| Eritrea | Sudan | Ethiopia | Djibouti | Somalia |

INITIATIVE REPORT

Horn of Africa:

Co-operation Instead of Wars and Destruction

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Lund, Sweden

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Introduction

Horn of Africa is more often defined through its conflicts and violence than through its level of co-operation. It is perhaps one of the most afflicted regions in Africa. Man made disasters have created a gloomy image of the region making the Horn of Africa synonymous with strife and wars that cause a wide scale of destruction. These conditions have paralysed peace, justice, equality, observation of basic human rights, democracy, stability and progressive development in most the of the Horn of Africa countries. To reverse these conditions, it needs a deep determination from all democratic and peace loving people to fight for peace and co-operation.

In this context, regional and local policy-makers and grassroots organizations, as well as international practioners increasingly recognize the need for collaboration and to establish a forum for discussing common issues and find credible and sustainable solutions.

On May 11 - 12, 2002 Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre (SIRC) in co-operation with Djibouti, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese associations in Sweden held a two-day conference entitled *Co-operation Instead of Wars and Destruction on Horn of Africa*. The conference launched an Initiative of SIRC to arrange future conferences, seminars, and meetings with the Horn of Africa in focus. The overall objectives with this Initiative are to create trust and confidence among the people from Horn of Africa, and to bring stakeholders from Horn of Africa together to co-ordinate lessons learned and best practices in the field of peace-building for Horn of Africa. The Initiative is designed to generate recommendations in the fields of economic co-operation; social and cultural co-operation; democracy and human rights; and peace-building, and to produce informal and formal networks of practioners in fields aforementioned. Through these recommendations the Initiative seeks to formalize a number of activities for the participants in their efforts to create sustainable and peaceful solutions in the Horn of Africa.

The Initiative conference 2002 successfully brought together 150 participants from ten countries (including all the countries from Horn of Africa) – most of whom were from Horn of Africa but live in Sweden today. The event afforded practioners the opportunity to present papers on Horn of Africa (17 papers were presented), and to share their experience to jointly formulate recommendations on economic co-operation; social and cultural co-operation; democracy and human rights; and peace-building.

Three subjects were given particular attention: the role of civil society, the role of education, and demilitarisation of the region. Most participants agree that these three areas are key to any peace-building efforts, and need international support.

A wide range of issues was discussed in the course of the two-day conference, and many participants shared experiences and stories that illustrated how needed regional co-operation and international attention are. One conclusion underlined many of the discussions: the vital importance to integrate the grassroots level into the peace-building process. Over the course of the two-day meeting participants discussed at length different aspects of rebuilding Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular.

It was a consensus and strong support among the participants to launch a second conference in May 2003 in Lund entitled No Development Without Peace.

This Initiative report outlines the presented papers during the conference. It is divided into four parts: economic co-operation, social- and cultural co-operation, democracy and human rights, and peace-building. This report also includes recommendations based on day two's workshops and discussions related to the presented papers.

<u>Conference Participants</u>

The Initiative conference was chaired by Ambassador Count Pietersen, Dr. Saida Mohamed Jama and Dr. Kamal Jamil. Their extensive experience from Africa and peace-building engagements made them a perfect choice for the moderation of the discussions. Participants included 17 conference speakers, and totally 300 participants with a wide range of backgrounds. The conference speakers, moderators, and conference assistants included:

- **Dr. Zakaria Mohamud Abdi**, Somali Minister of Higher Education, Somali Interim Government

- **Abdishakur Abdulle,** UAE University, Al-Ain, and member of Puntland Peace Mission

- **Dr. Tarekegn Adebo,** Ass. Professor at Uppsala University, Sweden

- **Gudmundur Alfredsson**, Professor at Director of Raoul Wallenberg Institute, Lund University, Sweden

- **Arne Ardeberg,** Professor and Vice Chancellor, Lund University, Sweden

- **Dr. Salah Al Bander,** Cambridge University, Director of Sudan Civic Foundation in United Kingdom (Sudanese origin)

- **Marie-Louise Bartolomei,** LL.D, Lund University, Sweden

- **Mohamed Abdi Gandi**, Professor, Bisaso University, France

- **Erik Green**, PhD Candidate at Department of Economic History, Lund University, Sweden

- **Dr. Julie Ikomi-Kumm**, Chairman of All African Congress, Sweden

- **Dr. Saida Jama**

- **Dr. Hinda Ahmed Jama,** Ass. Professor, Gothenburg University, Sweden

- **Morgan Johansson**, Swedish Member of Parliament and represent of Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna)

- **Gunnar Kraft**, Programme Officer, Forum Syd

- **Liselotte Lindberg**, Programme Officer, Olof Palme International Center

- **Carl Lindberg**, Deputy State Secretary of the Swedish Ministry of Education and Science

- **Dr. Osman Mohamed Mahjub,** from Sudan

- **Abdullahi Elmi Mohamed,** PhD Candidate, Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden

- **Dr. Ali Moussa Iye,** Programme Officer, UNESCO, researcher and writer (Djibouti origin)

- **Mammo Muchie,** Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark (Ethiopian origin)

- **Lennart Ryde**, Mayor of Lund Municipality

- **Dr. Amina Said**, Karolinska Institute, Sweden

- **Abdi Ismail Samatar**, Professor, Minnesota University, USA (Somali origin)

- **Olle Schmidt**, EU Member of Parliament, represent of Swedish Liberal Party (Folkpartiet Liberalerna)

- **Urban Sjöström**, Programme Officer African Section, Sida

- **Claudette Werleigh,** Director, Life and Peace Institute, Sweden

- **Håkan Wiberg,** Professor at Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Denmark

- **Bereket Yebio,** Assistant Professor at Malmö University, Sweden (Eritrean origin)

The conference was also attended by Swedish and international non-profit organizations with particular interest in the Horn of Africa among others ABF, Folkuniversitetet, Diakonia, All Africa Congress in Sweden, Africa Forum, LO, Nordic Africa Institute, Foreign Affairs Association in Lund.

Conference Structure

The conference lasted for two days. Day one focused on presentation of papers and discussions. Day two included presentation of papers and workshops related to economic, social and cultural co-operation, democracy and human rights, and peace-building. The presentations of papers and the workshops constitute basis for the recommendations from the conference.

Economic Co-operation

European Union and the Horn of Africa

Olle Schmidt
Member of European Union Parliament

Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti. Let me begin by thanking you all for this kind invitation.

My name is Olle Schmidt and I am a Member of the European Parliament (hereafter EP), I am from Sweden and I am a liberal. When I was younger starting my political life the cause was the injustice in the world. In the 1960's my main political interest was how to get rid of the apartheid regime in South Africa. In the EP, I am mainly dealing with economic issues, taxation, asylum and migration. I am also member of the Women's Committee.

The European Union (hereafter EU) has been deeply involved in trying to improve the living conditions, the political and humanitarian situation in the Horn of Africa. The EU works closely together with the United Nations (hereafter UN). The Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been fulfilled in order to achieve a normalisation throughout the region. Furthermore, the situation within Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland has to be stabilised. EU has supported the peace process that started in Arta in 1999, and during the Swedish presidency the Troika visited Mogadishu.

I am a firm and warm believer in the EU project. The European integration has been enormously successful. To quote my colleague and Nobel Peace Price Winner John Hume from Northern Ireland – "The EU is the most successful peace project in the all world".

Saying this, I am, however, very critical to the way the EU has been dealing with its relations to the third world, and I am of course talking about the agriculture policy. The EU Common Agriculture Policy (hereafter CAP) is costly (expensive for the EU consumer), inefficient; and deeply unfair to the developing countries.

It was my belief that something good came out of the World Trade Organisation (hereafter WTO) meeting in Doha. However, I am not that sure any longer. Hopefully, the EU's decision to grant exemptions for all goods from the least-developed countries was an important step in the right direction.

We know that free trade and open borders are the best way to promote sustainability, better living conditions and economic growth. Therefore, the ongoing trade war between the United States (hereafter US) and the EU is making me disappointed. But there are of course some good signals. The EU is beginning to react and act!

Last year the EU granted further customs privileges to the world's least-developed countries including the countries in the Horn of Africa. The decision, which has immediate effect, implies duty-free imports to the EU for all products with the exception of bananas sugar and rice. For these goods, a successive phasing out of tariffs will apply. Bananas will be duty-free by 2006 and sugar and rice by 2009. But already last year, duty-free imports were permitted for limited quotas of sugar and rice.

The European Commission in October 2000 took the initiative for the approved customs privileges. It is known as the EBA-initiative (Everything-but-Arms), since it covers all goods except arms.

Many goods from the least-developed countries are already exempt from customs duties. The decision means an immediate exemption for almost all products from 48 of the world's poorest countries, which will be extended to include bananas by 2006 and sugar and rice by no later than 2009. As holder of the presidency, Sweden pushed for a decision to be taken as swiftly as possible. I must say that was too late and too little. In addition, it shows how difficult it is for the EU to agree to move faster in changing the CAP. But of course this is better than nothing. However, I am of that opinion that the Swedish government could have done more and could also have reduced the face out periods.

Let me move on to the most important agreement that was signed in Benin on 23 June 2000, the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. The ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries) and the European states greeted this agreement with great relief (It was perceived as a victory as there had been no progress in co-operation between the European Community and the ACP countries. The Cotonou Agreement sets out the reduction of poverty as its main objective and it replaced the earlier Lome Conventions. The Cotonou Agreement states that this objective will be consistent with … the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.)[1]

More trade – and aid

Africa needs more aid. Much more aid!

Funding is not enough. We urgently need to develop a new approach to trade regimes. The current strategy of systematically replacing the existing system of trade preferences with a series of new economic partnerships, which are based on a progressive and reciprocal removal of trade barriers, is one step in the right direction and should be welcomed.

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[1] A new and important principle has emerged: participation and opening up of the partnership to various actors, particularly those from civil society. The central role of dialogue is emphasised. The Lomé Convention primarily dealt with cooperation between states. Lomé IVa, however, introduced cooperation between local institutions, in the framework of decentralised cooperation. In recognising the role of civil society, the Cotonou Agreement has made an important and very positive innovation. The text includes two fundamental principles. Non-state actors will 'be informed and involved in consultation on cooperation policies and strategies … and on the political dialogue', which means that they will be involved in defining the country's forward planning priorities. They will also 'be provided with financial resources, which will enable civil society actors, including human rights associations in countries where human rights are flouted by the state, to have direct access to possibilities of community funding. Along with trade, the question of good governance has long been a major barrier to conclusion of an agreement. Good governance might be a fair redistribution of wealth to all populations by a democratically elected and politically responsible government. Good governance should also cover compliance with international agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human rights, economic, social and cultural rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, international conventions on the environment, etc.. The European party raised the theme of migration late in the negotiations. The EU's current policy rests on a security-based vision, which cannot achieve lasting results and in the long term will not stem the increasing flow of migrants. A policy of sustainable development that facilitates the ACP-countries' commitment to stem migratory flows is needed to deal with this situation. The second part of the immigration policy concerns nationals of ACP-countries who are resident in the European Union and who are often subject to discrimination. What is needed is an integration policy based not only on equal treatment in terms of economic and social rights but also on the recognition of civil, cultural and political rights.

However, the question is whether this strategy is radical enough. At present, the EU and the member states are funding improvements to production conditions in ACP-countries while, at the same time, they are continuing to create trade barriers which hamper ACP-countries' direct access to EU markets. The CAP heavily subsidises EU products and penalises ACP efforts to become competitive. As such, the gradual introduction of free-trade areas should become the cornerstone of a genuine attempt to regenerate ACP economies.

If the Cotonou Agreement is going to be a success, 'people to people' cooperation and civil society involvement needs to be given the greatest possible focus. Local municipalities, trade unions should run joint development projects, professional

Efforts are now underway to expand the concept of fundamental rights: good governance and the fight against corruption as key elements for securing the rights of both ACP and European citizens and introducing higher standards into public life and implementing democracy.

The strengthened focus of the new agreement on improving, ensuring and broadening the equal participation of men and women in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life is welcomed, as is the encouragement of specific positive measures in favour of women such as ... taking specific account of women in emergency aid and rehabilitation operations The situation for women is particularly vital to improve, to protect them from sexual harassment, violence and raping.

Finally, let me shortly focus on some parts of the Cupertino between the Horn of Africa and the EU.

Somalia

The EU is closely following the development in Somalia – Somaliland, Puntland. The EU is maintaining the interest in bringing the Somali reconciliation effort to a successful end. The rehabilitation and reconstruction strategy of the European Commission has

concentrated upon the more secure areas of Somalia. It places emphasis on an inter-sectoral approach, based on five sectors as follows:

- Rural development (livestock, agriculture and food security);
- Social sectors (health, education, water, sanitation, civic education);
- Creation of employment (labour-intensive schemes and support to small- and medium sized enterprises, demobilization);
- Institutional reconstruction; and,
- Physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports, etc.), but setbacks due to security problems within Somalia, and in some sectors the lack of implementing partners, prevented a timely implementation.

The main partners for the implementation of these community-based small-scale projects continue to be Non-Governmental Organisations (hereafter NGOs) originating from within the European Union. The EU is increasing the overall budget from €47 million to €54 million. The total duration of implementation was also increased from 2 to 6 years ending 29 August 2002.

Eritrea

The Eritrean economy, once relatively advanced, suffered badly during the war of liberation. At independence, Eritrea was confronted with the task of rehabilitating a war damaged economy and social development vision, formulated in a new National Economic Policy Framework and Programme (NEPFP), and putting a strong emphasis on a market-based, export oriented and private sector-led strategy.

However, Eritrea remains one of the poorest countries on the continent with an annual income of US$ 150-200 per head, and ranks 159 out of 174 countries in terms of human development index in United Nations Development Program's 2000. The year 2000 was characterised by the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis caused by the war with Ethiopia, and particularly the May 2000 large-scale offensive, as well as worsening drought conditions. The war has resulted in massive damage and major macro-economic disruptions the more so as Ethiopia was Eritrea's main economic and commercial partner.

The visit in Eritrea of the EU Commissioner Nielson in October 2000 marked a turning point, and opened the way for a gradual resumption of development cooperation in relation with the cessation of hostilities, the peace agreement and the general progress towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The short-term programme to aid reconstruction and recovery was focused on integrated rural development, road infrastructure and institutional strengthening:

- Rehabilitation of the Asmara-Massawa road;
- Construction of agricultural dams;
- Water works in Gash Barka;
- Social infrastructure (education sector. Eleven schools have been constructed and equipped with furniture under this project);
- Social infrastructure (health sector);
- Institution building.

Ethiopia

Over the years, Ethiopia has been the largest beneficiary of EU support among the ACP States. The assistance has come from various sources. The subsequent European Development Funds (hereafter EDFs), governed by the Lomé Conventions, have contributed most to the assistance to Ethiopia. In addition, a very substantial source of support has been the food security/food aid budget line, which has contributed about 40% of the total value of EU assistance to Ethiopia since 1975. Million for food aid assistance and food security.

The total disbursement from the EU has been €38.2 million. Most of the disbursements took place in a few projects only. The road rehabilitation projects (Addis Ababa – Awassa and Addis Ababa – Jima) took account of nearly 70% of the disbursements in 2000, while the EIB funded projects (Gilge Gibe power plant, telecommunications and small enterprise development) used another 13%.

In terms of usage of funds, the cooperation presently focuses on five sectors:

- Food Security, Agriculture and Rural Development;
- Economic Reform and Private Sector Development;

- Infrastructure (mainly Roads);
- Human Resource Development; and
- Democratisation & Institution Building.

The National Indicative Programme (hereafter NIP) is an important source of funds for all these sectors. But in each sector the NIP is supplemented by funds from other EDF sources or budget lines. Besides these areas of cooperation, there are also some activities in other non-focal areas, notably humanitarian assistance, environment and culture.

The EU could do more on the Horn of Africa. There I agree. But the conditions – peace, stability, reliable institutions and the founding and straightening of democracy must also be taken into account. Otherwise the EU aide mainly will consist of humanitarian aid. What this region needs as well as the rest of Africa is sound and equal participation in a global economy and trade. More than a billion people have been lifted out of poverty during the last decades, thanks to globalisation. But the poorest nations have been left out of this development. They too need to be brought into the global economy, marked by increased investments, more trade and higher production. That is why this world needs more and better globalisation, not less.

Globalisation has fortunately also lead to a globalisation of fundamental values, such as human rights. This needs to be supported much more to go hand in hand with the economic aspects of globalisation.

More exchange
Trade is economically beneficial, as it allows participants to specialise on their relative strengths and then trade the results of their labour with others. But trade is about much more than money. Benefits of trade also include wider contacts between people, cultural exchange, more openness, political co-operation and enhanced security. Democracy and market economy go hand in hand. Thank you!

Hydro-Politics in the Horn of Africa:
Conflicts and Required Co-operation in the Juba and Shabelle River Basins
Need for Trans-boundary River Cooperation

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Somali Centre for Water and Environment

Rivers, the most important source of freshwater available for human use and the lifelines of many impoverished nations in Africa whose primary economy is agriculture, are increasingly becoming under stress. In general, internationally shared rivers particularly those in dry climate regions could be a source of conflict or a reason for cooperation between countries sharing them. Second half of last century, it was experienced that the concerns relating to the use of international water are becoming increasingly more important and complex. Water, a basin human necessity on all aspects of human life, is a scarce resource in the Horn of African region where the Juba and Shabelle River Basins are geographically located (see the map in the next page). Examining the physical and developmental aspects of the two rivers in a way to analyse the resulting hydro-politics and the looming water conflicts, this paper presents some aspects of interaction between Somalia and Ethiopia over these common river systems.

Physical Aspects

Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia occupy parts of the Juba and Shabelle River Basins in the Horn of Africa. In contrary to previous estimations[2], the total drainage area of the two basins was recently estimated to 805 100 sq. km[3]. Running a distance of about 1500 km, the Shabelle rises in the Ethiopian Highlands, where annual rainfall exceeds 1000 mm. Flowing generally south-eastern direction; the Shabelle River passes through an arid land

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[2] According to NWC (1989), the Shabelle River Basin, shared by Ethiopia and Somalia, is about 307,000 sq. km, more than half within Ethiopia, while the Juba River Basin is 233,000 sq. km, 65% in Ethiopia, 30% in Somalia and 5% in Kenya.

[3] A study updating international rivers of the world (Wolf et al., 1999), gives the combined area of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers Basins to 805,100 sq. km, of which Ethiopia occupies 45.7%; Somalia 27.5% and Kenya 26.8%.

in eastern region of Ethiopia[4] cutting wide valleys in southern Somalia. The river does not normally enter the Indian Ocean, but into a depression area, where it is finally lost in the sand in southern Somalia. Only with exceptionally heavy rains does the Shabelle River break through to join the Juba and thus succeed in reaching the ocean. With an average annual rainfall of 455 mm and much higher potential evaporation, mean annual runoff of the Shabelle River at Belet-Weyne is 2 384 million m3. Over 90% of the runoff is generated by catchments within Ethiopia. As the river crosses the existing international border between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Somali City of Belet-Weyne is the most important point where the river flow and its water quality could be observed in Somalia. The river has a high saline content even during high flows.

Like the Shabelle, the Juba River originates from the Ethiopian Highlands, where three large tributaries, the Gestro, the Genale and Dawa meet near the border with Somalia to form the Juba River. The rainfall at the source reach 1500 mm/y, dramatically decreasing southwards and the mean is 550 mm. Luuq, a Somali town, is the most important point to observe the Juba River as it crosses the border. The Juba, which enters the Indian Ocean at Kismayo City, has a total length of 1100 km, 550 km of which in Somalia. The mean annual runoff at Luuq is 6 400 million m3; Ethiopia again contributes over 90 %. Kenya, as there are no tributaries originating there, does not normally contribute to the Juba, and has no access to the main river thus any significant interests.

The Shabelle is larger in size and longer in distance than the Juba, but these did not lead the Shabelle to be larger in runoff due to climatic and geological conditions. As Somalia's most water resources exist in these rivers, runoff contributions by catchments in Somalia are normally minimal.

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[4] Inhabitants of eastern part of Ethiopia are ethnically Somalis. This region was internationally known as Ogaden but in Somalia it is referred as Somali Western, while it is recently named as Region 5 in Ethiopia.

Juba and Shabelle River Basins in the Horn of Africa.

Developmental Aspects

In upstream areas of Ethiopia, there are few developments based on the two rivers' water resources. In 1988, Ethiopia completed the Melka Wakana hydroelectric project on the upper reaches of the Shabelle. Ethiopia has now built another large dam on the Shabelle for irrigation and hydropower generation. Due to the very narrow arable alluvial plains, there are few permanent agricultural settlements along the Shabelle River inside Ethiopia.

As the two rivers supply the Somalia's rice bowl and support important economic areas in southern Somalia, several agricultural development projects have been implemented based on the water resources of the two rivers. Irrigation projects that were implemented or planned on the Juba River include: Juba Sugar Project (JSP), often known as Mareerey, irrigating sugarcane near Jilib; Mugaambo Rice Irrigation Project near Jamame, using run-of-the-river via canal; Fanole Dam Project, multipurpose dam development for irrigation, hydropower generation and flood mitigation, located near

Jilib; Arare Banana Irrigation Project, Jamame; Bardere Dam Project (BDP), the largest ever planned but unimplemented development project, which will be discussed below.

No major dam development was built on the Shabelle River, but those agriculture activities along the Shabelle River are many and intensively use much of the available water. Off-stream facility with storage capacity of 200 million m3 was build near Jowhar. Another dam which would store 130 - 200 million m3, was proposed upstream of Jowhar. Several agricultural areas exist near Mogadishu.

Hydro-political Aspects Historical Conflicts and Current Tensions
The relations between Ethiopia and Somalia were complicated particularly in view of their long history, which is full of animosity, mistrust, conflict and border dispute, which resulted from the demarcations by the European colony during 19th and 20th centuries. During that period, Ethiopia played a key role in the colonial division of the Somali plateau into five areas. These tense relations resulted at least two military wars in 1964 and 1977. The relations have also been deteriorating since the overthrow of the two countries' dictators in 1991. Since 1996, Ethiopia has several times been criticized for its repeatedly military and political interventions in Somalia, a country lacking a central government since 1991. In August 2000, when Ethiopian prime minister attended the inauguration of rebirth of the Somali government, many people looked upon it as a new era for Ethiopian-Somali relations, but this hope was dashed continuously since then. The transitional national government of Somalia (hereafter TNG) tried a number of times, with no encouraging results, to normalize the uneasy relations between them and Ethiopia. The ongoing international war against terrorism led by US, Ethiopian government officially said that there are terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda Network inside Somalia, which the TNG strongly denies. It is certain that these unfavourable relations will adversely affect the future required cooperation for the development of these shared rivers. The two countries have in the past never discussed agreements or joint commission for the utilization of the shared rivers.

Shabelle Development Projects in Ethiopia

During 1950s, there was a large scale Shabelle development scheme planned in Ethiopia, which is not implemented. Ethiopian plans in late 1970s towards development of the Shabelle River in most upstream areas for irrigation concerned Somalia. Resulted from its national policy of food self-sufficiency, Ethiopia has, since 1991, gone into a process of developing water resources. Taking advantage of Somalia's deep political crisis, Ethiopia started building large dams on the Shabelle River. Existing and planned dams on the river in Ethiopia function also as a political weapon for its rival downstream riparian. As many activities in southern Somalia, where the two river supply, depend mainly on this river's water resources, unilateral developments that Ethiopia currently carries out will severely impact on Somalia both in terms of economy and environment. Actions reflect and imply existing policies and perhaps the unilateral Ethiopian actions are based on its previous argument saying that it is the sovereign right of any riparian state, in the absence of an international agreement, to proceed unilaterally with the development of shared water resources within its territory. These new Ethiopian dams on the Shabelle will exacerbate the silent border dispute between the two countries.

Juba Valley Development in Somalia

The need to regulate the Juba River was recognized as early as the 1920s by the Italian colonial administration in Somalia. Since then and particularly after the independence in 1960, the Juba and Shabelle valleys became the focus of country's economic development. The largest ever-planned water development project was however Bardere Dam Project (hereafter BDP) launched during 1980s on the Juba River in the vicinity of the town of Bardere. It would fully utilize the river water. Regarded as a vital step towards food self-sufficiency and received priority in development planning, the BDP is intended for flood mitigation, irrigation development and hydropower generation. It would irrigate about 175 000 ha of agricultural land and supply power to reduce the cost of petroleum imports. The BDP was economically and technically motivated but politically failed. The two political factors that played important role were: (1) the dictatorial regime which Somalia had at the time of project appraisal and the deteriorating political situation of the country during the 1980s, which resulted in the ongoing civil

war, became a major hinder for the project development. The erupted civil war in 1991 interrupted and dismissed the entire project; (2) strong opposition from upstream co-basin country of Ethiopia impacted the project, as it argued that the river crosses disputed land and has no agreement on the utilization of its waters. Because of the Ethiopian opposition, the size of the dam has been reduced to irrigate only 50 000 ha.

The Role of the Rivers in Somalia's Economic Development

The Juba and Shabelle Rivers are important resource bases for Somalia, but there are growing fears that these rivers may impoverish the nation they would set on the path to prosperity, because of water scarcity and upstream activities. Somalia lacks significant alternatives to the two rivers as long as water development for agricultural productions are concerned. Current as well as traditional socio-economic activities in southern Somalia are strongly based on the availability of water in the two rivers, and without the guaranteed access to water the fertile areas between the rivers would have no value. Water resources in the two rivers are strongly linked to the survival of the Somali national economy as well as its social and environmental well-being, thus the security of the nation. Institutional structures and capacity for water affairs are currently totally absent in Somalia. Water infrastructures that have been set up for irrigation were also destroyed during the civil war.

Growing Water Scarcity and Looming Water Conflict

Considering the possible and potential future water development plans and taking into account the limited amount of water, the water resources in the two rivers will unlikely be able to fulfil the sum of all demands by the basin countries in the future. Potential disputes over the shared rivers are therefore likely to rise in response to political stability and desire of economic development. This may result competition over the utilization of scarce water in the rivers, which together with the current and historical relations between the two basin countries may lead to international conflict, shifting then the problem from water sharing to national security. However, the factors that increase the risk of future water conflict include severity of the water scarcity in the riparian countries; historical

conflicts and current misunderstandings; relative economic strength and military power and; growing population.

International Legal Perspectives

In international rivers, there are several conflicting theories favouring either upstream or downstream countries. A move to reconcile them and resolve the alarming crisis in shared freshwater resources; the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1997. This convention, which is not yet formally ratified and thus not operational, encourages cooperation in order to address equitable, reasonable and non-harmful utilization of the international freshwaters. Many argue that this new legal instrument is too weak to meditate disputing basin states over shared water resources.

Conclusion

In both basins, Somalia is a vulnerable end user located in downstream area, which is the least favourable position to be in hydro-political terms, as the upstream basin country, Ethiopia, can theoretically divert and pollute the water in the rivers. This makes Somalia to be permanently heavily dependent upon the actions taken by Ethiopia. Consequently, the downstream users in Somalia are the hostages of upstream activities in Ethiopia. Although the issue of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers is hidden and powerful one that could explode at any time in the future, no negotiations could be initiated before addressing and solving other more fundamental causes of the historical conflicts and the current tensions. In view of region's current political conditions as well as the historical facts combined with the future desire to increase the utilisation of the available resources in the river basins, it is unlikely to realize the desperately needed cooperation and future water conflict seems to be inevitable and it may also turn to be another layer of international conflict before the mid of the century, if nothing is done.

As these shared waters will play a key role in future relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, the desperate need to initiate cooperation through dialogue based on mutual security is significant and trust needs to be established. The only assurance that no harm

is done to the interests of any party lies in the process of collaboration through negotiation, and a useful way to initiate and sustain dialogue is to seek opportunities for mutual benefits. One opportunity that demands political commitments but could be explored is to go into regional economic integration based on water through securing a reliable access to the sea for which Ethiopia desperately needs in exchange to undisturbed river flows for Somalia. Since Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Ethiopia was left in a desperate situation concerning its lack of a reliable outlet access to the sea for their economy. Perhaps, in view of this, the existing opportunity, which the two countries could mutually benefit, is to allow the two rivers to run into Somalia without any development implemented in upstream Ethiopia in exchange of freely accessible ports for Ethiopia in the Somalia's long coastal lines. This economic integration strongly demands political commitments that should be made by the two countries assuring a joint security and save co-existence in the future.

Environmental Management for Sustainable Development in the Horn of Africa
Perceptions regarding Conservation and Development Interactions:
The case of the Northern and Central Highlands in Eritrea

Bereket Yebio
Ass. Professor at Malmö University, Sweden

My presentation will focus on a case study of the northern and central highlands in Eritrea. It is as an example of environmental management and sustainable development. The study was conducted as a part of a regional research project in Horn of Africa.

Most of the so called ethnic conflicts are in fact environmentally induced conflicts. They are caused by conflicts in the use of natural resources. In fact, there is a good example in Sweden of such a conflict. The Sami people are an indigenous minority who live in the most northern part of the country. They have been and are still struggling to secure their traditional grazing land for continued reindeer keeping. A conflict exists because the central government also wants to satisfy the interests of groups who want to use the area for fishing, hunting and energy generating. There are many other examples of such conflicts in Europe. However, they are seldom described as ethnic conflicts in the same way as in Africa.

Nearly all governments in the Horn of Africa have plans underway to conserve and preserve certain portions of their territory as a means of protecting biological diversity and attaining sustainable development.

The government of Eritrea considers converting the Northern and Central Highlands (hereafter NCH) into a strictly controlled conservation area. The NCH contains the remnants of the closed forest - mixed evergreen tropical woodland - of Eritrea. Situated north-east of the capital Asmara, it is an escarpment between 1,000 and 2,400 m above sea level. It enjoys two rainy seasons (July-August and December-February). The area is relatively rich in biological diversity. At the same time, the ecology of the forest is very fragile, and once damaged, it will be difficult to restore. It represents the most promising ecosystem for in-site conservation.

The study area is roughly 77,000 hectares with an ethnically diverse population. The central government of Eritrea considers the urgent national necessity of conserving biological diversity and has the legal obligation in response to Article 8 of the Convention, to which Eritrea acceded on 12 September 1995.

However, there is also the need to accommodate the subsistence agriculture of the resident population (approx.11, 000) as well as the need of the itinerant community, perhaps 200,000 that have traditionally earned their livelihood from the area by cropping and grazing.

The assumption is that there is an inherent conflict between conservation for biological diversity as a basis for sustainable development and the need to use the resource of the area by the people who live within the area or in its vicinity for their basic needs. How such a conflict is to be resolved without compromising any of the two desirable objectives is the key question to be researched. The purpose is to study the perceived conflicts and perceived solutions of the conflicting interests and objectives of different users and agencies. Initially six different users and interest groups of the NCH will be considered along with an objective function for each group.

	Users or Interest groups	Objective function
1.	The Eritrean Environmental Agency (EEA)	to minimize loss of biological diversity.
2.	The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)	to maximize income from forest products.
3.	The Ministry of Tourism (MOT)	to maximize income from tourism.
4.	Local groups dependent on the NCH for seasonal grazing (LGSG)	to maximize economic benefits from grazing.
5.	Local groups dependent on the NCH for farming (LGF)	to maximize economic benefits from farming.

6.	Ministry of Local Government (MLG)	to maximize regional development.

The different categories of users were stratified according to degree of utilisation of the area for cultivation and livestock grazing. Data has then been collected from a representative sample of each category through an interview questionnaire and focus group discussions with different stakeholders.

A research group conducted the sampling, the designing of the questionnaire and the identification, selection and training of the interviewers. The interviewers collected the data in a field study will carry out during the month of August 1997. The analyses of collected data was put on halt due to several reasons put we hope that it will be resumed and a research report produced.

Likely contributions from the research

The study will explore the IUCN principles on resolving conflict in protected areas and assess their applications in Eritrea in so far as the proposed plan for the NCH is concerned. The principles are described below.

Principle One: Focus on Underlying Interests

A major challenge in resolving conflicts is to address the underlying interests that are really at strike rather than getting stuck arguing over positions. The term "interests" is used throughout this handbook to mean people's fundamental needs and concerns. The term "positions" is used to mean the proposals that people put forward to try satisfy their interests. The difference between interests and positions can be illustrated by this example.

Principle Two: Involve all Significantly Affected Stakeholders in a Fair and Respectful Process

To resolve conflicts, there has to be an effort to involve all significantly affected stakeholders. Stakeholders are those individuals or groups who are directly involved in the conflict, or who may be affected by how the conflict is resolved. People want to be

involved in decisions when their interests are at stake, they want to have their opinions and ideas heard and valued, and they want to be respected as individuals.

Principle Three: Understand the Power that Various Stakeholders Have, and Take Into Account When Trying to Resolve a Conflict

Power is critical element in conflict resolution. A stakeholders' decision on how they approach the conflict will depend to a large extent on their view of the power they have and the power balance among the various stakeholders. For example, a group that feels powerless to influence an outcome through a bureaucratic decision making process may choose to use illegal activity or armed force instead.

There are many different kinds of power, including:

- Power of position (having authority, being in a position to make or influence decisions);
- Power of knowledge (having information);
- Personal power (being personally forceful/persuasive);
- Economic power (having financial resources);
- Political power (having a supportive constituency or access to political leadership);
- Legal power (having a "good" legal case, expert legal council, or access to courts);
- Coercive physical power (having police or military backing, or weaponry);
- Family power (being from a well connected family); and
- Group power (being a member of an ethnic, religious, or other type of group that has power or, for example, being male in a male dominated society).

There are often extreme differences in power between different stakeholders. In attempting to resolve a protected area of conflict it is especially important to involve both those with substantial power (especially those with the ability to thwart the implementation of a proposed resolution to the conflict) and those who are the least powerful.

The study will also develop some objective criteria and through a process of creating awareness and a sense of co-responsibility, prepare all stakeholders to find equitable method of resolving the potential conflict.

Social and Cultural Co-operation

Hurdles and Possibilities of the Civil Society in Contributing to
Peace and Co-operation in the Horn of Africa

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> "Actual civil societies are complex associational universes… they contain repression as well as democracy, conflict as well as co-operation, vice as well as virtue; they can be motivated by sectional greed as much as social interest."[5]

Civil society is neither good and peaceful nor violent and bad. It is neither all democratic nor all despotic. The concept is a generic term for containing and including every variety of association: grassroots organisations, civility expressing organisations, independent organisations, associational organisation, private organisation, private voluntary organisation, community based organisation and non-governmental and quasi- non governmental organisations. All those associations that are neither wholly market guided nor all state guided fall in the civil society sphere. Civil society is an old idea made newer by so- called third wave democratisation and the contemporary realities of a post cold war world. Its revival owes to the emergence of a globalising agenda driven largely by donor finance that dominated the world's intellectual, political and moral space and vision.

Civil society became popular after globalisation has fully discredited the planning state (e.g. former Soviet Union states) and the interventionist state (e.g. the Keynesian welfare state in the western states) in favour of a minimalist role of the state in the economy (the liberal state). It appears that globalisation and democratisation have changed world politics and economics in favour of the rich, markets, corporations, private finance or speculative capital, and against the poor, the state, trade unions and even non-financial capital. If state action cannot deliver better possibilities, it is said civil society, and non-profit making voluntary sectors, and community based organisations and other social

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[5] Robinson and White, The role of Civic Organisations in the provision of social services: towards synergy. Helsinki, World Institute for Development Economic research, 1997 p.3

networks and NGOs may step in. The role of NGOs is also related to help reduce the most unacceptable side of the mainly economic driven globalising logic. It is this international context of globalisation that explains the emergence of the current interest and development on civil society. There is thus much value in identifying the ideological contamination of this concept from the current go-go globalisation and the rhetoric of democratisation in order to distil and rescue the role of civil society in development, peace- making, and in fostering security and long-term co-operation.

There are three important indicators that are necessary but not sufficient to measure the contribution of civil society in fostering co-operation, stability, security and peace building in the Horn of Africa area:

- Spreading a culture of civility as a counter weight to war and violence;
- Institutionalising a culture of service by community based self-organisations to counter rampant poverty and inequalities;
- Spreading ethics and moral sense as a civic culture and virtue in order to overcome prevailing social interchanges marred by violence, deception, force and blackmail;
- Creating a new standard for cultivating self-aware citizens at all levels to foster long-term co-operation, security, stability and peace in the region.

The question is whether the current array or constellation of civil society associations, communities and organisations as they are evolving and persisting to exist in the region contribute to civility and civilisation or war, poverty and discord. There is an assumption that creating and spreading these associational forms will strengthen civility, co-operation and peace. There is an equal assumption that market and state failures make the latter the least attractive candidates as agencies for civilised co-operation and peace. This benign approach to civil society and uncharitable approach to markets and the state should not be taken at face value. For example, in Somalia with the disintegration of the state, civil society has become the source for the perpetuation of unending horizontal violence. Armed civilians in the context of conflict can be as lethal as militaries. The civil action that is violent should not be criminalized if the objective is to end all violence and transform chaos and incoherence with social transformation underpinned by notions of justice and equity.

Thus taken by themselves, none of the institutional actors representing markets, civil society and the state are, a priori, innocent or guilty. The context of their existence and persistence matters in identifying the social content of their occurrences in time and space co-ordinates. They are all complex organisms. They all have their own specific functions and problems. They can do different things differently. As a heterogeneous and complex sphere, civil society too can be a factor of discord and violence. There is in fact military civil society operating as a transitional network at present that has alarmed the hyper power of our time to declare the world disposition of political forces into those with the hyper power or the rest. Civil society has to be scrutinized re-conceptualised first before we admit that it can be a factor for peace and co-operation in the region.

Let Us State some Fundamental Principles Essential for Normalising the Region
For long-term stability, security, co-operation and peace, human well-being must become the foundation of good governance. The primary ethical norm for any just social arrangement begins with the intention and effort to make every person to enjoy basic well-being and security. That is the pre-imminent moral foundation that should guide any normal region, society and social-economic arrangement.

The content of human life should not be invaded by violence, and uncontrollable discord nor degraded by poverty. Here the notion of violence is treated in relation to social arrangements that impede and limit people from having the opportunity, right and freedom to access possibilities to construct reasonable and fulfilling lives. A society where the structures, institutions, norms and values tolerate massive poverty such as exists in Greater Horn of Africa now is one that suffers from massive moral and justice failure. Such a society oppresses human agency with poverty and war and opens no other reasonable outlet to human agency to search for justice other than a resort to more war and violence. While morally and from a humane point of view no violence can be afforded or condoned, in radically poor and unequal society violence may not be avoided. The dilemma is that once the option of violence is selected as the weapon of the poor, its execution perforce leads to further suffering and exacerbation of the poverty situation.

The condition of poverty opens the violence option; conversely the onset of violence aggravates the poverty situation. The two become mutually reinforcing rather than mutually cancelling. Horn of Africa is one of these regions that provide the empirical case for such a pervasive reinforcement of poverty by violence and violence by poverty.

Permanent violence can be broadly defined as a daily and routine violation of human rights, against the expression of human agency through the imposition of force and/ or deception. Violence can be organised and individualised, institutionalised or policy-driven where individuals, states, communities, societies, groups, and other specific actors can be the targets. A violent phenomenon occurs when violations, impositions and constraints restrict people from living lives they freely choose to lead. It is also an exertion of physical power on people, nations and countries without their consent or negotiation leading to their humiliation, violation of the basis of self-respect, the destruction of their human self-worth, normal functions, identity, dignity and capacity. New forms of violence are spreading such as we see taking place in Somalia on top of the old forms fought between states (e.g. Eritrea and Ethiopia) and those with a state and a major movement for self-determination (e.g. Sudan and The Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement). Military companies, security firms, private armies, multiplying arms dealers and markets in arms are spreading injecting new logic to war, and making it impossible to control the new wars. Poor societies are most vulnerable to the proliferation of drug and private-army related violence. The violence market is spreading in the region and generally in Africa, fuelled by the prevalence of poverty.

Permanent poverty denotes the destruction of human well-being through the lack of access, entitlement and capacity to command the following:

- Basic well-being (food, clothing, shelter),
- Additive well-being (education, physical health and psychic health),
- Subtractive change from well-being into ill-being: i.e., freedom from the invasive practices that convert well-being into ill-being such as violence, crime, torture, genocide, divisive discrimination, domestic violence, child abuse, sexism, racism, ethnic cleansing, militarism, xenophobia, arbitrary government control etc.,
- Multiplicative growth in human well-being development (freedom and ability to experience aesthetic, artistic, intellectual and moral/super ego level pursuits, enrichment of the content of living, psychic fulfilment, contentment, pursuit of

cultural capital through knowledge and wisdom while being free from worries of material constraints).

Poverty is said to be a form of silent violence while violence subtracts, degrades and destroys the fabric of society, exposing whole communities in the end to poverty. The existence of the combination of violence and poverty in a given regional society is morally, politically and economically undesirable. The Horn of Africa is one of the regions in the world where the civil society, the state and markets have not worked together to reduce the threshold of poverty and violence. A change is therefore needed to root out poverty and violence. The ultimate objective is to bring about a change to attain no poverty and violence (PV) to be zero ($\sum PV=0$).

$\sum PV =0$[6] is an expression of ambition or vision suggesting an end-goal that the society as a whole should strive to reach, an optimum social attainment. The politics, economics, legal, security and cultural systems need to be realigned and cohere to realise this objective and end-point with minimum cost and optimal efficiency. The social arrangement that needs to be promoted is that with a potential and a built in self-correcting mechanism for reducing poverty and violence in a direction through time that ultimately will bring them to zero (the state of poverty eradication).

The rate of change defines the speed at which the PV prevalent state changes into a PV reduction state, and the latter abbreviates into a PV eradication state. The state $\sum PV=0$ can be reached at a faster rate only when national ideological purpose, political, economic and legal arrangements are made to work in concert with the norms of high public ethics and public service.

There is a need to build a regional consensus in order to recognise the eradication of PV as a regional-African priority. There is also a need to accelerate the speed of change of PV from state to state until progressively the final poverty and violence eradicated state (PVe state) is attained. This requires a new thinking and approach to imagine not only the

'reduction' of poverty and violence (the current official thinking) but also total eradication (the expected desirable state that must be created). The lower the expectation for changing PV states the higher the probability that PV will be persistent. The higher the expectation that PV will be eradicated, the lower the probability that PV states will persist.

The regional society needs to create a new hope, optimism, moral foundation, courage and enterprising expectations for change free from deception and coercion. That foundation will assist the region to find feasible trajectories and drastic alternatives that are acceptable to the population without a radical polarisation of the population of the region with wealth concentration in the hands of the very few and poverty for the many.

Absence of Legal and Moral Base to Power Transitions and Transfers
A society or region that does not obey any legal, constitutional and moral principle to make transitions from one set of public servants to another can be seen as inherently prone to accidents and breakdowns. Non- legal means of bringing about political changes are risky to society. Where either traditional means of consensus building or modern constitutional means of change of power from party to party do not take place, the transitional problem is always going to be held hostage to fortune. The culture of public service and public ethics is an essential quality to political leadership. This is an important ingredient to cultivate. Lack of orderly and predictable transition is a critical deficiency of the political culture of the Horn of Africa religion. Intolerance against the tolerant and the intolerant is the norm in the region. Every minor matter turns into an issue ruling out deliberation, negotiation, conversation and consensus. There is a need to foster a culture where the defeated and the victors make it their obligation not to throw society into a state of chaos and violence to bring about political change. The use of force to bring about transition in the African context has led invariably to the production of tyrannical public masters rather than public servants. There is a need to de-tyrannise the

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[6] ∑PV is a summation of the representation of the state of existence of poverty and violence and their symbiotic relationship.

transition process where transfer of power moves from one segment of social groups to another.

The important question is whether civil society as it is actually evolving in the region is fit to the purposes of de-tyrannising the transition process and changing the quality of leadership in order to transforming society by eradicating violence and poverty.

The Discontent and Critique with Current Discourses of Civil Society
The discourse of civil society in our region is linked with the collapsed state (e.g. Somalia) and the generally assumed failure of state capacity for managing change. The private and the non- governmental actors are assumed to be able to do a better job in carrying out public tasks where the public agencies are said to have failed. Civil society has a role. The state also has a role. The private sector too as well. The key is not to allow ideological contamination to demote one of these actors and institutions while promoting another. Excision of current discourse of civil society in relation to failed states and failed markets are necessary not to discount the role of civil society. It is in fact the opposite, it is to redefine a proper relationship between them in order to provide fuller play to their synergistic impact on overall social change and transformation.

Globalisation spread this anti-statist pro-private business and civil society and NGO ideology. One of the consequences of this unalloyed and untrammelled ideology is the double and simultaneous global construction of the failed state and the assumption of 'success' in favour of Non-Governmental Organizations and the vibrant civil society. This is not borne out by the empirical fact of some state performing less well than others. It became a general strategy to roll back the state and give other agents/ actors promotion. In general globalisation fostered an ideology where the state was demoted; civil society along with the 'free' market was promoted. State failure was decried; civil society stakeholder failure was largely ignored by an unverified and empirically unsubstantiated attribute of some metaphysical 'benign goodness' to NGOs. As a consequence, as many of the functions of the state as possible migrated to the sphere of civil society actors. Donor funding shifted from the state to civil society. The state was morally condemned.

More of it was seen as a problem. Less of it was seen as necessary. The state was exhorted to be lean and minimal. The global discourse urged that the state reduce itself, maintain macro economic stability through balance of payment adjustment, promote the complete privatisation of the economy, come out of failure by learning to create state capacity through 'good governance' and create an enabling environment for private actors and civil society. How a failed state can do all these things is difficult to fathom.

The primary hurdle in the possible contribution of civil society to peace and co-operation lies in the discourse of civil society. There is a need to de- construct the global discourse of the failed state and the successful agents of civil society by closely examining how the global constitution of failure and success has been constructed. Civil society has to have local agency, if it is to play a freer role in the making of peace and co-operation. Tied to multiple and conflicting external interests, civil society may create more hurdles than possibilities for peace in the region.

The possible conflicts implicit between the global narratives of 'failure and success' and the local development of civil society must be appreciated to re-define civil society agency. Does the global influence distort the local evolution of civil society and the state in partnership? It appears that the description of the state as 'failed' and by implication civil society as a potential social space for 'success' by external actors introduces two problems. The first is the right of ownership to discourse formation: that is, it is related to the relative weight of internal and external contributions to frame discourses that shape the interaction of internal and external political and social forces. The second is the manufacturing of a new political economy through donor funding where state and civil society become engaged in tensions and conflicts rather than being able to promote partnership and social cohesion.

Donors feed finance and consultants to shape civil society according to their own images. Some international NGOs set up their own local offices. They help manufacture a transnationally induced civil society. Local NGOs can be threatened with international NGOs, unable to muster the resources and connections that come with extra- national

relations. NGO-dom, in effect, becomes something like a new social space for making a living. There may thus be a scramble to create NGOs for reasons of self-employment rather than promoting a social cause on the basis of local understandings. Even within local NGOs, there appear to be those that are funded by Western governments and foundations and those that may not have this opportunity. People with the same qualifications but with different connections with Western governments and foundations earn different salaries. This creates resentment and division among the local actors engaged in the NGO building industry. A shared understanding is lost. Civil society becomes a terrain for a more exclusive articulation and validation of private interests with new enclosures and barriers for inclusion and communication amongst large swathes of civil groups occupying roughly the same social status and role. It turns into an arena of battles amongst similar groups who are divided by income and funding differentials beyond local control. The global mode of constituting civil society and state relationships in terms of the frames, narratives, discourses, rhetoric and metaphors of "failure and success" needs to be questioned. The term "civil society" itself, as it is being constituted by the global discourse of donors, requires questioning.

An alternative development of civil society based on local definitions, knowledge and cultural assumptions for the creation of social cohesion, trust and coherence ought to be explored. In the Horn of African context, there needs to be a vision to create three strong and three successes - all mutually reinforcing rather than mutually destructive of each other's successes and strengths. That is, a strong state, a strong market and a strong civil society - against a failed state, failed market and failed civil society - by all working in concert to reinforce and augment each other - is needed. A strong partnership between civil society and a developmental state, capable of steering markets and social and political forces for regional and indeed continental structural transformation, provides a necessary framework for constructing social coherence and cohesion in the Horn of Africa.

Taming the Power of Discourse

Discourse has an intrinsic power to frame, set parameters, suggest agenda, help select policy options and legitimise outside intervention, especially by those who are able and willing to manufacture, name and control the discourse. Throughout the post-war period, there have been a number of powerful discourses competing to control the normative content and related social practices regarding the way economic, social, political and economic changes actually take place.

In the nineteenth century colonialism brought the discourse of the 'civilising mission' to shape Africa's social-political society and future. In the post war period there were the discourses of development, the third world, and democracy. Each in its own way has dominant discourse generators and discourse objects showing clearly who has agency and who lacks it. The coloniser, the developed, the first world have assumed agency, i.e., the knowledge, the freedom and power to set the agenda and select the terms of intervention. These actors have negotiated among and for themselves an African social reality only slightly, if at all, informed by African cultural currencies, and it is this self-serving 'reality' that is used to guide - or at least justify - interventions in African affairs. As a result, the colonised, the underdeveloped, the so-called third world arrangements have been subsumed as the objects of intervention rather than the subjects of history.

In the same vein, civil society and good governance are the latest discourses that are being promoted along with globalisation, economic liberalisation and political democratisation in Africa. Civil society has become one of the most prominent global concepts throughout the last two decades. It is an old idea, traceable at least as far back as the European enlightenment. It seems to have been forgotten, having largely fallen into disuse after having been taken up by thinkers such as Hegel, de Tocqueville and Gramci. Civil society as an issue appears to have been 'remembered' re-awakened from neglect, for now to become a pivotal element of Western cultural currency as applied to Africa.

Is this remembering of an old concept helpful to the Horn of Africa? Does the latest discourse on civil society accord agency to political and social actors native to the Horn of Africa? Or do the global social and political actors retain their monopoly on the

framing of discourses on civil society and the terms of thinking and speaking about them in relation to the ambition of delivering social change in the Horn of Africa.

Civil society, in the African context, was an idea largely exported from outside. That is its main peculiarity. The intent here is to find ways in which civil society can be re-appropriated for furthering the concept and reality of a peaceful and non- violent Horn of Africa.

State, Market and Society in the Horn of Africa

Africa has suffered from the general ideological backlash against the state. Neo- liberal preaching of 'free- market' went against the employment of concepts and strategies of the developmental state in Africa, the planning state in the former USSR and the interventionist state in Western countries. The remembering of the classical free market discourse for the 1980s and 1990s brought a virulent attack on the state's role in economic and social policy- making. The state retreat from the economy and social services has been yoked with the revival of free-market ideology (economy) and civil society (social services). While the state, market and civil society relation reflect the interdependence and mutual shaping of political, economic and civil societies, the ascendancy of free market and civil society with a beaten-down state actor suggest ideologies akin to what Putman called "Bowling Alone" The merit of a free-market ideology conceived by a constellation of transnational actors and imposed on the context of the region lies in delegitimising ideologically and rhetorically the regulative role of the states of the region over markets and civil society actors.

What the region needs are strong developmental states that work with equally strong civil societies and strong markets (and not free markets!). There is no such thing as a free market, just as there is no such thing as free air outside the context of space and time. The market is always and universally embedded in societies and social-economic arrangements and structures. State or civil society strength does not lie in their confrontations with each other or in being at logger heads with each other, but in social innovations for furthering their partnerships and co-operations. Strength is built on a

public policy orientation founded on the bedrock of public purpose, public service and public ethics that stimulate solidarity amongst states, markets and societies in Africa. They are not built with policies that divide, confront and weaken the triad of 'state-market-society' by strengthening one at the expense of the other or by not using law and moral authority, but rather force, deception and blackmail that disrupt further solidarity. Strength is not measurable in terms of how many states are adjusted to attract IMF and World Bank loans and grants by accepting and passing their dictations and conditions. It is measured by how much the state has developed public sense, by being rooted in society and markets and by emerging from it to guide society and the market in turn. Strength is also measured by how much it accomplishes governance by becoming itself a community for promoting self-reliance through following independent policy trajectories.

The successful state thrives on a successful civil society and an equally successful market, not on free market, retreating state and a 'civil society gridlock' made possible by NGOs scrambling for donor handouts. The successful state can be constructed by challenging the global constitution of the failed state. The wish to reject the donor role in this definition of failure can only be accomplished by resisting the global constitution/discourse of failure through using an alternative discourse of success made locally.

The principle is to find consensual mobilising ideas and practices for all to recognise a regional meta-narrative that embodies a 'strong and successful' co-ordination of Horn of African states, markets and societies. Such a meta-narrative should displace the donor driven narrative or discourse. It can be made to assist, interact with and even guide the local narratives of self-defining Horn of African communities.

Concluding remarks

The term civil society itself has its conceptual roots in Western history. Its present application in the regional context as the most promising for embedding (Western) ideas of development and democracy should therefore be questioned. As the agency of the states of the region has systematically been dismantled and replaced by diverse foreign

actors, the characteristics of cohesion and coherence normally associated with civil society have dissipated.

The project of creating regional co-operation, stability, security and peace involves re-appropriating, re-defining the state, civil society and market nexus of the region in order to create enduring institutional arrangements capable of self-correction, learning, self-reliance and innovation. The forms created cannot be and should not be determined from without, but should draw in their creation upon the varied and rich cultures, traditions, and long historical experience of the Horn of Africa region. Thus civil society as a concept needs to be emancipated before it can be of use for building regional co-operation, stability, security and peace.

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Myths of Domination and Rationale for Peace: The Need for a Movement of
Liberation of the Critical Thought in the Horn of Africa

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The Horn of Africa seems to be a land of paradoxes. Here is a region whose renowned history and geostrategic importance, instead of leading to a better understanding of the lives of its inhabitants, has contributed rather to enhance its mystery. It is a region whose abundant resources, since earliest antiquity, has attracted all kinds of soldiers of fortune but whose populations continue to endure the most catastrophic famine in recent history. This is, finally, a region in which paleaontological research repeatedly attests the antiquity and continuity of its inhabitation, but where the majority of its peoples persist in their claims to have originated elsewhere.

This region, situated at the crossroads of three civilisations, has sustained all sorts of myth-making and accumulated sediments of dangerous superstitions in the collective memories.

The world has evolved. The stakes have changed and globalised. And yet the peoples in the Horn of Africa still continue to settle old scores amongst themselves. As at the time of the Crusades, they confront one another along the same psychological lines of division, from the same ideological trenches: Christians against Muslims; Semitic against Cushitic populations; Nomads Pastoralists against sedentary cultivators, legitimate heirs against power usurpers; unionists against secessionists.

They still hold out - almost like badges of identity - the same tales of prestigious origins, in an attempt to extract themselves from Africa: Jewish lineage versus Arabic genealogy.

The fabrication of grandiose vocations and myths of origin is not the exclusive preserve of the peoples in the region. But what aggravates the effect of this "opium of the people" in this case is the absence of the requisite antidote - namely critical thought, and freedom

of mind. The intellectual community of the region has proved incapable of detachment from the dominant discourses of its culture. The very people, whose role was to question the beliefs of their societies, revisit their traditions, and debunk their prejudices, have - in this region more than anywhere else - failed in their mission.

Instrumentalised by the competing powers, the intellectuals of the region, at least those who claim the elevated credentials of academia, have been unable to fulfil their role as torchbearers. Instead of illuminating their people, they have allowed themselves to be used as eulogists of chauvinistic ambitions.

This 'scientific' legitimisation of myths of domination not only reinforces divisions and stereotyping between populations, but also affects the seriousness of the research on the Horn of Africa.

The precocious interest of foreign - notably Western – scholars in the Horn has not helped matters. Amazed by the biblical and koranic references to the region, many of them took part in the regional polemics and added confusion.

Subordinated also to the imperialistic goals and cultural prejudices of their societies, they offered their service by distributing their 'scientificness' to the claims of one side or the other.

We all know how most of these so-called Africanists were influenced by the ideology on race superiority, which backed slavery and colonialism. One of the major characteristics of this theory was to deprive African peoples of any trace of advanced civilisation discovered in their continent. This recurrent racism might explain why Western scholars have always given special credit to mythologies claiming the non-African origin of some peoples of the Horn and particularly to legends exaggerating the Semitic elements in the civilisations, which flourished in this region.

The subjugation of research to the dominant competing ambitions in the region, such as the Abyssinian hegemonism and the Somali irredentism, has resulted in the production of a distressing body of knowledge on the Horn. This literature is frequently exploited to nourish all kind of hate speeches against the enemies of the moment.

This was the case during the recent and terrible Ethio-Eritrean war. Intellectuals of each side were easily mobilised to produce rational arguments for their respective governments involved in one of the most irrational conflicts of the continent. The same zeal has been witnessed among local scholars during the conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Such subordination of research to the political and military vagaries constitutes a real threat to peaceful coexistence and co-operation in the region. It continues to widen the scope of the fields to 'de-mining', of the history to 'disarming' in order to build critical mass of knowledge capable of challenging the demagoguery of intolerance, exclusion and war.

A new regional configuration is on process, which is announcing important disruptions in the region. This redistribution of cards obliges us to revisit and revise the dominant concepts and paradigms on the region. It calls for another approach capable to address the challenges raised by the new regional order in process. For that to happen, we first need to overcome the methodological constraints, the ideological snares and the psychological reflexes, which limit our visions. Far from presenting an exhaustive analysis of the topic, I would like here to discuss few of these obstacles, which subvert the research on the Horn of Africa.

The tyranny of mythology

Mythologies in the Horn of Africa have not only discouraged the production of independent knowledge on the history and culture of the peoples. They have become ideological arguments to justify intolerable domination and oppression.

These mythologies raise an important contradiction often overlooked: they are used to legitimate nationalism based on territorial claims while they attempt, at the same time, to locate out of the disputed lands the origin of those who are claiming the ownership.

The 'rationality' of these legends, mostly drawn from biblical or koranic texts, has seduced en masse of the intellectuals of the region. It is difficult to understand this indulgence towards such epics, which often vehicles seeds of intolerance and which are used to address sensitive issues such as ownership of territory, access to resources, exercise of power. I would like to highlight here two significant examples of this tyranny of mythology.

The famous legend of Queen Saba and King Solomon whose natural son, Menelik the First, is supposed to have founded Abyssinia and brought back the Hebraic Ark of the Covenant. From the first Abyssinian dynasties to the latest Emperor Haile Selassie, those claiming to be from his descent have cultivated this belief in order to legitimate their monopolisation of power in Ethiopia.

The second example is the Somali legends, which attempt to attest the Arab origin of Somali clans by linking their genealogy to that of the Hashemite tribe of the Prophet Mohamed. Here also, these claims were used to facilitate access to power and to resources in the Islamic cities and states that flourished in the region. Each Somali tribe has its own version of these legends, which are also found in other populations such as the Afars.

I do not reject here the use of legends and myths as sources of information for social science research. The problem concerns the preferential weight and treatment accorded to those, which locate the origin of certain peoples of the region outside the African continent. After all, we know that - alongside these official mythologies - there have always existed local traditions insisting on a more endogenous genesis. These mythologies are less influenced by the biblical epics, and give interesting indications as to the origin and identity of the peoples of the Horn.

The mentality of the crusades

The Horn of Africa has been very early caught up in the war of religion, which pitted Christianity against Islam. The dynamic of this conflict has been particularly murderous in this region since it exacerbated already existing competition and tensions between regional powers. In order to mobilise populations, each camp has developed a multidimensional propaganda of hate and intolerance, reinforced by successive massacres and destruction of spiritual sites.

Despite the historical affinities and socio-economic interdependence of the peoples of the region, the autocrats in power set themselves to erect psychological barriers, which outlived their military confrontations.

The result of these conflicts is an insidious Crusade and Jihad mentality, which continues till now to imprison the peoples of the region in an implacably antagonistic worldview. This mentality has been internalised through various oral and written literature integrated in textbooks and taught in schools. It still affects the relations between people and continues to distort the perception of regional scholars.

The obsession with territory

The geostrategic location of the Horn of Africa has always inspired a harsh competition over the control of its territories. Because of the fact that the real strategic interest of the different areas in the region lies in their complementarily, the various powers in competition were pushed to develop what could be called a "geography of war" to reconfigure the regional map along their designs. This strategy has led to an obsessive crystallisation of confrontations over territory.

The complexity of the relations between the peoples of the Horn of Africa has been reduced to mere territorial ambitions and claims. Each protagonist has worked to transfigure the regional reality, characterised by its diversity and complexity, by

developing rhetoric of territory based on the exaltation of unity, greatness and exclusiveness.

For that purpose, each camp has called upon all kind of sciences to prove its sovereignty over disputed lands: metaphysics of sites, semantics of local names, genealogy of ancestors, genetics of 'vital spaces'.

Disastrous policies have been undertaken to seize large territories, which the conquerors do not even then bother to exploit for the benefit of their nation. This cult of territory continues to turn the leadership of the region away from the real challenges of development: poverty eradication, improvement of education and health.

The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a good example of this obsession. The two governments acknowledged - albeit for different reasons - that the real cause of their conflict has nothing to do with the few scraps of eroded land under dispute. Nevertheless the explanations given to their populations, and the rationale for their mobilisation call on this same rhetoric of territory. As if this were the only argument that the people could understand, the only cause for which one could ask them to pay sacrifice.

The feudal spirit

The scholars involved in these debates on territorial sovereignty curiously do not pay attention to the opinions and aspirations of the populations concerned. They mostly discuss the so-called evidence provided by the ruling classes to prove their right or ownership on lands.

This evidence is almost the same on each side: myths of foundation, songs and poems of glory, literature of courtiers and court scripts, diplomatic correspondence amongst kings, sultans or colonial powers.

This attitude is a pernicious legacy of the various forms of feudalism (be they Christian or Muslim), which developed in the Horn of Africa. Family-based autocracy has been the

dominant political system in the region. This type of power generally claims a divine legitimacy pulled from the God-favourite lineage.

This feudal mentality outlived the abolition of monarchic regimes and continues to influence political practices of the states in the region, despite their formal adhesion to the democratic model.

According to this conception, the source of power is considered as being prior to the existence of peoples and independent of their will. The later are not perceived as subjects of their history but rather as objects of the design of the authority under which the fatality placed them. They are regarded as some kind of "fauna" or "human flock", which just happens to graze on the estates of those who hold power. Under such circumstances the subject population is not in a position even to deliberate upon its fate or give voice to its concerns, still less to choose the political system under which it would like to live. The power holders are not accountable to the people, but to God or to ancestors. They have no constitutional obligations to their subjects but only moral and charitable duties. It is worth recalling that in a region where there have been such great number of territorial disputes, only very few referenda or popular consultations have ever been organised.

Influenced by this feudal way of thinking, scholars have paid little attention to the other systems and traditions of governance in the region built on more democratic principles of consensus, participation and sharing of responsibilities.

In fact, there are in our region interesting customary laws or socio-political contracts such as the Heer of the Somalis, the Gada of the Oromos, and the Dinkara of the Afars. These democratic traditions offer other models for power management, which could challenge feudal heritage and facilitate the democratisation of societies in the region.

The absolutist conception of conflict
Another perspective, which affects the relations between the peoples of the Horn, is this absolutist conception of the other, of the enemy. Despite their affinities, or perhaps

because of them, each camp has the tendency to regard its disputes with others as utterly ineluctable - as somehow inherent to the differences of nature, which separate them. It seems that the dichotomies of text-based religions (Good against Evil, God against Satan) have somehow become transposed onto the socio-political reality and interpersonal relations. Cultural, religious, and ethnic distinctions are thus viewed through an absolutist genesis or through a sort of primordialism, which excludes the possibility of consensus and compromise. The very existence of "the other", his way of life, well-being, and prosperity, is seen as a permanent threat. Thus, conflict is seen as a "duel" (him or me?), and its resolution in the zero-sum terms of equivalent gain or loss. Any advantage accorded or permitted to others is seen as correspondingly diminishing or disadvantaging one's own cause or interest.

This mentality is partly responsible of the way some peoples of the Horn have been marginalised by central governments, since their development and advancement were seen as a threat to the power monopolisation. This mentality can equally explain the narrowness of the ethnic- or clan—based powers, which exist in the region, and the policies of exclusion, which they pursue.

The case of Somalia is a significant example of the extreme to which such absolutist conception of the enemy can lead. Here is a people who fulfil the conditions, which are generally required to build a nation-state but who is experiencing one of the most disastrous civil war and the longest absence of central government in recent history.

An important lesson should be drawn from this experience: the homogeneity in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion and language that a lot of nationalists are dreaming of is far from guaranteeing any social and political harmony. It seems even easier sometimes to compromise and find common grounds when a society is constituted of diverse groups who are bound to live together.

In search of an alternative vision of the Horn of Africa

All the problems and constraints that I have been addressing here are not, of course, in any way particular to the Horn of Africa, and could also be equally relevant for the Balkans and the Middle East, to mention only those examples offered by news headlines. What seems to me, however, to be specific to our region is the rarity of analyses regarding the consequences of these patterns on the process of knowledge production.

Research on the Horn has been fed with narrow visions, which have exaggerated the differences between peoples and amplified discourses of exclusion. Now, all of that could have contributed to widening the gaps between the communities of the region. It has been exploited. Instead, it is time to consider the other face of the regional reality.

Beyond the intellectual integrity, which compels us to revisit the mistakes of the past, the plight of our region desperately calls for a new approach. The Horn of Africa, despite the glory of its history, continues to shelter some of the most miserable populations on the globe. Their extreme fragility should in itself be enough to prevent the outbreak of any single new-armed conflict. Scholars working in these war-torn societies can no longer allow themselves the luxury of concentrating on issues, which stir up and exacerbate division. Their new responsibility is to rediscover what brings theirs peoples back together, to reconstruct the bridges that have been destroyed, and to raise awareness about the commonalities of the lives of the populations in the Horn.

From this perspective, one of the disciplines often neglected in studies on our region could provide useful - perhaps essential - tools: that is economy. An economic approach could help to illuminate the web of interdependence and interaction which has helped in the past the peoples of the region to overcome their religious, cultural, and socio-political antagonism.

Such analysis could help to demonstrate the capacity for 'rapprochement', the potential exchanges and co-operation, which an economic rationale is capable of encouraging. This kind of research would help to understand the resistance to the propaganda of war and the non-violent management of conflict that the peoples of the region have displayed at

certain moments in their history. It would help to understand the peaceful transfer of populations, the trade interdependence and the inter-cultural dialogue, which prevailed between communities, despite the education of hate they received.

The economic rationality, which I have in mind, has little to do with the dogmatism of 'political economy' imposed from the top by central governments. I do not speak either about the 'ideological economy', which has ignored the natural logic of exchange between peoples and perverted the historical economic patterns of the region.

In other words, the requirements of economic laws are more likely to facilitate the regional integration, which constitutes an essential prelude to mutual development and regional peace.

Another area on which such research should focus is the investigation of common ideals, which could bring together the men and women of the region, and allow them to transcend the barriers of prejudice and chauvinism. Such ideals touch upon the humanist values enshrined in human rights, and the principles of the culture of peace. Research could revisit the historical instances of generosity displayed by the peoples of the region; I am talking about those exceptional moments when ideals superior to those of selfish nationalist have inspired the public imagination.

The new vision of the region which remains to be constructed should explore again the concept of 'patriotism' that humanist philosophers such as Habermas had in mind: a patriotism that insists on the defence of human values and constitutional rights wherever they are under threat, regardless of national or other boundaries. This sense of patriotism is likely to reconcile the differences of all those sharing the same deals.

This new vision needs to break with traditionalist and primordialist analyses, which have only imprisoned the peoples of the region within stereotypical imagery, purporting to capture the quintessential 'nature' or 'essence' of their culture. Rather, such attitude has tended to sentimentalise and romanticise the traditional order, only obscuring its

dynamics and capacity for internal transformation and adaptation. A noteworthy example from this region is the persistent influence of anthropological depiction of the pastoral idyll, which continues to view the present through the rose-tinted spectacles of nostalgia for a 'Golden Age' of the past. This approach is as dangerous as the attitude, which leads to consider the past with the geopolitical currents of today.

This new vision must also overcome the reductive vision of history, which equates the complex evolution of societies with the petty intrigues of palace politics. Our approach to history must look beyond the concrete footprints left to posterity by pretentious dynasties, and seek to find evidence also of those much more evanescent traces of peoples' achievements.

Such vision, centred on the sharing of humanist values cannot, unfortunately, come from the states themselves, or from those populations overly preoccupied with their survival. It requires a clear-headed leadership from those whose responsibility is to bring the perspective from the other side of the tracks, and break new ground, namely the intellectual elites and, in particular, the academic community. It is their duty to liberate research and translate this new vision into academic publications, university teaching, textbooks, and programmes of civic education and articles in the press.

What this region lacks is opportunities where critical thoughts can express themselves without control. What it is badly needed is institutes for research, reflection, and academic exchange, which are genuinely independent of the power of the state, of interest groups, and of short-term politicking.

To conclude, this region has produced more than its quota of ballads, bards, and minstrels to sing the praises of autocrats in the most elevated and sophisticated tones. It has enough experience of armed liberation fronts, banditry and thievery. It is time for intellectuals to involve themselves in a new kind of 'liberation movement' - a movement for the emancipation of critical thought, for the development for free of mind.

Education for All – Experience from Sweden

Carl Lindberg
Deputy State Secretary
Swedish Ministry of Education and Science

Honourable participants, dear friends, it is a great pleasure for me, as a representative of the Swedish government, to take part in this important conference on Horn of Africa – "Co-operation instead of Wars and Destruction". You have kindly invited me to talk about "Education for all – experience from Sweden. But at first I would like to give some general remarks on this issue.

Education for all is really a great challenge for all of us independent of where in the world we are living. According to the decision taken by the world Education Forum in Dakar April 2000 and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Children, all children, young people and adults have the human right to benefit from an education that will meet their basic learning needs in the best and fullest sense of the term. All governments have an obligation to ensure that Education for all -goals and targets are reached and sustained.

The EFA-goals are about: expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children, ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality; achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women; equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults, but also implement as a matter of urgency education programmes and actions to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Swedish government will do its utmost to take its part of the responsibility to contribute to the achievement of the Dakar Education for all-goals.

In Sweden the ideal of Education for all and a common educational system for all children, irrespective of their economic, social, cultural or ethnic backgrounds has been fundamental for Swedish educational policies for decades. The first political decision

based on this was made more than 50 years ago. This idea of a common educational system for all children and young people has, of course, not always been uncontroversial. But today, there are not many people who would question it. It means that we generally keep all pupils together during the nine years of compulsory school, until the age of 16. Within this general common framework, it has naturally been possible to apply different teaching methods and give pupils good opportunities to choose advanced studies in particular subjects.

Despite the fact that there are, of course, many faults in our educational system, international surveys have pointed to the fact that the education that we offer our children and young people in the various regions of the country shows fewer differences in quality than those in other countries. Both in the northern, southern, eastern or western parts of the country, and in the metropolitan or rural areas, it has been possible to offer relatively equal standard of education. There are, of course, differences, especially against the background of the fact that there are classes in the suburbs of our larger cities in which practically all pupils are of foreign origin, whilst other part of the country has classes in which only a few pupils have roots from countries other than Sweden.

Within this collective framework our Education Act stipulates that we should, both in the nine years compulsory school and in the three years upper secondary school, give priority to special support to those children and young people who have the greatest difficulty in attaining the required educational standard. Here, we no longer speak of special-needs children, but of children in need of special support. Thus, we try in different ways to take seriously the fundamental idea of all people's equal value, and the fact that this also means educational opportunities that are as equal as possible.

A crucial aspect of the common school system is that it must naturally take into account and respect the fact that its pupils come from many different cultures and have different religious beliefs. The Swedish school system is therefore denominational, i.e. it does not advocate a particular religion in preference to another. However, considerable work is still necessary to provide a place for different cultural and religious traditions without

foregoing the ideals of human rights, and especially not the rights of the child, which have been collectively formulated in the various declarations and conventions of the United Nations.

Our ideas on education for all and equal opportunities for education are also the basis of our considerable programme on adult education and learning. For 25 years, we have allocated enormous resources to adult education, efforts that in recent years have been greater than ever through the Adult Education Initiative project. Our basic idea is that it is both rational and fair to offer adult people who for different reasons have not had the opportunity to study, a second, third or fourth chance to strengthen their position on the labour market and at the same time enable them to further develop their confidence and personal life. The Adult Education Initiative, a five year programme, will give some 700 000 people, mostly during a time at which they have been unemployed, a real opportunity to enhance their skills to the level of completed upper secondary school education, equivalent to that available to the young people of today. These efforts comprise approximately 14 % of the work force.

Early childhood education represents the essential basis for lifelong learning. An awareness of the importance of the early years of a child's life for learning and human development is increasingly emphasised in international research.

Because of this, it is essential to have good early childhood education facilities. But early childhood education must not be merely a place where children are looked after in order for parents to work. The main purpose of early childhood education is that it should be for children's development and learning, a place where teaching methods and child-care are intertwined. To give all children equal chances when starting school, it is important that early childhood education is available to every child, and especially that it is able to integrate children who need special support.

In the work of reforming education, our guiding light is always the vision that people should not be forced to come from prosperous background to be able to realise dreams of

learning and a good education. Our aim of giving everybody the chance to study and ensuring a good start in life is the basis of future reforms that will make early childhood education universally available for 4 and 5-year olds and introduce maximum charges for child care. By doing this, we hope that no child will be excluded from early childhood education and childcare for financial reasons. This means that the education system totally free of charge that we already have in schools, institutions of adult education and higher education will be supplemented by a reform guaranteeing that no-one need forego education for financial reasons, whether it be child care or schooling at an early age or post-graduate education.

Sweden cannot boast of being a very old democracy. Democracy here is a mere 80 years old. Our women were the last of those in the Nordic countries to be awarded voting rights in 1921. But today, we may note with pride that we have the privilege of living in a well-developed democracy where Swedish representative government is based on freedom of opinion and on universal, equal suffrage. The concept of the equal value of all people is established in our Swedish Constitution. In it, all bodies of society are instructed to actively integrate democratic ideas as the guiding principle in all social areas.

Democratic values are not spread by themselves they must be transferred to new generations by being learned by children, young people and adults. One of the important things we can do is to use the educational system to create good, democratic and responsible citizens.

What must be communicated, from pre-schools and after-school leisure centres to upper secondary schools and adult education, are the concepts of the integrity of human life, the freedom and integrity of the individual, the equal value of all human beings, gender equality between women and men, and solidarity for the weak and vulnerable. Our democracy instructs us as adults and active staff within the Swedish school system to work for these rights. These are obligations that are, of course, easier to live up to in countries where there is the support of law, than in societies where one has to risk one's life to safeguard these rights.

However, one cannot learn democracy just by being given lessons on laws, regulations, values and attitudes. Instead, what is needed is to stimulate the interest and will of pupils to participate in society and to develop the understanding and skills that they need to be able to live as responsible and aware citizens. This can only happen if, in the everyday life of the school and in the teaching and learning of all subjects, they are able to practice democracy themselves. They must be given the opportunity to influence and take responsibility both for their own work and for the school as a whole. They must acquire knowledge about practical cooperation in different forms and in democratic decision-making, and simultaneously be given the opportunity to develop their independence and critical facilities.

I mean that pupils must have increasing responsibility over working methods, working forms and the contents of teaching and that they should be prepared for participation and collective responsibility, and for the rights and obligations characterising a democratic society.

We adults may never attribute our failures to pupils not showing an interest in democracy. It must always be our task in schools to find strategies to develop pupils' interest and to awaken their commitment. This is important, not only to develop their social skills but also to stimulate their desire to learn different school subjects. We know that the ability to influence has a great bearing on the desire to learn. It is particularly important to achieve a high level of pupil democracy in schools with different kinds of serious problems.

It is particularly important that the school is able to show a democratic and tolerant climate. Teaching democracy primarily requires organising the school in general and lessons in particular in a responsible and meaningful manner. Thus, what are also important are methods of developing the school so as to create and support a democratic school culture. Such a school culture sees conflicts, open questions and unsolved issues as a chance to teach and develop practical democracy among all those taking part.

Globalisation, migration and the revolution in communications technology are three factors now affecting us all. Changes brought about by these factors underline the importance of learning to live together in new environments and under different conditions and make it increasingly necessary for us to focus on issues relating to democracy and basic values.

Today, more than 20 per cent of pupils attending Swedish compulsory school are of immigrant origin, or have one of their parents coming from abroad. In the large metropolitan areas, we have classes consisting of 80 per cent of such pupils. Such classes will embrace many different cultural traditions. It is vital, to be able to live together in a friendly atmosphere, that pupils also share common basic values.

Collectively held fundamental values should permeate the activities of pre-school, school and adult education. These involve relations between people and the way in which we treat and value each other, both as children and as adults. Focus must be given to these basic values in order to strengthen democracy in school and within society. Only by doing this can we prevent and counteract bullying, sexual harassment, violence and other crimes, and similar expressions of a lack of respect for the equal value of human beings.

School should be a place at which one learns and develops. All children and young people should find pleasure in acquiring new knowledge and skills. Life in school should be fun and challenging for the pupils. By giving children good knowledge and skills, one builds the basis for lifelong learning that enables active citizenship and a strong position in a constantly changing labour market. Teachers' skills in establishing good relations with all their pupils and creating an environment in which it is easy to learn is a precondition for children to enjoy school, to develop and achieve educational targets. Each child must therefore be seen as an individual and educated according to the best of his/her abilities.

To develop school, children's natural curiosity for and interest in learning things must be stimulated and utilised to a far greater extent than occurs today. Teaching must draw from children's own questions and experience. A secure social environment in which discussions are held, challenging pupils' ideas, beliefs and prejudices can enable this. In such an environment, pupils become aware that they already possess knowledge that is being continually developed. By being allowed to make their own reflections on their schoolwork, their intellectual and emotional development is strengthened. If their studies occur in an environment marked by rich social, cultural and ethnic diversity, social cohesion in all our countries will most certainly be enhanced.

Even within higher education, our aim has been to give students greater opportunities for influence and responsibilitiy.Legislation applying to higher education requires student participation in all decision-making bodies throughout the university system. Students are entitled to be represented by three members on the 15-member Higher Education Boards of each university and other decision-making bodies. Students must be informed of and consulted on important issues, in good time before a decision is made. Student unions are also entitled to present their viewpoints and experiences in the annual reports submitted by universities and university colleges to the government.

The Swedish government believes that the assistance of students is crucial, not only for democratic reasons, but also for quality-enhancing initiatives to be taken. At all levels of university and other institutions of higher education, teachers and staff should work for the active participation of students in projects aimed at improving and developing educational programmes within the various institutions.

To give our pupils and students better possibilities to influence and take responsibility in early childhood activities, in schools and at the university level, is probably the single most effective way of strengthening our democracies. The quality of their learning will also improve.

In the last year the government has made a proposal on the responsibility of universities and university colleges to achieve broader recruitment to include new groups. The diversity that exists in society must be reflected to a greater extent in universities and university colleges. The bill also clarifies the responsibility of universities and university colleges to examine whether an applicant who lacks formal qualifications has acquired the knowledge required outside the formal education system. Methods for assessing skill in real terms in relation to higher education should be developed. The Swedish parliament has also taken a decision on a law on equal treatment of students in higher education that will enhance the protection of students by forbidding discrimination or harassment of students on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation, ethnic origin or disability.

All of us here realise that there is a great difference in the condition of creating education for all in Sweden and in your countries on the Horn of Africa. But I am convinced that all of you are very keen to work very hard for introducing education for all in your countries according to the Dakar goals. But I am also convinced that if this struggle for education for all will be successful it must in all countries be based on the ideas of Democracy and Human Rights.

Many thanks for your attention and my best wishes for your important work on co-operation instead of wars and destruction on Horn of Africa.

Democracy and Human Rights

Civil Society Co-Operation in Building Peace and Democracy
in the Horn of Africa- Path of a New Political Culture

Dr. Tarekegn Adebo

Distinguished guests - Ladies and Gentlemen

First of all allow me to thank Mr. Abdillahi Jama of the Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre (SIRC) for taking much of the burden of organising this important conference. After some time of separate and sporadic attempts to inform the Swedish/Scandinavian public on the plight of the peoples in the Horn of Africa, we felt it may be beneficial for all if we could approach the issue of peace from a regional perspective. This was how the idea for this conference was born.

The Horn of Africa is an African Sub-region that has seen a lot of devastation of wars and violence of over a century; first as a result of colonial incursions and fascist invasion, secondly in the wake of civil and interstate wars, revolutions and multiple uprisings and perennial brigandag. As armed confrontation still remains a major way of handling conflicts with its consequent high toll of human and material destruction, a culture of violence still abounds in the region.

Post-Cold War conflicts are notorious for their near home boundaries. Earlier conflicts were largely of interstate character, but the current ones are intra-societal and are brought nearer to villages and homesteads, pitting neighbours against neighbours.

With this conference, as its theme "Horn of Africa - Co-operation Instead of Wars and Destruction" depicts, *we wanted to vow violence and war no more! Peaceful negotiation, Co-operation and development, Yes!* We want a clear paradigm shift among all actors in the region in terms of handling conflicts - resolve your problems through peaceful means and not through armed violence, develop and respect peace forums, develop mutual confidence, act as rational human beings for the welfare of all, do not follow policies of mutual sabotage and destruction, rather follow those of mutual survival and prosperity.

At this moment, we are appealing to civil society actors who do not at present have political power and economic resources under their control, but that can have aspirations, visions, dreams, and thoughts about a better future for themselves and for posterity. Such associations are all those non-state interest groups, mainly of modern sectors, which are also well embedded in the cultures of the Horn region. We mean civic and professional associations - teachers, lawyers, women's groups, doctors, engineers, trade unionists, peasant groups, even merchants, etc. - all those who imbibe both global and local interests, who see beyond the shadows of narrow identity and particularistic traps, and struggle for inclusive human development as a condition for the survival of all. Religious communities and many other self-help associations of tradition too can be equipped to actively help in peace-building. Our region is full of such groups and individuals, but caught up in the vortex of violence and cowering under crushing politico-economic reality. We all in the Diaspora are part of that multitude, who at the moment are called to raise the voices of reasons, and to invoke the best in human morality and civility in order to bring our region to sanity and orderly development.

We want our societies, hitherto convulsed by wars and dictatorial rules, to be rehabilitated under peace, democracy and human rights. Eventually, one needs the civil society and state working in complimentarily, but not in mutual contradiction. A developmental democratic state would not fear people who are equipped with human rights and working for orderly development.

While dealing with conflict issues, there is a tendency to look for differences alone among people - whether it is linguistic, religious, cultural or regional. The underlying factors of unity and co-operation, which often characterise life, are lost under the shadow of conflict. Such expressions as "deeply divided societies" become self -evident perspectives in dealings with situations of variety. The following figures, ideal types, can help us see how African societies, with their ca 2500 linguistic variety, could be linked in chains of their interconnectedness. We have dwelt too much on differences and they are

not difficult to find. But now, let us search for linkages, bridges, and similarities everywhere to construct peace - linkages within societies and across borders.

Societies do not always conflict with each other merely because they are diverse. As one writer noted, "the universal need for bonding can be thought of as the key to the survival of the human species" and asserts, "it is the need of humans for one another that draws them towards negotiating with one another in the face of conflicting interests, needs, perceptions, whether in settings of family, neighbourhood, workplace, or public institutions".

While speaking of the legitimate roles individuals and groups play in society, an analyst cautions, "extreme individualism which ignores social bonding leads to the eclipse of community and results in alienation and violence. On the hand, an extreme communitarian orientation produces rigid structures, which restrict individual freedom and constricts human creativity. What we need of establishing a violence-free society is the requisite balance between individualism and communitarianism".

Identity fixation or narrow and exclusivist mindset does not understand life in its multifaceted characteristics. On the other hand, openness does not disrespect identity; rather it strives for unity in diversity, tolerance and mutual survival.

What is really at stake today? A new democratic political culture? For sure, we know a lot - we know in the Horn when people meet each other as people, how soon they discover their commonalities. From time immemorial, people in the Horn region have evolved a lot in common - customs, cultures, languages, religions, kinship through widespread intermarriage, etc. In many of the border areas you find inhabitants of different states speaking the same language, if not, they are bilingual. They share markets and a lot more.

Both in the sub-region, as well as within the countries and communities, our main headache is in the field of modern politics and leadership. The political arena should have

helped us in forging common political values, norms and forums that could formalise and cement the myriads of submerged as well as still visible traditional bonds that manifest along all our national borders and inside. They rather engage people in conflicts of bygone era and even invent new ones, to cause more bloodletting for the sole purpose of remaining in power. Look at Scandinavia, where most of us live now, how people have prospered in peace and co-operation! They left their earlier conflicts behind them and forged new bonds. Cross-border co-operation in peace and development needs political will and understanding, forging a new co-operative political mindset.

This needs a new democratic political culture, a set of ideas based on the respect of human rights and freedoms, as one political analyst states, a distinct set of political values and orientations including moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, participation. Such politically relevant believes, values, and attitudes held in families as shaping people's thoughts from childhood, at schools, in religious institutions and promoted by media, and group forums, are to guide and shape attitudes in modern world. They help people to navigate their ways in the complexity of contemporary world, they help them to accept each other and respect diversity.

Above all, pursuing the values of tolerance and mutual respect enables creation or strengthening of mechanism of peace and reconciliation and encourages us to respect and use the democratic institutions on various levels and to resolve conflicts in a non-violence way.

Concerning conflicts and the means of conflict resolution, some peace researchers talk in terms of a triangle with ABC points, where point A. Represents attitudes, values, norms, point B actions (violence or peaceful transformation) while point C represents conflicting goals. Conflict goals or interests C have existed and will continue to exist among the countries of the Horn or even among the different communities within individual countries. There are different attitudes, mindsets A of mutual understanding, tolerance, peace or belligerence, violence and a zero sum game posturing. There are choices of action based on such attitudes B violence, war or peaceful means, negotiation,

reconciling interests. This conference is to say let us choose the values of non-violence, peaceful change, negotiation forums, and win-win attitudes. *The guiding principle should not be that of survival of the fittest, but that of survival of all!*

The peoples of the Horn, largely inhabiting climatically harsh areas, can only achieve decent survival through co-operation in winning peace and overcoming the vagaries of nature, as to harnessing their human and natural resources for the benefit of all. As the root causes for may of the conflicts are related to underdevelopment and under utilisation of resources, co-operation in the development of our lands, waters (rivers, lakes, seas oceans) rich animal wealth and industry, is inevitable for the common advantage. Peoples of the Horn should burry their mutual enmity and refuse to be lured by friend or foe of far and near, who try to enlist them for proxy roles against each other.

Ubuntu, a south Africa philosophical term that imbued attitudes of reconciliation and forgiveness in the process to heal the wounds of apartheid, suggests that people are incomplete to extent that they are alienated from on another. The fulfilment of one becomes a condition for the fulfilment of the other.

Our being human in itself should compel us to respect one another and to co-operate. This is what the very first article of Universal Declaration of Human rights urges us to do:

> "All human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. They
> are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards
> one another in a spirit of brotherhood". One should have added
> sisterhood, too.

Dear friend, our attempts, today, in this gathering, is tones of small steps on the course of idealist's vision for a Horn of Africa where a culture of violence is replaced by a culture of peace, and where co-operation, development and human welfare flourish.

Can we think of a possibility of establishing a standing forum that carries our vision of peace, co-operation and development forward and bring the same to the Horn region? Starting research across borders on what links peoples in these areas - culture, languages, economy, etc…? Conducting feasibility studies about starting joint socio-economic development projects? Establishing joint development of animal husbandry; improved cattle, sheep, goats, and camels? Creating arid zone agriculture and irrigation-fed farming? Jointly developed fishery industry and marketing?

Can international actors in Scandinavian countries, EU, UNDP …… encourage experts, merchants and governments to develop such cross-border joint undertakings?

Let us be imaginative! Thank you!

The Role Democratic Parliament in Building Democratic Society
Experience from Sweden

Morgan Johansson
Member of the Swedish Parliament
Social Democratic Party

Dear friends,

Let me first express my gratitude for the chance to address this important conference. I have been a part of one of the workshops on the first part of the day. I must say, I am impressed by the discussions and by the subjects that are addressed. It seems to me, that if this is the starting-point of a new era for the Horn of Africa, then the region has a bright future ahead. But, I also understand that there is a long way to peace and democracy for all of the countries in the region.

I will speak about the role of the parliament in a strong democracy. As one of the members of parliament in Sweden, it feels as the right subject to me.

Some of you may think that I seem a little bit too young to be a member of the parliament (hereafter MP). I am 32 years and from Lund. Today, Lund is my constituency, and there are five MPs from Lund. Two of us are in the 30s. This might reflect the inhabitants in Lund with many students.

So I will continue to talk about the role of the parliament and the MPs in a democracy. First a few words about humility. Together with many Swedes I feel very lucky to have been born in a stable and peaceful democracy. A vast majority of the people of the world haven't had that luck. Most of the people of the world have never truly felt that they could participate in the decision-making in the country that they are living in. Many of them cannot even think that thought - they are happy as long as they are not persecuted by the rulers, or called to war, or plundered. That is the reality in many parts of the world. Democracy, equality and human rights are at worst almost unknown concepts, and at best

just words on a paper that the rulers are showing the rest of the world as a facade for its dictatorship.

It is of course difficult for a human being who is born in a country where the state was constituted in the 16th century, where there has been no war since 1814, and where democratic rule was established 80 years ago, to imagine how it is to live in a country where none of these conditions are at hand.

So I would not dream of trying to point out a path to democracy for the countries on the horn of Africa. Our conditions and our history are so different. But maybe I can make some remarks that I know have been useful in the case of Sweden. I think, however, they can also be useful in this context, despite all the differences.

There can be peace without democracy, but there cannot be democracy without peace. Why is that? Because as long as a country is at war - either with its neighbours, or in a civil war - the real power will be in the hands of the military - not in the hands of the politicians. A democracy can be at war for a shorter period of time - for instance during the Second World War, when Great Britain and the United States fought the Germans. But sooner or later - in a state at war democracy will suffer - there will come censorship of the newspapers, persecution of people who are accused to collaborate with the enemy, and so on.

As long as there is war in a country, it is almost impossible to build democratic institutions. So peace is always the first step towards democracy. And when you have established democracy, the risk for war will always be smaller. For instance, we are in Lund. This city was created by Denmark. Until the year 1658 this was Danish soil, but then the Swedish king Karl X Gustav conquered Denmark, and occupied Lund, Malmö and the whole region.

This was one of the many wars between Denmark and Sweden, and the conflict lasted for centuries. Thousands and thousands of lives were lost in these wars between Sweden and

Denmark. Today nobody would dream of starting a war between us again. There are many reasons, but a major reason for peace is that we have democracy in Denmark and Sweden. In a democracy the people rules, and the people wants peace.

For a king or a warlord, the peoples wishes are never considered - the people are just seen as the mean to get something from somebody else, that is land or assets from another king, or another warlord.

So peace is one of the conditions for democracy. The second condition is a state. There can be a state without democracy, but there cannot be a democracy without a state. Sweden was until the 16th century controlled by families or clans (you might say with a different word). The clans, or the families, had there own armies and controlled different regions in Sweden. Sometimes they had peace among themselves, sometimes war. They elected a king, who was often very weak, because the families, or the nobility, kept him weak. The third player in the system was the church, which sometimes joined side with some noble family, sometimes joined the king. The people of Sweden - farmers and workers - had no say in the different power struggles. Instead, they just had to pay to the noble family, the king, the church, or any institution that controlled the area.

I guess you recognise this system. This changed during the 16th and 17th century, when strong state institutions were created. The most important thing was that the control over the military armies became centralised to the king. As long as you have decentralised armies, controlled by warlords, there will be civil wars, and even foreign states will play the different powers against each other. And you will never be able to create strong institutions and rule of law. Instead of rule of law, you will have rule of the strongest, and democracy can never prevail.

Peace and a state are the foundation of democracy. Then you can lay the cornerstones; free and equal elections; freedom of speech; freedom of the media; the right to organise labour unions, civil organisations, political parties; transparency in the decision-making;

rule of law; independent courts; fight against corruption; and, in the centre, a strong parliament.

I know that the role of the parliament is different in different countries. I won't go in to details, but I know this much: a weak parliament is the safest sign of dictatorship in a country. Most of the countries in the world have a parliament. Many parliaments are, however, just a facade to hide the real decision-making. This is not unknown in Sweden. We had Restage, a parliament, for centuries. Before 1921, the rules of voting shut most people out. In fact, the real power lay in the hands of the king or the nobility, or the landlords.

My grandmother was born in 1916, and she was born to a country where women had no right to vote, and the men's votes were not equal - the richest men had 40 votes, the poorest just one vote. She was born to a country where you could go to prison if you wrote in a newspaper that the king should resign or that you did not believe in God. That was the Swedish political system in those days.

In the beginning of the 1920s I changed, when the Social Democrats and the Liberals managed to make two reforms. We created equal right to vote for both men and women, and the first democratic election was held 1921, and 1922 the first democratically elected parliament opened its session. It is exactly 80 years ago.

The second reform was establishment of parliamentarism. The government should no longer answer to the king, but to the parliament. This was not an easy process, and the king tried to hold back as long as he could. In the beginning of the 1920s, he was forced to give in, and slowly during the decades the royal family transformed into a symbol for Sweden, with no political power.

So we have parliamentarism in Sweden, as in Great Britain, or Denmark, or Norway. The Prime Minister is elected by the parliament, and he can be replaced by the parliament, along with the rest of the government, if the majority changes after an election.

I know there is an alternative model - the presidential system, as in US or in France - where there is a power balance between the president and the parliament, both elected by the people. In my opinion our model is better, because I think it is more effective. In a system where the president can come from one political side, and the political side dominate the parliament, there often become deadlocks. We saw that during Clinton's period in the White House, with a congress often dominated by the Republicans. We have seen it in France, with a conservative president and a socialist prime minister.

So presidential systems, in my opinion, tend to become ineffective. It is a perfect system if you do not want social change, for instance higher taxes for the rich and better conditions for the poor, because that calls for political decisions creating a welfare state. And if you run into deadlocks where the parliament and the president fight each other, as in US, all the time, these political decisions cannot be made.

So, if you want social change, if you want an effective political system, you should choose the Scandinavian and British way, parliamentarism, and not the American or French way. I think this is one of the answers to the question why we have overall high participation in the elections in Scandinavia - people feel that it matters, because when a political system is effective, it can really matters who is winning the election.

If it is ineffective, when you feel that the political system does not matter, then you just do not care about who is winning or loosing.

I said that the parliament is the centre of every democracy. That also means that the members of parliament are important. They must consider themselves as the personal representative of the people in the constituency. They must be true democrats themselves, of course, believe in democracy, have great integrity, and be impossible to bribe. They must take people's issues and questions serious, they must treat everyone as an equal, and they must be fair. A good politician is a servant and a leader at the same time. Above all,

they must be ready to step down when it is time for change, and he or she feels that the people now want somebody else to represent them.

It is important that the people recognise who is representing them, feels that he or she is one of them. I said before that parliament should reflect the people coming to age. Same thing about gender. In Sweden 42 percent of the parliamentarians are women, highest in the world. It should be 50 - the Socialdemocrats in parliament has 50-50. I know a number of countries where it is very few women in parliament - maybe less then 10 percent.

How can that be? As far as I know, the population all over the planet has about 50 percent men, 50 percent women - even more women because women live longer than men. And as far as I know, men are not better politicians than women. We must work with that everywhere and you too, when you are building your democracies. Make place for the women.

In Sweden we have, as I said, a fairly good balance men and women in the parliament. But we have another problem. Sweden is now a country with many nationalities and ethnic groups. 20 percent of our population is either born outside Sweden, or has at least one parent born outside Sweden. But the proportions in parliament are much lesser - only a few of the members have a non-Swedish ethnic background. Of course this change in the Swedish society is quite new - just 20 to 30 years old, which is new in a sociological sense, but this is a big problem. Many of the new Swedish inhabitants feel that there is no one representing them, and we have a low participation among them in the elections.

We have to work seriously with that, but the remark takes me to another conclusion. We have been afraid of ethnic conflicts even here in Sweden, and there are political parties trying to play the ethnic Swedes against the immigrants. That is of course very dangerous, and you, with your experience from Africa really know what can happen if politicians start to play ethnic groups against each other. These politicians appeal to the

worst side of every human being, trying to blame hunger or defeat or unemployment on somebody else. It is evil, and I cannot find any other word.

However, there is only one way of fighting this. Is to get people to talk with each other, over ethnic or religious lines, to work together, instead of against each other. As most people discover it is a lot more that unites us, then separates us.

So the conclusion is, when forming political parties in a country, try not to do that along religious lines, or ethnic lines. Try to do it along ideological lines instead. Because ideology you can discuss in an intellectual way, you can make people change their minds if new information or better arguments comes up, but you can never discuss or change your ethnic heritance, and very seldom your religion. So in my opinion, there is a greater risk for conflicts that can never be solved, if you have parties based on religion or ethnicity, rather than ideology.

In a democracy no one can forbid anybody from creating a political party, so do not take my words in that way. I think, however, political parties should try to overcome religious and ethnic conflicts rather than doing them deeper.

To make democracy work, the idea of democracy must come from the people itself. It can never be imposed on the people from above. In Sweden the Social Democratic party was founded in 1889. A democratic political system was won 30 years later. It tells us that political change is often a slow process, and that the powers against democracy in Sweden were strong: the rich, the king, the landlords, the nobility, the military, the big companies, in other words, the Swedish political and economic elite at that time. As time passed, the call for political change grew stronger and stronger through strikes and demonstrations, as well as imprisonment and persecutions. Eventually, the elite could not look away, and they were first forced to compromise, and then to give up.

At the end of the day, it was the labour unions that made the difference. They had built organisations for over 50 years, and thousands and thousands of people had learned

democracy on the street level for decades; how to lead a meeting; how to make decisions; how to keep an eye on the members' money, and control so nothing disappears. It was these skills that came in hand when democracy on the state level broke its way through, and it is one of the reasons why the Social Democratic party has dominated Sweden for 80 years.

An important lesson is the academics and the elite can never build a stable democracy. Only ordinary people can - the worker on the factory, the woman on the field with her child. Organise ordinary people. Give them education. Believe in them. That is the safest way to democracy.

I visited Cuba a couple of years ago. It is no democracy. I use to say, with a slight exaggeration, that there is only one dictator on the American continent that the US has not supported, and it is Fidel Castro. They have three newspapers - one run by the Communist party from Monday through Friday, one run by the Communist youth on Saturdays, and one run by the Communist labour union on Sundays. Talk about pluralism. There is a parliament, but it has absolutely no power.

I asked one representative of the Communist party a very simple question. I asked him: "You say that you have all the people behind you in the revolution". And he answered immediately, "Yes, I do!" Then I wonder: "how do you know that?" Then he started to think, and at last he said: "Well, look outside, we have no tanks on the streets!"

So for him, the evidence for having popular support was that the state did not have to call out the military to beat up demonstrators. In a democracy the answer is much easier - the people are backing us, because they voted for us in the last election, but if they do not want us anymore, they can sack us in the next.

That is the simple rule in a democracy. It sounds easy, but it is tough to reach. We know that in Sweden. You know that, even more, in Africa. I wish you luck in your future nation- and democracy building efforts. You deserve success. We have seen democratic

breakthrough in Europe, North America, Asia and South America. Now it is Africa's turn.

The Civil Society on the Horn of Africa –
Co-operation Through Swedish Associations

Gunnar Kraft
Horn of Africa Programme Officer at Forum Syd

Thank you very much for arranging this seminar. Co-operation instead of wars and destruction in the Horn of Africa is an important heading and much work is done and much more will have to be done. Forum Syd is a small actor but our aim is to continue to be active in support to the civil society at the horn of Africa and in that way support co-operation instead of wars and destruction.

The topic of this paper is Forum Syd and the civil society in the Horn of Africa – Co-operation through Swedish Associations. But before I venture into the topic I have to explain a few words about Forum Syd and our organisation. Forum Syd interpreted in English will be "Swedish NGO Centre for Development Co-operation".

Forum Syd is to be found in the span between NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and CSOs (civil society organisations). More than 150 organisations of diverse ideologies and activities have joined hands to form Forum Syd. Forum Syd is a CSO in the meaning that these organisations have created Forum Syd. Forum Syd has a policy, which guides our work. A representative board, elected at an annual meeting, direct our actions and activities. The Swedish government through Sida mainly funds Forum Syd so we are not a financially independent organisation but in all other ways an independent organisation created and run by the civil society in Sweden.

We say that Forum Syd is a meeting place for people with different ideas and experiences, all working towards a common goal: global justice and sustainable development. Our motto is – strength in diversity. Our conviction is that popular movements are at the heart of civilian society, and that these movements are crucial to world development. Thus the principal strategic task of Forum Syd is to contribute to the organisation of women and men in democratic forms to make civil society as strong as

possible. In itself Forum Syd functions as a large-scale network. We participate and are active in networks at a local level in Sweden but also at the global level.

Forum Syd works at different levels with development co-operation and, it is important to stress not supporting humanitarian projects (even if the difference is not crystal clear). I will just mention a few examples our activities. We are assisting Swedish organisations, which can apply for Sida funding through Forum Syd. Development assistance by popular movements is based on North-South co-operation between organisations. Forum Syd is commissioned by Sida to process applications for funding of projects from Swedish organisations. More than 200 organisations apply to Forum Syd each year for financial support for development projects, organisational development projects and information projects in the South but also in East Europe. This funding is restricted to Swedish organisations and the total sum each year is about 90 million SEK. We are also engaged in international global networking, information campaigns, recruiting development worker etc.

Forum Syd is not an implementing agency of our own. We are working together and co-operating with partners in different areas. To simplify, we can say that we are a demand driven organisation. When there is an active interest among member organisations of Forum Syd, or articulated in the NGO-society in Sweden, of a certain important area for development co-operation – then the board of Forum Syd can decide of more active support and assistance from Forum Syd.

That is what has happened regarding the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular. We have since a few years experienced a growing interest from Somali-Swedish organisations of co-operating with Forum Syd. A rising number of organisations are applying for membership in Forum Syd, the number of applications for Sida funding is increasing for each year, formal and informal contacts between Somali-Swedish organisations and Forum Syd are increasing. All this together led the board of Forum Syd to decide to allocate more resources for that work and intensify contacts with these organisations with the aim to improve support and networking. We believe that the

organised civil society is, and will continue to be, an important factor for establishing a democratic society in Somalia.

Forum Syd does today have contacts with nearly one hundred Somali Swedish organisations and closer contacts with about 50 of these organisations. 5 organisations are members of Forum Syd and 3 more will hopefully be accepted this year. Organisations participating in our general courses and seminars in project planning, project evaluation etc. are increasing – we are arranging seminars targeting Somali Swedish organisations in areas of organisational development or conflict impact assessment. Meetings for exchanging experiences have also been and will be arranged.

Organisations applying for Sida funding for their co-operation in Somalia have increased during the last five years, from one organisation 1995 to 27 organisations 2002 with a total number of 33 applications. The number of applications for 2003 will probably be around 50 applied by approx. 35 organisations. Our criteria for accepting projects are the general NGO criteria adopted by Sida, which includes formal demands on the Swedish organisation but also on the co-operating partner in Somalia. We have many applications but unfortunately many do not fulfil the criteria out of formal reasons. We have a continuous dialogue with the organisations when processing the applications trying to assist organisations in their struggle to cope with our demands. All funding is with a 20% financial contribution by the Swedish organisation.

Main types of projects that have received funding:

1) Primary education but also secondary education or vocational training. Project support for improving schools (rehabilitation of buildings, educational material, teacher training) but also volunteers – Somali Swedish teachers working a few years in schools in Somalia.

2) Health projects with supports to projects (health clinics and/or primary health clinics) and volunteers, Main areas area maternal health and child health.

Straightforward peace building or conflict resolution projects are few so far but are increasing.

Secondary funding areas have been to a wide diversity of projects – from training of small-scale business people in Hargeisa to an agricultural co-operative in Beled weyn.

We support projects in areas in Somalia where peace and stability have been prevailing for quite some time. The period between 1995 up to 2000 our funding was mainly to the northern parts – Somaliland and Puntland. Since 2000 we are also funding projects in other stable areas in Somalia. This year we also have funding for two pilot projects in Mogadishu – one regarding primary education and one working with young boys connected to the militia trying to create alternative for these youngsters. These projects will be followed very close in order to see the sustainability and/or risks but also possibilities with the support to projects in Mogadishu.

When talking about analysing results and effects of support to projects in Somalia, we are now, together with two Swedish organisations, analysing/evaluating the first two finalised projects assisted by Sida NGO funds. The aim of this analyse is of course to learn of efforts to support health in a district in Somaliland and education in a town in Puntland through NGOs in order to strengthen future co-operation We are also interested to see what complications and difficulties that has hampered the co-operation. How to eliminate these complications and difficulties to improve development co-operation are a main objective for Forum Syd.

The financial volume for projects in Somalia is fairly limited so far but slowly increasing. Sida contribution for projects in Somalia through NGO funding is today around 2,5 million SEK each year during the last two years but will probably increase the coming years. We are not lacking good and sustainable project ideas but are lacking funding. Forum Syd has not a Somalia pocket for funding projects but all projects are competing on equal level with other organisations for funding NGO projects. We have yearly demand of around SEK 150 million from NGOs in Sweden for funding projects abroad.

Available funds are lesser than SEK 100 million. Another limitation for Somali Swedish organisations is of course demands of a contribution of 20% from the Swedish NGOs own pocket.

The guideline for support to Somalia, channelled through Forum Syd is of course the general Swedish six headings for development co-operation, poverty alleviation, democratic development etc. Forum Syd is also stressing the general view from Sida and the ministry of Foreign affairs regarding target areas (primary education, health and infrastructure) and also target groups (women, children and IDPs) in co-operation with Somalia. Forum Syd itself underlines capacity building, support to organisation development, conflict impact assessment, and sustainability when funding NGO-projects in Somalia.

To summarise, we can say that development co-operation in Somalia through Somali Swedish organisations have increased during the last few years. Increased in the meaning that organisations utilise the possibility to increase their own funds with Sida funding. The board and the management of Forum Syd see the potential of Somali Swedish organisations in support to the civil society and future development co-operation in Somalia. Forum Syd will try to be innovative in future engagement and support to the struggle restore society in Somalia. How that support and co-operation will be materialised is right now discussed inside Forum Syd and results will hopefully be shown later this year.

Peace-Building

Horn of Turbulence and Crisis to Horn of Hope

Zakaria Mohamud Haji Abdi
Minister of Higher Education
Somali Government Interim Government

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, ladies and gentleman.

On behalf of the National Transitional Government of Somalia, the Somali people and on my own behalf I would like to seize this opportunity to thank Swedish people and their government for their generosity in helping Somali and other Horn of Africa refugees in this beautiful country. I would also extend my thanks to and congratulate Mr. Abdillahi Jama and Xarunta Caalamiga ah ee deb-u-dhiska Soomaaliya (Somalia International Rehabilitation Center), other co-operating organisations and partners for the tremendous efforts in organizing this timely and unique conference here in Lund, Sweden.

Timely and unique, because our sub-region is in a critical and challenging situation which necessitates dialogue and proper communication to confront these challenges by the people of the Horn, regardless of their nation, state, region and religion or ethnic affiliation and political or ideological orientation. The conference brings together peoples of the Horn. Your bold enough to do what leaders and politicians of the sub-region have failed or at least afraid to do. It is my firm believe that civil society driven initiatives such as this conference are essential ingredients in the search for dialogue in order to find viable solutions for our ailments. I, therefore, strongly commend you to your endeavour and hope other civil society groups in the sub-region would be able to follow the suit.

I feel honoured in talking to you and also pleased with the level of participation in the forum. In the following minutes I will try to paint general picture about the sub- region's present political and security situation. Highlighting Somalia's current affairs as the most chronic and contentious zone not only in the sub-region of Horn of Africa but the entire sub-Saharan Africa.

Historical Background

Where are we in the world of unprecedented scientific and technological advance? Information and telecommunication technology, television and internet powered by state of the art, broadband and fibre optics and remote control techniques, microchips, global positioning satellites (GPS), GIS mobiles, powerful PCs, jet airlines, decoding human gene (the genomic project) and other advanced biotech's biomedicine, the so-called MNCs and TNCs, meaning multi-national and Trans-national companies, financial markets, e-commerce, etc.. And, where are we in politics, social development, healthcare, primary and higher education, democracy and good governance, etc.? Where are the people and states on the Horn of Africa by these benchmarks? Are we in the forefront, in the middle, or in the tail? Neither. I guess, certainly neither in upper limit or middle, nor even in the lower limit of distribution graph. Unfortunately, I am afraid, we are in other side of the coin, the darker side of the map. A side full of many disenchantments, tragic tales, and human miseries. Our region is encapsulated with hatred, conflicts, killings, catastrophes, and conspiracies.

As we all know, the Horn has been a conflict-prone region for decades. Though many attempts have been made to resolve these crises through various levels and in various forums, yet the countries of the Horn have explicitly exposed inability. They are confronted with a variety of endemic and protracted natural adversaries and all sorts of man-made conflicts. Often expressed in to acute forms of extreme natural disasters, such as severe draughts, famine, floods and armed conflicts including civil wars. In addition, it is portrayed as political, social, economic, security, environmental and humanitarian crisis of immense proportions. Since the independence of Sub-Sahara Africa in general, and countries in the Horn of Africa in particular, they do not only belong to the war torn and poorest countries in the world; they rank as the lowest at the tail of the list in the United Nations' Human Development Index.

It was hoped that the political independence of the region would induce the willingness towards nation building, social development and economic prosperity and most

importantly co-operation among the Horn states and their political leaders. It was hoped that they would eventually be able to extricate the region from the inherited colonial predicament. Unfortunately, without exceptions, the elite who took over the power were worse than the departed colonialist.

Today the optimism and euphoria during the independence have been replaced by a deep sense of disappointment, anger and betrayal. Repressive regimes pursuing a succession of disastrous political and socio-economic models, led to social conflicts, dismal growth in per capita incomes, falling rates of food production, periodic famines, environmental and ecological degradation, systematic disregard of basic human liberties, institutionalised corruption, etc. While these and others internal factors, other external forces are primary causes of the Horn's ailment. Including colonial legacy, the effect of the cold war which triggered proxy wars, middling in the state internal affairs by ex-colonial masters and /or the Super Powers, unfavourable terms of trade, serving and repayment of foreign debt, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), hyper inflation, persistent balance of payment deficits and capital flights administered by Breton Woods institutions, the IMF and World bank, have created havoc in the region as is the case in most less developing countries (hereafter LDCs) around the globe.

As a result, the Horn of Africa is in fiasco. It suffers from a decade long civil war. In Somalia, the conflict is fed by fluid coalition of rivalry warlords. They are fuelled by and under the directives of a neighbouring country, which astonishingly still insists to host these war criminals. The situation hinders peace and reconciliation processes, which were pioneered by the Arta peace process and championed by the Somali Transitional National Government (hereafter TNG) and civil society.

Clashes between Ethiopia and Eritrea over disputed borders have transformed into full-scale armed conflict, thank God it is over now. The war in Sudan continues. All this exacerbated by the onset of widespread famine, refugees and violence spilling over into other the countries in the region such Djibouti, Uganda, and Kenya.

Where such human-made and natural adversities are combined, subsistence begins to fail, social unrest and wars starts to spread and consequently the state collapses as in the case of Somalia. This leads to the vicious triangle of famine, disease and death, and the ultimate human misery.

The situation in Somalia is the extreme picture of the interactions among these negative factors. Unfortunately, no lesson is learned from the previous mistakes and business is conducted as usual even though the very existence of Somalia is at stake. In fact, the misleading notion that only those with guns can improve the lot of the Somali nation continue to this day, although there is a government of national unity. Legitimacy bestowed to the faction leaders provides tools necessary to open vaults and the doors of various chanceries and help them to strengthen their grip and prolong the agony of the people.

Shuttling warlords in the neighbouring capitals and ensuring failures did not convey to the world community the need to change course and stop courting armed faction leaders. Individuals with vested interest to preserve the status quo would never surrender the ill - gotten gains, or renounce acquired privileges. Till to this day and as I speak in this room, these individuals, namely the Somali Warlords, continue to promote war, instability and division among the Somali society in some parts of the country rather than entering peace and reconciliation.

The disastrous outcomes of the previous 13 peace conferences held in the capital cities of Ethiopia, Kenya and Egypt should be a guide for devising a pragmatic approach to make peace in Somalia. That approach was outlined in the fall of 1999 by President Ismail Omar Gelle of the Djibouti Republic at the World Forum of the UN's General Assembly in New York.

The Arta Peace and Reconciliation Process

Arta[7] Somali peace process was unique in its kind for Somalis and indeed for future conflict management, at least for chronic interstate conflicts in Africa. The Arta-process succeeded for the first time, where UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia), the United States, and the rest of the international community with over 40 000 soldiers (mainly from the US servicemen), and backed with over US$3 billion in two years, have failed.

Under the auspices of H.E. President Ismail Omar Gelle, his government and people of the Djibouti Republic, over two thousand five hundred Somali drawn from all segments of the Somali society in the 18 regions of the country were assembled, with no external support even a penny from the international donor community. The process has taken seven months to decide and to produce the Transitional National Charter, the Transitional National Assembly, to elect President, and to form Transitional National Government (hereafter TNG). Seven good months, no breaks, no holidays, 14 to 16 hours a day, people were engaged in discussions. As a result, as you all know, the Arta outcome is the present Transitional National Government in Somalia.

Since its inception the TNG, despite sever resource limitations demonstrated in extreme economic and financial hardships, lack of infrastructure and institutional frameworks, the government has achieved modest results. Somalia's general situation has notably progressed, thanks to the Transitional National Government's determination and leadership. To mention few of these achievements, I would particularly highlight a few areas: political, social, institutional and security aspects which continue to gain remarkable improvements due to the TNG's tireless and strenuous efforts to engage all actors in all political spectrum of Somalia the process of peace and national reconciliation.

International and Regional Political Affairs

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[7] Arta is a small resort village on the top of Ugul Mountain, some 35 km from the capital city of Djibouti in the republic of Djibouti.

The government has re-established Somalia's representation in all international, continental and regional forms, in the United Nations, OAU, Arab League, OIC, and IGAD. We also have restored diplomatic relationship with a number of countries, most importantly, the IGAD countries. The government of Somalia has in many occasions asked the Ethiopian government to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Somali state, to observe the good neighbourhood between our two nations and refrain from further supporting the notorious warlords who have committed crimes against their own people and against US and United Nations peace-keeping forces during the UNOSOM mandate in 1993. These warlords are based in Ethiopian capital and supported by the Ethiopian government. We clearly made known to Ethiopian authorities our total commitment to peace, stability, development, and social prosperity guided by democratic principles in the region. We thought that the Ethiopian leadership shares those principles with us, and therefore expresses reciprocity of our vision. We hope they would be sensitive to our appeals and might re-assess and review their wrong policies towards Somalia and thus restrict themselves from further hostile actions.

Peace and Reconciliation Aspect

The number of major armed conflicts, between factions and inter-clan confrontations, has greatly dropped in almost all major hotpots. People have been able to reach substantial peace and security deals brokered by directly or indirectly by outsiders. The TNG wants to achieve peace as well. We believe the Arta peace process offers useful set of mechanisms, similar to peace-negotiations in other conflict areas. We believe in using simple and effective engagement of local traditional leaders and other local actors.

The government has so far achieved tangible and substantial results in promoting and realising peace and reconciliation at local, community and regional levels. In the capital city of Mogadishu alone, the most difficult and complicated place in the whole country, the government in its sole initiative have persuaded successfully several armed faction leaders to enter into peace agreement. As a result, they have finally joined the government. The government has signed an agreement at a peace conference, hosted by the Kenyan President H.E. Danial Arab Moi in Nakuro, Kenya, in December last year.

The Social Dimension

The decade long civil war have inflicted incalculable damage to the very fabric of the Somali society, with great effects on vulnerable segments in the society. Recognising the negative social norms and attitudes that the culture of war induces on members of the society, the government has introduced ambitious social programs and projects, which contribute to the trust building, promote community peace culture, enhance mutual understanding, cohabitation and peaceful coexistence rather than prevailing mistrusts and survival for the fittest principle. These projects were designed to create strong civil society organisations and rekindle social dynamics at neighbourhood, village district levels. The government encouraged emergence of sport teams, social clubs through which social interactions are activated through arts and culture.

The security aspect

In Mogadishu, the government recreated the National Police Force and National Army that operate in streets and markets of the capital. In Mogadishu alone over 5000 policemen composed of ex-servicemen and newly rehabilitated and recruited were put into service. Police buildings were refurbished and reopened all police stations in the 14 districts of the capital, including a central prison.

Demobilisation and rehabilitation of militias: over 11 000 youths are voluntarily disarmed and put into rehabilitation centres for training them into various vocational training.

In the aftermath of the September 11th tragic attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington D.C., the government has formed high level anti-terrorism National Task Force Committee (hereafter NTFC) headed by the minister of information with all police, intelligence and military chiefs and national security adviser for the president. The NTFC has established tough measure to combat terrorism.

With Regard to the Institutional Building

The government is concerned about the importance to build successful institutions. All state apparatus are important, at this stage our focus is on the three main bodies, executive branch represented by TNG, the legislative branch represented by Transitional National Assembly (the primary constitutional branch and the guardian of the nation's democracy during transitional period), and lastly but not the least, the judiciary branch.

Although the basic foundations for these institutions were reconstructed, we must confess that we are experiencing great organisational administrative, managerial and logistical challenges.

Problems Facing TNG

There is a set of problems in our process to rebuild Somalia. Below is a list of our concerns:

- Disengagement of the international community and lack of donor commitment, particularly the EU and United States;

- Negative involvement in the affairs of Somalia by some countries supporting the warlords who consistently oppose the peace and reconciliation process; and,

- Inability to execute priority projects, such as peace and trust building programs at the community/clan, district and regional levels, demobilisation, decommission of arms and rehabilitation of armed militia and policing the streets of the capital in order to ensure public security by the part of TNG because severe financial and logistical resources.

Future Prospects for the Horn of Africa

To reach our goal of peace in the country and with our neighbours, Somalia will need to:

- Promote indigenous rather than depending on external solutions;
- Promote the role of the grassroots and emerging forces of the civil society with commitment to peace, development, and democracy;
- Work together towards establishment of democratic systems at the interstate and intra-state levels;
- Enhance institutional development and harness dialogue and harmony both between state and communities as well as between states;
- Enhance interstate trade and infrastructure development projects; and,
- Exploit local and regional resources properly.

Somalia's Reconstruction:
Beyond IGAD and the European Union's Peace Dividend

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How do we strengthen the state responsibly, when all too often state capacity is used not to track the behaviour of criminals, but rather the behaviour of political opponents? In other words, how can we strength the law enforcement capacity of weak states and avoid the mistakes of the Cold Water, "when in the name of resisting and containing Communism, this country assisted some truly appalling regimes in Africa -governments that pursued policies antithetical to our national values, leading to disastrous results that ultimately did not serve our national interests".[8]

The cold war and super power rivalry had catastrophic consequences for some countries. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Cambodia are in a distinct league among the ill-fated nations. Somalia is peerless, among these unfortunate societies, in being the only country without national political authority and public institutions. The human cost of this calamity has been incomprehensible and its legacy will be with Somalis for a very long time. Who is responsible for Somalia's abominable circumstances? I would argue that the former Soviet Union and the United States who dumped hundreds of million of dollars in weapons and that supported a brutal dictatorship bear some responsibility, as Senator Feingold remarks underscore. But Somali political/military leaders and the public are ultimately culpable. The collapse of the Somali State in 1991 and the decade of statelessness have taken a horrific toll on the population. The poor and vulnerable majority of the Somali people have singularly suffered from the loss of statehood, but their vulnerability will not remain theirs alone for much longer. International criminals and drug lords will find a haven in stateless Somalia. This brief essay has four purposes. First, it sketches the outline of the extant explanation of why the Somali state disintegrated. Its second concern is to discuss why Somalis have failed to rebuild their

public authority. Third, it evaluates whether IGAD's strategy or the EU's peace dividend advances Somalia's rehabilitation. Finally, it will identify policies and actions that the international community could undertake to help Somalis build a democratic and sustainable political order.

Internal Causes of National Disintegration

Observers of African nation-states assumed that Somalia was unique in the continent as the population shared many social and cultural traits, such as language, mode of economic production, and religion. Given its social and cultural base, the state was thought to be viable. Just over a decade ago, it would have been impossible to imagine the disintegration of Somalia. Today, many political commentators are similarly strident about the clan structure being essential to the very essence of a Somali community. The commentators argue that is not possible to reconstruct Somalia without the clan being the basis of the new polity.

These elementary arguments are grounded on a limited understanding of Somali political history. They also lack an appreciation of the art of state formation. The 'shared social and cultural heritage' thesis fails to recognize that common traits can form a necessary, but insufficient foundation for building state institutions that cater to the community's collective interest. The ability of cultural resources to bind a society together depends on how they are used. The socially unifying appeal of these resources declines when mined continuously without the society reinvesting in them. The callous exploitation of shared cultural resources not only impoverishes their richness and resiliency, but may also turn them into a national liability. This is exactly what has transpired in Somalia. However, if a society does not take the long-term vitality of cultural resources for granted, but continuously and consciously replenishes their richness and value, they will continue to be a source of social cohesion. This means that a society must actively nourish inherited shared values and develop new ones that reinforce the appeal of this common heritage.

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[8] Senator Russ Feingold, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Hearing on US Policy Options in Somalia. February 6, 2002.

The most important addition to Somalia's pool of shared resources since the middle of last century has been the (colonial) state and its institutions. The imposition of the state, in its colonial and post-colonial forms, induced social processes that had the potential to reinforce and positively transform shared-values in an inclusive manner, or to undermine and distort their appeal to the entire community.[9] The state's impact on the vitality of shared values depends on whether the authorities use public institutions to nurture a common or sectarian agenda. The diminishing attractiveness of traditional shared Somali values is not due to Somalis' primordial predisposition for divisiveness. Instead it is due to the misuse of public institutions and resources for private gain. Moreover, the use of public power to intimidate and punish those who try to protect common causes has delegitimised public authority and the worth of these public resources. The authorities' cynical manipulation of shared values and traditions to mollify public distrust and prolong their tenure further alienated the public from the state. The public is not only hostile toward the state but is deeply mistrustful of anyone who attempts to mobilize them on the basis of shared sentiments.

Traditional analysts of Somali politics have cited two occurrences as evidence of the Somalis' sectarian nature despite the fact that they share a common language, culture, and religion[10]. These occurrences are the Somalis' recent antipathy toward the state and nationalism, and the warlords' success in carving up the country into fiefdoms. Advocates of the clan thesis wrongly insist that a clan based federal dispensation is the only political formula that will reunite Somalia. They erroneously assume that genealogical differences led to Somalia's disintegration[11]. I argue that the causes of the Somali calamity are: state leaders' failure to nurture shared cultural and social commonalties and sectarian entrepreneurs' instrumentalist accentuation of social

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[9] Samatar, A. I. The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia 1884-1986 (Madison, 1989); Samatar, A (ed). The Somali Challenge (Boulder, 1994).

[10] Lewis, I.M. Blood and Bone: The Calling of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville 1994); Luling, V. "Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State" Third World Quarterly, 18 (2) 1997, Laitin, D. and Samatar, S. Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Bouder, 1987).

[11] For a critical analysis of ethnicity and national development in Africa, see Mustapha, R. The House Lugard Built and the Zones of Contention: The Nigerian State in Historical Perspective. In Samatar, A.I. and Samatar, A. (eds), The African State: Reconsiderations (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002).

differences. The innocuous differences' transformation has become lethal weapon in the hands of sectarians.

The state's credibility has been destroyed because it failed to guard common interest and the erosion of social solidarity based on inclusive values makes Somali reconstruction an awesome task. Putnam's thesis that building a stock of social capital requires many decades seems to apply here.[12] If Putnam is right, it will take a long time for generalized social trust to develop (millenarian). Tendler's thesis that public trust can be built in a relatively short time seems more feasible.[13] These authors' seemingly contradictory positions are reconcilable. Communities and states can steadily generate trust and confidence for common cause. Shared values across communities are the basis of civic bonds and trust in a society. But the state must take leadership in nurturing society-wide civic bonds. Communities, in turn, must scrupulously monitor state actions to ensure that public institutions function in ways that consistently enhance the quality of those shared values. Such partnership between state and community will facilitate social capital generation in relatively short time.[14]

The following discussion points out that building people's confidence that they can work together for common good and establishing their trust in public institutions is not necessarily a long-term proposition. I argue that there is one critical factor to reversing the trends of the last three decades in Somalia. That key is to create institutions that constrain sectarian entrepreneurs while strengthening shared values and hopes. Such institutions must enhance accountability, rebuild public trust, and advance a common agenda.

The rest of the discussion is divided into four parts. The first section panoramically sketches Somali elite politics and describes how they destroyed public trust for state institutions and undermined the importance of shared norms. Section two looks at the

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[12] Putnam, R. Making Democracy Work (Princeton, 1993). .
[13] Tendler, J. Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore, 1997).
[14] Lemos, M.C. "The Politics of Pollution Control in Brazil: State Actors and Social Movements Cleaning up Cubatao" World Development 26 (1)1998: 75-87. ; Evans, P. Embedded Autonomy (Princeton, 1995).

terrorism in Somalia and its relations to Islamic practice. Part three evaluates failed the underlying causes of failed attempts to reconstitute national authority in the country. The conclusion entertains what must be done to secure democracy and peace in Somalia.

Elite Politics and Destruction of Public Trust

A key development problem in Africa is the discrepancy between states' claims and the impacts of its actions on communities. Most Africans assume that state managers care little about the common good and are in business for themselves and their clients. Somalis are extreme among Africans in this antipathy. Hostile feelings toward state authorities rarely existed 40 years ago when most countries become independent. Hoping to replace colonial bosses with regimes that respected Africans' dignity and managed public affairs justly, Africans routed colonial authorities. This section briefly sketches how the mismanagement of public institutions in Somalia turned Somalis' hope into despair.

Public despondency in the continent is deep. In fact, today citizens are shocked when they receive courteous and efficient service from a public servant. This sharply contrasts with popular opinion from forty years ago when people embraced the nationalist project[15]. Somalis shared this optimism in 1960 and their nationalism generated incredible fervour and social unity that reflected their hope for democracy and development. However, the sanguine public did not realize that their hopes depended on the quality of the national elite and intra-elite politics. Somali elite politics manifested two contradictory political and economic tendencies. One tendency emphasized a Somali-wide identity, nationalism, the protection of common good, and justice in the dispensation of the rule of law (civic movement). The other predisposition embraced sectarianism and clanism, driven by individualistic interest without regard for community well-being (sectarian movement).[16]

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[15] Mkandawire, T. Globalization and Africa's Unfinished Agenda. Macalester International, 7 (1998): 71-107.

[16] This section draws on Samatar, A.I. "Leadership and Ethnicity in the Making of African State Models: Botswana versus Somalia" Third World Quarterly 18 (4) 1997: 687-707.

The Somali-wide versus the sectarian trajectories were opposing post-colonial national strategies embedded in the new republic's fabric in 1960. The struggle between these two elite political projects marked the state's institutional history since 1960. Four elite qualities shaped the civic or sectarian impacts on public institutions and public trust. These characteristics were: the degree of elite unity or lack thereof; the legitimacy of its leadership within the group and the public; the leadership's understanding of the nature of the collective project; and clarity of their strategy in translating plans into concrete reality.

The independence euphoria and the unification of former British and Italian Somali lands in 1960 generated national cohesion that masked differences between groups with competing agendas (1960-64).[17] The patriotic fervour induced by the 1964 war with Ethiopia prolonged this spirit's life span. But appearance of nationalist solidarity was short lived.[18] The regime's leadership enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy with the public, however, the leadership showed no sign of understanding the particulars of the nationalist project. Moreover, the leadership did not articulate a clear road map for achieving its development agenda. Consequently, it undertook minimal institutional reform, other than streaming lining the British and Italian colonial administrations into a single apparatus.[19]

The second republic (1964-7) is singularly unique in postcolonial Somali history on two accounts. First, the 1964 national parliamentary elections exposed the ascendancy and strength of the sectarian forces and the opportunistic tendencies of many elite members. The number of political parties proliferated into 24 as individual elite members tried to gain a parliament seat in order to loot the public purse. Only four of these parties succeeded in winning parliamentary seats. Second, the nationalist forces made their last systematic effort, after the elections, to contain the sectarian tide from engulfing public

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[17] This division was clear even in the first Somali governments formed under Italian and British colonial masters in the late 1950s. Hussein, A. H. (Prime Minister 1964-67) Interview October 21, 1999, Minneapolis.

[18] Major differences emerged between the President and his Prime Minister with regard to the government's public management strategy. The President appointed a like minded Prime Minister.

life. The nationalist forces attempted to insulate the civil service from undisciplined politicians' particularistic intervention. President Osman and Premier Hussein wanted to do more than integrate the two former colonies. However, this regime failed to enunciate its development project clearly. In spite of this weakness, the Hussein government understood that to make public institutions effective and root out corruption and the abuse of public power, it needed to bureaucratise its institutions.

Two of the Premier's initiatives signalled his institution-building strategy. First, he appointed his ministers based on their professional skills. As a result of this action, a significant number of key portfolios went to northerners. Many southern MPs were not happy with the ministerial line up and accused the Prime Minister (hereafter PM) of favouritism. One of the northerners, Mohamoud Issa Jama, who was nominated as minister of agriculture, gave up his post so southerners could be accommodated. The second and most important decision was to reform the civil service and establish a professional and autonomous Civil Service Commission. The Commission's mandate, with technical assistance from United Nations experts, was to professionalize the service. The Commission started re-evaluating all major posts in the civil service and the qualifications of their occupants. It discovered that many senior officials were unqualified and ill equipped to lead their departments. Consequently, the Commission recommended relieving these individuals of their responsibilities for two years and giving them an opportunity to improve their competency. The Prime Minister heeded this advice and dismissed nearly 200 senior officials over the next year.[20] All those discharged were from the republic's southern region except for two northerners.[21] Those discharged were some of the southern elite's leading elements.

This attempt at institutional reform was short-lived as an administration less concerned with curbing corruption and insulating public service came to power after the 1967

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[19] It must be noted that the integration of these two administrative systems into a coherent one was a major accomplishment of the first and second republics.

[20] Several hundred junior employees appointed on the basis of clientalism were also dismissed. Hussein, A. H. Interview October 23, 1999. Among those fired was the Primer's older brother who was hired employed by the Italian colonial administration.

[21] Abdirazak H. Hussein, Interview, Minneapolis, October 30, 1999.

presidential election[22]. President Osman appeared to have lost the election for three reasons. First, he was competing with a popular former Prime Minister. Second, Premier Hussein's anti-corruption drive and termination of a significant number of southern elite members from the civil service alienated a powerful political constituency. Third, candidate Sharmarke and his allies promised seductive rewards for parliamentarians who voted for him. Sharmarke's promises worked their magic, and he captured the presidency with a slim margin.

President Sharmarke and his Premier, Egal, understood the volatility of the electoral process. Immediately, they started planning for the 1969 parliamentary election. The elite, and especially those in parliament, failed to be united by anything except their willingness to trade off any public resource for private gain.[23] The leaders of the government, having fuelled this tendency during the presidential election, knew the only way to remain in power was to appeal to each MP's material interests, tantalizing them with rewards and promises. Given these priorities, the regime abandoned civil service reform initiated by its predecessor. Corruption and the politics of divide and rule, rather than fostering inclusive collective project, became the name of the game.[24]

The 1969 parliamentary elections proved that the elite's sectarian faction had gained the upper hand. The struggle for individual political survival divided and united this cohort. The political process disintegrated as 62 political parties fielded candidates. Ambitious individuals who were not selected by the main parties formed their own. These so called opposition parties won 50 of the 123 seats. However, as soon as the election was over, the opposition MPs abandoned their parties and joined the ruling party. The shift of political "loyalty" was induced by the clear recognition that MPs could access public largesse only if they were associated with government. Moreover, political bosses in power enticed these MPs to join the ruling party. The only opposition member of parliament was former Prime Minister Hussein.

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[22] Abib, 1996. He was cabinet secretary under Prime Minister Egal.
[23] Lewis, 1972.

The military took control of the government before the sectarian stampede could run its course and the public poured into the streets to rejoice over the termination of corrupt politics. The military regime enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy during the first years of its tenure. The swift and effective management of the 1973-4 drought, the introduction of Latin scripts for the Somali language and the expansion of education and other services increased the regime's popularity. The military, with the Soviet's prodding, adopted socialism as its development strategy. However, the government showed no sign of comprehending what socialism meant in the Somali context as it blindly adopted Soviet tested but unproductive economic management methods[25]. Consequently, it retained, at first, the rudderless public service policy of the last civilian regime.

The Somali army's defeat in the Ethiopian-Somali war, 1977-78, brought the regime's honeymoon period to an end. The government discarded citizens' rights and any pretence of supporting inclusive national project as the public and significant elements of the military challenged the regime's right to govern. As paranoia engulfed the leadership, it began a massive campaign to put loyal supporters in all key government positions without regard to merit or due process. The majority of these new and quickly promoted public employees did not have the skills or experience to manage public affairs, further damaging competency of state apparatus. Having lost legitimacy, the regime used military power to punish entire regions and communities deemed disloyal. A most sectarian and brutal use of the military machine occurred in 1988 when Hargeisa and Burao, two of the country's largest cities, were destroyed. These cities were targeted for special treatment after one of the opposition movement's, Somali National Movement (SNM) guerrillas impetuously entered them. The local populations were devastated, and survivors fled to Ethiopian refugee camps.

The nation bled for another three years before the regime was finally ousted from its final stronghold in the capital. By then, unfortunately, all national institutions were ruined. Moreover, the separate opposition movements, who collectively destroyed the old

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[24] Abib, 1996.
[25] Samatar, 1993.

regime, were sectarian themselves and had no national reconstruction program. They fought each other for control and in the process ruined what little the old regime left behind. The prolonged civil war and the terror instigated by warlords reversed integrative national processes. Warlords and factions leaders fragmented the country into 'clan' fiefdoms that led to carnage and the worst famine in Somali history in the Biadao region. Most reasonable Somalis agree that Siyad Barre's regime was dreadful, but it was better than what followed it. They often note 'a bad government is better than none'. Every government since independence made some contribution to shared values, except for two: the 1967-69 and those dominated by warlords and faction leaders.

The people's antipathy toward public management is the antithesis of how Somalis felt about the nationalist project in 1960. The thoughtful citizen who takes account of what unifying values have been added to the old stock of shared traditions since independence will find slim pickings. The first reinforcement of shared traditions was the unification of British and Italian Somalilands in 1960. Northern Somali leaders spearheaded this act. The second episode is President Osman's dignified and democratic departure from the presidency in 1967 after failing to be re-elected. President Osman's compliance with the constitution signalled that no one was above the law of the land. Somalis now recognize him as an exemplary founding president whom they wish others emulated. A third tangible addition to the Somali social capital was Premier Hussein's valiant effort to professionalize public service and insulate it from sectarian political intervention. Premier Hussein's qualities underscore the character of public service for which most Somalis so desperately yearn. The fourth and perhaps the most enduring addition to Somali social capital was the development of orthography for the language. The writing of Somali language is taken for granted to the extent that even faction leaders desperate to create their little 'homelands' use it as their official medium.

Somalia's social and political balance sheet since independence is dominated by liabilities that have significantly diminished the nation's sense of a common destiny. The murderous and illegal uses of state power and sectarian exploitation of national resources figure prominently in the population's collective memory of the last three decades.

Moreover, incompetent management of public affairs for most of the country's recent history has eroded Somalis' communal self-confidence. Undoing these liabilities is what reconciliation and reconstruction is all about. Creating common projects that are effectively and fairly managed is essential to establishing collective self-worth and rebuilding inclusive polity and identity.

Failed Attempts to Rebuild the Somali State

Two theses guided nearly all regional- and international efforts to help Somalis reconcile and rebuilt their national government. The first attempt assumed that the warlords were the key political and military actors. Consequently, they were invited into a number of conferences in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Egypt. Whatever agreements were reached in these meetings none was implemented to start national reconstruction. The second effort at national reconciliation was built on the supposition that clan conflict was the essence of the Somali conundrum. Two of the three most 'successful' reconciliation attempts were held in north-western and north-eastern Somali towns of Borama and Garowe. These conferences led to the formation of two regional administrations and the restoration of fragile peace. The third trial used similar 'clan' affiliation as the basis of inviting delegates from most parts of Somalia. This conference held in Arta, Djibouti, was the most inclusive Somali reconciliation meeting since 1991. The conference produced the most representative (in clan and gender terms) post-1991 political agreement that led to the establishment of a transitional national government (hereafter TNG). Although the initial Arta agreement stipulated that the TNG would be headquartered in Baidoa, the decision was not honoured when the operation was moved to Mogadishu, the old capital. Unfortunately, Mogadishu remains divided due to the violence and the military strength of the warlords in and around the city, the TNG's lack of resources, incompetence, corruption and unwillingness to use force to subdue them.

These three 'relatively' successful attempts to rebuild public authority restored peace in areas varying in size but none of them has legitimacy in all regions. The TNG has the widest legitimacy with the Somali population but controls the smallest territory among the three. In spite of these difference the three operations share the character that clan

provides the basis for selecting members of their organs. This foundational attribute of the three administrations provides them a certain degree of stability, but that undermines their ability to build civic, effective, and inclusive public institutions. First, the clan as a basis of representation may be an expedient tool to restore some semblance of democratic facade. However, the establishment of clan identity as the way to allocate both political offices and civil service posts is divisive. This creates a system of rights and job entitlements based on exclusive identity, which forecloses the formations of public order based on equal rights of all citizens. Second, this scheme completely distorts the function of public institutions from that of serving citizens to being purely rent havens for office holders and their key genealogical clients. The consequences are the development of public establishment that is incapable of rebuilding public trust let alone engage in development and enhance the competence of the public sector. In essence this clan-based system has produced a poor Somali version of the infamous South African 'Bantustans'.

The most advanced regional authority based on clan system is in northern Somalia with Hargeisa as its capital. The authority was nominally established in 1990, but it did not become stable until after the regional conference held in Borama in 1993. In spite of nearly a decade of stability only a formal governmental structure has been created. Due to the lack of real institutional order and professional logic, the region made little progress in building governmental capacity that could reinvest in inclusive shared values.[26] Recent events in Hargeisa testify to the chaotic and arbitrary political order. The regional charter promulgates that new provincial and administrative districts could be formed only after the ministry of interior undertakes careful study. The proposal then goes to the assembly after the cabinet approves it. The proposition becomes law only after parliament votes on it. All districts and the province created since the regional authority was formed have failed to follow the steps the charter mandates. The late regional president unilaterally claimed the establishment of a province, namely Sahel, and several districts without the consent of the interior ministry and the regional parliament. Informed people have told the author that the regional president acts alone to satisfy clients and insure his re-election

bid this year. Many of the new districts lack both resources and hinterland to administer. It appears that the regional administration in the north is not a transparent and accountable system. Furthermore, the ministries and district administrations are balkanised and therefore reinforce sectarian and exclusive identity thus undermining the regional scope of the project.

The northeast region suffers from the same maladies as the north. The ministerial portfolios are distributed along clan lines. This means each ministry becomes a tribal fiefdom and thus its occupants and their clients serve themselves and are immune to public scrutiny. This is not a recipe for rebuilding inclusive political dispensation.

Finally, the TNG shares many of the characteristics of the regional administrations with the significant exception that it is a more inclusive and more representative national body. The TNG administration has created the largest number of ministerial portfolios of any country, approximately seventy. According to the authorities, the rational for the exceptionally large number of portfolios in an impoverished country and administration is to secure the peace and bring all clans and warlord into the national fold. Furthermore, professional administrative posts were/are allocated along the same lines. The TNG's administrative structure thus suffers from the same ailments as those in the north and northeast: balkanised administration, absence of professionalism, merit, and corruption. This bodes ill for restoring the public's trust in national institutions, and resurrecting national identity based on inclusive shared values.

Policy Options: Piece Meal versus Comprehensive Strategy
The underlying assumptions of the three semi-successful attempts to rebuild Somalia are the wrong foundations for reconstructing Somali national authority and securing sustainable peace. The availability of automatic weapons in every household and business in the two regional administrations and the occasional flare up of violence indicates the shallowness of the peace. Their inept, clan-based and corrupt administrations have no

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[26] See Salim, Z. S, State Decline and the Rise and Coming Fall of Clannist Politics in Northern Somalia. Unpublished Thesis, Oxford University Press, 2002. The thesis's is based on Fieldwork done in Northern

chance of developing into a viable and vibrant public authority that could permanently tame violence and inspire public confidence. In contrast, the TNG has wider national support from the public. However, due to its exclusive identity-based political representative and administrative order, corruption and incompetence, it has failed to sustain the public's confidence after the TNG's formation in Arta.

There have been three competing policy options under consideration for the past decade.

Building Blocs

The so-called building-bloc approach to reconstruction is supported by warlords, faction leaders, Ethiopia, staff of international agencies and NGO's that benefit from the absence of central political authority, and colonial anthropologists. The fundamental assumption of this approach is that Somalia consists of discrete territorial based clans, which the post-colonial dispensation failed to take into account. The state's failure to integrate clan reality into the way it administered the country ultimately led to the Somali disaster. The upshot of this proposition is that local (clan) authorities should be rebuilt and they should subsequently negotiate the nature of national authority. The so-called clan or building-bloc based reconstruction strategy is inherently defective and is not worthy of further consideration as the aforementioned discussion of TNG and regional administrations indicates. If 'clans' were the core of the conflict then the struggles of the last decade should not only have produced peace within communities but effective local administrations.

IGAD and the Regional Approach

The IGAD strategy aims to find a solution to the Somali problem that is acceptable to Ethiopia, Djibouti and all Somali groups. This approach is fatally deadlocked due to the mutually exclusive positions of Djibouti and Ethiopia. I have already noted the weakness and strength of the Arta approach. The Building Bloc approach Ethiopia favours is akin to the regional (Hargeisa/Garowe) project whose severe weaknesses were discussed earlier. The worthy efforts of President Moi's government to push the reconciliation

Somalia in 2001.

process further, notwithstanding, IGAD has neither the moral force nor political and material resources to help civic Somalis overcome the political barriers created by warlords and faction leaders.

EU and the Peace Dividend

This is a welfare-based approach to Somali reconciliation and reconstruction. Its human thrust is worthy of strengthening. Its purpose has been to invest resources in peaceful regions of the country in the hope that such investments will enhance local capacity for sustainable peace and economic development. Secondly, it is intended that violence-ridden regions will be persuaded by the peace investment's benefits. The value of investing in peace, notwithstanding, the project's two aforementioned assumption are misplaced given the reality of political structure in peaceful regions. Moreover, warlords who dominate parts of the country and who enormously profit from the absence of peace and accountable political structures find the benefits of peace not worthy of the attentions.

The lack of credible democratic and developmental leadership in relatively peaceful regions and warlord dominance elsewhere subverts the welfare approach's reach and effectiveness. For the peace-dividend approach to be have the intended outcome it should be wedded to a larger civic and inclusive political project. The Somali people should not be penalized because of selfishness of unaccountable faction leaders and brutal warlords.

Diplomacy: The Viable Option

This alternative considers warlords' and faction leaders' dominance (partly supported by outside interests), and armed violence as the principle cause of the community's inability to re-establish accountable and democratic political authority in the last decade. This has created circumstance in which the rule of the gun rather than law is supreme. Moreover, there are signs that some drug dealers and environmental terrorists are finding home in some parts of Somalia due to lawlessness. The danger is that, without national authority accountable to the local population and the international community, these criminal activities and more menacing others might not only find refuge, but also establish bases

in the country. The biggest immediate worry is not about terrorist relocating in Somalia, but drug lords routing their trade through Somalia or local entrepreneurs figuring out that drug production is a lucrative enterprise. The latter is particularly possible given the wide spread use of Kat in the country and the surrounding region.

Conditions in Somalia indicate the confluence of the international community's interest and that of civic-mined Somali people: establishing democratic national authority. Creating a civil political climate that is conducive to open dialogue in order to peacefully reconstruct national authority requires disarmament in the country. The weak Somali civic movement is incapable of undertaking this massive job. The international community alone, with USA and EU leadership, can muster the necessary strength and resources to successfully undertake this task. Moreover, it can definitively use its diplomatic weight to impress on Somalis that the only government it will recognize is the one that emerges from a peaceful conference of this civic movement. There is little doubt that this diplomatic ultimatum will convince the intransigent, corrupt and sectarian entrepreneurs that their old ways will not be tolerated any longer and their only choice is to constructively participate in a peaceful and democratic process. Diplomatic recognition is a vital non-military tool at the disposal of the international community that has not been effectively used so far. The international community can demand certain conditions to be met in the national conference once Somalia's future diplomatic status is made unequivocally clear. First, the conference must not last longer than three months and should use Arta's achievement as the point of departure. Second, the government formed must not have more than 20 ministries and ministers and that its tenure is limited to five years. Third, those who serve at senior political capacities during this period will not have the opportunity to hold such offices again for the following decade.

The prospect for rebuilding political and civic life in Somalia is absolutely dim without disarming the warlords and the population. This process, fully supported by the international community but implemented by Somalis should start once a recognized government is selected. Disarmament must be thorough. In addition, the international community should be fully engaged during the first five years to help establish an

effective police force and help rebuild the administrative and physical infrastructure of the country. The combined use of diplomatic and material resources will make the task of establishing a democratic national government in Somalia a feasible project.

Scaling up the Peace-Divident, the EU Peace Dividend approach will bear fruit if it is hitched to the above proposition in the following manner:

- Recognize IGAD as an inept political project (despite Kenya's noble effort) driven by interests other than those of civic minded Somali people;

- Recognize that civic action and its growth presupposes political dispensation that is democratic. That actions of local civic and international NGOs will be wasted without such political consideration;

- Unify international community behind a Somali civic centred political project and commit regional interests to stay out of the Somali agenda. The key is united international diplomatic effort serious about boosting democratic politics and civic action.

- The principal instrument of the international community in inducing the needed political transformation is diplomatic reconfirmation of the integrity of the Somali Republic, and to use the inclusive structure of the Arta process as a basis of rebuilding a democratic and inclusive national political dispensation. Given that the Transitional period of the Arta process is coming to an end, without the establishment of stipulated necessary institutions for the post-transitional period, provides an opportunity for civic Somalis and their allies in the international community to move things forward. It could be convened a national conference akin to what IGAD failed to deliver. The major difference is that the international community - and not interested parties in the region - should sponsor it (like Dayton in Ohio for Bosnia) and insist that the coalition that emerges from the conference will be accepted as the legitimate national government for all of Somalia for a limited term. (The lessons of Sierra Leone beckon). Local and national elections will then be held before the end of this period.

- Create an international commission to oversee the disarmament of militias and civilians and the establishment of integrated national police force. Here is the time to heavily invest in the consolidation of inclusive political and civic agenda. The injection of a strong diplomatic thrust will give civics and the Somali people the space and opportunity they have been denied for over a decade.

Peace Building in the Horn of Africa: Multi-Track Approach

Dr. Salah Al Bander
Sudan Civic Foundation

> Definition: Civil war *n*. any malignant conflict… Spread may occur via military establishment across regions … setting up secondary conflicts… each individual primary conflict has its own pattern… There are many causative factors… *Treatment* by a multi-track peace building processes…. depends on the type of conflict, the site of the primary conflict, period, and the extent of the spread.

The organisers of this conference stated that peace is constructive and a precondition for any meaningful socio-economic development. I have been asked to look at how can we make this simple fact clear in the Horn of Africa? Indeed, this is a very topical and timely endeavour. Yet, I must confess it is a very complex subject that cannot be covered in about 20 minutes.

Let me stress that I recognise fully that the on-going conflict in the Middle East and the failures to deal with it, the was in the Balkans and its Dayton Accord, the Northern Ireland conflict and its agreement; all these cases reflect the international dimension of regional conflicts. An international involvement that creates impartiality, gives legitimacy to a process, and strikes agreement where compromise and consensus appear elusive. They also reflect the failures of the multi-track peace building approaches in dealing in my very simple analogy of civil wars with the case of dealing with the cancer disease. Well, it is sad to say that the situation in the Horn of Africa reflects even a major element of each one of such deadly conflicts. It is indecent to compare suffering, yet ten times as many people have lost their lives in the Horn as have died in the Balkans, six times as many Horn of Africa people have been displaced. Yet, the United Nations provided resources 15 times per refugee in the Balkans compared to what it covered per refugee in our Horn. And I will keep silent and not comment on the relative position of the European Union or the contributions of its individual members!

We should think carefully about available fast multi-track peace-building models. For example, the attempts to solve the conflicts through constitutional means have either collapsed or are collapsing. Yugoslavia, USSR, Somalia, and Ethiopia are cases in point. Moreover, to a large degree the crises the whole region is going through is precisely due to the failure of the ultra-nationalist ruling establishments and the on-going process within these countries to replace them by Islamic regimes even in the heart of the Ethiopian highlands. Indeed, our civic demands cannot be addressed in the existing political systems. However, we are firm believers that such conflicts are possible to be resolved through political action. In all our difficult times in the Horn of Africa we were very clear in stating that peace processes will not succeed in addressing all the socio-political, economic and institutional roots of our cancer. It is rather advocated that root causes will indeed form only the core of the negotiating agenda, connecting the end of fighting to the key issue of change. So where do we stand? Between non-democratic fully armed regimes, and non-democratic fully armed opposition groups. Our 'choice' is not really a fair choice! So, let us begin by stating the obvious.

I was born and bred in the region. I had the opportunity from my early age to visit the neighbouring countries, sustain and share life-long friendships and solidarities with the people of the region. All communities have, at some point of their history, endured persecution, lost their resources, feared for their future, and strove to preserve their identity. From my childhood, the Horn that was, is no more! It is unfortunate, that I shared with all of them the suffering, the ordeals, the hopes and indeed the unshaken belief that the only solution to the conflicts is social justice. Peace and democracy can stop wars for sometime to come; yet they cannot solve serious divisions, structural injustices and principal disequilibrium in the Horn states controlled by minority elites. There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between multi-track processes of democratic governance, peace building and social justice.

For the last 50 years the Horn of Africa has been largely trapped in self-reinforcing spiral of famine, slavery, mass population displacements, war, and progressive collapse of the

state capacity. A state of affairs that would condemn us to a long-lasting state of disintegration in the age of globalisation. The current state of conflicts in our Horn is a product of complex system that evolved, at least, over a century. What is going on in the region is a manifestation of different socio-economic and ecological structures developed interdependently in each of its individual countries within an overall regional system.

It is unlikely that we can provide a unified grand framework that will help us to better understand the causes of war, the maintenance of peace or establishment of democratic governance. However, this disappointing hurdle should not let us lose hope or give-up. On the contrary, we should focus our limited resources on the transformations, multi-dimensions of each conflict, searching for viable options for peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

The achievement of peace, democratic governance and social justice cannot be done exclusively at any one track for peace building. Rather, it needs to be seen as a collective outcome of many partners and achieved by many agencies at the same time. Peace is a constant struggle. It is a progressive move to transfer conflict to the political, rather than the military theatre, almost under the same international instruments of engagement. However, the current Sudanese and Somali experiences show us that the different role of each track, governmental or civic, should not be seen as in competition, but a distinctive contribution of each one. A flexible platform of consultation across the different tracks is vital.

In our own experience in the Sudan, after more than 35 years of exchange between military dictatorships and civilian misrule and nearly 50 years of civil wars we noticed that sustainable peace is more workable way if it only leads to social justice and is carried by democratic governance. Any settlement even if achieved the containment or the defeat of the warring parties, short of addressing the challenges of structural social injustice produces an unstable peace and invites further more brutal cycles of violence.

In the Horn, at the time that all the oppressive regimes formed their own NGOs! And at the time that the private sector, the third pillar of governance domains, along the civil society and the state, is completely controlled by the agents of the ruling elites (just look at what is happening in the Sudan and Ethiopia, and leave alone the rest). The limiting of the search for stability to the case of peace and democratic governance, by all means, is partial. Ignoring or postponing the overlapping connections between immediate conflict resolution and social justice in the Horn of Africa are just a temporary measure of cease-fires, the war will explode again. Any multi-track peace efforts divorced from direct and fundamental structural socio-economic and political changes, even if successful in containing or defeating an armed uprising, produces an inherently unstable, non-sustainable peace, democracy and development. It invites further brutal cycles of violence.

In the Horn of Africa there is a serious problem of resources-based conflicts. It concerns the growing interdependence between communities, resource availability and dynamic ecological transformations embedded within a web of outdated national political and socio-economic networks. It shows its desperate signs on every level, in town markets, in fierce competitions for subsistence, in jockeying for controlling resources, in the killing fields, and in the struggle for power. Yet, the core of the conflicts is not the limitation and the ever-diminishing capacity of those resources but the absence of strategic preventative procedures, which regulate the systematic exploitation of them.

This leads one to stop and reflect. In any multi-track peace building effort we should focus on searching for badly needed flexible dynamic strategic procedures in order to deal with the current conflicts and anticipate the coming ones. The essence of the survivalist, very harsh struggle in the Horn of Africa is searching for justice. Neither peace nor democratic structures alone are the horizon of our people, and they are increasingly convinced that the existing political set-ups that protect the historical injustices do not concern the current peace initiatives. This is the weakest point in all the current institutional arrangement and in our understanding of the reality of the region. In

this case, it seems, any talks about democratic governance, or open market economy options to sort out the conflicts are irrelevant.

In our experience in the Horn of Africa, and again for the last century, we learnt the tragic lesson that wars are negative sum games among peoples. But unfortunately, not all negative sum games are irrational to every one of the parties. Indeed, the interests of the ruling establishment are not identical with the population and are biased in favour of conflict. In every single country of the region we witness time and again, the opportunities for gains to agreement that are not realised, and opportunities for sustained peaceful co-existence between communities are lost. In the light of the dismal historical record the ruling elites are perfecting the game of tactical agreement and strategic avoidance (or the opposite) in order to buy time in asserting its base of power by continuing exploiting the modalities of conflict. One should add to these elements the unavoidable deception of the will to co-operation that is accompanied by mutual suspicion, distrust, and the maintenance of exit routes.

Turning now to the lessons of the near past, we can see that the conflicts within and between the states in the region takes an interesting shifting periodical short-time patterns of re-arrangement of broader alliances of interests between the conflict parties rather than integration of their strategic forces. Sometimes I do feel we can make clear to our people in the Horn if we explain the record of failures through the analogy of the difference between the runners of short-distance and the long-distance.

It is exceptionally clear that we need to look at this challenge by considering a different model. Alternative model that will take into account the transformations that are happening for the last ten years in particular. What is very clear to us again is that conflicts can take dynamic, unique stages of their own regardless of their initiating stages. In this point, history and political ecology matter in order to make it clear to everybody. Yet the analogy of understanding the pathology of the cancer disease is, again, relevant.

The dynamics of competitions within and between states in the Horn of Africa shows that the major actors in each conflict do not copy each other strategies. Rather, they vitalise their capacity in continuing the conflict in harmony with their indigenous political network and resources structures, but in the long-term they are very careful not to allow the trends of relative disparity between their resources capacities to increase without periodical adjustment through stages of short-lived peace. Through this mechanism to contain difference in relative capacities the conflict is sustained to go on forever. An indefinite cycling and re-cycling of conflicts is one that no one party could win. In short, the Horn of Africa experience, suggests to us that any conflict is a complex web of minor multiple causes, it is time dependent, it is regionally interdependent, it is internationally independent, frequently irreversible, periodical in nature, self-reinforcing, and consistently expanding to new areas.

Many tracks for peace-building are up and running in the region: Top-down round-table negotiations between and among the ruling elites and the armed groups are the most noticeable ones. The IGAD role, for that matter, since its establishment in 1986, in peace-building has been filled with paradox. However, many people agree that despite the shortcoming of the IGAD, it needs to remain the major forum for peace negotiation and settlement. The normative view that a sustainable peace is a matter of determining what the parties are fighting about, minimising the conflicts of interest, and maximising the gain from co-operation is to some extent irrelevant to the Horn of Africa. Indeed, being in Europe, or in Sweden for that matter, sometimes influenced us to believe in advocating that democratic political institutions; and the sustainability of peace within and between states in the region are part of a larger interdependent system which included the evolution of socio-economic processes. The trouble is that all member states continue to disagree about the better ways to take the region to peace or how to solve the conflicts within or between its members.

Well, ironically, the IGAD turned to be a platform used skilfully to protect the interest of the ruling elites against any loss and consequently facilitates incentives towards continuation of war rather supporting the options for peace. After 16 years of its

establishment and many millions of dollars to support its structure and its expanding budget, the IGAD is still a body that serve to express the individual country-interests of its members.

Let us look at the way that the issue of national security policy of each of the region's countries. No collective regional policy has emerged yet. We can observe that the pillars of this thorny issue have evolved in response to internal threats to the governing elites power rather than to the external threats perceived by the regime. In each of the countries the state capacity is structured to deal with internal problems, and provide strategic capacity for regional interventions. The overall situation in the Horn of Africa indicates that the military deterrence concept has the upper hand rather than promoting political and socio-economic filters of actions in order to establish workable solution to the prevailing conflicts.

On more point that would help us to make it clear that wars are destructive is to focus on the Ethiopian regional role. Ethiopia is a special case not because it is the only country regarded by some as being the only colonial power in the region or by its dominant cultural heritage and population (65 million of them against 59 for the rest of the region). Ethiopia's role was already on decline because others saw it not as a force for change, reform and democracy, but as a poor and weakening country whose only claim to legitimacy is violent suppression of dissidents and periodic intimidations of its neighbours.

Nevertheless, I can see Ethiopia as being in a special position as a regional power because it is the only country sharing boundaries with all other countries of the region. We need to emphasise this very unique role of Ethiopia at the time the IGAD continues to be ineffective. Ethiopia has an opportunity for constructive work in the region that is inviting as any since the collapse of the Imperial dictatorship in 1974. The future stability of the region depend on Ethiopia to leave behind the arrogant way of encouraging war by proxy, its myopic view of the Horn as a place for her hegemony, and its goodwill towards its neighbours as much as the determination of its neighbours to live in peace. A

workable effective formula that will command the role of Ethiopia, I have to confess, has eluded me for the last twenty years. In considering the future of Ethiopian role in the region it is critical to focus on its limitations. The issue here will be easier if it is viewed as how to influence the events for peace-building in the region. Although the processes have a number of common elements that permit a single recommended framework, and indeed each have unique national characteristics. No doubt, the final outcome will depend, first and last, on the position of local actors but Ethiopian role and timing can have immense impacts. Indeed, the political ecology of the region is adding more responsibility to the Ethiopians, state and civic society, to accelerate their commitments towards common interests rather than differences.

Moreover, the very deadly problem is the very much expanded, but the less recognised or acknowledged, is the role of the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Yemen and United Arab Emirates in particular) in the affairs of the Horn of Africa. As I have argued elsewhere, we know that the Gulf impact is substantial, but we can rarely stop and quantify the precise links. Middle East finance, arms, intelligence support to the conflict parties and manipulations of the Horn communities in the Gulf states are playing very significant role. Yet, neither the IGAD nor the international partners are interested in dealing or confronting such sensitive issue. This, however, is not the end of the story. The international track for peace-building that headed by the Americans and to a lesser degree by the European Union has yet failed to produce a comprehensive peace to the region. To a significant degree it was even more limited by the Ethiopian-Eritrean periodic political and military conformations.

For the fatalists who tend to see the empty half of the cup, all the elements of a permanent tragedy are still there, but all the ingredients for a positive way out are available for the committed scholars and activists who see the full half of the cup and relentlessly work at filling the cup. For the people of the region that have not known a single decade of peace in the 20th century, sustainable resolution in our time would be the most dramatic change in the dawn of the 21st century. In this angle we see the active engagement of the bottom-up track represented by the civil society as an alternative route

that add new force to the post-conflict stakeholders and expand representation of any peace agreement.

Ever since the early 1970s, activists in the region have been engaged in an internal introspection, confronting their deals, ideals and ideas. Many groups realised that what they are fighting against is not the same as what they are fighting for. Among other things, they are in constant questioning of their core strategies, their contrasting concepts of freedom and development, power of their heritage and its relevance to their future. Yet, many more observers still wonder whether these revelations are good enough to re-invent our realities on the Horn or are they just a defensive tool in which each section of the community seeks to protect or advance its immediate interests. Let me take this opportunity to confirm, as I said earlier, that in talking to you about the obvious, will help me to communicate to you partially the historical wisdom that is coming out of the ashes.

The people of the Horn have the will of living together. The common base of shared experiences, core values are their strength in their unshakable will to survive and prosper. In gathering like this, we should be paying glowing tribute to the power of our pastoral democracy that even shaped the social structures of the urban sector. Yet, it is not widely recognised as a method of conflict resolution beyond the local communities. In Somalia as in the Sudan communal efforts to solve conflicts are providing models and examples applicable beyond their immediate areas or national boundaries.

All these conflict resolution efforts indicate the factors that will facilitate the formation of a collective consciousness to live in peace, to share a destiny and re-enforce the will to remain together. All these events and through a bottom-up peace building processes show to the ruling establishment, their war lords, their regional backers and the international community that:

> Peaceful co-existence between communities is unavoidable. Yet the people are interested in 'living together'. Not within the parameters of co-existence that the European community envoys and the American administration promoting as 'living side by side'. Communities in the Horn know that living together is an

irrevocable fate, cemented by the emerging political
ecology of the region. They have no alternative but to
find a workable solution.

Successful multi-track peace building approach can only be sustained when the government of the day, and the head of the ruling elite in particular, and the negotiators from the parties to the conflict are viewed as legitimate by each other.

In making agreements a slow framework should proceed from the general to the specific. Linking our conflict resolution modalities to local and indigenous systems in harmony with the political ecology of the region. Compromise and concession to share resources are the way forward.

Secular approaches are better tools. Religious banners from Christians or Muslims are widely recognised to contribute to the persistence of conflicts. Christian and Muslim leaders from the Horn have today failed to play any major role in promotion of peace, democracy and advocacy for social justice. Yes, international Christian groups are very active, but local groups have played no role. Interestingly, at the same time, the churches failed to develop a position with respect to Islam. Islam is the religion for nearly all Somalis, 96% in Djibouti, 70% of Sudanese, 50% of Eritreans, and 35% of Ethiopians.

Conflicts are the tool of the ruling establishment in order to modify the rules of the game, when the people see it as an attempt to reverse permanently the equation of power in order to address the interdependent triangle of peace, democratic governance and social justice. At the same time they look at the peace initiatives, despite their multi-tracks, as an endeavour to re-establish the prevailed order of exploitation or does it open a way for its phasing out?

Building civil society networks between communities and across the region to facilitate direct communications, exchange of ideas, experiences and workable options. Activists are learning not to depend on a third party to handle their issues or to assert one's demand. Contributing in supporting the capacity for a vibrant civil society is certainly the

best investment for lasting regional harmony. Activists are increasingly engaged in solidarity and across-region fights for democracy, freedom, human rights, and exploring the viable options of social justice. Indeed, the most effective tools for a viable evolution towards regional integration will be realised through this grassroots-up approach.

It is of vital importance that the creation of national professional armed and security institutions are under the ultimate control of civilians. In addition, it is of equal importance to adopt a clear non-allied inclusive foreign policy.

At last, more attention should be given to civic education and culture that designed to reach beyond the elites involving the grassroots sections. That could foster a common national and durable regional identity. The situation in the Horn is unique. No other region ideas represent more powerful and more vital option to the determination of its future. Almost 55% of its inhabitants are less than 15 years old. In every other region political agreements, distribution of power, international military intervention managed to change the state of conflicts. In the Horn of Africa civic ideas will make the difference and establish the pillars of a lasting peace and democratic governance by linking the end of fighting to the burning issues of social justice.

Then, what new civil society initiative can be launched? It is estimated that more than ten million people from the Horn are living in Diaspora. Carrying with them their ordeals, collective memories, and hopes. Indeed, their role is one that yet to be fully recognised. In every step of war and peace in the region their fingerprints are there to be noticed. The Diaspora communities are the invisible oil of the Horn's political engine. If I try to talk about this issue in more details I might need more than the full day in order to figure out and share with you the best ways to utilise this very critical role in the issues of war and peace. No doubt, that there will be disappearing boundaries between internal and cross-boarder conflicts in the Horn. The within and between states conflicts are likely to increase with an increase in the fragile political ecology make-up of the region. We need to enhance the civic society capacity for establishing an early warning and sustainable competence in conflict prevention.

Indeed, there are many ideas on what initiatives can be put forward, or institutions, which can cater for their management of conflicts. We forward a simple proposal, but a powerful one. The Sudan Civic Foundation proposes an establishment of a European network for the Horn civic associations. There has been a consistent growth of variety of civic society groups within the Horn Diaspora communities living in Europe. These groups have increasingly become professional and institutionalised their concerns. Some of them developed significant capabilities for peace making and peace-building with concrete social justice perspectives. What is now necessary is clear networking possibilities and co-operation across the region. This very conference is a living example of such a viable model and potential for effective action.

The key element of this proposal to establish a network is a very modest, but a practical first step towards a consensus building towards the common issues. It is a catalytic process needed whereby the trust and confidence of the Horn civic actors living in Europe to obtain a space within which free exchange, effective lobbying, and co-ordination is created. The whole process is advocated in order to facilitate a civic forum to support the current official efforts by the European friends and partners of the IGAD. This will enable sustainable contacts rather than isolated events to deal with our region. On behalf of the Sudan Civic Foundation I will hand this proposal to the organisers of the conference in order to discuss it further in tomorrow's workshops and consider the best ways to adopt it as one of the workable recommendations of this conference. And I will pass it now to the chairperson of this session.

The role of a self-sustainable Euro-Horn civic network and those regional and international third parties roles are complementary and mutually re-enforcing, but it is vital that they are kept distinct. At the same time to be careful not to repeat the 'Traffic Jam' of peace initiatives that are, at the moment, creating confusion and undermining the efforts to end Sudan's 19-year-old war. The civic society efforts need to be free from any institutional links or associations to the official tracks. The best role for us as a civil

society is to act as catalysts for change or as facilitators of positive consensus and concessionary steps, or a mixture of both.

Thank you for affording us this opportunity to attempt to chart certain lines of enquiry which if followed in the workshops tomorrow could perhaps lead to more systematic analysis. Thank you for giving us this opportunity to share with you our difficulties, anxieties and hopes. The Sudan Civic Foundation is indeed grateful and appreciates very much your generous support in allowing us to meet in this very beautiful city, and meet such honourable people. I hope that our contributions will help in delivering a long overdue peace and democracy to our region. A sustainable peace that will lead to social justice that we need, and we deserve. A peace that comes from ourselves, from our collective efforts, from our collective hopes. Thank you!

Puntland Peace Mission: An Inside Account

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Your excellences, guest speakers, fellow East African citizens, and ladies and gentlemen.

I am honoured to represent the Puntland Peace Mission (PPM) members, and take this opportunity to thank and congratulate, at the same time, the organizers of this landmark conference for inviting me to participate and share with you an inside account of Puntland Peace Mission, methods and challenges.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure of that you have had enough philosophical notions today. I have no intentions of wasting your valuable time any further, but I would rather tell you a 'story' of more pragmatic nature; A successful story of a peace mission in Puntland.

Background

Following the political crises in Puntland last year, the region went into a severe recession. The little existing public services diminished, international agencies withdrew from the region, and many other negative outcomes were quite visible. In other words, the region suffered from economic recession, instability, lack of trade and investment, and many other negative post-conflict outcomes.

The Initiative

Among other people, women's groups were the first who initiated the first peace process with strong support from the community elders. The wide spectrum of the conflict and the realization of its multi factorial nature have further encouraged many Puntlanders to try to solve the problem before it will develop to a full scale civil war.

Eventually, a Swedish NGO (Diakonia) took it on their shoulders to assist, and facilitate the process. It was the combination of all this that motivated 29 Puntlanders to attend a seminar in Aberdara, Kenya. One might appreciate the mixed backgrounds of these people, who came from inside and outside the country. Despite their differences, such as gender, attitude, knowledge, and expertise, they had one common goal. They were all committed to work proactively for peace in Puntland and Somalia at large.

We attended a participatory seminar to ensure that we discussed and analysed the situation in Puntland thoroughly. We also agreed on a common vision, strategy and action plan for a two months project. This became our wagon for peace to enable an environment for an eventual future peace conference in Issimo.

Let me tell you some of the outcome of this 11-day meeting. We had different views to both the conflict and the solution. For example, those who came from Puntland thought the conflict was at a level of manifest or violence. Those who came from the Diaspora thought it was at containment. (Latent, Manifest, Violent, Escalation, Containment, Mitigated, Resolution, re-ignition.) But, more importantly we had to build trust amongst us, and we did it with an atmosphere of respect and understanding. Another important thing to mention here is that we could not propose a possible solution, because we believed the solution should come from within the people of Puntland rather than outside.

Right from the beginning it was clear to us that none of the two leaders will reconcile without the involvement of the people. A good example is the mediation efforts made by the Ethiopian government between the two leaders, and as you are all aware, this has failed and produced no results. Thus, one could conclude that creating pressure from within and further educating the public was a key to any solution to the stalemate.

Objectives and Methods

The first thing was to initiate a dialogue within the community, and that is why we called our project "Let Us Talk", by raising awareness among the community members. Two issues were addressed:

- The devastation of war and what it can lead to; and,
- The option of peace.

We thought that this would create significant pressure on the leadership from within the people. The leadership would respond to people's demand for peace. Thus, the objectives for Puntland Peace Mission (hereafter PPM) were to:

- Prevent further conflict;
- Create a peaceful environment for dialogue between factions; and,
- Start a reconciliation process by engaging the entire community.

Grassroots' pressure was and is the only and by far the most successful approach. In addition, to everybody's surprise, it is working marvellously.

The program activities

After the initial workshop, we landed in on March 23 in Puntland. We met with each of the following group separately:

- Political leaders;
- Isims and elders;
- Religious leaders;
- Intellectuals and business people; and,
- Women and youth groups.

At this stage, we held numerous meetings where we met thousands of people in all the regions of Puntland. By far, the most attended of all was in the city of Galkaio. The meeting was very important and gave a significant indication of the willingness from the people and their unprecedented support.

The second stage of the mission in Puntland started on April 4, 2002. The PPM set up its headquarters in Garowe (the capital of the state), because of its central location and because of its highly political vulnerability.[27]

Achievements

We believe Puntland Peace Mission achieved a lot. To begin with, the PPM was instrumental to break the ice and the stalemate by marching coast to coast unarmed. The message of this tour was very clear:

- It reiterated the unity of the people;
- It restored confidence in the minds of people in the region, particularly the business community;
- It sent a strong message to the leadership that war was not an option, and people are against it;
- It assured the holiness of Puntland and its capital city Garoowe, where our head office was located despite the most hostile frontier in the entire region.

At the national level, the message was a comprehensive search for peace is always possible in Somalia, but it required a very strong will and determination. Our example was the first of its kind in the entire nation.

New Situation

As a result of the PPM activities and campaign, the people of Puntland today are not the same as yesterday. They unanimously oppose war and have greater understanding for peace. The combined two factors have created a new condition for peace. Today, the stalemate is over. One would obviously ask how did this happen?

As far as the PPM is concerned, I must say, we have always believed in the will of the people, and the capabilities of our elders. Ladies and gentleman, despite our initiation of the peace process, it was the people of Puntland, who made the right choices at the right time, beyond imagination. No one ever thought that Puntland saga would have such a rosy end. No one thought that the people of Garoowe, and Qardho would manage to

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[27] On the specific details of the day-to-day activity of the PPM, please see www. ppmpunt.com.

avoid war. And of course no one ever thought that Boosaaso, would be welcoming the former administration. To the best of our understanding, people chose peace for any devastating war, with many lost lives and a total chaos.

All these were unprecedented moves in the Somali civil war context. They showed a great deal of civility. Their vision and capacity are beyond imagination. They taught us unforgettable lessons by taking the initiative to create peace and to avoid war.

Conclusion

Peace in Puntland was possible, and we believe it is possible in Somalia too. Promises will not prevent war. They have to be invested together with favourable conditions for reconciliation. The PPM is encouraged, despite the difficulties in the horizon, by the level of raised awareness in the community that has been achieved so far.

Their motives, mission objectives and goals, as well as their plan of action are all quite achievable. We can also see that their success indicators are quite promising and unprecedented.

With this note, I thank you all and wish you a very fruitful outcome of this historical conference. May God enlighten our path for peace in East Africa at large.

Recommendations

The second day of the conference focused on workshops. Four workshops were organized to discuss four topics; economic co-operation, social- and cultural co-operation, democracy and human rights; and peace-building.

The goal with the workshops was to produce recommendations in line with the title of the conference "Co-operation Instead of Wars and Destruction". Together with presented papers, the workshops generated a wide range of ideas to address current issues and challenges in the Horn of Africa.

Although, the workshops were divided into four themes, the discussions and recommendations were not as distinct as the themes. It is obvious that any attempt to address the prevailing issues will include solutions that encompass all four areas.

Fundamentally, the region must work together. The challenges and problems in the region are jointly shared. Any peace-building effort has to be a joint effort between the countries on the Horn of Africa.

It is a common understanding among the participants that the initiative for peace and economic development should come from the grassroots level. It is however widely recognized that the Horn of Africa needs to be integrated and supported by the international community.

Despite the lack of any formal relationship and exchange among the countries in the Horn of Africa, communities and people trade and move across borders. Any model for economic development in the region should therefore be built on the informal existing relationships between communities in the region.

It is a sense that the region lacks an economic model for sustainable development. It is however recognized that economic development cannot be accomplished as long as

conflict and war exist. As the region moves towards peace, it needs a regional as well as a local strategy for building a viable and sustainable economy for the Horn of Africa.

Peace needs to be built by the people. The civil society plays an important role in organizing people and channelling the hidden energy towards peace. Central authorities in the region are asked to work with local civic organizations. All stakeholders in the region need to be integrated in a regional peace-process. In this respect, it is of vital importance that educational institutions will be re-built and restored to function as a catalyst and a focal point for peace.

The participants also ask for international partnerships between, in particular, Somali institutions and Swedish counterparts. Academic institutions are today as much about teaching as it is about accessing resources. Any restoration of the academic institutions needs therefore to be accompanied by adequate technology and infrastructure. The participants urged political leaders in the region to make education both free and universal, and to abolish any discrimination against women and minorities. Equal rights between men and women are of absolute vital importance, and must prevail over any religion and traditional values. Local authorities in the region are asked to respect United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as the Convention on the Elimination of All of Forms of Discrimination against Women.

Education is a fundamental cornerstone for a democratic society with respect for human rights. As education can work as a catalyst for peace, it can also be a guardian for nurturing democracy and human rights. Civic education must not only include the elite, it must also include the masses of people. Civic education plays an important role to foster common and shared values for peace. An established civic society is a vital mechanism for early warning to prevent conflict.

Education plays also an important role in preventing epidemic, endemic and other diseases. The region needs to work with the international community to ensure equitable health services.

In addition, education is a crucial tool to provide men and women opportunities in life, instead of participating in warfare. The region must demilitarise. However, successful demilitarisation must be accompanied with several efforts to establish an effective police force, rebuild the administrative and physical infrastructure, and provide vocational training and jobs. In this effort, the region needs a long-term support and commitment from international community.

As mentioned, the participants agreed that a solution to end conflicts and to improve the poor outlook for the people in Horn of Africa could only be found in a regional effort with broad support from civic societies, communities, and people. A solution must be in harmony with the region's cultural context. In case of Somalia, it is believed it is not enough to build peace from the grassroots level. It is instead argued that the role of state is key to the reconstruction of the Somali society.

Somalia suffers from the lack of functional institutions. It needs therefore a broad support from all stakeholders within and outside the region to build the basic institutions for democracy and a society; the executive-, legislative-, and the judiciary branch.

The international community must have a more active engagement in the region of Horn of Africa, and in particular in Somalia.

Finally, participants expressed that this conference, in May 2002, can play a future and vital role to bring stakeholders together and build consensus on the issues in the Horn of Africa. It will work as an opportunity to build a network of academics and practioners from and in the region, as well as with outside key constituencies. It is believed that a series of similar conferences can be a forum and viable catalytic process to exchange ideas, co-ordinate actions, and lobby for issues in the Horn of Africa.

Conclusion

The organizers of the conference on "Co-operation Instead of Wars and Destruction" were very pleased with the overall outcome and felt that it had launched a significant and essential discussion on the situation in the Horn of Africa and the ways to raise the awareness of the people of the Horn of Africa, create a political atmosphere for mutual understanding and trust among the participants from the Horn of Africa, and to find a more lasting forum for the exchange of views and ideas.

A number of important themes (such as economic co-operation, social and cultural co-operation, democracy and human rights) were only touched upon, but these will be taken up in detail in later conferences and meetings. Other issues, such as peace-building received more attention but deserve more discussion and will also be revisited. The Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre is planning another conference in May 2003 that build on the discussion initiated in Lund 2002. The conference will address:

- An effective prevention strategy that encompasses both short-term and long -term political, humanitarian, human rights, developmental and institutional measures. It will also include a strong focus on gender equality and the situation of children;
- Repertories of best practices and lessons learned in functional areas of peace-building;
- The need for a network of scholars and practioners from the Horn of Africa and from the international community with focus on related regional issues;
- The need for a forum to co-ordinate and consult, and to develop regular channels of communication on peace-building issues, including raising public awareness;
- Cultural co-operation.

Through these initiatives, Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre believes it can contribute to a development in the right direction for the people on the Horn of Africa.