its imports and exports have expanded rapidly since 2000 and so has the port of Djibouti on which it depends.

It is fortunate that political relations between Ethiopia and Djibouti are good. It is a matter of economic necessity that they remain so. It is also fortunate that Djibouti has been able to expand and improve its port facilities. This was only possible because of the huge investment it was able to attract from the Gulf States after Dubai Port World took over the management of the port. But in the long run an expanding economy like Ethiopia needs port options. Ethiopia has not forgotten about the port of Assab in Eritrea, which until the 1998 war handled well over 80% of its trade. Eritrea has lost out too since 22% of its government revenue used to come from port charges there but the port today is almost obsolete.

One of the economic questions that hang over the region is whether, when and how Ethiopia might return to using Assab. After twenty four years of disuse the comparative economic case between Assab and Djibouti has tipped towards Djibouti. The 910 km journey from Addis to Djibouti is just 30kms more than the distance to Assab. Djibouti has important natural advantages over Assab, can handle much larger ships and continues to expand and develop. Its state of the art petroleum terminal despatches 200 fuel trucks a day to Ethiopia and a throughput of 2 million cubic meters annually.

Djibouti’s economic development has benefited from the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea but its prospects are also constrained by other conflicts in the region. Dubai Port World’s plans to develop Djibouti as a major transhipment centre are hampered by the problem of piracy that has grown exponentially out of Somalia’s breakdown. Ethiopia has no desire to trade through Eritrea at present and it suits it better to try to suffocate Eritrea economically. But ideally Assab and Djibouti would be competing for Ethiopia’s trade whereas Djibouti now enjoys a monopoly.

This in turn creates opportunities for the port of Berbera in Somaliland as a possible competitor with Djibouti. There has been no investment in Berbera for decades and the road infrastructure is in very poor shape. However, here is another case where port access and economic interdependency has the potential to transform the economic life of Somaliland and Eastern Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the dead weight of politics will continue to get in the way of realising the interlocking economic poten-
special. Berbera’s potential for regional development is certain to be hampered by the fact that Somaliland is not internationally recognised.

**Energy and Water resources:**

The Horn of Africa is not well endowed with fossil fuels. The region’s only oil producer is Sudan. The division of the country into two has far reaching implications for oil production. An estimated 75% of the country’s oil reserves lie in South Sudan. Yet the entire necessary infrastructure, including the pipeline and oil refining capacity, has remained in Sudan.

Sudan’s separation has been a messy divorce. A number of vital issues were not resolved before South Sudan’s independence, among them the arrangements for resource sharing and joint exploitation of oil. South Sudan and Sudan were held together for a short time by their common need for the oil revenues on which each must depend and in the first 6 months of independence South Sudan sold $3.2bn worth of crude oil to Sudan. But production has been suspended since the start of this year. Despite their economic interdependence, politically, the two sides remain at loggerheads. This can only damage investor confidence and affect the pace at which either country can make use of this valuable endowment.

But just as Djibouti has profited economically from the breakdown between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the imperatives of economic dependency have a tendency to open up new opportunities. In this case, the ambitious regional integration project known as LAPSSET (the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia transport corridor) has gained some momentum from the political break down between South Sudan and Sudan. South Sudan and Kenya have signed an accord to build an oil pipeline to a new Kenyan port in Lamu as part of a (yet to be financed) $20bn integrated road, rail, pipeline and refinery infrastructure programme. Currently there no functioning oil refineries south of Port Sudan along the entire coast of the Horn of Africa up to Mombasa. (Older refineries in Assab and Mogadishu are now obsolete.)

Ethiopia imports only refined oil products – at the cost of some $1.4 bn in 2009/10. Supplies come mainly from Saudi Arabia – or the lowest cost supplier. With fuel accounting for 17% of the value imports (2009/10) Ethiopia is understandably looking for alternative sources of energy. The government has embarked on a major dam building programme and aspires to a five-fold increase its electricity production.

Ethiopia’s Renaissance dam, which will be the biggest dam in Africa, is on the Blue Nile, which provides 85% of the Nile waters. Dam building proposals sends shock waves up the Nile. Egypt and Sudan are the beneficiaries of colonial era treaties that defined allocations of water between them in certain proportions – but made no allocation for downstream countries. The World Bank’s Nile Basin Initiative worked for 10 years to secure a new framework for water usage that took account of the other riparian countries but it is yet to come to fruition. Thus far there is partial agreement on a new protocol that Sudan and Egypt have yet to sign. This has put a damper
on investor confidence but Ethiopia has resolved to raise the necessary funds from public subscription.

Ethiopia’s plans for electricity production are framed around selling surpluses to its neighbours. Power lines have been connected to Sudan since 2010 and to Djibouti this year. Somaliland and South Sudan are now on the list for connection and a power line to Kenya should be complete in 2014. But Kenya has cause to worry about the regional impact of Ethiopia’s dams on the Omo river (in the south west of the country) and their impact the Lake Turkana ecosystem. As yet there is no regional mechanism to negotiate the costs and benefits of such programmes and consider their cross border environmental impact.

Several other possible new energy sources have come to light in recent years as high prices raise the prospects for profitable extraction of deposits previously considered uneconomic to exploit. There are significant gas reserves in the Somali region of Ethiopia where a Chinese company, Petro Trans, is undertaking fresh seismic studies and plans to drill several wells this year. Discussions have taken place about a potential gas pipeline to Berbera or Djibouti for the export of gas. In Puntland exploratory drilling for oil began this year in the Bari region where some oil blocks extend into territory that is disputed between Puntland and Somaliland. The Puntland authorities have also agreed to some offshore exploration. Oil exploration continues in several sites in Ethiopia both in the Somali region and in the Gambella and South Omo areas.

Livestock production and trade is a third network of regional economic interdependence that demonstrates the important potential of regional integration schemes. It centres on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the heart of a vibrant livestock economy that spreads across Somalia and into Kenya. This is not a potential arena for cross-border economic co-operation but a working example of a regional economy in full swing. The live animal exports out of the Northern ports of the region are in the region of 3 million head annually in a trade worth at least $200m. It is an example of Somali entrepreneurship on a gigantic scale and an economy that functions largely outside formal institutions and state regulation.

The livestock trade in the Horn of Africa is a model of resilience. It has survived conflict and state collapse, import bans and trade blockades, constantly adapting to sudden and unpredictable changes of authority. It has proven exceptionally well suited to coping with the political turbulence of the region. But it would be a mistake to think of this simply as an unchanging “age old trade”. Commercialisation is going on apace. There is currently a boom in camel sales for the Egyptian meat market. Ethiopia is taking the lead in this very lucrative new trade, which is drawing in animals from Somalia and Northern Kenya too. The pattern of cattle exports has changed quite dramatically in the last 20 years. The animals that Somalia used to export to the Gulf countries now go to feed the burgeoning cities of Kenya.

The livestock trade, which is a system of informal cross-border trade, helps to illustrate the real potential of regional economic integration in the Horn. The foundation for its success is simple: it builds upon the close social bonds linking people
across borders. These relationships underpin the trading networks that play such a vital part in economic life and show the economic value of cross-border linkages as well as the neglected potential of the border communities themselves. They deserve much more recognition for their economic endeavours. If the commercial potential of the borderlands could be opened up and fully developed they could make a much more positive contribution to peace and security.

Building on the regionalism that exists

But for all the difficulties that confront the attainment of economic integration, the Horn is a region where economic interdependence is a reality. Strong social and economic ties exist across the borders and, of necessity, much shared economic activity takes place across frontiers. The success of informal trade networks, especially the livestock trade networks, shows the possibilities inherent in future regional economic integration arrangements and demonstrates that cross-border linkages do not have to be mediated by formal institutions.

The countries of the region remain bound by history and geography into relationships of economic interdependence that lend themselves to cooperation. So as much as economic integration appears to be a political impossibility it may also prove to be an unavoidable reality. There is recognized potential for enhancing regional economic interdependence through the development of transport corridors to sea ports, the management of shared water resources, common management of pastoral rangelands and improved energy security. All could be regarded as drivers of economic integration.

Building on these trends may prove to be more important in the long run than a narrow institutional focus. There is need for a less state-centric approach to regional integration that could capitalize on the strengths of cross-border relationships. An approach that centres only on the conventional template of trade-led integration ignores the political and economic realities of a region where persistent conflict has left a deep legacy of distrust between states yet lively cross-border economic networks still flourish. Doing more to promote informal cross-border trade could provide help for neglected communities with important implications for prosperity and peace in the borderlands.

By using the concepts of regional economic integration to achieve greater economic inclusion and empowerment, the vast resources of the Horn could be better harnessed for development and diverted from the cycles of violent poverty that perpetuate poverty. This could be the basis for longer-term growth and prosperity, turning the burgeoning illicit cross-border economic activity to advantage.

In conclusion, let me return to the question I posed

- Regional economic integration is no silver bullet that could cure the economic and security ills of the region.
• Despite high and growing levels of interdependence, economic integration will be extremely hard to achieve among states that are so often at war, that distrust one another, that are primarily trying to do each other down.

• The security concerns that engulf this region encourage the closure of borders and the clamp down on freedom of movement and open commerce. While the logic of economic integration would point in the opposite direction, and would make the most of all the connections that exist.

• Examples from the region show that closer economic interaction and mutual dependence has not prevented conflict between neighbours in this region or increased peace and stability. The distrust and suspicion between neighbours will require mechanisms to address conflicts of interest as part of the design of any integration schemes.

• But the standard African economic integration model that is being attempted – based on formal trade in the first instance – doesn’t fit the realities of the situation. It requires models of statehood and standards of regulation that don’t actually exist across the region. And it doesn’t seem able to capitalise on the wealth of informal trade and interconnection that do actually exist.

• The strong cross border economic and social ties can be seen as an enduring and long term asset, not a liability. They could yet provide a promising foundation for integration and a basis for peace and security in the region.
Perspectives on Somalia and Sudan
Fundamentalists and the Security Situation in Sudan

al-Haj Hamad M.K Haj Hamad

1. Introduction

Besides the notion of volatility, the main conceptual tools employed in this research are largely in line with the vocabulary of contemporary debates on policy processes. In this vocabulary, policymaking is the process of setting and achieving goals that the political leadership deems desirable for its constituency, whether that is a narrow interest group or the public at large. Questions about the legitimacy of the leadership, the nature and size of its constituency, and its relative openness to integrating into policy decisions the views and interests of groups outside that constituency are all-important issues to consider when examining how policy goals are set. Policy options are defined as alternative strategies or courses of action that can be pursued to achieve these goals, with the understanding that only those that are developed to a level close to an actual action plan represent effective options in a policymaking process.

A peculiar problem in volatile policy environments is that not all important policies are traceable to explicit statements of policy decision or to instruments such as laws and action plans. Some policy decisions may not even be officially announced. However, even in these situations there may be a series of actions taken and decisions made by government officials that share a common orientation or pattern of behavior, and thereby reveal or de facto produce a policy orientation that could very well contradict the current legal framework.¹

Policy processes are understood here as taking place in policy arenas that link them to political processes, in line with the teachings of several strands of literature in political science.² A policy arena is a specific type of action situation with its own

¹ In doing so, caution must be exercised in order not to fall into the opposite error of attributing all observed policy impacts to policy objectives, aware as we are that divergence between intentions and results of actions is the rule rather than the exception in human action.

² Attention to this linkage is characteristic of constitutional theory, where constitution-making is generally conceptualized as the consolidation of a political configuration into an institutional and regulatory framework for policymaking. See for instance Elazar’s “Constitution-making: The pre-eminently political act” (1985). Within given constitutional configurations, there is of course much space for the “political,” that is, not merely institution-driven processes of formulation and negotiation of policy options. The literature on interest groups in public administration theory is perhaps the most obvious example of how this space may be articulated conceptually and analyzed. With specific regard to constitutional democracies, see Grossman and Helpman’s Special interest politics (2002) and Phillips et al.’s “Public interest groups in the policy process” (1990). The link
rules and with a set of players that engage in repeated interactions, make alliances or coalitions, and learn from their past experience. A policy decision generally represents the outcome of such an interaction (Ilchman and Uphoff 1998), therefore policy outcomes depend on the rules of the policymaking game as well as on the objectives, talents, knowledge, resources, and strategies of the players involved in different stages of policymaking processes. For policy design, these players can promote competing options or cooperate in developing a specific policy.

Similarly, at policy implementation these same or other players may twist the approved policy depending on their institutional or personal power, for instance by stretching a policy decision beyond its intended domain or resisting it according to their particular interests and goals.3

As policy processes are embedded in policy arenas where a variety of political factors interact (for example patterns of alliance, interest and power distribution, basis of legitimacy, prevailing ideological culture and beliefs, etc.), they are rarely in line with the stages heuristic proposed by some US scholars in the 1970s and 1980s. According to this heuristic, the policy process follows an established sequence of logical stages. In ideal terms, the process would start with the analysis of issues and causes, followed by the identification of available options, their appraisal to determine their comparative worth, and a conclusion presumably based on criteria that maximize the collective utility or welfare. This kind of sequence may actually describe formal self-representations of policymaking process in most countries, including Sudan.

This policy frame can be equated with the so-called international anti-terrorist policy, a jargon that hides the unity-power interests. This policy’s more major features can be traced in every contour in the Horn of Africa region.

2. Emergence and Continuity of Fundamentalism in Sudan

In June, 1989, a partisan coup toppled a multi-party government elected in a free and fair process. This was the final move by the fundamentalist Muslim groups’ progressive move that started in 1977. This success was mainly due to the conducive global atmosphere of the cold war era. The polarization between Western interests and the Soviets brought faulty body polities to power in many third world countries. In Africa a Soviet targeted regime will bring the Western competitors. When the

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3 Note that this approach to defining a “policy arena” is in principle compatible with a variety of theories of the policy process, since we assume that the various agents with a stake in certain (potential or actual) policy issues may be driven by interests but also by beliefs, patterns of alliances, resources, etc. Some of the implications of “messy” policymaking processes in non-democratic and fragile states are documented by Brock, McGee, and Gaventa in Unpacking policy: Knowledge, actors, and spaces in poverty reduction in Uganda and Nigeria (2004).
left-leaning May regime, in 1969, toppled a democratically elected government, the West accepted the Soviet challenge and started using its historical influence until the same left/Soviet-leaning Junta turned West and right. But as they could not depend on the traditional social forces, the basis for the rule they toppled, they had to establish a new political base. In this the Islamists, who since independence were considered a moral force of the elites, graduates of civil and military schools Junta, in 1979, when the military ruled the state and left them the street, business and commerce. A decade long empowerment made them quite dominant and penetrated the rank and file in the army. When the popular uprising that toppled the May regime in April 1986, although the Islamists were part of the regime’s decadence, yet with the rich resources they successfully escaped the wrath of the popular movement and their swift move to inherit the spoils of the old regime by sealing their alliance with desperate anti soviet forces that had already roughed the Eritrean and Ethiopian opposition. Thus the politically induced refugees of the cold war era they were ripe for taking over their country from the pro soviet Ethiopian military government.

The Islamists jumped to this wagon, accepting to violate the AU and other international codes that forbid the change of governments by invasions. The Ethiopian, Eritrean and Sudanese people change one master by another, moving from the soviet orbit to the American one. So polarization provided a conducive atmosphere for those local political trends, including theocracies, to become a multi state competitors for global support, recognition and funding. The global system seems to be bereft of solutions. Foreign policy competition for an international power broker i.e. USA brings more conflict to the horn of Africa region than solutions. The fundamentalists are, paradoxically brought by this kind of power center competition but this same competition can’t keep the regional security where fundamentalists prevail or become the balancing factors and they have a subjective corrosive influence. This stems from the fact that Islam, unlike its monolithic predecessors, has no one single hierarchy. It is very popular nature concedes splitter and factional competition. Jihad in non nation state is the unifying rod. In a nation oriented states it ruling elites are competing with their Muslim brothers whether in right or left. The Islamic reigning party in Somalia and the extreme fundamentalist al-Shabab movement each found support from some power centers from US or its other competitors or puppets in the region. Thus fundamentalism playing with major security systems and knowing that these systems are quite flexible and adaptive because it submits to accountability and fundamentalism contradiction is that it fails to incorporate accountability so it coheres its own people and as it does so it become lacking confidence and increase security budgets. To hide its weakness trends militarize the system of governance. It suffices to give the Sudan government.

20 years of fundamentalism have obviously strengthened the grip of religion conservatism and have drawn many of the youth to these groups. These groups are known for romanticizing their belief. 2nd political patroness and control by elites

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4 The Funj Sultanate (1500-1800) in the context of African Islam, Al-Haj Hamad M.K Haj Hamad (PhD), A paper presented to international conference on Islam in Africa international Islamic university Malaysia July 2011
5 The invention of the Jewish people, Shlomo Sand, international bestseller, 2009.
is well entrenched. Outwardly the systems approach is in a state of reform but real political change is elusive as foundlings of system are sustained. As their ideological mask falls their security budget become unbearable for both the budget, currently 75% of the fiscal year and 70-85 since 1989.

3. The security policy analysis confirms some lessons between policy research and totalitarian fundamentalist features

3.1 The fragmentation of policy arenas generates contradictory policies.

Our first hypothesis links policy volatility to decisions made in many largely independent but partly overlapping, un-coordinated, and competing policy arenas, namely federal administration, state and local government, Native Administration, and large development projects. Overlapping and fragmented policy arenas with their own specific players, rules, strengths, and weaknesses tend to produce conflicting policies and practices, even under conditions like those prevailing in consolidated democratic systems. In less stable conditions, these conflicting policies are likely to contribute to overall policy volatility, unless they can be prevented by making all policy arenas operate in full coordination and with homogenous goals and visions (which may in turn require a clear institutionalization of national goals and values — something that is often associated with consolidated states, whether democratic or not). Given this realization, one cannot exclude the possibility that the decentralization process that has taken place in the region in general and in Sudan over the past several decades has contributed to the fragmentation of the policymaking process in many policy domains and has therefore been a factor of volatility. Similarly, the well-known difficulty that donors have in coordinating their respective operations and approaches and in channeling resources through government institutions may have added to the problem, as it has resulted in a multiplicity of decision-making locations and processes.

3.2 Policy processes that are excessively skewed in favor of ideological or ascriptive considerations (or both) rather than concrete problem-solving inhibit adaptive and incremental collective learning

The second proposition focuses on the cultural and political environment of policymakers in the Sudan, which is often characterized as a mix of militaristic, ethno-tribal, and religious discourses that place a premium on the preservation of ascriptive
or conflict-related alliances rather than on the achievement of concrete solutions to public issues such as rural poverty, environmental degradation, etc. In this regard, it is clear such regime of ideology (notably a mix of religious, ethno-tribal, and militaristic ideologies make the nature of the political realm), combined with widespread formal and substantive attachment to social norms linked to religious and ethno-tribal identity, and may significantly contribute to bad governance. In particular, the relative disregard for factual evidence – or at least the relegation to a minor role of such evidence in policymaking when compared to respect for patterns of alliances of an ascriptive or ideological character. This does not mean that decision makers are never aware of what is ineffective in certain policy processes and outcomes, but rather that this awareness does not translate into learning within the policy process itself. The negative effects of this fact are amplified by dysfunctional (or absent) democratic processes at local and national levels.

3.3 Polarized International Power Policy: Reducing Impact on Security Sector Reform

This proposition recognizes that policy arenas are not isolated from the country’s economic, institutional and social environment. Policy volatility can thus reflect the instability of this environment, including phenomena as different as market price volatility, recurrent droughts and conflicts, and political instability. In a context such as Sudan, this proposition bears considerable weight, although it does not help us to understand the process by which environmental instability becomes linked to policy volatility, let alone suggest instruments to address such a process and possibly reverse it.

As already mentioned, these hypotheses are largely complementary. This can be illustrated by the mixed effects of external funding on political commitment and therefore on policy continuity and volatility. While external funding generally helps government in the short term to accelerate collective learning and to expand the range of available policy options, it may in the longer run weaken government planning capabilities. In other words, repeated policy cycles where external capabilities de facto substitute for internal planning capabilities tend to generate patterns of behavior and norms in the policymaking community that feed a vicious circle, where more recourse to external aid produces even fewer internal planning capabilities, which in turn justifies increased recourse to external aid. All of this tends to result in volatility both because of the multiplicity of (inside and outside) players that have influence on decision-making, and because of the erosion of internal capabilities to plan and execute policy built on progressive learning. Frequent shocks of a diverse nature then put pressure on policymakers for immediate responses that rarely build on accumulated knowledge or experience, thus further feeding volatile processes and outcomes. This is mostly felt in the humanitarian sector which is caused by the security situation and where donors and their sub contractors become a liability and asset for the security sector policy.
4. The Glimpse of Hope

The people of Sudan are increasingly aware of the deep and widening gulf between their rulers and the appalling privation and repression they invoke upon them. The resulting anger is naturally directed first against their rulers, and then against those whom they keeping those rulers in power for selfish reasons.

The ire of fundamentalists was directed not primarily against those whom they saw as betraying and degrading Islam from within: on the one hand those who attempted any kind of modernizing reform; on the other – and this was the more immediate – those whom the Wahhabis saw as corrupting and debasing the true Islam heritage of the Prophet and his Companions. They were of course strongly opposed to any school or version of Islam, whether the Sunni or Shi'ite, other than their own, they were particularly opposed to Sufism, condemning not only its mysticism and tolerance but also what they saw as the pagan cults associated with it.

Young people, including youth religious groups, are becoming increasingly implanted with the present state of affairs. Economic stagnation and joblessness are rife. Lack of economic opportunity and pervasive poverty need to be addressed urgently and are the leading force of social unrest and disillusionment with present state of affairs. Far more important a two decade of lack of rights based approach, spread of nepotism, ethnic competition and miss opportunities and use of natural wealth, make these groups skeptical about. Even worth the army, loosing trust in the army made them to make a parallel one called the people defence forces (PDF). The police (by the current constitution is a state authority, also have a parallel police (society security) pausing like a moral one. The security apparatus is divided between the state one and the party.

As international finance institutions have no formal relations with the country, since it had shelved these relations in 1990, economy is hard hit by the neo-liberal policies that are perceived to allow the benefits of national wealth to flow to all segments of society. Additionally there is high stress because of the 34 billion US$ debt owed to these IFIS. In this the fundamentalist state is similar to any other Totalitarian regimes.

A mission: the country loosing its security after the unmanaged fall of the pro soviet regime led to Somalization to supersede the historical balkanization.

The Ugandan army, failing in the hunt for the lord movement and its ICC wanted, Kony, commander, pose like a power to broker peace in Somalia the same is valid for Ethiopia which is failing to end the OROMO Islamic rebels, internally it is trying to import another Islamic sect, namely Shi’ites, to utilize inter-Muslims competition the Ahbash versus the Majlis movement l. It is clear that these governments are trying their best to send a massage to the 70% Muslim population of the continent that we are not against Islam but against fundamentalism which is an empty claim by some elite groups, mostly released from the ware house of ideological warfare of the west against the so-called Atheist soviet bloc.\(^6\)

\(^6\) Lewis, B, the crisis of Islam: holy war and unholy terror, international best seller, 2004, PP. 89 A.
Ever since that time and most of the efforts made by the west to tame the monster of Islamic fundamentalism released and nourished by them is a failure; because it is not attempting loosing to use it to suppress secondary contradictions among western market power interest.

When the international community, headed by US, accepts a forged election to provide the fundamentalists with a land slide victory, as a selling chip for them to accept a smooth separation of the country.

The regime suffers a tri lemma being under very thick cover of Islamic sloganeering a theatrical patriotic rhetoric and a hypocritical anti terrorist partnership with the west. The only way out is democratization, separation of powers and coverage to face the demands of marginalized groups.

5. Religion in the global power struggle: A two edge sword:

Ever since the emergency of modern colonial state, they were compelled to develop a policy to encage with Muslim have we give the example of Napoleon.

With what seems to us sometimes an extraordinary impudence (according to our temperaments, magnificent or outrageous), Napoleon who less than a year later would be assuring the clergy of Milan that he was a Catholic could write in July, 1799, to the Cairo diwan concerning the English fleet:

There are Russians on the fleet, who hold in horror those who believe in the unity of God, because, according to their lies, they believe that there are three of them. But they will not wait long to find out that it is not the number of gods which make strength, and there is only one, father of victory, merciful and compassionate, fighting always for the good, confounding the schemes of the wicked; and who, in his wisdom, decided that I should come to Egypt to change its face, and to substitute for a regime of devastation one of order and peace …”

At last it was generous not to accuse the English, too, of Trinitarianism. For once we doubt even the momentary sincerity, though the accent of the truth soon returns. Napoleon played at Islamic world, and gave his playing at being Muslim a certain desperate sincerity which sprang from his deep belief in himself. The account of his conversation with the sheikhs at Giza, on 25th Thermidor, and VI (it appeared in the Moniteur for 27th November, 1798), and his letters in Muslim style to various potentates that had never met him, were all part of a game, as was his attendance at the festivities celebrating the Prophet’s birthday (a feast whose importance he may have exaggerated, judging it by Christian parallel); but he was not cynical so long as he was playing the part with sufficient enthusiasm. At least he may be said to have suspended his unbelief. His contemporaries said that he came so near to adopting Islam that he was restrained by the inconvenience of teetotalism and circumcision.

7  Normal Danial, Islam. Europe &Empire, (University of Edin Burfh), 1966, p. 106.
The facts seem to be rather that, when he was asked why, if he felt so well disposed towards Islam, he did not take the next logical step (as his general Abdulla Menou did), he played the game out by advancing these excuses; to ask the question at all was approval of Menou, though there may have been jealousy and malice in it, was sensible enough; he said that his becoming a Muslim was favourable so far as the Egyptians were concerned, but ridiculous from the Arm’s point of view, contrary to French custom, groundless, and liable to lead to trouble.

Scott was surly wrong to think Napoleon’s enthusiasm (although not enthusiasm for orthodox doctrine) that led him to think he could impart it to the public.

The difference was in the actor, not in the play.

Fanaticism must be but to sleep before it can be uprooted.

There are none less dangerous than sheikhs, who are timid, do not know how to fight, and who, like the priests, inspire fanaticism without being fanatics.

It was a state of mind that he shared notionally – sincerely, but only as long as was practical.

They had a hard choice. If they left their homes deserted, in terror at the approach of the French, they returned to find only the mud of the walls and the bodies of their dogs that had defended their property. If the army was to stay in the village, the villagers were called to return under penalty of being treated as rebels. If they came back in a body, they were liable to be mistaken for men in arms and to be met by rifle fire. In this case, when in turn the French were succeeded by Mameluke troops, the villagers were robbed of everything, for being guilty of partiality to French, and the village sheikh was executed.

This realistic French view explains the relation between invaders and invaded and the limits to the success of Bonaparte’s projection of Islamic sentiment.

To refer opposition to religious reasons, rather than to national ones, or motives like their own.

6. Concluding remarks

The so-called nation state is no longer a good cover up policy frame for the ex-colonial boundaries the so-called globalization may recognize only regional and sub-region at least in Africa and its sub-regions i.e. Horn of Africa.

Institutional reforms of the policy, the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), are critical for conditions for effective human rights protection and state obligations towards humanity and good governance the economic crisis is an expression of bad distribution of income with more than 50%, within the last two decades, goes to security and defence.

The reason for this important convergence is that both of these policy domains – NR governance and decentralization and/or devolution – are of the utmost importance for the livelihood strategies of the majority of the rural population in Sudan,
as well as for the processes of empowerment or disempowerment that affect them. In addition, both domains provide an excellent laboratory in which to investigate the relevance of various models of policy process to developing countries similar to Sudan.8

This includes models of bureaucratic organization and decision-making processes in consolidated democracies and, more rarely, in other kinds of states (for example neo-patrimonial, rentier, “failed” or fragile states, etc.), as well as models of policy processes driven by rational choice, institutions, advocacy coalitions, and belief systems involving state and non-state agents.9

Without directly investigating the relevance of any particular model to the policy process in Sudan, in this study we link volatility to a policymaking environment characterized by the overlap of certain features of bureaucratic organization with others that are typical of neo-patrimonial states, where policies serve in part to shore up political alignments based on a mix of personal, ideological, ethno regional, and conflict-related ties. The former features may include “bounded rationality,” resistance to change, a tendency to focus on sectoral specialization and to resist inter-agency collaboration and policy integration, and a built-in contradiction between technical and political rationalities in both policy processes and outcomes. All of these may also be present in consolidated democracies, where they are however generally moderated by the effects of accountable political institutions and of relatively transparent debate on potential or actual policy issues, options, and process rules.10

The same flexibility also exists on the American side. Just as such allies can at any time abandon such allies, if the alliance becomes too troublesome or ceases to be cost-effective- as for example, in South Vietnam, Kurdistan, and Lebanon. In abandoning an ally with which there is more than a strategic accommodation, one can proceed without compunction and without risk of serious criticism at home.

The other kind of alliance is one based on a genuine affinity of institutions, aspirations, and way of life- and is far less subject to change. The Soviets in their heyday were well aware of this and tried to create communist dictatorships wherever they went. Democracies are more difficult to create. They are also more difficult to destroy.

It is not only the competition between foreign policy lobby groups within country but also, far more important, is the countries competitions.

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8 This appears to be the case, for instance, in Ascher’s Why governments waste natural resources: Policy failures in developing countries (1999), which takes the case of natural resource policy as a key entry point into structural problems (notably inter-agency conflict combined with lack of political accountability) in policymaking in a number of developing countries.

9 A classic reference concerning decision making processes in bureaucratic environments is Allison’s The essence of decision (1971). For a review of theories on the policy process (with a focus on the US context) see, among others, Sabatier’s Theories of the policy process (1999) and Birkland’s Introduction to the policy process: Theories, concepts, and models of public policy making (2005).

10 The effects of relatively open debate and learning in shaping public stances on policy issues, including people’s perceptions of their interests and their “beliefs” or ideological orientations, are particularly emphasized by authors writing in the “advocacy coalition” framework. See Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach (1993).
Claim that isn’t their business to correct them, still less to change them, but merely to ensure that the despots are friendly rather than hostile is an empty claim. The double impact in the so-called failed-states makers. In this perspective it is dangerous to tamper with the existing order, and those who seek better lives for themselves and their countrymen are disparaged, often actively discouraged. It is simpler, cheaper, and safer to replace a troublesome tyrant with an amenable tyrant, rather than face the unpredictable hazards of regime change, especially of a change brought about by the will of people expressed in a free election.

The “devil-you-know” principle seems to underlie the foreign policies of many Westerns governments toward the people of Islamic world. This attitude is sometimes presented and even accepted as an expression of sympathy and support for Arabs and their causes, apparently in the belief that by exempting Arab rulers and leaders from the normal rules of civilized behavior the west somehow confer a boon on the Arab peoples.

This approach commands some support in both diplomatic and academic circles in the United States and rather more widely in Europe. Arab rulers are thus able to slaughter tens of thousands of their people, as in Syria and Algeria, or hundreds thousands, as in Iraq and Sudan, to deprive men and women of all civil rights, and to indoctrinate children in their schools with bigotry and hatred against others, without incurring any significant protest from liberal media and instructions in the West. International institutions must engage with CSOs to invigorate the process of change and when change happen the need to assist in balancing attitude to policies of good governance. Obviously the process of change is slow and often painstaking, requiring patience and sustained engagement by and with CSOs.

Citizens will no longer accept governments and corporations breaching their compact with them as custodians of a sustainable future for all. More generally, international, national and local governance across the world must fully embrace the requirements of a sustainable development future, as must civil society and the private sector. At the same time, local communities must be encouraged to participate actively and consistently in conceptualizing, planning and executing sustainability policies to take away the youth from militarization. Central to this is including young people in society, in politics and in the economy.

7. Recommendations

The anti terrorist measures that scrutinized the flow of resources to CSOs as a risk aversion has lead to an increased space for extremists groups that fill the void of systemic under development and exclusion.

Now when the civil war erupted in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. It is not only the warring factions that denied neutral access to civil victims but also weak
and not prepared neutral CSOs can not stand for the challenge. The same is true for human rights activism and advocacy for women and political rights.

Security sector reform is urgently needed so to improve the lot of the human security situation in the country and help reduce the security dependent budget, for the last two decades, improve in both the horizontal and vertical spread of education, health services and other basic needs.

8. References

1. The effects of relatively open debate and learning in shaping public stances on policy issues, including people’s perceptions of their interests and their “beliefs” or ideological orientations, are particularly emphasized by authors writing in the “advocacy coalition” framework. See Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach (1993).

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5. Note that this approach to defining a “policy arena” is in principle compatible with a variety of theories of the policy process, since we assume that the various
agents with a stake in certain (potential or actual) policy issues may be driven by interests but also by beliefs, patterns of alliances, resources, etc. Some of the implications of “messy” policymaking processes in non-democratic and fragile states are documented by Brock, McGee, and Gaventa in *Unpacking policy: Knowledge, actors, and spaces in poverty reduction in Uganda and Nigeria* (2004).

6. The limited relevance of this heuristic to substantive policy processes even in consolidated constitutional democracies has often been argued. Nonetheless, this model remains a formal reference for policy processes in many countries, often in combination with an interest-driven rational choice model and/or by an ideology of “scientific” approaches to policy challenges that persists in some development discourses.

7. In doing so, caution must be exercised in order not to fall into the opposite error of attributing all observed policy impacts to policy objectives, aware as we are that divergence between intentions and results of actions is the rule rather than the exception in human action.


9. The invention of the Jewish people, Shlomo Sand, international bestseller, 2009.

UN Threatens the Somali Democratic Movement: Danger to Peace and Security

Abdi Ismail Samatar

On May 1, 2012, the UN Special Representative (SR), The African Union Special Representative (AUSR), and IGAD Facilitator for Somalia (IGADF) distributed a press release threatening those they call spoilers of the Somali political process with sanction. Here is how they articulated the threats which they might impose on the movement, including sanctions and other unspecified measures.

“… the United Nations, the African Union, and IGAD are jointly issuing this unambiguous warning to all potential spoilers: non-compliance with or active obstruction of the Road Map for ending the Transition in Somalia will be referred to IGAD Council of Ministers with our recommendation for immediate imposition of specific measures and restrictions. Moreover requests for further sanctions against spoilers may simultaneously be referred to the United Nations Monitoring on Somalia and Eritrea in order to open an investigation under the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution 1844 (2008).”

What is the Road Map (RM) for Ending the Transition in Somalia? Does the RM has any legitimacy with Somali people? Who are the Spoilers? Is the authority of the SR, AUSR and IGADF divine such that it cannot be challenged by the Somali people whose political fate is to be determined by the RM if the SR has his way? This essay probes these questions.

The engine driving the RM is an agreement in Kampala between the President of the Transitional Federal Government, the Former Speaker of the TFG Parliament, and a former Prime Minister in the summer of 2011. These three individuals were brought to Kampala, Uganda, under the auspices of President Museveni of Uganda with the SR’s participation. The purported purpose of the meeting was to reconcile the conflict between the three Somalis over the nature of the transitional period and distribution of political power among these three people during the remaining days of the transition which was supposed to end on August 2011. Somalia’s transitional charter that governs the transition has been set aside by the SR in order for his group to have their way in determining Somalia’s future. Without any consultation with the Somali Parliament and the Somali people, the hosts forced the three TFG personalities to agree in Kampala. Since then the Kampala Accord has become the force behind the Road Map.
For all practical purposes the Kampala Accord has empowered the TFG President, the former Speaker of Parliament, the new Prime Minister, and several of their self-selected individuals to determine the way out of the transition. The SR, AUSR, and IGADF and their Somali clients manage this process which has completely shut out the Somali people and the TFG parliament. RM is currently structured to allow the TFG President, the PM and the former Speaker of parliament (the latter is still considered by the SR, IGAD, and the AU as Speaker although parliament removed him from that post several months ago) to pick the traditional leaders who are supposed to select members of the post-transition parliament, and the congress that will approve the UN drafted post-transition constitution. In other words, the SR, AUSR, and IGAD wish to enable the very TFG President, former speaker and the current PM who failed to deliver any results during their tenure to determine the future of the country as well allow them to reappoint themselves to power. Given that there has been no open and sustained public debate and discussion about the terms of the RM means that the UN and a small group among the TFG are the sole owners of the Road Map. Reflecting the famous American liberation motto “no taxation without representation” the Somali democratic movement’s response to the UN Road Map is “No legitimacy without autonomous Somali ownership and input.”

Who are the spoilers? Nelson Mandela was a “spoiler and a terrorist” in the eyes of apartheid governments and their allies. So were Gandhi and Ben Bella. In Somalia, the likes of Mandela were the members of the SYL and SNL during the Italian and British colonialism. In a style reminiscent of colonial times, the SR, the AUSR, and IGADF consider the democratic movement, the new political parties, and the independent Muslim Ulema who are engaged in peaceful political activities as spoilers. These groups have carefully studied the UNDP drafted constitution and found it to be opposed to basic Somali and Islamic values. They have openly rejected the UN owned draft constitution without resorting to violence and have begin to mobilize the population. Not only do these civilian groups find the constitution anti-Somali, but they view the entire RM which is supposed to lead to the post-transition political order utterly illegitimate. Somalia’s democratic and peace movement is challenging the authoritarian operation of the UN, the AU, and IGAD. It is this non-violent and unarmed movement that the UN and its partners dub as spoilers and threaten to punish. Apparently, the UN, AU, and IGAD consider good Somalis to be child-like on whose behalf they can act politically, or terrorists and spoiler who should be sanctioned and punished using AU/IGAD and UN instruments.

The history of liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere provide ample examples of democratic movements and liberation leaders who were vilified and persecuted by colonial and imperial powers. But the determination of the African people and their pursuit of justice and democracy ultimately prevailed. It is ironic that the UN and AU which supported the liberation movements in those years are now acting as instruments of Somali subjugation. Further the UN has been vocal about the rights of people in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere in the Arab World, however, the UN considers the rights of the Somali people to peacefully mobilize themselves in order to determine their destiny to be a criminal affair that must be sanctioned and
punished. The use of threats by the SR, AUSR, and IGADF demonstrate how these institutions are used for undemocratic and unjust political ends. Such behavior reinforces the established idea that the UN, AU, and IGAD do not have the Somali people’s interest at heart and that the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea is a partisan organization set to subjugate independent Somalis who dare to stand up for their rights and those of their country.

The SR and his African counterparts at the AU and IGAD have presided over a political project in Somalia that has delivered nothing but failure and misery over the last decade and half. About three years ago, the UN led international community concocted another TFG for Somalia which is now accepted by all parties to be frighteningly corrupt and incompetent. Most recently, the SR, AUSR, and IGADF were caught sleeping on the switch as tens of thousands of Somalis starved to death and millions were devastated by the famine; while the monitoring Group has been implicated in the production of the famine. Given this record, it is reasonable to conclude that the SR, AUSR, and IGADF think of Somalia to be their colony rather than belonging to Somalis. Their latest effort to cower the Somali civic movement into submission is designed to install more incompetent and illegitimate political order that does not respect the dignity of the people and the integrity of the nation. This agenda is as audacious as any former colonial scheme and will destroy the Somali Republic if it is not stopped.

Finally, the only “crime” the Somali democratic movement has committed is to dare dream of freedom in the land of its birth. By demonizing the Somali democratic movement as spoilers, that must be punished, the United Nations and the African Union are behaving like the autocrats in the Arab World which the Arab Uprising is trying to flush out of political power. They can try to impose an apartheid-like political order on the Somali people because AMISOM which is not accountable to the population and funded by the United States & Europe controls Mogadishu. The hope was that AMISOM, as African brothers, will defeat Al-Shabaab and give the Somali people a chance to rebuild their country, but that hope has been dashed as the UN and the AU try to suffocate Somalis’ democratic aspirations. Fortunately the Somali democratic movement will endure the latest humiliation and shall prevail sooner or later as they seek freedom, justice, and democracy in their own home.
Transnationalism and Civic Engagement: The role of Somali civil society in development and security

Abdulkadir Osman Farah

Introduction

For more than two decades Somalia has lacked nationwide functioning bureaucratic Western inspired state institutions. Under such stateless circumstances, formally and informally organized social groups, have tried to fill the vacuum in providing social, economic, security and political services for the increasingly traumatized and displaced citizens. This has raised a number of relevant questions on the character, the representation, and the ability of Somali civil society groups to prevail under a stateless condition in attempting to promote security and tolerable social condition in a volatile country.

Departing from selected theoretical conceptualizations of the term civil society and supplementing it with empirical developments, this paper discusses the Somali civil society with emphasis on its entrenched indigenous character and more recently emerging transnational appeal. Furthermore the paper proposes tentative strategic ideas on how to overcome major societal obstacles that have so far confronted Somali civil society in contributing to security consolidation.

Recently I taught a course to Danish post graduate students on the relationship between state and civil society. In extension I considered introducing the students to the Somali civil society, particularly on how these diverse social groups manage to survive in an almost stateless environment. In the not so distant past (about 150-200 years ago) the Scandinavian civil society, though not struggling under civil war as the Somali civil society did, similarly functioned under not properly developed state structures. Over time through its bottom up cooperative strategies, Scandinavian civil society became instrumental in the emergence of an inclusive welfare state. This led to an expanded form of public institutions that subsidized, formalized and to a certain extent professionalized most of the earlier largely civil society managed social activities such as feeding, protecting, educating and empowering people.
Finally the paper theoretically argues that the colonial state, through education and socialization, had left behind corrupt leaders that dominated the first Somali republic and the subsequent military takeover. The militarization of the society divided the Somali people into proponent and opponent contingents, subsequently leading to migration and brain drain. This has prevented the country from exploiting its human capital, paving the way for oblivious warlords to replace the illegitimate military regime that mostly rested on external support from superpowers. Eventually the process culminated into the trans-nationalization of Somali civil society through diaspora formations that initially began in the Middle East and East Africa and more recently expanded globally.

The theoretical assertion is supplemented with empirical observations suggesting that in classical times the Somali civil society followed professional traits rather than regional and genealogical trajectories. It was colonialism that first divided civil society into proponents and opponents in relation to the prevailing system. This cyclical pattern continued until the recent warlordism and anarchy. With the trans-nationalization of the Somali civil society, through the global diaspora formations together with the emergence of a professionalized Somali civil society in the country, Somalis might balance and combine elements from the pre-colonial past with emerging global opportunities.

Conceptualizing civil society

In Western scholarship the Hegelian perspective on the concept of the civil society dominates the debate. Hegel places civil society groups in an intermediate position between the family and the state. This refers to the meso structures between micro and macro institutions in the society. In general the theoretical debate on civil society focuses on whether the state generates civil society or it is the reverse. Hegel tries to bridge the gap between the individual insistence on autonomy and freedom and the social dimension of insisting conceptual heteronomy. This means that we can try to operate in the natural world autonomously, but in the process we need to refer to the “heteronomously structured society” (Mack, 2001). Hegel argued that societies should overcome poverty and class divisions in trying to provide most citizens with the freedom essential to social organization.

Though Hegel is the main reference for the West, we also need to recognize relevant conceptualization attempts prior to European industrialization. We know oriental thinkers dealt with the tension between civil society and state. For instance Ibn-Khaldun considered civil society significant for the process of civilizational development that requires extensive division of labour and established organizations and legal frameworks. Ibn-Khaldun argues justice among members of the society as essential for civilizational development, otherwise social decline and human deterioration becomes inevitable (Ibn-Khaldun, 1979). In addition Ibn-Khaldun with his
empirical epistemological approach helps us to overcome the dichotomies of modernism versus religiosity, and instead calls for a dialogical understanding to overcome the *assabiya* (semitimental group solidarity) based social development (Zeidi, 2011:20).

Additionally we can supplement the thesis considering civil society as transition with the idea of social society as a social space distinct from the state and the capitalist economy. Tocqueville (1835/1945, 1840/1945) states that such civil society consists of ‘voluntary associations’ such as ‘families, churches, neighbourhoods’ and a ‘free press’. This is the space Marx conceptualized as space for the productive forces in the society. Calhoun proposes that such space empowers the civil society:

> “Such arguments placed a new emphasis on the social integration of a people, on society as such rather than merely on the aggregation of subjects. In such a view, the state no longer defined the political community directly, for its own legitimacy depended on the acquiescence or even support of an already-existing political community” (Calhoun, 1993: 270–1)

In this regard Habermas’s analysis of the public sphere is relevant to comprehension of the relationship between civil society and state institutions. Habermas suggests that the public sphere provides a space for a mutual learning process for competing diverse components of the society and that it will prevent fundamentalism that could threaten the collective wellbeing. He considers the public sphere as an intermediate space between the formal level of policy formulation and regulation (the state or the system world) and the level of private interests (the life world) (Habermas, 1991). Interestingly the public sphere is not immune from state manipulation. In Atatürk’s secular Turkey civil society is constructed as an institutionalized public space for modern Western imagination in the process, excluding an expression of Turkish Muslim social imagination (Gole, 1996:136).

There is, nonetheless, a need to detach civil society not just from the state but also interest groups. The link between the interest groups and civil society is that it is assumed that civil society organization can offer a “short cut” for political parties to find potential candidates and even funding. Eventually the civil society organizations expect support from the candidates they supported when they conquer state mechanism (Katz & Mair, 2012).

The main analytical challenge for the conventional conceptualization of civil society is the inability to distinguish civil society from interest groups. For instance, in the US farmers, women’s groups, medical associations, bar associations, etc. are treated as interest groups. While its counterparts in African organized communities are framed as a civil society. Obviously civil society formations are mostly interest groups. Interest and mission remains vital for human survival. Particularly in the neo-liberal pluralist oriented US the focus rests on the specific individual exclusive group interest, while in other parts of the world, emphasis might rest on the idea of collective inclusive interest aggregation.

To overcome the interest trap we could focus on Social capital defined as a private and public good with potential positive and negative externalities (Dasgupta 2000). A proper positive externality could be moral social codes inscribed into religions
requiring the treatment of all humans as equal, not just your immediate relations. Building on Robert Putnam’s work, Dasgupta suggests:

In an early definition, social capital was identified with those “... features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 167). As a characterization this appears beguiling, but it suffers from a weakness: it encourages us to amalgamate strikingly different social capital occur somewhere between the individual and the State: they are conducted within informal institutions. Indeed, social capital is frequently identified with the workings of civil society (Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam 2000). If the externalities are positive, as in the case of making friends (or becoming literate and numerate as a prelude to enjoying advanced communication links), there would typically be an undersupply. There can also be negative externalities in the creation of channels, such as those within groups that are hostile to one another. One would expect an oversupply of them (they are often neighbourhood ‘arms’ races; Gambetta, 1993). Be they positive or negative, externalities give rise to collective inefficiency. Positive externalities point to an argument for public subsidy; negative ones for investment in such institutions as those whose presence would lower the externalities (‘taxing’ the corresponding activities would be another possibility) (Dasgupta, 2005).

Civil society seems to emerge from an internal as well as external dialectics continuously shifting from proponents to opposition depending on prevailing circumstances. This confirms that in the society there exist institutionalized social conditions as classics such as Durkheim proposed. Often we also witness repetitive cyclical social relations as Ibn-Khaldun suggested where we move in circular patterns reflecting a rise and decline dialectics. In addition most civil society groups demonstrate hybridity capabilities in socially adapting to the prevailing social conditions while in other situations opposing or remaining proponent of occasionally simultaneous social transformations. This makes civil society diverse and complex, reflecting the social choice and strategic planning of those involved and their ability to mobilize political and structural opportunities as well as framing structures. Clearly in the long term the cyclical pattern of civil society (in the proponent and opposition condition) is not sustainable as civil societies under prolonged conflict such as the Somalis reach a sort of dead end. In search for alternatives, we first need to replace the cyclical social condition with more progressive cooperative engagement among conflicting civil society groups. Secondly there is a need to transform the core power structures and relations in the society. This could start with the creation of a neutral space, where the diverse civil society groups (at least those working with positive externalities that improve basic social conditions of the society) can meet and exchange their views and ideas for the benefit of the rest of the society. This holds the state maneuvering back into the top of the political society. The paradox is that on one hand we need state institutions to safeguard and ensure a vibrant public space under which civil societies need to operate and develop. While we on the other hand need to remain skeptical to macro state institutions dominating and designing social processes that should in normal circumstances remain bottom up and inclusive. A democratic and more inclusive state would, nonetheless, partially address this dilemma. In return that will demand trust and compromise from civil society groups.
Table 1 The dynamics of state-civil society relationships in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The dynamics of state-civil society relationship</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State centered approach structuring and manipulating civil society.</td>
<td>Partially horizontal relationship between state &amp; civil society. State based its policies on civic engagement concerns.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hierarchical relationship between state and civil society, where the state is partially receptive towards civic engagement.</td>
<td>Stateless and weak state condition where civil society substitutes the state in providing services. Alternatively and global civil society that pay pass the state.</td>
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Competing models for civil society

Fragmentation

Following the modernization of societies, new forms of social, political and economic organization emerge. These are intermediate social organizations that locate between the family and the state. This implies a transition from a particular interest to common interest. Modernization means moving people from *badawa* to *hadara*, from mechanical to organic relationships and from gemmenshieft to Gasselshieft. This is the linear development towards more of an industrialized, secularized, de-traditionalized society with strong coercive government institutions. The assumption is when the state is fully modernized and consolidated the CS will assimilate. Society shifts from micro level to macro.

Consolidation/Hegemonization

This is the stage where the state gradually consolidates. It allows the emergence of public life as alternative to private or household-based activities. This happens in the form of non-governmental actors conducting non-coerced activities. We could also
characterize this sphere as a public sphere, a site filled with associational life, arenas for public deliberation. It could also be the sphere of self-organization – meso level. This is also a sphere reflecting the bastion of class hegemony, the inevitable coercive and consensual, soft or hard power, the cultural and the hard core politics, the power with persuasion. From this public sphere social movements with emphasis on citizenship expression and articulation of social capital emerge (Putnam, 2001).

Transformation

Critics point to the non-neutrality of the public sphere. It is Eurocentric and state centric and propagates for liberalism, modernization, realism. In addition it is gendered and ethno-centric as it ignores traditions, the kinship networks, the family and the transnational dimensions of human relations and aspirations. Therefore we need non-state-centered transnational global oriented civil society that collectively addresses global inequalities, underdevelopment and injustice. By doing this we will overcome essentialization and predetermined categorization.
The Somali civil society

If we apply Hagel’s approach to the Somali context, the closest we get to civil society would be the warlords. For a while these warlords served as a cushion, indeed a brutal one, between the state and society. Other parts of the Somali civil society are not monolithic. Some are organic to society and serve a real need in diverse communities, while others carry private and personal outfits.

Although the role of civil society, its capacity and scope have increased since 1991, as Professor Mahadallah argues in the exchange I had with him in the following statement, its character was shaped by political developments going back to colonialism. The Somali civil society suffered from colonialism, military dictatorship and continues to do so under the recent multiple external interventions and regional clanism.

The colonial regimes have actually laid the foundation for Somalia’s recent civil society. They had created labor organizations, especially in the civil aviation and transportation industry. There were also a significant number of agricultural groups in different commodities, such as fruits and cotton. Most of these had participated in the anti-colonial struggle. After independence, they thought (erroneously) that they did not need to protect themselves from their kinsmen leaders. Some also joined the government. That was the beginning of their end. After the overthrow of the civilian regime, the Military Regime finally disbanded them. Later on, the regime brought them back in the form of parastatals. They were cheerleading for the regime. My problem is how to demarcate the line between civil society and interest groups. Are they synonymous? Is interest segregation v interest aggregation a good distinction of them? I know that there are interest groups that try to link with other groups for certain purposes (Mahadallah, April 2012).

The issue of what groups of the society should we include as civil society is rather controversial. We could probably consider Somali warlords as members of the civil society. Actually in the West mafia groups, racist and terrorist networks are considered non-state members of the society that aggregate social capital with negative externalities, thereby being disadvantageous for the overall collective society. The state then tries to reduce their negative impact through information, empowerment, education, and eventually imprisonment etc.

We can roughly divide the development of Somali civil society into five main stages. The first is the pre-modern periods, probably going back thousands of years. Somalis then were divided into socio-professional groups representing biyomaal, baajamaal, muruqmaal and maskax maal social groups. In ancient Somalia, that among others interacted with Chinese and Egyptian civilizations, people’s professional characteristics were more important than their genealogical profiling.

The second period refers to the modernization era including the injection of colonialism into the country. Intense struggle between the preservation of a traditional society versus colonial modernization attempts characterized the period. The Somali civil society had the option to either adopt the livelihood presented by colonial powers or oppose imperialism and its cultural, economic and political influence.

Fragmentation that started with the so-called colonial modernization continued until the transnational disintegration during which civil society groups connected to
semi-autonomous regions, clans and diasporic interest groups. Strangely the most consistent and the least disjointed civil society groups are merchants that continue to control the market and thereby dominate the society. Similarly women, youth and professional groups play lesser but significant roles. Particularly women groups played a significant role during the struggle for independence, under dictatorship, during the collapse and continue to support and facilitate humanitarian activities in Somalia. It is well known that traditional communities often challenge modernization. The educated elite have in periods contributed to development but have been in recent years, similar to other groups, split into regional and clan groups undermining the emergence of a consistent national project.

During modernization and colonization civil society divided itself into religious and nationalistic camps to counter colonial powers and their missionary programmes. Colonial powers divided the Somali society into traditional and modern components, implicitly referring to for and against the colonial system. Those who embraced the colonial project qualified as modern and civilized components, while those preserving their traditional values, whether religious or customary, reflected backwardness and recalcitrance. Part of the secularized and urbanized society initially supported the colonial system. Colonial urbanization was far from a functional process based on cosmopolitan and civilizational interaction with the outside world. It was rather a distorted urbanization under which colonial administrations recruited clients for auxiliary positions in the colonial machinery such as security personnel, drivers and domestic workers. The process created gaps in the society where people working with the colonial system imitated colonial cultures, while opponents scorned such practice.

Colonialism divided the Somali society. For the Somalis it was not just an issue of opposing foreigners invading your country, but also an issue of resisting enslavement and total subordination under colonial rule. Colonial representatives considered themselves as superhuman and expected people to serve them as their masters. Taking sides with regard to colonial powers had consequences for the mobilized civil society. Opponents of the colonial system risked torture, imprisonment and execution while proponents risked their lives and eventual exile when colonialism ended.

When colonizers came during colonialism, Somalis became divided into struggling colonial lines. Colonial powers specially the Italians humiliated and enslaved the Somalia. The British also divided the labour so that people from minorities should cook the food and wash clothes. Some of them protested. Some rejected and some accepted. CS was divided into pro and against colonialism. Those who opposed were fighting, using traditional fighting tools such as tooreey. Those who opposed, most were killed. Colonial powers used to rape Somali women. The colonial powers created tension among the Somalis. In their health sector the colonial powers also manipulated as they helped those they want and deprive from those they don't like. During independence, those who supported colonialism fled with them. In Italy most women who fled with the Italians are now seniors and they are suffering. They used to work as spies for colonial powers, particularly for the Italians (Halima, May 2012).

After independence, people expected that Somali independence will bring peace and prosperity. That did not happen and most people were disappointed and longed for better conditions.
There was a widespread killing and prostitution and suffering resulting from increased urbanization, and elite mismanagement following independence (Ali, May 2012).

At the time, the military was one of the few national institutions not infected by widespread tribalism and corruption. The situation was unbearable for ordinary citizens and politicians increasingly became factionalised across regions and clans. The military took power in a speculative coup after the assassination of the president in 1969. This again led to the division of the society into a pro and against the regime. Since then Somalis have been divided and continue to be so.

Later, independent tribalism increased and Somalis confronted each other, leading to the military takeover in 1969. From there Somalis were again divided pro or against the military regime. Those that opposed the system did it discretely. Civil society were divided those that “la jaanqaaday” with the system. Production and agriculture started. To opposing forces, a lot mobilization- state mobilization. Now the Somali CS are tired from wars and conflicts (Hassan, May 2012)

The third period introduced authoritarianism during which civil society again found itself divided into pro and against dictatorship. Actually dictatorship continued the oppression began by colonial powers. Colonialism divided the society into traditional and less traditional components, while the authoritarian system complicated that earlier division. Following independence people trained by colonial powers within and outside the country accessed and attained privileges. Actually colonial powers together with the UN observed the transition period leading a form of post-colonial era. Clearly the post-colonial elite became corrupt as expected, leading the military takeover in 1969 that also divided the society into pro revolutionary regime and opponents. The military regime engaged the militarization and through orientation centres polarized society by creating militias (guulwadayaaal), widening the gap between the civil society. This resulted in intensive emigration and brain drain as many civic groups left the country for either exile or to join the opposition groups abroad.

The militarization of the diverse African societies mainly came with European colonization as the structures of the colonial military and bureaucratic organization were modeled on British, Italian or French standards, including the rituals of marching and the applied terminology, all becoming Europeanized in “tone” and “style” (Mazrui, 1976). When colonial powers nominally left, the African leaders they trained concentrated on national sovereignty and security and spent the scarce resources on the construction of one party military regimes, leading to dictatorship and economic decline (Bratton, 1989). The colonial transformation of the Somali society is best captured by the following remarks of Abdi Samatar:

Although pre-colonial pastoralism was not isolated from the mercantile world, the latter had marginal influences over the reproduction of everyday life. But over the last century the new relationships between pastoralists, merchants, and the state have entailed the emergence of different social relations and the demise of communitarianism. …Pastoral Politics The imposition of a state on the old Somali order has also eroded pastoral democratic practices with far-reaching and lethal repercussions. One of the legacies of colonial administrations was the neglect and commercialization of pastoralism and peasant agriculture, and the absence of any vibrant new productive enterprises. In the context of an impoverished economy, small but rapidly growing social groups involved in trading, as well as state employees, came to demand independence in
the 1950s, and the Somali Republic emerged from the union of Italian and British Somalilands on 1 July 1960. The leadership in both the public and private sectors was dominated by a group of Somalis who had little experience of, let alone much attachment to, either livestock and/or peasant agriculture. Moreover, they were overwhelmingly ill-equipped to devise and implement a successful strategy for development. The new regime inherited an anaemic economy, a deepening budgetary deficit, a multi-party political system, a growing urban population largely unhinged from productive labour, and intensifying competition among dominant social groups for resources (Samatar, 1992).

The significance of art and oratory for civil society

Oratory is important in the Somali culture, also in the struggle against colonial powers and the mobilization of the civil society. The best known cases are from the application of poetry by the freedom fighter, Sayid Mohamed Abdulla Hassan, popularly ridiculed by the British Empire as “Mad Mullah”. He convinced the Somalis that the Jihad against colonial powers was holy, religious and nationalistic duty. The use of literature and oratory continues in post-independent periods.

Literature was important in this regard. For instance Sayid (the former president) used poetry and military engagement to fight colonialism. In general literature was significant. During independence Somalis focused on nationalism and people sang and recited nationalistic poetry (Asha, May 20012).

In his book “Literature, clans and the nation state in Somalia”, Ali Jimale Ahmed argues that language, literature, myth and symbols are important in our understanding and construction of societies. Language is thus not neutral and spoken in a vacuum. Ahmed suggests that the state is preoccupied with language, myth and symbols to consolidate its grip on power and “oblivious to subtle messages directed at undermining its power base” (Ahmed, 1996:5).

The fourth stage is the period of state collapse and warlordism, where civil society again suffered and tried to fill the vacuum of state collapse. Here they provided service while bribing the warlords to save their lives. During the collapse civil society in Somalia was organized through civil and non-civil formations (warlords and troublemakers).

During the collapse of the Somali state, most civil society groups either left the country or subordinated their activities under the different warlords competing for resources in the country. A few organizations have nonetheless managed to provide health and education services. The warlords were also divided into secular groups terrorising people and religious groups exploiting their religious positions. Both groups utilized identity and clan premises.

Civil society found itself contributing both to peace and security challenges. Since independence, for instance, Diaspora has been involved in the country’s development as they contributed to the struggle for independence and more recently the struggle for power for particularly regional and clan affiliates. On the other hand,
civil society often challenged the prevailing system. Artists and public intellectuals, academics and professionals have on numerous occasions contributed to the development of political and economic sectors.

The fifth and final stage is the trans-national stage where civil society through the worldwide Diaspora links to trans-national communities. In an increasingly trans-nationalized complex world civil society tries to adjust with the increase of Diaspora contribution and involvement. Civil society confronts the dilemma of wanting to benefit from trans-nationalization while avoiding yet another “imperial conquest through globalization”. This is possible if global civil society is able to reduce the gap between top down global hegemonic power confronted with the new popular bottom up demands for justice and sovereignty (Bourdieu, 1998). In addition trans-nationalism provides Diaspora communities with an opportunity to engage and mobilize in multisided network frames to challenge the hegemonic order that often partially succeed in oppressing civic engagement in the homeland (Hepner, 2003). For the Somalis trans-national political organization as well as the *hawaala* system ensures a dynamic trans-national political, economic and social system linking the homeland to global trans-national locations (Horst, 2004).

Table 2 The state condition & the character of civil society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The state condition</th>
<th>The character of civil society</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical city states</td>
<td>Professionalized production-centred civic communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial state</td>
<td>Colonial-linked organized communities (mainly urban educated) vs. anti-colonial organized communities (traditional religious and cultural communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcolonial states</td>
<td>Regime-linked communities (mainly urban educated) vs. anti-regime opposition groups (mainly from urban educated elites and traditional religious communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under collapsed state</td>
<td>Warlord, regional and clan-linked trans-national communities vs. subordinate professional trans-national communities.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Beyond the proponent-opponent pattern

Clearly the Somali civil society has been divided since the periods of urbanization and colonization. Now it seems that at least most of the civil society long for peaceful settlement due to prolonged civil war and suffering. Public demonstrations by various social groups together with the literary expression by influential members of the Somali civil society calling for reconciliation and peace attest to this reality.

It is also important to note that international actors such as the international community and neighbouring countries and the AU play a significant role in the security situation of Somalia. Here we also need to remember the Diaspora involvement that could complicate the Somali civil society and its quest for better security. Diaspora could be constructive in many ways but they could also be destructive in numerous
aspects. Diaspora’s trans-national condition is ostensibly unsettled as they relate to multiple homelands and are not genuinely interested in investing in one homeland. Trans-national communities find comfort in the hybridity and transitional context, exploiting opportunities provided by such circumstances. This has, occasionally, created tension as people on the ground accuse Diaspora of “long distance nationalism” by engaging and mobilizing people across continents, while not directly paying the price if things fall part. It is mainly the people in Somalia that will have to carry the burden. Most people with flexible citizenships either return to their host societies or stay in other comfortable countries where they access reasonable security and protection.

Strangely the most vibrant Somali civil society groups congregate in neighbouring countries such as Kenya. This has probably to do with Kenya being a democratic country as well as the East African country hosting major international donor representatives, occasionally subsidizing the civil society engagement in Somalia. The increasing number of shuttling civil society elites between major towns in Somalia and Nairobi attest to this. Obviously people seem concerned for their personal security. At the moment civil society cannot fully operate and prevail in major towns like Mogadishu. The same applies to major towns in the so-called semi-autonomous regions.

Conclusion: Options to overcome the current debacle

Currently, humanitarian, social and political dimensions of civil society engagement, though limited, exist in Somalia. There is nonetheless a clear fragmentation into regional and transnational features. Although with the availability of internet and satellite TVs, an option for coordination exists, it is rather difficult bringing Somali civil society into a common cause. To limit the negative social capital and externalities from destructive groups, Somalis could seek international support. For instance, the Sri Lanka case in which peace first re-emerged following transnational sanctions targeting funding for rebel groups substantiates the need for coordinated transnational efforts. So the issue is not to bring civil society as a unitary form but to try to encourage and channel resources for positive externalities and if possible also foster bridging dimensions rather than bonding aspects of the Somali civil society, by supporting professional humanitarian associations rather than sectarian or regional groups.

Theoretically the idea of the division of the civil society into pro and against the central power holds for the Somali case. It is nonetheless not clear whether it is the civil society itself that generate such division or if it is a top down mechanism generated by dominant national and international institutions. At least with the emergence of a worldwide Somalia Diaspora, there is an opportunity for the Somali Diaspora to have social spaces where they can express, engage and mobilize. The problem is that such unrestricted mobilization could lead to additional disintegration. Most diasporic civil societies are relatively beneficial for their societies, but there has to
be some kind of state that could mediate and support Diaspora initiatives. Without a state it is very difficult to have space where civil society can flourish. With a state there is also a need to make sure that macro institutions accommodate civil society in a way that at least ensures freedom of expression and organization, allowing people to pursue their interest and share their views and prospects with others.

In conclusion, this paper suggests that what we need is a transparent civil society in the Diaspora and in the country. In addition we should coordinate efforts with host countries to prevent negative externalities. Regionalism together with the prevailing clanism, partially fuelled by subversive Diaspora transnationalism, has so far fragmented Somali civil society. The reorganization of the Somali civil society through professional, humanitarian and possibly religious, and not extremist, causes might help overcoming such obstacles.

Civil society in Somalia goes back to classical times as professionalized social groups. Colonialism introduced modern fragmentation, paving the way for corrupt authoritarian regimes that fostered brutal warlords, who mastered the brutalization of the society. It is not possible to return to the past, but with the emergence of global Diaspora, Somalis could pursue transnational civic engagement that could potentially combine indigenous social professionalization with transnational civic engagement supporting developmental initiatives. Focus should, for instance, rest on improving education, social, health and economic sectors that create opportunities for communities across the country and beyond.

References


Women at the forefront – enforcing security in Mogadishu

Lilla Schumicky

“On 23rd April 2012, it was Somali Military Force’s 52nd anniversary celebration day. The military started marching from Jazeera beach to the old seaport resided by Somali Marines Forces. During marching a land mine was placed under Maka Almukarama Street in Waberi district in Mogadishu. Members of the Women Civilian Protection Unit have noticed that a boy putting explosive devices under the street. They immediately sent coded SMS to the police and hundreds of other members of the Unit. The Waberi District Response Team has swiftly arrived to the area. They blocked the street and people were not allowed to pass the road until the anti-explosion group came and disarmed the land mine. Finally the boy was also arrested. During the interrogation it turned out that he is a young member of Al-Shabaab and specially trained for putting together explosive devices”.¹

The women of Mogadishu are continuing to protect lives every day by patrolling, observing and reporting. The paper will argue that the international community is best placed to support community based interventions and programmes that are enhancing safety and security at the community level – using a bottom-up approach – and contributing to the stabilization of Mogadishu and the South-Central regions.

Community protection is not a stand-alone intervention. Rather it is part of the wider focus on governance and rule of law programming where particular focus is being given to community security, access to justice, civilian policing and poverty reduction environmental protection programming. Non-conventional Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programmes are creating a security vacuum by disengaging members of militias. These militias had ‘protected’ the community using violence and intimidation. The vacuum that is created by their removal needs to be filled promptly with a legitimate, effective alternative in order to prevent the re-emergence or formation of other militias that will occupy the empty space. Community protection is one of the best methods to secure legitimate rule of law and security and to create the conditions that will allow the formal police force to move in, gain leverage, and establish themselves on a permanent basis.

Community protection is enabling the transition from a humanitarian emergency situation to real development that is comprehensive and targets multiple areas of security sector as part of the reform process.

In Mogadishu women are the best placed to undertake community protection activities because it is unlikely that they will be assimilated into vigilante groups or form militias. The initiative is co-managed by the community and the police and focuses on crime prevention.

1. Why traditional DDR does not work in Mogadishu?

Traditional disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) has been tried in Mogadishu between 2003 and 2007 supported by UNESCO and UNDP. However this programme was small scale and concluded with the demobilization and “reintegration” of less than 1500 combatants\(^2\). It failed to achieve its primary objective, which was to “support security and development through security sector transformation, demobilization and the sustainable reintegration of combatants, militia and members of security forces excess to the security needs of the authorities, while strengthening controls and reducing the number of weapons in Somalia”\(^3\). Hence it chose to reward those who were active combatants and paid little or no attention to those youth who are at risk of becoming criminals or being recruited by militias. The programme made attempts to engage with members of the civil society, for example it enrolled 150 women. However in such a volatile context this should not have been part of the target group. These women could have been utilized effectively by becoming engaged in community patrolling, which will be discussed later in the paper.

The identification of the caseload is crucial. During the 2003-2007 DDR process, community leaders alone chose combatants to participate in the demobilization process. Yet the active role of the police, courts, and civil society is paramount during the selection process. The police know which youth are often involved in petty crime and who are the repeat offenders. The courts, whether religious or statutory are also aware which youth have been on trial and jailed for committing crimes. Moreover experience shows that the re-integration process should be wider in scope; by focusing exclusively on militia members it is possible to overlook at-risk youth who can often pose a greater security risk to their community.

Security in the communities can only be improved if the actors of crime and violence are removed. Engagement with militia members and criminals alike is required.


It is crucial in Mogadishu that the poll of people that are offered rehabilitation/transformation support is widened. Crime and violence is rampant and poses the greatest security problem is the city. According to the Crime and Victimization survey conducted in 2011 the sense of security of 1200 respondents has dramatically decreased because serious crimes such as armed robberies, killings and rapes have become the norm. These are mainly committed by the dozens of different non-state armed groups that are operating in Mogadishu.

This includes Al-Shabaab, madani (neighborhood watch) groups, private militias and cloistered security groups but also freelance militia that occasionally come together and form a loose alliance. The survey has pointed out that the majority of perpetrators are youth between the age of 12 and 34.

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Figure 2 Number of armed groups in Mogadishu Proportion of groups including children (<18) = 62%
Youngest members = 10 years old, but average around 14 years old, all in Mogadishu

The incentives that have been provided to the demobilized ex-combatants during the 2003-2007 DDR project focused mainly on literacy courses, practical training in local enterprise, vocational training, and support for training in the running of small businesses. These courses have not provided any real opportunity to transform the minds and attitudes of the targeted beneficiaries. Yet social transformation that intends to influence the thinking, beliefs, and moral system of the beneficiaries is essential. Hence most of the recipients (not only the ex-combatants) have been conducting unlawful activities for years. Without changing their perception regarding the importance of peace, women, human rights, rule of law and governance, long-term integration cannot be achieved. Moreover the idea of socialization, communication and problem solving with non-violent tools is crucial. Without attitude change long-term integration is unattainable. Many examples of DDR projects from Liberia, DR Congo, and Sudan have demonstrated that once the short-term economic support is over, demobilized and reintegrated combatants return to fighting. Economically it is much more viable than being unemployed even if practical skill is possessed.

The DDR between 2003 and 2007 has also involved members of the civil society; anyone wishing to be enrolled in the programme was required to hand in a firearm for disposal. Much as the idea was that the community takes an active role in the reintegration, however, this simply did not happen. As Özerdem rightly states, the community did not have any function or task to monitor the beneficiaries. Yet ac-


tive community participation and ownership is crucial to long-term reintegration. Communities should not only be the recipients of the caseload but also the supporters. This can be achieved through community volunteer activities whereby the targeted beneficiaries identify activities that involve labour or awareness and carry them out on a regular basis. This can help the community to change its concepts about the youth which were formally affiliated with crime and violence. At the same time the individual’s image within his community is redefined.

**Figure 3** Weapons used for assault (Freq %)

**Sequencing of previous DDR** was also an issue because disarmament was a pre-requisite of enrollment of the combatants. They were required to surrender a machine gun in good working condition\(^8\). Many youths do not own machine guns and about one third of all assaults are committed with pistols, revolvers, and knives. The disarmament component in the context of Mogadishu should have followed reintegration after gaining the confidence of the beneficiaries and the community rather than being selection criteria.

**Figure 4** Reasons for possessing guns.

Moreover instead of **disarmament**, the idea of responsibility could be planted in the communities. Firearm registration and awareness could be one way of tackling gun incidents. According to the CVS over 75% of the population possess some type of firearm in order to protect itself.

2. Alternative sentencing – an unconventional method of DDR in Mogadishu

Based on lessons learnt from the previous DDR programme in Somalia and other places, an alternative was designed and introduced in December 2011 within the framework of a joint programming between different UN agencies such as UNDP, ILO and UNICEF. The aim of the 8 month programme was “to contain and prevent violent conflict by engaging youth at risk through the creation of employment and livelihood opportunities at the district level”⁹. The project reached beyond traditional DDR with regards to its approach, caseload, integration and rehabilitation, community involvement and inclusion of women.

The project was not run ad hoc and stand-alone, which has contributed to the failure of many DDR interventions. The structure was supported for years in advance to enable the creation and sustainability of the programme. Many scholars have noted that one of the biggest issues with DDR was that it was a top-down intervention through a national DDR committee. In Somalia this may not have been possible; therefore the **district level structure** was strengthened. So called District Safety Committees (DSC) /District Peace Committees (DPC) have been established, which enabled state and civil society partnerships. The DSCs are composed of representatives of the different segments of the community such as women, elders, religious leaders, youth, business men, police, and members of the justice system. They are established under the District Council in accordance with local government legislation and are tasked to oversee safety and security within the district from a civilian prospective. Each year they create a District Safety Plan (DSP) which prioritizes areas where improvement is needed from the security point of view. For instance, in a specific area where incidences of rape are frequent, the physical characteristics need to be addressed, i.e. the area needs to be lit in order to reduce the risk of such activity. The DSP is part of the broader District Development Framework that is adopted by the District Council. Moreover they are also linked to the Peace-building Unit that is established on the **national level** and oversees peace-building activities.

However there were not many resources available for the implementation of the District Safety Plans and this has led to slow recognition of the District Safety/Peace Committees by the communities. The INGOs and local NGOs failed to use

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the DSPs and community security interventions were executed in isolation without linking to the broader local governance structure. Moreover the position of the committee within the local governance structure is not yet completely clear. Hence most regions have their own structural setting that differs from others, meaning that no uniform formula can be applied. As part of the solution a national peace-building policy is currently being worked out and led by the Ministry. The policy is aimed to clarify the structure of reporting and existing linkages. It will also oblige other international actors to follow the policy and to ensure that parallel systems are not created. This has occurred in the past and has led to severe confusion within the government and communities.

The purpose of a robust peace-building structure is twofold. Most DDR programmes have failed because once the funding dried up and external actors departed, nothing tangible and locally owned has remained in place and most committees have been dissolved. In the case of Somalia both the DSC/DPCs and Peace-building Unit are there to stay and are integrated into the government structure. National ownership and legacy is increased because national counterparts are implementing the project instead of NGOs. The PB Unit has overall responsibility for monitoring and evaluation.

The currently ongoing programme also fits into the rule of law context. It builds on the idea of parole/probation in order to support the sustainability of the programme. The parole/probation system provides the legal framework for intervention. Beneficiaries can come from four main areas: (1) from the community, identified as members of militias, criminal gangs, individual criminals, (2) from the prisons, released upon condition for good behaviour (parole) (3) from the trial, released by the judge upon condition (probation) (4) from the detention cell, diverted by the police. All youth who are offered alternative sentencing under the Youth for Change programme are given a conditional pardon by the judge, police and community. However they are held accountable in case of non-compliance. Before entering the programme a legal contract is signed by the beneficiary and the Governor or Judge, depending on where the person is coming from. This binds the participant to the rules and regulations included in the Code of Conduct. The individuals are followed by mentors (parole officers), who ensure that after the conclusion of the daily engagement, when the participant returns home no illegal activity is undertaken. If crime and unlawful activity is committed while enrolled in the programme (24 months), the Disciplinary Committee is in charge of deciding restorative action that is to be undertaken by the offender. The restorative action is to support the re-building of the relationship between the victim(s) and the offender.

The institutionalization of the above is currently being implemented and is supported by the government.

The intervention is divided into four main components (1) outreach and negotiation (2) case management (3) social rehabilitation (4) short and long-term economic integration. This formula is new and has not been applied in any previous DDR interventions so coherently. However the programme is a pilot, making it hard to accurately determine the long-term impact.
2.1 Outreach and negotiation

Communication and sensitizations are the key activities during outreach and negotiation. It is crucial to create awareness and understanding of the rehabilitation programme in order to manage the possible beneficiaries’ and the communities’ expectations. This requires a well-coordinated communication strategy and uniform messages in order to avoid confusing messages and limit the focus on finance/cash handling within the process. In Somalia religious leaders, community Elders, and former criminals are the most able groups within society to convey such messages. Outreach activities are carried out in various, locally understood forms, for example through community dramas, dialogues, radio shows, and performances.

In the past uniform messages were not carried out comprehensively, this led to massive confusion, misunderstanding, and raised expectations among the beneficiaries, communities, and local government. The problem was as a result of a lack of coordination between the UN agencies on Mogadishu and Nairobi level. In addition to that the local authorities were often informed late and that caused conflict. Specific components of the programme are carried out through the Mayor’s office where capacity is extremely low and requires immense support and monitoring. However this is the first step to enhancing the government’s authority within Mogadishu, which will hopefully lead to long-term sustainability.

Negotiation can happen on multiple levels. The community and the law enforcement agencies are best placed to negotiate the release of members of militias and gangs, and individual criminals. They can also identify those youth who are most at risk of becoming engaged in unlawful activists. In addition to this, militia members that are captured by the government and alliance forces are referred to the programme. Repeat offenders and those detained are diverted to rehabilitation centers by the police. Incarcerated individuals can be given conditional release by the prosecutors.

2.2 Case management

The case management system builds on the existing legal framework and aims to strengthen it further. The main objective of the system is to monitor the enrolled individuals throughout the programme and beyond. Case management commences at the registration when the beneficiary signs the legal contract to confirm that he agrees to conform to the Code of Conduct. The contract is attached to the beneficiary’s profile and a copy of it is kept by the Governor or the District Commissioner.

Once the contract is signed the participant undertakes a mindset assessment which is designed to quantify attitude and perception about the world. The questionnaire is composed of 32 questions designed to capture the individual’s view on the role of the state, use of force and firearms, the local community, peace-building operations, gender equality and women’s empowerment. The assessment is repeated at the end of the social rehabilitation programme in order to compare results and examine the change of attitude.
The beneficiary is registered into a central database called the Youth Support Management System (Youth-SMS). This database contains the complete socio-economic profile of the individual. A biometrical ID (iris scan), detailed personnel information such as family, education and health background as well as exam results from the social and economic skills development programme are recorded. The information can be accessed online and the case administrators are responsible for updating the profiles on a regular basis.

Each individual is accompanied by a mentor and each mentor is a member of the community. In Mogadishu this function is not only filled by Elders and religious leaders but peer youth who can serve as role models for the beneficiaries. Each mentor caters for about 10-15 youth and conducts regular meetings with them. The aim of the mentorship is to discuss any issues and problems that are raised during the programme and prevent them from spiraling out of control. The mentor’s role is crucial in providing both guidance and direction.

The attendance and active participation in the rehabilitation programme is also monitored on a daily basis. All youth are issued with a personal ID card that includes a barcode. This barcode is read and uploaded to the system on a daily basis in order to monitor attendance.

If there is an incident that does not warrant immediate police attention, the Disciplinary Committee takes a decision regarding any restorative action required. The mentor acts as the defence lawyer for the individual during the hearing because s/he knows the beneficiary and his background thoroughly.

However the above system is not yet fully operational. The monitoring software requires additional improvements and the staff operating it needs further capacity development. The question of what happens to those that drop out from the programme should be asked and addressed. So far no accurate system is in place and the beneficiaries, especially those that are put forward by the community can simply drop out and disappear without consequence. The dropout rate in Mogadishu is at least 20% but it is likely that this is due to the delay of the implementation of the economic component. Once the legal framework is in place the dropouts can be monitored and prevented more effectively.

2.3 Social rehabilitation

Without fundamentally changing the mindset and way of thinking, the long-term reintegration and rehabilitation of criminal youth is unfeasible. The aim of this 468 hour programme is to provide the necessary skills and education to facilitate a shift away from vectors of violence to supporting peace and security at the community level. The social rehabilitation is composed of both theory and practical classes. The theory classes are divided into four main modules.

1) Social skills – designed to install holistic life skills and self-management strategies that are imperative for peaceful co-habiting within the community. This entails communication, anger and stress management, re-vitalization of self-esteem and
self-worth. (2) Peace-building – whereby the former criminal learns how he can participate in the reduction in the frequency, severity and impact of violent conflict in the community by demonstrating analytical and problem solving skills. (3) A Rule of Law module provides youth with an understanding of the role of the different elements of the criminal justice system including the police, courts and prisons. The module teaches them how to contribute actively as community members and provides them with an explanation of the implications of criminal behaviour. (4) A Governance and Human Rights module provides an understanding of the role of public institutions, the conduct of public affairs and management of public resources. It also covers the principles of human rights and develops the participants’ knowledge of the functions and activities of the different government institutions.

These activities are complemented with practical classes. The aim of these activities is to put the theoretical knowledge into practice in the following ways: (1) Art/drama/poems – role plays are the one of the best methods to reiterate situations and draw from lessons learned during the theory classes. Feelings are expressed through non-verbal communication such as drawing and painting, a process that can often contribute to active trauma healing. In an oral society such as Somalia poems can end or cause conflict and are an extremely powerful means of expressing an individual’s thoughts. (2) Sports for Peace – signals strong community cohesion through team activities and the spirit of competition. Moreover sport is an outlet to expend extra energy that otherwise could be directed towards something negative. (3) Islamic education – plays the role of reinstating moral and ethical values of the beneficiaries. In Mogadishu about 65% of the youth (several of which were formerly affiliated with Al-Shabaab) have claimed that they have never read the Holy Quran. Therefore the role of the sheikh is crucial in teaching the youth to pray and re-align their ethical values. (4) Community volunteer activities - are aimed at assisting the youth with re-creating their image within the community. Collectively participants are encouraged to identify projects that can contribute to the well-being and safety of the community, for instance clearing the bushes and obstructions in a dark alley. By regularly participating in such positive activities the community changes its perception of at-risk youth, consequently the youth can be accepted much more readily.

These are the core modules of the social rehabilitation; they are often supplemented or revised depending on the specific context. For example in Mogadishu additional mine risk education (MRE) has been conducted. Health education is planned and tied in with HIV/AIDS sensitization. When the programme began in January 2012 not all modules were fully developed and that led to confusion among the facilitators and instructors. Furthermore the repeat of the mindset assessment will be crucial at the end of the social rehabilitation in order to measure whether the modules were effective and impacted on the attitude and perception of the youth.

2.4 Short and long-term economic integration

While the youth are transforming their way of thinking and attitude during the social rehabilitation classes, they are also engaged in short-term economic integration
activities. This mainly entails community service activities consisting of labor intensive work activities such as; rehabilitating roads, involvement in sanitation projects and strengthening the walls of the river beds. The idea behind the community service activities is to install a work ethic and sense of participation within the beneficiaries and support physical engagement in the reconstruction of Mogadishu city. These actions further contribute to the positive image of the youth involved.

Once the beneficiaries have completed the social rehabilitation classes, skills development begins. The skills offered are based on the previously conducted market, job, and labour survey. Initially traditional and non-traditional vocational skills are offered, but preliminary results indicate that approximately two thirds of the youth are interested in setting up their own micro-enterprises. Where this is the case they are provided with extensive micro-enterprise training. Once training has concluded in both areas those who have learned vocational skills are provided with job placements through a private public partnership (PPP) scheme or absorbed into local enterprises. This occurs through a Business Development Centre that is set up to support long-term sustainable livelihood opportunities of the beneficiaries. Without economic alternatives there are few licit activities with which participants can actively engage, hence despite the social rehabilitation, youth are likely to return to illegal activities. Therefore this facility is essential. Business mentors monitor closely the performance of the individuals within their caseload.

Unfortunately the current programme does not offer skills development opportunities to all the beneficiaries and job market as well as labour market surveys are yet to be concluded. It means that skills that are offered are not necessarily those that are viable and marketable. Furthermore skills are only the means to an end. The goal is to provide the socially rehabilitated youth with long-term sustainable livelihood opportunities. Most DDR programmes in the past failed at this point, because toll kits were provided to the ex-combatants but monitoring, job placements, micro enterprises were rarely opened and beneficiaries followed up. Therefore if the programme is to achieve real impact the beneficiaries need to be offered the above opportunities. The social rehabilitation and short-term economic integration activities (community service) is to be concluded in September 2012. It is essential that immediately after the youth are economically re-profiled and offered alternatives and further economic support.

3. Community protection through women

Through this comprehensive 12-16 month package complemented by the leading guidance and constant involvement of the surrounding community and with support from both local and national governments, criminal and at-risk youth can be re-integrated fully into the wider society. Whilst the process mitigates against many youth becoming potential offenders it also removes existing criminals from the society. In Mogadishu the majority of the caseload is former militia members. As stated
earlier “security” is mainly provided by militia within the 16 districts and following their removal a vacuum is created. If this vacuum is not swiftly filled new militias are likely to emerge and occupy the empty space created. As it stands the National Police Force has very little leverage or legitimacy within the communities.

According to the CVS there is general mistrust of the courts and the police. This is due to the perception of the community that the resources and capacity of the police are so severely limited that their presence is ineffective. The clan-dimensions also play an important role because police forces are often unable to move between districts due to clan sensitivities. Moreover the people of Mogadishu have suffered at the hands of repressive state actors, rival clan-based warlords, and religious extremists, none of which wished to establish a functioning police force.

The best example for this was demonstrated through the reporting of assaults. The main reasons mentioned for not disclosing incidents of assault to the public authorities included; the lack of someone to report such cases to (48.6%), followed by not being physically able to report the incident (17.1%). This shows that the police force requires further support and capacity development if it is to be able to respond and prevent crime effectively.
Whilst attempts are being made to enhance the aptitude of the licit police force the security vacuum needs to be filled. According to the Director General of the Ministry of the Interior of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) women are the best placed in Mogadishu to fill this space.

Through the community protection model where women are taking the lead in identifying and reporting criminal acts the results to date are twofold. On one hand the re-emergence of armed militias can be mitigated and on the other hand the police are ensured with ability to move freely into the community. They are also regaining their leverage through their work with the WCPU. The community needs to rebuild its relationship with the law enforcement agencies. Female community members’ involvement is simultaneously contributing to enhanced security whilst creating a sense of community ownership that is essential for long term sustainability.

Each district of Mogadishu has about 100 women protection members that are tasked to carry out regular patrolling. They move around in the streets and observe events unfolding and report any suspicious activities to the police through a text message system. They have been trained in the sending of coded SMS messages which are put through to a central database. The message is automatically forwarded to the nearest police station and police are directed to the scene to secure the area, prevent and respond. Patrolling also facilitates information sharing and provides an even more in depth knowledge of the neighborhoods where the women live. They often organize communal prayers and meals together. These activities further strengthen the community cohesion and harmony. The 100 women are composed of 20 internally displaced persons and 80 residents. They are managed by the management committee that has been elected among the women.

The women are also empowered economically through two initiatives. They patrol three days a week and the other three days they conduct additional community services activities in the form of labor intensive work. Currently they are participating
in sanitation projects and removal and collection of rubbish from the wards that has not been collected for the past two decades due to the lack of central government. Participants receive some incentives for both patrolling and community service. Yet they have joined the programme as volunteers and did not expected to receive any incentive from the outset.

However the idea of voluntarism is diminished and expectation of an incentive is increased. Hence understandably the women need to be supported and it cannot be expected of them to do 6 days voluntary work. Also the monitoring of attendance while patrolling is not yet fully worked out. Moreover community service is something that the individual offers for the community voluntarily. However a pilot is being introduced which is also to strengthen the sustainability of the programme. Through the revolving fund scheme women are supported to sustain their own micro enterprises.

A community based organization (CBO) is established and managed by the women themselves. About half of the participants already own functioning small businesses. These micro enterprises are further supported by additional micro loans. These loans need to be paid back to the CBO and once a debt is fully repaid a further loan can be issued to the next woman. In these way women who are from the same wards, districts, and sub-clans (and members of the CBO) guarantee each other’s payment.

The political participation and the leadership skills of the women are enhanced through specific needs based training. According to the needs assessment conflict resolution, negotiation and conflict sensitivity skills were provided in the first round. The second training is offered on health related issues, SGBV and HIV/AIDS prevention. Thirdly the focus shifts to human, international and women’s rights while the fourth one caters for knowledge of crime prevention and the Scanning, analysis, Response and Assessment (SARA) model. Additional training modules are currently being developed on self-defence and self-worth. A certification process is introduced in order to encourage active participation in the modules. Moreover literacy and numeracy classes are offered throughout to ensure comprehensive understanding and the empowerment of the women.

The training courses were developed prior to the project’s implementation. Further research is required into what sorts of modules are offered to similar schemes in other countries if this model is applied elsewhere. Furthermore the women need to be assessed, supported, and their capacity developed on a regular basis in order to ensure long-term participation.

Finally the bridge between the community and the police is established through the WCPU. Hence the police are also offered similar training classes. Police trainers are trained together with the protection unit trainers and they in turn train those police which are in the Response Team. Each response unit consists of 20 to 25 police officers and they accompany the women while patrolling or respond upon an SMS alert. Once the police secure the area and respond appropriately when crime occurs, they gradually gain the trust of the community Moreover the community police outposts are re-established on ward level to ensure physical presence in Mogadishu.
However the referral system between the police and the women needs to be further strengthened in practice. This means that the capacity of the police needs to be enhanced rapidly in order to enable them to respond. In the same time the justice system needs to be developed so referral between the police and the justice can also occur. A clear referral system needs to be established between the courts, police, and the Youth for Change Programme. This will allow those perpetrators that are identified by the women, arrested by the police, and judged by the statutory courts to receive alternative sentencing under the Youth for Change Programme.

4. Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated a comprehensive example of an intervention of the international community for enhancing community security in Mogadishu. The intervention described is owned nationally, driven by the community and fully executed by Somali men and women. Some of the shortcomings were also pointed out such as lack of coordination among the UN agencies and the local government, and accurate preparation for the intervention. Crucial attention needs to be paid to prevent drop outs and establish the legal framework of the programme. Some of the crucial elements that were lacking from the previous DDR programme that was executed from 2003 to 2007 in Mogadishu have been discussed. Most importantly it did not offer the essential social rehabilitation and the community was not engaged actively in the process. Furthermore there was no structure such as the District Safety Committees that could remain after the intervention.

Youth between the ages of 14 to 35 years are posing the greatest security threat to the citizens of Mogadishu. They are engaged in criminal activities, are members of different militia groups that are terrorizing the population.

Through the Youth for Change programme criminal elements and at-risk youth are offered a 12 to 15 month rehabilitation programme that consists of social, short-term and long-term integration activities. The youth are identified and referred to the intervention by the police, prosecutors, international military forces (AU, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops) and the community. The District Peace Committees that are a platform of state and civil society are taking the lead on the process and following closely each individual. While the criminals and militias are removed from the wards and districts the formal police force is allowed to move in and establish itself. This is supported by the Women Civilian Protection Unit. Hence women play a crucial role in the formation and upkeep of community security in Mogadishu. They are best placed to support the reparation of the damaged social fabric through “patrolling”, observing and interacting with the other members of the community.

Women are also increasing their own profile socially, economically and politically. Their social status is being strengthened through the engagement in regular patrolling activities. The trust of the community is enhanced as the women are partici-
pating actively in the lives of the communities. Through the common prayers and shared meals the social cohesion is further strengthened. Parallel to the social status the economic flexibility of the women is enhanced. While they generate regular income through the short-term community service activities, a longer-term economic resilience is also enhanced through the revolving fund scheme. The bridge between the police and the community is established as the response to crime becomes swifter and more effective.

The community security model in Mogadishu is one of the best examples of a new and comprehensive intervention that enhances local ownership both operationally and programmatically. There is much space to improve, however initial success is yielded through the rehabilitated youth and prevented crimes by the Women Civilian Protection Unit. This contributes to the improvement of community security and the overall stabilization of Mogadishu.
Famine, Drought, War, Piracy, International Terrorism, and the Absence of Democratic Governance:
The factors behind, as well as the symptoms of, the failed Somali state are legion

*Morgan Lorraine Roach and Ray Walser*

Introduction

Famine, drought, war, piracy, international terrorism, and the absence of democratic governance: The factors behind, as well as the symptoms of, the failed Somali state are legion. Despite its woes, Somalia has not been considered a U.S. foreign policy priority – an unfortunate relegation that has undermined national security. Yet, as terrorist groups like al-Shabaab increase their grip on the region, the U.S. can no longer afford to be anything but fully engaged with Somalia. Rather than attempting another round of unsuccessful “nation building,” the U.S. should set the conditions that will allow the Somalis to secure a more prosperous and secure future, while mitigating threats to U.S. security.

In the past twenty years, the African continent has made progress toward democratic governance. Civilians now govern many countries once under military rule; political parties have emerged in what were previously single-party states; observance of civil liberties and political rights has strengthened; and inter-state conflict has diminished. However, some African countries have bucked this trend and either maintained an undemocratic status quo or plunged into chaos. Somalia, more so than any other African state, continues to be synonymous with intractable anarchy – a well-earned distinction, given that, for two decades, Somalia has lacked a functioning central government while serving as a haven for terrorism and piracy.

Since the infamous Battle for Mogadishu in 1993, the United States has constrained its engagement in the Horn of Africa.[1] While Somalia’s challenges impact the United States, it is not considered a U.S. foreign policy priority – an unfortunate relegation that has undermined national security. With the United States and its allies under constant threat from terrorists, Somalia poses an international security risk.
not only to U.S. interests in the region, but also to the broader international community. Piracy, another condition of Somalia’s failed state status, imperils the flow of commerce and costs the shipping industry and consumers billions of dollars per year. Furthermore, the ongoing anarchy has prevented the Somali people from receiving the most basic services.

The Obama Administration has taken steps, though limited, toward engagement with Somalia’s local governing entities while supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).[2] This “dual track” approach only addresses half of the problem, as continued recognition of the TFG offers little hope of moving beyond the status quo – order, stability, and democracy must come from within. U.S. policymakers should instead embrace a comprehensive strategy that places renewed emphasis on responsible democratic governance and the construction of a pluralistic and functioning Somali state. To accomplish this objective, the U.S., regional stakeholders, and the Somali people must build a strategy based on broader power sharing, genuine security, and viable economic opportunities. Only then can the root causes of the failed Somali state be addressed.

In order to understand the current crisis, it is necessary to examine several key components of Somalia’s collapse, including the evolution of U.S. engagement with Somalia, why such engagement has failed, and the critical factors that fueled Somalia’s decline. An analysis of these components reveals, first and foremost, the need to establish a democratic government in Somalia, as well as several other initial steps the Obama Administration could take to begin resolving the crisis. Rather than engaging in more failed attempts at “nation building,” the U.S. should set the conditions that will allow Somalis to secure a more prosperous and secure future, while mitigating threats to U.S. security.

Nation Building Not the Answer

For over two decades Somalia has lacked a legitimate, functioning national government. With the collapse of General Siyad Barre’s authoritarian regime in 1991, the country plummeted into anarchy as rival leaders jousted for territorial dominance. [3] In 1992, the international community acted and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) launched an operation to deliver humanitarian aid. Later that year, President George H. W. Bush authorized Operation Restore Hope to provide security support to the United Nations.

The Clinton Administration altered Operation Restore Hope, transforming it from a short-term humanitarian mission to a longer-term operation dedicated to Somalia’s reconstruction. This change in policy yielded deadly consequences. Outraged by what was perceived as foreign intervention, warlords – including General Mohammed Farah Aideed, the leader primarily responsible for Barre’s ouster, waged war against U.N. peacekeeping troops. In response, the U.S. dispatched
Special Forces to arrest General Aideed in October 1993, only to have eighteen elite U.S. soldiers and hundreds of Somalis killed in a military clash referred to as Black Hawk Down.[4] Shocked by what was, at the time, the greatest loss of American servicemen in combat since Vietnam, President Clinton abandoned the mission and, by the end of March 1994, all U.S. forces were withdrawn from Somalia.

Fight for Governance

In 2000, after a dozen attempts to establish a central government, Djibouti convened the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC), which, in turn, established the Transitional National Government (TNG). The initial mandate of the TNG ended in August 2003, and was unsuccessful in solidifying authority; a rival governmental movement known as the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) opposed the TNG.[5] Anticipating the failure of the TNG to establish permanent governance, Kenya hosted the 2002 Somalia National Reconciliation Conference.[6] By the end of the conference in October 2004, the TNG and the SRCC agreed to the formation of a “Transitional Nation Charter,” thereby creating the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

The TFG represents Somalia’s 14th attempt to establish a permanent government. As a result of ongoing battles between rival warlords, the TFG was unable to enter Somalia until 2005, and, therefore, lacked legitimacy with the majority of Somalis. Even when the TFG entered Somalia, it was forced to govern from Baidoa, 250km outside Mogadishu.[7]

While the international community struggled to establish governance during the 1990s, Somalia’s local Islamic courts started to take root. Various Islamist organizations – although primarily al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (Islamic Unity or AIAI), a radical militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda – organized local tribunals and their militias under the banner of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). ICU forced many warlords out of power, and even claimed Mogadishu in June 2006. Eventually, the ICU reorganized itself into the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) and expanded its authority throughout much of southern and central Somalia. Despite its brutal tendencies, the Council enjoyed broad support from the Somali people as its militias restored relative order.

Ethiopia, a majority Christian nation with a substantial Muslim minority, dreaded the expansionary and destabilizing potential of Somali Islamism. As such, on Christmas Eve 2006, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi launched a military invasion of Somalia, decimating CIC militias. A year later the CIC was removed from power, thereby allowing the TFG to move to Mogadishu.

The TFG’s arrival, however, did not lead to the establishment of a permanent government. Rather, the TFG’s authority depended upon the presence of the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Given the system under which it was founded, the TFG’s inability to govern is hardly surprising. Specifically,
during the 2002 Nairobi Peace Process, the architects of the TFG instituted a top-down approach to governance known as the “clan quota system,” whereby TFG members were appointed – not elected.[8] Rather than working toward stability and prosperity for the country as a whole, each government official sought to narrowly address his clan’s interests.[9]

Equally disturbing is the TFG’s complete disregard for the fundamentals of good governance. Rampant fraud and corruption have run unchecked and, when foreign monies are involved, even increased, thereby adding to the suffering of the Somali people. When East Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) appointed the TFG in 2004, it chose Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a veteran warlord as president, and Ali Mohamed Gedi, a veterinarian with no political experience, as prime minister.[10] Rather than select individuals who best represent the interests of the Somali people, Ahmed and Gedi appointed relatives and political allies to various positions within government and molded the TFG to serve their objectives.[11]

Al-Shabaab: Terror Threat

Despite international backing, the TFG has proved itself incapable of tackling the most existential threat to the Somali people: terrorism. In 1992, al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, operating out of Sudan, sent his lieutenant, Abu Hafs al-Masri, on repeated scouting missions to Somalia. Offering a willing recruiting pool and a lack of governance, Somalia was ripe for al-Qaeda expansion. Somalia's clan dynamics and expensive operating costs, however, proved challenging and al-Qaeda suspended its initiative. Despite this setback, al-Qaeda continues to use Somalia as a recruiting ground and a safe haven.[12]

When the CIC took control of Mogadishu in 2006, members of al-Shabaab served in its militant branch. Following the Ethiopian invasion and the overthrow of the CIC, al-Shabaab dispersed throughout the country. Once the CIC was disbanded it split into two factions: the moderates and the radicals. The moderates, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh, turned themselves into Kenyan authorities and later joined the TFG. [13] The radical elements of the CIC also split, forming two groups, al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, headed by Hassan Dahir Aweys.[14]

Following the CIC’s breakup, the leadership of al-Shabaab passed to Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed “Godane,” and the now deceased Aden Hashi Ayro. Having both trained with al-Qaeda in the 1990s, they sought to model their chain of command, ideology, strategy, and tactics on those of al-Qaeda.[15] Though al-Shabaab formalized its ties with al-Qaeda in February, it was previously considered an affiliate.[16] Unlike al-Qaeda, whose primary objective remains the establishment of a global caliphate, al-Shabaab’s leaders seek the establishment and expansion of a “Greater Somalia,” and the imposition of Sharia law through jihad.[17]
In addition to its support from al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab's expansion and growing influence in the region are made possible by support from the government of Eritrea. Since 2007, the Eritrean government has provided political and material support for al-Shabaab in the form of arms, munitions, and training.[18] Eritrea's readiness to back al-Shabaab derives from its long-term resentment toward Ethiopia, from which it gained independence in 1993.[19] Reports by the United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Group on Somalia (SMG) have repeatedly found evidence of Eritrea's support for terrorism. In July 2007, the SMG reported:

Huge quantities of arms have been provided to the Shabab by and through Eritrea...the weapons in caches and otherwise in possession of the Shabab include an unknown number of surface-to-air missiles, suicide belts, and explosives with timers and detonators.[20]

Subsequent SMG reports have yielded similar results. In his 2009 testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, stated, “We have clear evidence that Eritrea is supporting these extremist elements, including credible reports that the Government of Eritrea continues to supply weapons and munitions to extremists and terrorist elements.”[21] In December 2009, the U.N., acting under Resolution 1907, sanctioned the government of Eritrea for backing militants in Somalia. The sanctions included an arms embargo, travel bans, and asset freezes on businesses and government officials.[22]

Despite these sanctions, the Government of Eritrea remains defiant, and therefore, last December, the U.N. Security Council voted in favor of Resolution 2023, which requires foreign companies involved in Eritrea's mining industry to ensure that profits are not used to benefit terrorism. Earlier drafts of the resolution included bans on foreign investment in the mining sector and the blockage of a remittance tax on Eritreans living overseas. However, such steps were opposed when some European member states, Russia, and China raised objections, arguing that such sanctions would hurt the Eritrean people rather than prevent the government's support of terrorism.[23] The U.S. has taken little direct action or levied bilateral sanctions against Eritrea for its support for terrorism. While the United States ended bilateral support to Eritrea in 2005, in fiscal year (FY) 2004 the U.S. government provided over $65 million in humanitarian aid, including $58.1 million in food assistance and $3.47 million in refugee support.[24]

**Al-Shabaab Emboldened**

On July 11, 2010, terrorism in Somalia reached a turning point when al-Shabaab launched its first transnational attacks with synchronized bombings in Kampala, Uganda. The Kampala attacks emphasized a bolder and more dangerous al-Shabaab. Traditionally al-Shabaab limited its targets to those in Somalia. However, the Kampala
attacks, though directed at Uganda’s military support to the TFG, highlighted al-Shabaab’s aspirations to have an impact beyond Somalia. It also raised questions about al-Shabaab’s ability to contribute to the destabilization of East Africa.

Al-Shabaab’s attack on Kampala served as a wake-up call for both the African Union (AU) and the U.S. When al-Shabaab first expanded its operations in 2007–2008, the Bush Administration officially designated al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.[25] Although the threat from al-Shabaab continues to grow, the Obama Administration has made it clear that direct U.S. military engagement in Somalia is to be limited. In March 2010, Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson stated that the United States “has no desire to Americanize the conflict in Somalia.”[26] Nevertheless, the U.S. responded to the threat before and after the Kampala attacks by increasing its counterterrorism operations in the region via the intelligence community, the deployment of proxy forces, armed drones, and Special Forces missions.

While it is difficult to determine how many strikes the U.S. intelligence community has carried out, former ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn estimates that, since 2007, there have been nearly a dozen U.S. covert strikes on terrorist targets in the region.[27] The U.S. military has previously targeted militants through helicopter raids, Special Forces operations, and sea-launched cruise missiles.[28]

In 2010, the White House implemented a new approach to counterterrorism via the 2010 National Security Strategy.[29] In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Daniel Benjamin, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, stated that the strategy emphasizes tactical counterterrorism efforts aimed at “taking individual terrorists off the streets.”[30] The strategy includes the increased use of armed Reaper and Predator drones – low-risk weapons that employ a level of force consonant with the specific goal of a given operation. Furthermore, drone attacks are discriminate, as they are launched against a specific target and reduce the risk of collateral damage.[31]

The U.S. intelligence community believes it has achieved considerable returns from its increased use of drone strikes. Last June, the U.S. conducted its first known drone operation in Somalia – an attack on a vehicle convoy in the southern city of Kismayo, an established al-Shabaab stronghold. The strike wounded two senior al-Shabaab operatives who may have been targeted as a result of their relationship with the late Yemeni al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Anwar al-Awlaki.[32]

These strikes are being expanded, with drones now reportedly operating out of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) base in Djibouti; an airfield in Manda Bay, Kenya; and the Arabian Peninsula. As in other parts of the world, the Obama Administration has made U.S. technological sophistication a key component of its anti-terror operations in Somalia. While U.S. drone strikes are often effective, the U.S. must continue to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism approach. Relying on a “decapitation” strategy does not guarantee success, and, as such, drone strikes are most efficient when used to complement sound policy.

Despite al-Shabaab’s influence, there are reasons to suspect that the organization’s strength is fading. Al-Shabaab’s brutal tactics for establishing authority – floggings, amputations, stonings, and beheadings – have failed to win the group popularity
among local communities. To broaden its influence, al-Shabaab engages in forced recruiting and marriages between al-Shabaab fighters and local women. Somalis are also regular victims of al-Shabaab’s suicide bombings and IED attacks.[33]

Internal divisions within the al-Shabaab ranks have fractured the organization and reduced its territory and influence. In August 2010, al-Shabaab launched a series of attacks against AMISOM forces in Mogadishu, a campaign that resulted in heavy casualties and the loss of significant manpower. Soon after, in an apparent rift with leadership, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, al-Shabaab’s deputy commander in chief, withdrew his Rahanweyn clan fighters from Mogadishu and retreated to his stronghold in Baidoa.[34]

In August 2011, al-Shabaab unexpectedly withdrew from Mogadishu, ceding the capital to the TFG and AMISOM forces. Although al-Shabaab’s withdrawal seemed to constitute a victory for the TFG, in reality, it marked only a shift in strategy. Upon leaving the capital, al-Shabaab vowed to return while continuing to launch attacks against targets. Al-Shabaab made good on this promise last October, when a suicide bomber attacked the Ministry of Education, killing 70 and wounding dozens.[35]

A few months later, al-Shabaab experienced an unexpected setback when Kenyan military forces launched an incursion against the group. Holding al-Shabaab responsible for a string of cross-border kidnappings and the unrelenting flow of Somali refugees across its border, the Kenyan government sent approximately 2,000 troops into southern Somalia with the objective of driving al-Shabaab from occupied territory and, in particular, the group’s sanctuary in Kismayo.[36]

Although Kenya does not pursue an interventionist foreign policy, its military is one of the most professional in the region. Generously aided by Washington, last year Kenya received $70 million in military, counterterrorism, and intelligence support. However, despite close cooperation, U.S. officials were reportedly surprised by Kenya’s launch of troops into Somalia without notifying Washington. The U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Scott Gration, stated that the U.S. was working with Kenya to figure out where they need help. He further emphasized that the U.S. “doesn’t have a military operation outside the border of Kenya,” but did note that “our support is through our equipment.”[37]

A Kenyan military presence in southern Somalia could result in important victories; it could, however, also yield unanticipated setbacks. Using the 2006 Ethiopian invasion as a precedent, al-Shabaab has portrayed Kenyan forces as invaders rather than liberators. Yet, even before 2006, Somalis have been suspicious of outsiders – and not just those who are viewed as proxy forces for the U.S., like Ethiopia. In the 1990s, al-Qaeda had a difficult time recruiting Somali militants and it was not until five years after al-Shabaab emerged that the two organizations formalized relations. Therefore, any analysis of Kenyan operations, and their integration into AMISOM in February, must take into account this unique Somali dynamic.[38]
Somalia’s Limited Defense

Actively working to eradicate the terrorist threat, AMISOM is the entity with the military capacity and international support needed to establish peace and stability in Somalia. In theory, AMISOM exists to allow the TFG to stand up its National Security Force (NSF), a task the TFG has thus far failed to accomplish.\[39\] However, as NSF members are unprofessional and known for splitting their loyalties between the TFG and al-Shabaab, AMISOM troops are responsible for defending the TFG.

The United States, France, and the European Union have provided substantial arms equipment to the NSF, which boasts approximately 10,000 troops. In August 2009, after pledging support for the TFG, the U.S. State Department dispatched 40 tons of weapons and military equipment to the NSF. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International believe that some of these weapons were used in attacks against civilians.\[40\]

When AMISOM was created at the AU’s Peace and Security Council meeting in January 2007, leaders expressed enthusiasm for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Unanimously authorized afterward by the UNSC, AMISOM fell under a Chapter VII mandate of the U.N. Charter.\[41\] When time came to deploy troops, however, AMISOM contributions were below the projected 8,000-member force. In December 2010, the UNSC raised the force level to 12,000. Currently there are approximately 10,000 peacekeepers, the majority of whom are from Uganda and Burundi. However, in February, the UNSC passed a unanimous resolution increasing the AMISOM force to 17,731.\[42\]

In the past year, AMISOM troops have launched attacks against militant groups and extended their control into the northern part of Mogadishu, territory that was once occupied by insurgents. Al-Shabaab’s August 2011 withdrawal from Mogadishu allowed AMISOM to extend its control over the city and surrounding areas. The relative improvement in the security situation in Mogadishu prompted British Foreign Secretary William Hague to visit the Somali capital in early February 2012, the first Foreign Secretary to visit Mogadishu in over 20 years, and to appoint a British ambassador to Somalia, Matt Baugh. This key diplomatic step was followed by a largely symbolic international conference on Somalia hosted by Prime Minister David Cameron in London.

U.S. Foreign Policy on Somalia

Following the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime, the United States closed its embassy in Mogadishu, and transferred diplomatic responsibilities to the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. The security situation has been considered so threatening that the State Department has declared Somalia a “no-go” zone for civilian personnel, and,
in January 2010, the World Food Program (WFP) suspended food aid operations. While Washington has supported the TFG, it has done so largely because there is no viable alternative. Rather than increase engagement with the TFG, the U.S. has relied upon regional partners to lead diplomatic efforts.

The Obama Administration has presented a multifaceted strategy for Somalia. In September 2010, the Administration unveiled what it has described as a “dual track” approach. This interagency strategy aims to curb terrorism and emphasizes U.S. support for the TFG. The first track is designed to improve the TFG’s effectiveness and address its capacity to deliver security and governance. The strategy also includes strengthening AMISOM forces: Since AMISOM’s creation, the U.S. has provided approximately $258 million for logistics support, equipment, and pre-deployment training for its forces, as well as $85 million to build the capacity of the NSF. Despite increasing AMISOM’s force strength last year, Washington must urge national governments contributing to AMISOM to live up to their commitments.[43]

Yet, U.S. support for AMISOM alone will not restore peace to Somalia; effective governance that addresses the needs of the Somali people is the key to long-term stability. The second track of the strategy, therefore, expands U.S. engagement with Somalia’s local entities.[44] U.S. officials are also increasing their diplomatic engagement with the semi-autonomous states of Somaliland and Puntland as well as other parts of Somalia that were previously overlooked, such as Galmudug state. These diplomatic initiatives are worthwhile endeavors and should be more aggressively pursued. By working with local governments and populations, the U.S. will have an increased number of opportunities to develop broader and more enduring relations with political actors.

By building relationships with the Somali people, the Obama Administration is laying the foundation for a future scenario where American diplomats and aid workers will be able to engage with local actors on an ad hoc basis to provide capacity building and development assistance. Increased diplomatic, economic, and security engagement in Somaliland and Puntland – referred to by State’s Assistant Secretary Carson as “zones of relative political and civil stability” – serve as opportune entry points for gaining access to segments of the country.[45] The strategy, however, overlooks the importance of good governance. As attempts to work with the TFG have resulted in a waste of time and resources, the Obama Administration should consider a strategy that emphasizes representative governance – a strategy that will allow the Administration to directly, and therefore, more effectively, assist the Somali people.

Northern Somalia

Somaliland. Though the armed insurgency is widespread, northern Somalia, particularly Somaliland, has made significant strides toward peace and stability. Shortly after achieving independence from the British in 1960, Somaliland unified with the
Trust Territory of Somalia, formerly under Italian control, to form the Republic of Somalia. Wanting no part in the chaos that followed the regime’s collapse, the Somali National Movement (SNM), in conjunction with clan leaders, declared Somaliland an independent state in 1991.

In 2001, Somaliland reaffirmed its independence when the government held a referendum in which 97 percent of voters cast their ballots in favor of a new constitution. The constitution created executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government and mandated that the president, vice president, members of the House of Representatives, and upper chamber of elders be directly elected, and the judiciary independent.

Despite Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence and the establishment of a democratic system of governance, the international community does not recognize the territory as an autonomous state. Somalilanders have repeatedly affirmed their commitment to democracy and good governance as demonstrated by free and fair presidential elections in 2003 and 2010, the 2002 local elections, and again in 2005 with their parliamentary elections. Somaliland’s bottom-up approach to governance has contributed to its successful transition to representative democracy. By clearly communicating its objectives and policies, the SNM provided Somalilanders access to the governing process, which, in turn, allowed the SNM to unify the public. Furthermore, despite Somaliland’s clan diversity, every clan, with modest exceptions, supported the establishment of a nation state. The international community, on the other hand, has failed to provide the same opportunities to the people of Somalia. Rather than inspiring unity among a large and deeply divided populace, the U.N. instituted a top-down approach to governance whereby members of the TFG were appointed governing authority. Somaliland has benefited from its renewal of de facto independence and stands as a test case for a state that could have failed, but, instead, chose responsible, representative governance.

As long as the international community refuses to acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereignty, it permits the TFG to solidify its claim to represent the country’s only authentic government. While Somaliland will continue to make modest gains with limited resources, international recognition, even of a provisional nature, would open the state’s economy to investment opportunities and allow the government to work more effectively with its international partners on counterterrorism and anti-piracy measures. Somaliland’s current status excludes it from participation in international forums and reduces its ability to seek and receive foreign aid. Rather than allow Somaliland’s government to take responsibility for the distribution of funding, donors rely on the U.N. and NGOs to support and maintain projects. These funds are then paid to foreign workers who complete the projects, rather than Somalilanders who have an incentive in leading their country’s development.

Puntland. To the east of Somaliland lies the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland supports a unified Somalia but, in the absence of an effective central authority, has taken the opportunity to establish its own government. In 1998, leaders of the Darood clan and various sub-clans – tired of
the omnipresent instability that wracked their immediate territory – established an administration and adopted an interim charter. Members of parliament, who were appointed on the basis of clan affiliation, then elected a president, the first of whom was Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who later served as president of the TFG.

Washington maintains two main interests in Puntland: counterterrorism and anti-piracy. In the 1990s, the terrorist organization al-Ittihad al-Islamiya was based in Puntland and controlled many of the port cities including Bosaso – control that facilitated the buildup of revenue to purchase arms and recruit militias.[48] Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, and various other Islamist insurgents are also known to have operated out of the region. In October 2008, Shirwa Ahmed, a U.S. citizen, blew himself up outside Puntland’s Intelligence Service in Bosaso while others coordinated simultaneous suicide attacks on a security office close to the Presidential Palace, the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) office, and the Ethiopian consulate in Hargeisa, Somaliland. Although the attacks were allegedly carried out by al-Shabaab, no organization took responsibility.[49]

As the international community struggles to eradicate piracy from the region, it should engage Puntland. Puntland is a safe haven for pirates and their illicit earnings are a primary source of revenue. State officials, security forces, and businessmen are often complicit in piracy and piracy-related operations.[50] According to an International Crisis Group report:

Without some form of official protection and collusion, [pirate] gangs would find it difficult to operate as efficiently as they do, given the complex logistics involved in planning and executing raids and negotiating ransoms.[51]

Puntland’s participation in piracy operations has resulted in increased pressure from the international community. As a result of this pressure, in 2009 President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole ordered raids of pirate camps, and courts have begun meting out long prison sentences to convicted pirates. Government anti-piracy campaigns are also being waged. However, in a country where there are few opportunities to accumulate wealth legitimately, piracy is still a tempting solution to an otherwise impoverished lifestyle.

Famine in Somalia and the Horn of Africa

The challenges posed by Somalia’s anarchic landscape have been further complicated by a recent drought affecting much of the south and adjacent areas. Last year, Somalia’s worst drought in 60 years led the U.N. to declare a famine. At the height of the famine, 4 million people were impacted and 750,000 were considered at risk of starvation.[52]

The TFG’s lack of leadership in responding to the famine proved startling. As late as last December, TFG Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohammed Ali denied the existence of famine in Mogadishu, claiming “entrenched interest group[s]” exaggerated
the scale of suffering in order to drum up donations.[53] And, last September, the TFG banned foreign aid workers and journalists from entering areas controlled by al-Shabaab. According to Mogadishu’s mayor and governor, Mohamud Ahmed Nur,

We want the starving Somalis in al-Shabab areas to be fed but we do not want the foreign workers to meet al-Shabab…. Let the foreign aid workers hand over the relief food to the local NGOs, which can deliver to the drought victims in al-Shabab areas. [54]

By preventing the delivery of aid, the TFG is stealing a play from the al-Shabaab strategy book; the terrorist organization has also blocked aid agencies from operating in its territory. Furthermore, should the aid be delivered to the starving or at-risk populations via local NGOs, there are no guarantees the food would actually reach those in need. Too often, World Food Program-labeled sacks of grain and rice are pilfered and sold in Mogadishu’s markets. Additionally, like the TFG, local NGOs have clan ties and political loyalties that prevent them from distributing aid without favoritism.

It is hard to imagine how a people as vulnerable as famine victims could be caused more harm. Yet, the TFG found a way. As Somalia’s internally displaced people (IDPs) sought relief in Mogadishu, rival TFG politicians set up relief camps luring in international donors. In many cases, food aid never reached the victims. Rather, aid was diverted and sold to the very people it was intended to save. There were also cases of TFG paramilitaries storming refugee camps, where soldiers preyed on famine victims and stole their food rations.[55]

The delivery of aid was further complicated by numerous operating challenges. Reaching those in need was the top priority for international donors but also the biggest setback. Apart from dodging taxes (bribes), checkpoints, and armed militias, much of the territory hit by famine was under al-Shabaab control. At the height of the famine, as many as three million Somalis affected by the scarcity resided in the south; two million could not be reached. And when the international community made its initial attempt to deliver aid, al-Shabaab denied access. Since then al-Shabaab has allowed some aid to be delivered, though infrequently. When aid groups are allowed access to occupied areas, the aid is stolen by al-Shabaab fighters, who use it as a weapon against local populations. Al-Shabaab also prevents local populations from seeking relief by blocking their exit from famine stricken villages.

Since famine was declared last summer, the United States has taken the lead in responding to the crisis by providing more than $1.1 billion in humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa – the largest single bilateral donation.[56] Last July, the Obama Administration issued new guidelines, exempting aid groups from legal restraints and urging expedited aid delivery. Corruption and instability have caused the U.S. to implement strict restrictions on aid distribution. Under typical circumstances, should food aid fall into the wrong hands, aid groups would risk prosecution. Despite political support by the Administration, it continues to be a challenge to provide effective and impartial delivery to those in need without allowing either al-Shabaab or other local powerbrokers to hijack assistance.

In February the United Nations announced that famine conditions in Somalia had ended. However, approximately 2.51 million people still require emergency sup-
Beyond the challenges of immediate relief, long-range planning and action is necessary to address the cyclical crisis of drought and agricultural failure and the need to establish genuine food security in the Horn.

Maritime Piracy: Terror on the Seas

Somalia’s lawlessness has encouraged Somalis, searching to make a living, to pursue illegal ventures, including piracy. Pirates are often former fishermen and militia fighters, principally based in Eyl; in northeastern Puntland; and in Xarardheere, in central Somalia. While piracy is a risky business, the profits are considerable.

With nearly 30,000 ships sailing through it annually, the Gulf of Aden is one of the busiest waterways in the world. Located between Somalia, Djibouti, and Yemen, the region’s main artery for seaborne cargo covers 205,000 square miles and is a direct route to the Suez Canal. Approximately 7 percent of the world’s maritime commerce and over 10 percent of waterborne transportation of oil transits flows through the Gulf.[58]

Despite its risks, piracy has become enormously profitable. In 2008, pirates obtained $30 million in ransoms alone.[59] Such profitability has led to a rapid increase in the number of hijackings. In the past five years, hijackings rose from 14 in 2006 to 53 in 2010.[60] As of May 2012, Somali pirates were holding 12 vessels and 173 hostages.

There are a number of long-standing legal mechanisms at the disposal of parties affected by piracy. For the United States, Title 18 of U.S. Code, section 1651, mandates that those who commit piracy as defined by law can be jailed for life. International law dictates that all states must cooperate to the fullest measure in suppressing piracy. The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation outlines a cohesive framework whereby countries deliver suspected pirates to coastal nations for prosecution or extradition.[61] According to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816, states are permitted to use “all necessary measures to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.”[62] Resolutions 1838 and 1851 emphasize and authorize the expansion of counter-piracy activities. [63] While such legal measures are in place, they are not without complications: Frequent challenges the U.S. government faces for prosecuting pirates in the Horn of Africa include the determination of legal jurisdiction, due process for detained pirate suspects, and the role of foreign military forces in anti-piracy law enforcement.[64]

The implementation of a coordinated counter-piracy strategy adds to the legal complexities. An international coalition of the willing, including the United States, the European Union, and non-Western partners have responded to the piracy threat by dispatching military ships to the Gulf. The impact of this action, however, has been limited. The lack of a harmonized international counter-piracy strategy has
caused poor coordination of naval activities, and pirates have taken advantage of this failure by avoiding patrolled locations.

Private shipping industries have also taken protective measures. While it is the responsibility of carriers to implement International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) codes, including a ship security plan (SSP), SSPs do not adequately address counter-piracy. Therefore, carriers have begun to adopt new anti-piracy tactics. The International Chamber of Shipping and the Baltic and International Maritime Council, for example, have produced best practice guidelines to reduce the risks of commercial transit. Some shipping companies have also taken a more controversial (and expensive) approach by hiring armed protection teams.

While counter-piracy measures have experienced some success, they are reactionary and do not address the root of the problem—Somalia’s lack of governance, which has allowed piracy to establish itself as a multi-million-dollar industry. According to Martin Murphy at the Atlantic Council, “Piracy is a symptom not a cause of Somalia’s current predicament. It arose as one consequence of Somalia’s domestic turmoil…. Dealing with piracy requires engagement on land.”[65] Too often, the international community relies on military force to eradicate the threat of piracy rather than address the complicated issue at the core of Somalia’s continued failure.

The Way Forward

Somalia’s transformation will be a long-term process that requires a steady political will, both from the U.S. and the international community. A comprehensive strategy for Somalia starts with good governance. A representative system of governance whereby politicians are elected by the people is a crucial first step toward saving Somalia and one that is expected to be achieved with this summer’s elections.[66] However, as long as the international community continues to recognize the TFG, such a democratic transition is dubious.

To truly address the challenges posed by Somalia, the Obama Administration should combine its encouragement of “good governance” with a regional counterterrorism strategy and diplomatic engagement. A constructive strategy for the United States has to start with a series of concrete actions that will halt Somalia’s descent into further chaos, while laying the foundation for a more prosperous future. These steps will also fill the leadership vacuum that, for so long, has hamstrung the international communities’ efforts in Somalia. Specifically, the U.S. should:

- Recognize Somaliland’s provisional independence. Somaliland is a model that proves democratic governance in Somalia is possible. Hargeisa’s connections to Mogadishu are limited to the extent that Somaliland’s government is forced to deal with the effects of the TFG’s failures. Somaliland is a willing partner in the fight against piracy and terrorism and can do more, but is prevented from doing so by the fact that it lacks state status and therefore cannot participate in international forums.
Take the necessary steps – in conjunction with the international community – to transfer central authority from the TFG to a more representative system of governance. The TFG has proved incapable of providing any meaningful progress to Somalia and has allowed terrorists and pirates to wreak havoc on the Somali people. Its current mandate expires in August 2012 thus creating an opportunity for the U.S., its allies, the U.N., and the AU to make progress toward a democratic and federal Somali government.

Support local governments. American diplomats should work with local administrations, where possible, toward creating more stable and accountable systems of governance. This should include assistance in setting up democratic reforms, implementing benchmarks for success, and curbing the influence of those who might attempt to hijack the democratic process.

To dismantle the terrorist threat, the United States should create a sustainable counterterrorism strategy for the region. The Administration’s use of drone attacks and missile strikes is useful; however, singling out targets in a game of “whack a mole” is not a long-term solution. The Administration should instead focus on a strategy that:

Increases intelligence operations. U.S. intelligence agencies should coordinate with local administrations and actors on the ground through a variety of methods including manned intelligence and paid informants. Furthermore, while insecurity prevents the State Department and Department of Defense from establishing permanent operations in Somalia, regular travel to Somalia is integral for understanding the political dynamics and the social structures necessary for future engagement.

Coordinates and trains regional militaries. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is an excellent resource to provide training to regional militaries in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and border control. Special preference should be given to countries that contribute troops to AMISOM.

Lists Eritrea as a state sponsor of terror. Eritrea has continuously provided al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab with the means to commit acts of terrorism. Because U.N. member states often prevent biting sanctions from being enforced, the United States should implement tougher bilateral sanctions against the government of Eritrea.

Terrorism has hindered the international community’s ability to assist Somalia’s famine victims. The Obama Administration should adjust its humanitarian relief strategy by:

Bringing accountability to aid distribution. Congress and the Administration have a responsibility to the American taxpayer to make sure that appropriate protections are in place to prevent misuse of aid. NGOs and national governments receiving U.S. aid must ensure such assistance is used for its intended purposes. Congress and the Administration must do a more effective job monitoring where these resources go.

Insisting the African Union assume a greater role in coordinating humanitarian relief. Last summer, fewer than half of AU members made contributions at an AU donor conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Together, they pledged a meager $50 million; the U.S. contributed $650 million. Last year’s famine was an African crisis
that the AU was unwilling or incapable of addressing. Steps should be taken to remed
ey this lackluster response, and ensure future crises are met with a more consistent
effort from the AU.

Piracy is a threat to global economic freedom. It impedes the flow of cargo and costs
the shipping industry billions of dollars annually. In fact, there are more attacks every
year in the Gulf of Aden than anywhere else in the world. To counter this, the United
States must:

Harmonize international counter-piracy operations. The international coalition of
the willing – including the United States, EU, and NATO – should increase its coor-
dination of activities and monitoring of patrol areas. To achieve this, the U.S. must
continue to support its global naval forces.

Use intelligence and reconnaissance assets to identify, track, and map pirate activities
and their supporting networks. This step should be followed by the cutting off of
pirates’ access to vital supplies, such as fuel, mechanical equipment, and weapons,
thus denying these criminals the tools of their trade.

Establish official representation in Somaliland and Puntland. Generate rules, proce-
dures, and mechanisms to increase foreign investment. Private-sector development
will provide those individuals prone to piracy with a source of employment.

Condition U.S. engagement with Puntland and Somaliland on good governance.
Too often, government officials and influential businessmen are complicit with pi-
racy. The United States should monitor the government’s involvement with, and
punish those who engage in, piracy.

A New Hope

The chaos in Somalia has grown too large to ignore. Recent U.S. contributions to
AMISOM are a positive start with regard to increasing Washington’s engagement in
the region. Regional players like Kenya, the AU, and America’s European partners
like the United Kingdom are working to deliver security and new hope for Somalia.
However, military might alone cannot achieve genuine peace. Good governance re-
mains the linchpin to stability, but the TFG is only able to offer governmental im-
potence. Consequently, the United States must work with regional partners to help
deliver a new and more effective model for governance in Somalia.

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2002 Cooperation instead of Wars and Destruction, May 11-12