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**FINAL REPORT**  
**CONFERENCE HORN OF AFRICA: II**  
**NO DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT PEACE**

23 – 25 May, 2003

At Stadshallen in Lund, Sweden

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15 October, 2003



Eritrea



Sudan



Ethiopia



Djibouti



Somalia

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## Acknowledgement

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## Overview

While the Somali and the Sudanese peace processes are underway, and the Eritrean-Ethiopian tensions are increasing, practitioners and scholars met in Lund in Sweden for three days to discuss a road map for peace and development in the Horn of Africa.

After many years of wars and conflicts afflicted upon the people of the region, there is currently some hope that peace is within the reach for some people in the Horn of Africa. However, the hope is based on fragile peace processes, as well as a brittle peace agreement.

Horn of Africa is a neglected corner of the world in many ways. The international community and the international press have shown limited interest in confronting and reporting the tragedies of the Horn of Africa since the American intervention in 1993.

The region is also losing in priority as the war on terror is focused on other regions of the world. At the same time, there are further outbreaks of conflicts both on the African continent and elsewhere.

In this context, the Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre (SIRC) realized the need to bring together vital stakeholders and experts from Horn of Africa, Europe and the United States.

*Horn of Africa – No Development Without Peace* was the title for the conference in May 2003. The previous conference in 2002 had shown the need for participants to come together and share their experiences, as well as their commitment to building peace for the region.

It is difficult to measure success in the field of conflict resolution as long as conflict exists between the parties. The conference in May 2002 was however a

proof for success in its efforts to build confidence and trust among the participants, as well as for the organizers.

Based on the trust given to SIRC by the participants, it was appropriate for the 2003 conference to focus on peace building. The *aim* was therefore to promote a dialogue between international scholars and practitioners on development of good governance, democracy, and human rights. The conference also aimed to address the deep-rooted causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of the regional conflicts.

Taking advantage of the experience and knowledge among participants, and to continue the dialogue, the conference hopes to establish a forum of scholars and practitioners for co-ordination, consultation, and communication on peace building issues. With a platform for communication, the conference also hopes to launch repertoires of best practices and lessons learned in functional areas of peace building.

**The** conference lasted for three days with four main components: speeches, workshop, recommendations and cultural exhibitions.

The conference devoted most of its time to speeches. Twenty-two speeches were presented with most of them focused on the role of regional leadership to move the Horn of Africa away from conflicts and abuses to sustainable peace with democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights.

Each session of three or four speeches was followed up by questions from the floor. Each session for questions offered participants and guests a chance to discuss the presentation by the speakers.

The speeches triggered reactions among participants and guests, and despite high

emotions the conference showed a great ability to moderate differences in views and opinions while stimulating further discussions.

The second day of the conference focused on four workshops led by prominent scholars: Prof. Gudmundur Alfredsson from Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Lund University, Prof. Håkan Wiberg from Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in Denmark, Prof. Ole Elgström from the Department of Political Science at Lund University, and Prof. Robert Rotberg from the World Peace Foundation at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The main themes for the workshops were: security issues, disarmament, and demobilization; the status of democracy, human rights, and good governance; justice and reconciliation; minority rights, gender-equality, child soldiers, and refugees; civil society; regional mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution; preventing states from collapsing; and a framework for communication.

With so many themes to discuss, it became impossible to have an in-depth analysis for each of them. However, the workshops devoted more attention discussing the following areas in more detail:

- The role of human rights and reconciliation in post-conflict reconstruction;
- The issue of governmental legitimacy;
- The role of education for rehabilitation;
- Women participation in peace building;
- The need for regional cooperation, structures for peace building, and models for conflict resolution; and,
- The role of communications in peace building.

Combined with speeches, the workshops generated a rich flora of ideas to enhance the peace building efforts for the Horn of Africa.

Most of these ideas were presented on the last day as the recommendations for the conference. The main points of the recommendations were:

- An enhanced role of the Swedish Government in the Somali peace process;
- Establishment of a Euro-Horn Civic Network with the aim to promote: A forum for dialogue, communication and focal points for activities towards peace building; and
- Local programs for strengthening the capacity building for women issues.

In conclusion, with a strong support from local Horn of African associations in Sweden, the conference offered a unique forum for exchanging reflections and understanding of issues facing the Horn of Africa today. Participants and organizers are convinced that subsequent conferences will play an increasingly important role as a meeting ground for people seeking peace in the Horn of Africa.

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## *Summary & commentary*

*A summary of and commentary on the speeches will be given below. Most speeches will be available in their full version in the appendix ii, and on SIRC's website in pdf.format.*

### The moral crisis in Horn of Africa

As an outsider to the Horn of Africa, one starts to wonder what is it about the region that makes it such an epicenter for conflicts. The region seems to be highly convoluted, intricate and intransigent. So, the question is simply: why?

A second question that comes to an outsider's mind and might be most difficult

to find an answer to: how can the conflicts in the region be resolved?

The final question for an outsider is simply: what do the people of the region want?

By looking at the first question, we will start with a focus on the moral crisis in the Horn of Africa.

Dr. Ali Moussa Iye<sup>1</sup> (Iye) could unfortunately not participate at the conference, but he submitted his speech as a paper.

His paper concentrates on the lack of moral responsibility in the African Horn among people in general and at the level of the leadership in particular.

He explains that the region “overvalues the external causes and neglect the psychological and personal dimension.” He thinks therefore that the “rhetoric about solutions has even become a part of our problem.”

He adds, “the systematic search of external causes leads to overlook the need to understand the crucial notion of individual responsibility and ignores our role as subject in the making of our own fate.” “Running away from responsibility has become a national sport in our communities”, he says.

In order to confront the moral crisis in the region, Iye suggests that “new ways and new words to tell the true stories of our history” have to be developed. On a personal level, he suggests three moral questions for the purpose of reflection and to understand the past:

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Ali Moussa Iye is a senior researcher at UNESCO in Paris. See appendix ii for his paper, *Collective patterns and individual behaviours: Questioning our responsibility in the moral crisis of our region*, in full transcript.

What did I do during the crucial moments at my personal level?

What am I doing to prevent the same things to happen again?

What would I like to leave after me for the coming generations?

Iye thinks, “we all share the responsibility of what happened in our country by having successively or even simultaneously played the role of spectator, victim and of author of the horror.” “People have therefore a ‘shared responsibility’ for the moral crisis in the region.”

In other words, Iye thinks everyone has a responsibility for the atrocities taking place in a society. This assumption is important because it asks for everyone’s attention to play an active role in preventing past abuses to be repeated.

Then, Iye makes a distinction between people and leaders. He argues that the political leadership has a higher degree of responsibility than a passive observer. Political leaders are obviously more involved in atrocities because of their influence in making decisions.

On the other hand, leaders rarely participate in carrying out the abuses, since they are often left to the foot soldiers to be taken care of. This is a serious dilemma, when trying to understand who played an active and an intentional role in committing abuses and crimes against humanity.

Iye argues that people were “politically and ideologically betrayed because they believed in their leaders and communities.”

In the case of Somalia, the consequence of betrayal is “lack of confidence and trust” between the people and the leaders. It makes people “suspicious and expect that there is a hidden agenda” behind any proposed peace

plan. In addition, it creates “cynicism and collective madness of what we are witnessing in Somalia today”, Iye adds. It has affected “every Somali individual”, and, “how can we get out of this vicious circle?” he asks.

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## Resource-based conflicts

The next set of root-causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa refers to the “issue of access to resources expressed in terms of equitable sharing, fairness, and social justice.”<sup>2</sup> According to Dr. Salah Al Bander<sup>3</sup> (Bander), this is the central concern for fighting groups.

Bander explains that any effort to resolve the regional conflicts depends on “dealing specifically with the triangle of the state, who is controlling the resources, and access available to whom?”

This is a rather new way of looking at the root-causes in the Horn. For many people, the conflicts in the region are still nurtured by nationalism and religion. Instead Bander’s model reflects the regional and local socio-political thinking. It recognizes there are multiple roots to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. He emphasizes the “issue of marginalization of the majority of the people, indicating that the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are moving towards resource-based conflicts.”

Bander argues, “it is clear from the developments over the last three decades

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<sup>2</sup> Dr. Salah Al Bander, *Peace, group rights and development: A political ecology approach*, conference paper 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Salah Al Bander is the Director of the Sudan Civic Foundation in Cambridge, UK. He also teaches at Cambridge University. See appendix ii for his paper, *Peace, group rights and development: A political ecology approach*, in full transcript.

that time have gradually if consistently changed the nature of the conflicts from being regarded as a classic ethno-religious conflict to one primarily over resources, with the twin of economic and resource crisis emerging as the driving force in all its conflicts.”

To simplify the complexity of the root-causes and their dynamic that often leads to conflict in the Horn region, Bander suggests a distinction between “structural and direct causes of conflict”.

“Structural problems are responsible for making the whole region at risk of destabilization, while the direct causes are the ones that actually ignite violent conflict.”

“Horn of Africa is overwhelmed with intrinsic structural problems that are conducive to violent conflict, whenever immediate causes arise. These major structural factors are amplified and reinforced by ever more shrinking resources and exploitation of identity dichotomies”, Bander adds.

Shrinking resources bode ill in combination with increasing density of the population in the Horn of Africa. Bander notes that, “the overall situation is further compounded by uneven distribution and sharing of resource endowment. Land is scarce in the Horn of Africa and is identified as the most critical resource battleground.” On top of all these structural problems, which plagued the region, deep rooted, traditional identity dichotomies (ethnic, cultural and religious differences) started to surface and play an important role in inspiring violence in the land.”

The conflicts are even more convoluted, intricate and intransigent because people transform their own perceptions of a conflict into new realities. Bander thinks, for an increasing number of people, identity is perceived as the cause to the conflicts. This adds to already existing initial causes to a conflict.

To illustrate his argument, Bander gives an example of the misconceptions about the Sudanese war, which is perceived to be a war between African Christians in the South and Arab Muslims in the North.

The facts help dismiss this perception. Bander observes, “the majority of foot soldiers of the Sudanese army some 90% are Southerners, Nuba and Westerners, more than 60% of them are non-Muslims.”

Furthermore, “many Southern politician, army officers, and civil servants are allied with the Khartoum Government and are supporting it in all its policies without reservation. In fact, the supporters of the current government from the Southern region are more than any previous ones in the history of the conflict.”

“Almost 3 million Southerners live and work in the North. The majority of them attributed that to the relative safety and security of the place”, Bander adds.

Given the uneven distribution and sharing of resource endowment, Bander asks, “how to achieve the desired end: social justice.”

Bander thinks, a more comprehensive approach must be taken into account, which reflects the diversity in the region, the transformation of conflicts towards resource-based, and the interdependence between group rights and political ecology of the region. “Without focusing more on these elements the conflicts will continue for another century.”

Bander lists a number of perpetuating elements that nurture the conflicts in the region:  
Powerful military establishment;  
High degree of militarisation;  
The politically destabilising potential of oil production in the Sudan; and,  
The continuous avoidance of the marginalised majority, including women.

A lack of understanding of these elements will continue to undermine any political resolution of the conflict and a socio-economic reconstruction of the region. Bander adds, “it is not surprising that we are looking with great interest to the development of IGAD as a model for peace making forum for sustainable development. It shows, also, that emphasis is shifting to group rights, autonomous arrangements, devolution of power to the local people and the importance of regionally developed conflict resolution approaches.”

Iye and Bander have now pointed out two sets of root-causes of the conflicts in the African Horn: the lack of moral responsibility and the lack of equitable sharing of resources and social justice.

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## The poverty dimension

One major challenge facing Africa today is poverty, Håkan Wiberg<sup>4</sup> (Wiberg) says. This is even a greater problem because, “poverty and war often compound each other as causes of suffering and death; they may also engender each other”, he adds.

Wiberg notes “the Horn of Africa tragically exemplifies, that the areas in the world that are suffering worst from poverty also tend to be among those that are worst stricken by war.”

Ambassador Kebede of Ethiopia argues it is central for the Horn of Africa and for development partners to focus on concrete measures to eradicate poverty through the implementation of sustainable development programs.

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<sup>4</sup> Prof. Håkan Wiberg was a former Director at Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. See appendix ii for his paper, *War and poverty – A deadly spiral*, in full transcript.



“The poorer a country is, the more war do we find, with the exception that the very poorest countries have slightly less war than very poor ones. Why this is so can have several explanations, including such effects of scarcity as greed (trying to monopolise existing resources) and grievances (trying to counteract that)”, Wiberg argues.

Wiberg notes that, “behind these effects we find several macroeconomic and microeconomic mechanisms.” He adds, “one effect at macro level is inflation (unless the government is able to withstand the temptation to finance part of the war by printing more currency). Another is lower government revenues: there is less to collect because of shrinking production, trade, etc. - and it becomes more difficult to collect them, by lack of territorial control, deteriorating administration, etc. Military expenditures increase however, sometimes drastically. In the ensuing redistribution of expenditures, it is normally the production of public goods - health, education, welfare - that suffer from this combination. This is not necessarily so however: if - as was the case in Sri Lanka, Mozambique and Nicaragua - there is a government that is both strong (efficient) and firmly committed to them, these public goods may remain largely unaffected.”

Furthermore, he states “the microeconomic decision makers, i.e. the households, face several decisions that have to be made in the light of the macroeconomic changes, the security situation, etc.: whether to remain at their work or flee elsewhere; whether to save to have reserves or spend to provide for immediate survival; whether to continue trading labor force and products at the market, go over to bartering them or to subsistence production; and whether to remain within legal activities or go over to such illegal ones as smuggling, black market operations or plain robbery. In each case, the first alternative tends to

be undermined in wartime, which in turn contributes to a further worsening of the macroeconomic phenomena just reviewed: less investments, less trade, less government revenues, etc. And this, finally, becomes one instance of a more general phenomenon: quite apart from the causes that started a war, it tends to produce additional causes by its own effects, such as (increased) poverty, which may eventually become more important than the causes of the initiation of the war.”

To be a richer country does not necessary guarantee peace, instead it seems like democracy is a better guardian for peace. Wiberg explains that, “two democracies never, or hardly ever, fight each other. Inside states, by contrast, the relation is a complex and A-shaped one: the most peaceful states are stable democracies, which are followed by stable autocracies, with much higher risks of war in states that are in between these extremes. This seems to be both because they are in between and because they are in a process of change (whether towards or away from democracy).”

Wiberg concludes that, “the ethnic composition of a state has little relation to its participation in international war. Inside states, however, the risk of war is higher in those that are ethnically heterogeneous, in particular if the biggest group is not a solid majority and if the groups are heavily mixed in territorial terms.”

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## Human rights dimension

Another question asked initially was: how can the conflicts in the region be resolved? This presentation does not give a direct answer, but it makes some important reflections on the transition from conflict to peace.

Dr. Martin Hill<sup>5</sup> (Hill) investigates and discusses any potential emerging and important questions in a post-conflict society, such as Somalia.

Hill's discussion touches on Iye remarks on people being "politically and ideologically betrayed because they believed in their leaders and communities", and "how can we get out of this vicious circle?"

Hill starts with asking "should those who have committed human rights abuses in the past, during the Siad Barre government or the civil conflicts since 1991, be allowed to hold office with impunity in a future government".

Hill's human rights approach to conflict and conflict resolution "leads directly to a discussion on reconciliation and transitional or restorative justice, in relation to dealing with abuses of the past for the sake of the future protection of human rights."

Hill observes that reconciliation means different in different places. "To most people in Somalia it probably means reconciliation between opposed political factions or clans, or between perpetrators of abuses and their victims, and in the context of a political settlement and reparations. One point of tension is the reclaiming of land and property, where the technical committee recommended procedures for return of illegally and violently acquired property, whether as a result of Italian colonial-era confiscations, land confiscations and seizures under the Siad Barre Government, or land theft and looting by faction militias."

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<sup>5</sup> Dr. Martin Hill is a senior researcher at Amnesty International in London. See appendix ii for his paper, *Human rights, conflict resolution and reconciliation in the Horn of Africa*, in full transcript.

For Amnesty International, "it is up to the Somali people to decide how to approach the question of past abuses and when. Various possibly acceptable options are available ranging from conditional amnesty to truth-telling mechanisms or criminal prosecutions", Hill informs.

Responding to what option is most likely, Hill states that "the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is widely cited as an example of a successful reconciliation mechanism, agreed by both sides, to resolve conflicts and abuses of the apartheid regime to complement and strengthen the political transition in 1994 to majority rule through free elections." "What would work in Somalia would depend on cultural acceptability and the needs of the situation", he adds.

On the issue of gross human rights abuses, Hill refers to Amnesty International's call in April 2003 on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to support human rights reconstruction, "Amnesty International would find it unacceptable for those responsible for such crimes to be included in any new government, which would be expected to be wholeheartedly committed to the rule of law and respect for human rights. Granting total impunity through a general amnesty would not bring lasting peace to Somalia. In practice it would open the door to new violations by the same perpetrators, who would make sure they continued to silence their accusers, and it would encourage others to hope to go unpunished... Any new government must ratify the statutes of the International Criminal Court so that new war crimes and crimes against humanity could be reported to it... To the extent that it is possible, an interim government should comprise only members with a clean human rights record and non-involvement with abuses."

"Amnesty International recommends that investigations and documentation should

start during the interim period and at the international level to document past abuses, and should work closely with Somali witnesses and human rights defense NGOs. The model for such an inquiry, where some preliminary work has been done by UNDP-Somalia, could be the independent Panel of Experts established by the UN Security Council on violations of the arms embargo,” Hill reports.

A major obstacle, for the peace process to succeed and to prevent leaders or individuals with records of human rights abuses from taking on governmental or public positions, is, according to Hill, to overcome clannism. Hill argues “clans protect their own members and promote them to office, whatever crimes they might have committed against others. So long as this principle of absolute clan solidarity remains a powerful divisive factor in Somali society, clannism would prevail over and defeat nationalism.”

It illustrates the importance to understand the role of Somali clannism for a successful and sustainable peace in Somalia.

For lasting peace in Somalia to take place, it is important, Hill argues, to make “human rights part of peace talks and agreements.” If not, he states, “the grievances for which the conflict began are not settled, and if the new grievances arising from the conflict are not settled, the peace will not be lasting.” Hill suggests therefore a “human rights agenda” to be included in any peace agreement. For full text of the agenda, please see Hill’s paper in full transcript.

Supporting Dr. Bander’s argument on the need to resolve the problem of marginalized majority (including women) in the region, Hill points out, if peace will be ensured in Somalia, it must be “supported by all political authorities and communities from top to bottom”, also

including “social rights issues of post conflict reconstruction”. In this context, it is important to note that gender and minority rights issues are not given sufficient weight, Hill adds.

Ambassador Berhanu Kebede (Kebede) of Ethiopia<sup>6</sup> reports accordingly, in a study produced by United Nations, an inclusive government is the “best guarantors against internal violent conflicts.” “Inclusiveness requires that all the major groups in a society participate in its major institutions, government, administration, police and the military”, he adds.

Kebede points out that good governance should ensure the rule of law, transparent political policies, an independent judiciary, a free press, a vibrant civil society, tolerance for minority and opposition groups, and respect for basic human rights, as well as an impartial police force, and a military that is subject to civilian government control.

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## Somali peace process

The Somali peace process illustrates the issues and challenges, as well as the complexity in resolving one of the conflicts in the region.

In his presentation, Dr. Hill used “chequer-board” scenario to illustrate how conflicts have been fuelled from neighboring countries in the form of providing political support or weapons.

Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar<sup>7</sup> (Samatar) reflects in more detail in his presentation

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<sup>6</sup> Berhanu Kebede is Ambassador of Ethiopia to Sweden. See appendix ii for his speech.

<sup>7</sup> Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar teaches at the Department of Geography & the MacArthur Program at the University of Minnesota. See appendix ii for his paper, *The IGAD Somali Peace Process*:

on what the “chequer-board” politics has meant to the Somali reconciliation conference held in Kenya. Based on his own observations as an observer and later as an advisor to the Chairman, Ambassador Kiplagat, of the conference, Professor Samatar spells out the main obstacles for a successful peace agreement in Somalia.

Professor Samatar starts with a review of the Somali reconciliation conference held in Djibouti in 1999-2000. Here, Samatar examines the reasons the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG), which was formed in Arta, “failed to live up to its mandate and the people’s expectation.”

Professor Samatar argues that, “authorities in Addis Ababa adopted three pronged strategy to destabilize and de-legitimize the TNG.” According to Samatar, the strategy was “first, Ethiopia convened a meeting for the warlords and, in the process, helped establish an umbrella organization for them to be named Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC). Second, Ethiopia intensified its military support for members of this group.<sup>8</sup> In spite of this development, Ethiopia’s client warlords could not agree on a united political dispensation for the areas of the country they controlled. Third, Ethiopia actively lobbied the OAU (AU) and other international organizations to unseat the TNG.”

Ambassador Kebede of Ethiopia responds in his speech stating that “Ethiopia does

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*Incubating Inept or Illegitimate Dispensation*, in full transcript.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1425 (2002)* (New York: United Nations, 2002). This report unambiguously illuminates that Ethiopia is the key supplier of weapons to the warlords in contravention to the Security Council resolution.

not have a military role in Somalia”, nor has Ethiopia invaded or occupied parts of Somalia, he adds. Kebede underscores that “Ethiopia fully respects the territorial integrity of” Somalia, and it does not favor any “group in Somalia”. Ethiopia “totally rejects the allegations which are completely false and unfounded”, he says.

“The existence of a terrorist group with an international network in Somalia, where there is no central government authority is a serious concern not only to Ethiopia, which has a long porous boundary to Somalia, but also to the sub-region and at large to the international community”, Kebede notes.

The terrorist group, Al-Itihad Al Islamia, “carried out indiscriminate attacks inside Ethiopia” with a “large number of civilian casualties and destruction of property and permanent disability on innocent civilians”, Kebede explains.

Kebede argues that Ethiopia has a right under international law to defend itself, and it should not be interpreted as “interference in internal affairs of Somalia.” “Ethiopia strongly believes it would benefit more from the emergence of a strong Somalia with a vibrant political and economic system,” he adds.

Professor Samatar then directed his analysis towards the demise of TNG. There are several factors leading up to TNG’s demise. Samatar accounts “the interim President and the Prime Minister, Ali K. Galyedh, as well as much of the cabinet appointees were remnants of the old regime. Second, no broad vision, let alone a specific one for national mobilization fit for the challenge of the interregnum, was articulated. Third, hardly any attention was paid to competence and to integrity in the appointment of a new team, reviving memories of vulgar and cheap horse-trading that crippled the old order.”

The second part of his contribution is a narrative of the first phase of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) sponsored Somali reconciliation conference, in the western Kenyan city of Eldoret. Samatar explains “how the Kenyan chairman mismanaged the process by allowing the Ethiopian representatives (one of the mediators) to gerrymander the negotiation in favor of their warlord clients.”

Professor Samatar points out that, “after the conference commenced, non-Somalis set the conference’s agenda.” “There was no input from Somalis (outside of the warlords) or those who study Somali society”, he adds.

In the third part of his paper, Samatar appraises “the role of Kenya’s new envoy in restoring confidence to the conference. The evidence presented illustrates how he wasted several opportunities to remedy previous problems and allowed Ethiopia and its clients to continue to dominate the conference. Further, the discussion reveals the ineptitude of those representing the TNG and how they failed to defend the conference’s original terms of reference and maintain their unity as a negotiating team.”

Two issues were of particular importance for the success of the conference: the list of participants and legitimacy of the participants. Samatar points out that chairman Kiplagat tried subsequently “to bring forth a list of ‘traditional leaders’ he intended to invite to the third phase of the conference.” According to Samatar, the warlords rejected this proposition. Instead, it demonstrates: “1) the Ambassador’s lack of knowledge about Somali culture - traditional leaders are not subjects of anyone in communal affairs, let alone warlords, 2) the degree of power ceded to the warlords, since the inception of the conference, and 3) Ethiopia’s partisan involvement in the conference and the

Ambassador’s unwillingness to confront it.”

The conference also faced a serious challenge when Kiplagat appointed an independent Somali group to “harmonize the documents the conference’s six working committees produced.”<sup>9</sup> According to Samatar, Ethiopia was very unhappy about the appointment of the harmonization committee, which was chaired by Samatar. Upon its presentation of the draft charter for the Technical Committee and official representatives of the international community, Samatar notes that, “the Ethiopian delegation walked out of the room before they read the document or heard the committee’s oral presentation.” Instead, Samatar points out, “Ethiopian representatives began to discredit the draft charter and egged on their clients to resist it.” As a result, the warlords produced their own version of a charter. Samatar notes that, “eighteen warlords and faction leaders signed a cover letter addressed to Kiplagat in which they openly stated that their version alone should be presented to the plenary of the conference.<sup>10</sup> If not, they threatened, they would walk out of the peace process altogether.”

Professor Samatar sums up the controversy of the charter: “Whatever the relative merits of the two documents might be, it is incredible to witness the audacity of Ethiopia and its clients to demand that their crudely self-serving draft charter *alone* should be debated in the plenary session. What is even more enigmatic was the fact that Ambassador Kiplagat succumbed to

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<sup>9</sup> The committees worked on the following issues: a) land and property, b) charter, c) economic recovery, d) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, e) regional and international relations, f) conflict resolution and reconciliation.

<sup>10</sup> As noted earlier, two-thirds of the plenary delegates are beholden to Ethiopia and its clients.

their demand even though he described the SRRC as clients of Ethiopia.”<sup>11</sup>

Professor Samatar also points out how “TNG fell apart due to internal squabbles between its three senior leaders.” Samatar states that the ambassador “exploited the TNG’s split and rushed to organize a poorly announced plenary meeting.” At the meeting Kiplagat announced an agreement had been reached on four key issues. Samatar notes that, “the supporter of the Warlord-Ethiopian agenda went into frenzy celebration.” “Others who did not have forewarning were shocked at turn of events”, he adds.

Professor Samatar thinks that, “ambassador Kiplagat’s behavior contravened the letter and spirit of reconciliation and fuelled a growing mistrust that he was predisposed from the outset towards a warlord-Ethiopian pact. Kiplagat’s action on July 5 fed this suspicion.” “In such a late hour, unless he regains his role as an impartial mediator,<sup>12</sup> the entire process was likely to become illegitimate; Kenya’s perceived role as a neutral Somali neighbor fatally damaged; and the peace conference

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<sup>11</sup> The Special envoy noted, on June 24, 2003, that the Somalis might fire him. He said all key Somali leaders are angry with him. He complained that it is difficult to deal with people (faction leader or warlords) who cannot honor agreements they signed. He told several of us that he could easily tell, in yesterday’s meeting with faction leaders, that one of the warlords and the Ethiopian Ambassador did not have enough rest the night before as they were agitated. He noted the reason the warlord changed his mind was that he was told to do so by the ambassador. He added that it is difficult to make any progress in the conference as these people change their minds according to the instruction Ethiopia gives them. June 24, 2003

<sup>12</sup> Kiplagat is unlikely to change his strategy unless his government forces him to shift gears. The TNG could have been a strong Somali counter force but its leaders killed Arta’s spirit early in their tenure.

doomed to the same fate as the many others that preceded it”, he adds.

In his final part, Samatar “prognosticates what might be expected from the conference and what that could mean for Somali reconciliation and national reconstruction.”

Samatar notes that the “the dominance of warlords and faction leaders (some are illiterate and others are known for exceptional incompetence) in the conference bodes ill for Somalia’s post-conflict dispensation. For instance, one of the two power sharing formulas calls for the warlords and faction leaders, in consultation with traditional leaders, to appoint parliamentarians. If this method prevails, it is certain that the merchants of violence and their supporters will constitute the majority of deputies in parliament as well as take up position of the new provisional administration. Alternatively, traditional leaders in consultation with warlords, and factions and political leaders will select members of parliament. Such an assembly could have a broader representative base.”

Professor Samatar concludes: “In the end, whether warlords or traditional leaders appoint members of parliament, the fact remains that the likely confluence of an imprudently expansive assembly and government, destructive Ethiopian influence, and propensity for low quality of political leadership is bound to cripple the promise.”<sup>13</sup>

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## The Sudan peace-process

A second illustration of the conflicts in the region is the peace process in Sudan, between the government of Sudan and the

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<sup>13</sup> For an idea what might be done to use the transition to empower the Somali public see our editorial in *Bildhaan: International Journal of Somali Studies*, volume 3, 2003.

rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

Peter Marwa (Marwa)<sup>14</sup> made some observations of the on-going Sudanese peace talks. He thinks that, "the challenges facing IGAD's initiatives are enormous" with respect to "the mistrust between North and South", which is fuelled by racial and religious suspicion.

IGAD became involved four years ago, and had the parties agreed to a Declaration of Principles, including: state and religion, self-determination, power and wealth-sharing. There is no breakthrough on the three main issues: power and wealth-sharing, security arrangement, and the three conflict areas.<sup>15</sup> The three conflict areas of Nuba Mountains, Upper Blue Nile and Abei are negotiated differently without any progress so far.

Lars Ronnås<sup>16</sup> (Ronnås) points out that, "in addition, to resolve issues of security arrangements, power and wealth sharing, Sweden believes that the issue of human rights needs to be given a prominent place in any transitional arrangement. It is essential for the long-term sustainability of any peace treaty that respect for and the promotion of human rights are an important part of the deal."

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<sup>14</sup> Peter Marwa is Director for Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution at the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). See appendix ii for his paper.

<sup>15</sup> It was the case as by May 25 2003. The two negotiating parties have however been able in September 2003 to reach an agreement on the security arrangement.

<sup>16</sup> Lars Ronnås is the Director for Africa Department at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See appendix ii for his paper, *Peace and development in the Horn of Africa: A Swedish perspective*, in full transcript.

As Sudan is moving towards a phase of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation, it will be important with "quick start projects", that can demonstrate the benefits of peace in conflict ridden areas." "The term 'peace dividend' must be given concrete meaning. However, also in this situation, it is clear that it is the Sudanese who must take the lead. Naturally, there is a need for capacity building and support, in particular in the South", Ronnås adds.

In the last year, three major milestones have characterized the talks: in June 2002 a protocol was signed outlining self-determination for the southern Sudan in six years, and a separation between state and religion; in October 2002 an agreement was signed to end hostilities; and, in late 2002 the parties agreed to strengthen the October agreement by creating a verification and monitoring team to monitor and compliance with start in March 2003, Marwa explained.

After some inertia in the negotiations, IGAD changed negotiation strategy to a more "holistic approach", which included negotiating all issues as opposed to one issue at the time. Marwa also notes that past issues were overcome, which changed the dynamic in the Sudanese peace talks. "Since the removal and replacement of Mr. Mboya (the chairman of the peace talks) with General Sumbeiyu (the current chairman), there has been complete change in the management of the process for the better", he adds. As a result, he points out "support is now forthcoming from the international community." "The presence and participation of the international community have forced the parties to be serious." The role of international community to provide advice, to mediate behind scene, and to boost reconciliation "has had a huge impact on the way the parties see issues", Marwa adds.

## A sore spot: Ethiopia - Eritrea

A third illustration of conflicts in the region is the strained relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ronnås stresses that, “it is of critical importance to the whole region that peace is maintained between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The peace agreement, signed in Algiers in December 2000 to end border wars between the two sides that lasted for two years in which tens of thousands were killed, provides the “foundation to this end, including through its provision that the two parties recognize the authority of the Boundary Commission. It is of course of paramount importance that its rulings be respected and allowed to be implemented. It is time to move ahead with demarcation and we believe that this should be possible. UNMEE, which is mandated by the Security Council, continues to play a key role in this regard,” Ronnås adds.

The ambassador of South Africa, Sonto Kudjoe<sup>17</sup> (Kudjoe) asks how can a “dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the issue of their border dispute” be revived? Kudjoe points out how important a resolution is to break the “paralyzed the use of strategically located seaports such as Assab and Massawa.”

The Ambassador of Eritrea, Araya Desta<sup>18</sup> (Desta) explains that Eritrea faces a high number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Today there are approximately 65 000 IDPs in Eritrea.

The IDPs are unable to return to their homes “until mines are cleared from the fields and villages, infrastructure is

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<sup>17</sup> H.E. Sonto Kudjoe is Ambassador of South Africa to Sweden. See appendix ii for her speech.

<sup>18</sup> H.E. Araya Desta is Ambassador of Eritrea to Sweden. See appendix ii for his speech.

rehabilitated from war damages, and the border demarcation is completed”, he adds.

Desta argues the return of IDPs will depend on how soon Ethiopia will comply with the “delimitation decision by the UN Court in The Hague in 2002.”

Desta concludes with stating, “Eritrea considers its border conflict with Ethiopia closed and sealed, and urges the guarantors of the Algiers Peace Treaty, including the UN, EU, AU, USA and Algeria, to exercise their role and responsibility as witnesses and guarantors of the peace treaty to make Ethiopia abide by the findings of the Border Commission.” He adds, “a refusal to accept the verdicts of an International Court set up by the UN will only prolong the sufferings of the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia and thereby contribute to destabilizing the region as a whole.”

On a different note, Ambassador Kudjoe thinks that, “Eritrea seemed to be at loggerheads with all its neighbors, except Djibouti. Its conflict with Yemen stems from sovereignty claims by both sides over a set of islands in the Red Sea. The islands possess substantial fishery resources. Although there seems to be less tension between them these days, the issue has not been resolved. Internal political tensions reign as parliament was suspended two years ago.”

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## IGAD – A regional peace-maker?

This summary began with three very basic questions: Why conflict? How can they be resolved? And, what do the people in the region want?

With a better understanding of the first question, we are now taking a closer look



at the second question: how the conflicts in the region can be resolved.

Peace making is a very complex and complicated business. It is often as confusing as the dynamic of a conflict itself. But peace making needs to start somewhere, and Marwa offers some reflections on the role of Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) as a tool for peace-making in the region.

Marwa has closely observed the Somali and Sudanese Peace and Reconciliation Conferences. As a represent of IGAD<sup>19</sup>, Marwa explains that IGAD had been revitalized in 1995 to include a mandate to address conflicts. IGAD has therefore developed a mechanism to work with conflicts in the region of Horn of Africa. IGAD is currently managing the peace and reconciliation conferences for both Somalia and Sudan.

At the IGAD summit in Khartoum in January 2002, it was decided to launch a new attempt to establish peace and reconciliation in Somali. The conference aimed to “bring together the TNG and all opposition groups to form a broad-based, all inclusive government of national unity”, Marwa explains.

As known, the problem with an all-inclusive government is the issue of preventing people with human rights abuses to participate in a government.

Marwa stresses that IGAD does care about the crimes against humanity committed by some of the warlords. However, it is IGAD’s priority to “return Somalia to stability and remove the vestiges of war in that country. What Somalia later does with those who have committed crimes against their people should come in the next stage

and should be shouldered by Somalis themselves”, he adds.

Marwa states that the “disagreement on representation was the most serious of them all.” However, IGAD expects “an interim structure or authority acceptable to the majority of the Somali and supported by the international system”, he reports.

Ronnås of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs thinks that, “in both the Sudan and the Somalia peace processes IGAD plays a key role. It is high time that the benefits of regional cooperation be fully exploited in the Horn of Africa. In areas such as conflict resolution and peace building it has been demonstrated that cooperation between neighboring countries can play a crucial role. IGAD could further develop this potential in the years to come.”

Marwa also points out the importance of “the unanimity of the region towards the Sudan problem.” It meant that the member countries in the region agreed to back the IGAD-led Sudanese peace process and to reject parallel initiatives. It also asked stakeholders to coordinate their efforts with IGAD.

Ronnås adds that a “central component in the peace making effort must be to prevent the influx of arms. The embargo pronounced by the United Nations Security Council some years ago, and then strengthened by a monitoring mechanism through an additional resolution last year, is of vital importance. The international community, including the neighboring countries, carries a strong responsibility to ensure its effective implementation.”

Ambassador Kebede of Ethiopia argues that an “early warning” system is a vital tool for a preventive strategy. It is crucial for the region to “improve the capacity of” IGAD. He also thinks that IGAD should work in collaboration with both the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) on preventive strategies,

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<sup>19</sup> IGAD includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda.

including deployment and disarmament. The “excessive presence and flow of small arms” is a serious problem for the Horn of Africa, which therefore needs a preventive deployment to build confidence “in areas of tension and highly polarized communities”, Kebede adds.

According to Ronnås, “Ambassador Kiplagat, the chief negotiator in Somali Peace Conference, has highlighted the need for conflict resolution and reconciliation on the ground, at the local community level. The Uppsala-based Life and Peace Institute has worked for many years in Somalia and will now endeavor to enhance its involvement in such efforts. Sweden will aim to assist in linking the lessons learned and results achieved at the community level back to the national peace negotiations taking place in Mbagathi. Combining a bottom-up approach with efforts at the national level may hold the solution to many of the long term Somali problems.”

On behalf of IGAD, Marwa appeals to the international community “to come forward to support the government (in Somalia) which will be formed from the national reconciliation process”, and “to take bold steps to engage in post agreement reconstruction of the country.” Marwa argues, “it will be important that one country takes a leading role “in mobilizing and co-coordinating” reconstruction efforts when an agreement has been signed.

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## Is there an African alternative?

Despite IGAD’s vital roles in the Horn of Africa, it still seems limited as an organization to resolve conflicts in the region. Until IGAD has developed and strengthened its conflict resolution and peace making capacity, how can IGAD be supported?

Responding to Marwa’s appeal for support in Somalia, Ronnås agrees that, there is a need for “enhanced international involvement in the efforts for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. Sweden will work to that end, and we are stepping up our contacts with partners in the international community on the Somalia peace process.”

Ronnås acknowledges the important role IGAD plays in the peace process in Sudan, but he also wants to give “credit to the troika of observers namely Norway, the United Kingdom and the USA.” “The international community will continue to play a central role in the years to come – including in providing support in monitoring the expected peace agreement. Sweden would like to see a Security Council mandate for such monitoring, regardless of whether it will be carried out through the AU, the EU or the UN or some other party”, he adds.

Ronnås mentions the African Union (AU) as a potential party to step in and play an active role in the peace-making process in Somalia. Does AU have the capacity to do that?

Both professor Mammo Muchie<sup>20</sup> (Muchie) and professor Robert Rotberg<sup>21</sup> (Rotberg) think it would be highly

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<sup>20</sup> Professor Mammo Muchie teaches currently at the School of Development Studies at University of Natal in Durban, South Africa. He is also director of a research programme on civil society in and for African integration. See appendix ii for his paper, *Partnership or self-reliance: Does NEPAD provide the strategy for African development?* in full transcript.

<sup>21</sup> Professor Robert Rotberg teaches at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is also the president of World Peace Foundation in Cambridge, Massachusetts. His speech is available on videotape.

desirable and positive if the newly founded AU would have the capacity to step in.

In the absence of an African institutional mechanism, such as AU, Rotberg seems to suggest that a strong African third part intervention is desirable. He points out some recent successes in different parts of Africa, such as Congo, Burundi and Sierra Leone, which all have been intervened by either a strong African country or the United Kingdom. But, in order to be successful the third part intervention needs to be able to carry both a strong stick and a carrot.

Unfortunately, Africa does not have a great history of successfully intervention, because many African leaders either seem unwilling to use a strong stick, or lack a strong stick, Rotberg argues. “Negotiators are always much more successful when they can actually use threats as well promises”, he adds.

Rotberg explains that Africa lacks so far a mechanism for intervening in civil wars in an effective manner. He notes, “we still do not know whether African Union will develop a crisis response ability that OAU certainly never had.”

Ronnås notes that Sweden is “very encouraged by recent moves to strengthen the African Union, in particular the establishment of a Peace and Security Council.” He adds, that Sweden thinks that the new African institutions are important progress, “like the election of the African Commission, and in agreeing on the composition of the African Peace and Security Council. The Council will have an important role in enhancing African capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region.”

The Kenyan Charge’ di’ Affaires, Daniel Tamui<sup>22</sup>, agrees with Ronnås that the “African capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management should be strengthened.” He adds that, “the international community can contribute more to this by supporting peace-keeping training and regional conflict resolution mechanisms.”

As long as there is an African institutional vacuum to intervene and play an active role as a peace-maker, the third part intervention in Horn of Africa rests more on the willingness from strong African states.

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### *NEPAD – an instrument for African integration?*

The subject on African integration ties into our second question: how conflicts in the region can be resolved. For more than 50 years, we have now witnessed the effects of the European integration of sovereign states, establishing the European Union (EU), and creating a platform for sustainable development and peace among the members of the EU. As Anders Wijkman<sup>23</sup> (Wijkman) pointed out “the best way to build peace would be to closely integrate their economies.”

The situation is of course very different in the Horn of Africa from Europe, but there are lessons to be learned from the European experience, Wijkman adds.

“If you integrate your economies, you can benefit from economies of scale, comparative advantages, and indeed more efficient use of shared natural resources,

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<sup>22</sup> Daniel Tamui is Charge’ di’ Affaires of Kenyan Embassy in Sweden. See appendix ii for his speech.

<sup>23</sup> Anders Wijkman is Vice Chairman of EU Parliament Committee for Development and Co-operation. His speech is available on videotape.

like water”, Wijkman explains. And once the benefits begin to be visual, the conflict is likely to gradually disappear.

Without making any immediate parallels with the European experience, Muchie outlines in great detail the need for a stronger African integration. “It is important to crystallize a new African synergy beyond the current de-colonized fragments. There is a clear need to forge an African nation going beyond the existing fragile, ineffective and fragmented state system. All nations are imagined communities. African unity is first and foremost the development of an African national consciousness to transform, build, guide and finally realize an African national project by thinking beyond the existing state frontiers. It represents above all the African conquest of a unity of purpose and unity of action to confront the many challenges Africans face in today’s fragile and chaotic world.”

Muchie reviews the consequence of fragmentation of African countries, which left them vulnerable to dependence on foreign assistance. This led to “unhealthy competition for limited donor funds, loans, and grants amongst African states”, he adds. Facing such a problem, Muchie suggests that, “one of the key principles to advance African integration is to reduce such destructive competition with co-operation and trust.” African integration and development have to go hand in hand, and it must be “designed to respond to the needs and aspirations of ordinary people.”

Muchie likens the African Union with an “African national community” that will lead to African integration. And, he likens New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) with the “economic arm in deepening and widening the integration process.”

Muchie explains that “the leaders have put forth four initiatives to address the

programmatic implementation of the NEPAD concept: a) the Peace and Security Initiative, b) Democracy and Governance Initiative, c) Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative and, d) the Sub-regional Approaches to Development.”

Muchie says, “while Africa’s leaders’ understanding of the political economy of the global economic system is contentious, on the whole NEPAD resonate a positive tone echoing very much the upbeat talk of the African renaissance. The development plan and agenda are supposed to have been owned by Africans, which means that African leaders will take responsibility for the failure and success of NEPAD. The leaders seek a new partnership that may or may not mean a diplomatically couched demand for reforming the existing structure of global power. The leaders pledge to democratize society and respect human rights and this is meant to be monitored through a peer-review mechanism. Poverty eradication is an essential foundation to protect human rights. They also pledge to ensure macro-economic stability, accountability and transparency of both leaders and institutions and the institutional and policy support to market relations. They pledge to pursue regional integration at both the regions and the level of the continent. They seemed to take Pan-African integration more as a step-by-step, incremental geographical, economic and political integration from the sub-regions to the continent. The danger of sub-regional incremental evolution in relation to the option of a big-bang burst into continental integration remains real. In addition, they have not addressed the issue of the historic African Diaspora and the recent Diaspora that migrated after the creation of the largely authoritarian post-colonial system of African Government.”

## Ethiopia aims for stability and development

Our third question can seem obvious: what do the people in the region want? Maybe, we should have asked: what do people want beyond peace? It might also seem obvious. However, a way out of conflict and poverty is not an easy one, but Ethiopia has recently embarked on one.

Together with Sweden, Ethiopia has recently signed a bilateral agreement for development cooperation, Ronnås reports. “Sweden will support Ethiopia’s efforts to implement its Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme. An area of particular interest to Sweden in this regard, is the planned legal sector reform. In order to ensure progress in the area of respect for human rights, a modern and effective legal sector is of vital importance”, he adds.

Ambassador Kebede of Ethiopia explains in more detail that the program consists of reforms within the agricultural and non-agricultural private sectors with a focus on export growth. The program also addresses the need for investment in education, and to strengthen the effort on capacity-building. Ethiopia also aims to improve governance, as well as to deepen and strengthen the decentralization process to shift decision-making closer to the grass root population.

Kudjoe notes that Ethiopia is “seemingly peaceful and stable on the surface”, but “the internal political situation is inherently unstable as the country is going through a transition to full and participatory democracy. However, since all the constitutional processes are still intact and the government holds out hope for proper democratization, Ethiopia can be regarded as stable in the region in its evolution towards full democracy.”

## Eritrea faces another drought

Even if one embarks on the path towards peace and development, the journey is likely to be very bumpy.

The Ambassador Desta provides some sad insights into the last years’ effect of the drought in southern Africa and in Eritrea in particular. “The harvest of 2001 was the lowest in the last ten years. Following the poor harvest in 2001, insufficient rainfall in 2002 contributed to yet another catastrophic year for Eritrean farmers.”

“The majority of the population is involved in agricultural activities and yet agriculture makes up to only 16 percentage of Eritrea’s gross national product. The low level of productivity achieved last year is the main cause of the widespread food shortage experienced by the country. Low agricultural output is partly due to the reliance on rain-fed agriculture and partly due to the fact that farmers work in harsh, arid to semi-arid environments where drought is common. For example, six of the last ten years were marked by a serious lack of rainfall that led to crop failure”, Desta adds.

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## Ideas and incentives for Somalia

Still in the midst of violence and without a government, Somalia has embarked on new peace talks since October 2002. As professor Samatar pointed out, there are many hurdles ahead for Somalia until there are any signs for real change towards peace and development.

Professor Arne Ardeberg<sup>24</sup> (Ardeberg) outlines some very important necessities

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<sup>24</sup> Professor Arne Ardeberg is the vice chancellor at Lund University. See appendix ii for his paper, *Lund University*

and possibilities for Somalia to consider. In collaboration with SIRC, Lund University has drawn up some rather optimistic plans for a reconstruction of the National University of Somalia in Mogadishu.

Ardeberg explains what a reconstructed national university has a lot to offer to the people of the Horn of Africa. “The university will set the scene for improvements in other social activities dependent on an intellectual and responsible dimension. Important examples are health care, social care, childcare and old-age care. Other necessities concern legal institutions, courts and a range of public institutions. A reconstruction of a functioning public administration is an essential part of the total endeavor”, he adds.

“Some of the examined students will continue at the university as teachers, researchers and in administratively and technically oriented positions, many will leave the university for other occupations. Some of them will continue as teachers in colleges and schools. This will imply an important strengthening of the total educative system of the country, a measure of fundamental necessity for an improved future and implementation of more equal opportunities for all people”, Ardeberg explains.

“It is strongly believed that the ensemble of actions will define a stabilizing factor, serving as a support of the strengthening of society and as an over-all motor of the emergence of a sustainable modern regional community. This way, the university will enhance the growth and power of peace, progress and prosperity, while maintaining ethical aspects high on the agenda”, Ardeberg adds. “A reconstructed national university can be an

efficient instrument in offering peaceful solutions.”

“A comprehensive university must be a natural target for a restoration of a national university. Such a university is foreseen in the discussion. It is understood as comprising several faculties. These have been taken to represent arts and humanities, theology, social sciences, economy, law, (natural) science, engineering, medicine and performing arts”, Ardeberg notes.

As we noted at the beginning of this summary, the role of promoting understanding of past developments and problems, and their causes and roots cannot be underestimated. Ardeberg explains how important the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, as well as the Department of History will play to fulfill this task and promote and restore national and regional pride. In addition, “the goal will be to explain how the region can turn its ethnical, cultural and other diversities into an advantage.”

In similar fashion, the Department of Theology will have a “vital role in the easing of the corresponding tensions and in working for improved religious understanding and tolerance”, Ardeberg notes.

Ardeberg presents a concrete example of how a reconstructed national university can play an important role. He outlines the potentials for a reconstructed national university to become an important player in developing production, storing, distribution and consumption of energy.

Ardeberg states that “once the practical process of artificial photosynthesis works, a new paradigm has taken over in the field of energy production.” Then, he argues, “we will be able to convert sunlight into useful energy, in a manner similar to that employed by vegetation.”

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*perspectives on the Horn of Africa - necessities and possibilities, in full transcript.*

This could lead to converting “the Horn of Africa into a competitive region with high standards of living and education, all with a clear international character and impact”, Ardeberg adds.

Wijkman notes that energy and water are two necessities for development in the Horn of Africa. Today, a very little percentage of the population in the Horn of Africa has access to electricity needed for lightening, refrigeration, communication, improvement of health services, and productivity. Wijkman also notes that the Nile River represents a potential asset for development of food production, transport, power generation, industrial development and conservation.

Few years ago, World Bank and United Nations Development Program launched the Nile initiative. Eleven members formulated a shared vision for development of the river basin. Wijkman explains the impact can be great since “equitable sharing of international water is a serious problem, and water management between stakeholders could serve as catalytic for regional integration.”

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## Conclusion and Recommendations

The speakers have contributed tremendously to enlighten us on three very basic questions but profoundly important for us to understand the answers to: Why conflict? How can it be resolved? What do people want?

The questions have all been answered. However, there are no obvious answers. As we have learned about the complexity of the region, is it too overwhelming to discuss peace building for the region as a whole, than focusing on one country at the time?

The answer is no, and, as many speakers pointed out during the conference, that many issues existing in the Horn of Africa are often highly inter-linked and trans-national. However, the region is highly diverse and each country has its own unique set of issues. Thus, to infuse the people in the Horn of Africa with new hope to move from a status of conflict to peace, we need a two-folded approach: one regional track, and a track for each country. However, these tracks should not be viewed as separate. Instead, their success is mutually dependent on each other.

As stated in the program, an aim with the conference was to address the deep-rooted causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of the regional conflicts. We learned from Dr. Salah Al Bander “that the issue of access to resources expressed in terms of equitable sharing, fairness, and social justice is the central concern for fighting groups.” We also learned from Dr. Bander the deep-rooted causes to conflicts in the region have changed over the decades from “a classic ethno-religious conflict to one primarily over resources.” However, the public perceptions of the causes of the conflicts have not changed over the same time. Dr. Bander thinks this creates an additional problem, because “the initial causes are constantly being amplified by the inversion of feelings (perceptions) into the causal sphere.”

Now, within the framework of a two-folded approach, we need to fill it with a strategy addressing both real and perceived causes of conflicts. Returning to Dr. Bander and his statement on real causes of conflict, we need to design the framework with a focus on the “conflict over resources”, and respect for “social justice”, which guarantees a fair distribution of resources and reflects the increasing problem with marginalization of groups.

A second feature for the framework addressing the real causes of conflict is the lack of leadership in the region. Dr. Ali Moussa Iye and Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar point at Somalia as an example where people have been and still are betrayed by their leaders, which feeds into the existing mistrust between them. The framework needs therefore to include a mechanism that ensures responsible leadership.

The regional leadership is a problem. We need to learn about the leaders influencing the peace building process locally and regionally. We need to find out who they are, and which role they play? For this reason, the two-folded approach is important. Where is the power today in Somalia, with the warlords? How does the clan structure play out in the peace building process? Where does foreign support come from, and how does it affect the power balance in Somalia? All these questions are not unique for Somalia. They should adequately be applied to Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as for the region as a whole.

A third feature for the framework to address is the role of human rights abuses. It is a very complex issue, because many abuses were committed by people in senior governmental positions, or by people with potential to take on leading governmental positions.

In the case of Somalia, Dr. Martin Hill asks whether “those who have committed human rights abuses in the past, during the Siad Barre government or the civil conflicts since 1991, be allowed to hold office with impunity in a future government.”

This question ties back to the role of leadership and responsibility. Dr. Hill offers however three different alternatives for the Somali post-conflict society to

adopt: conditional amnesty, truth-telling mechanism, or criminal prosecution.

Maybe these alternatives are adequate to all post-conflict societies in the Horn of Africa. The post-conflict situation is however quite different in each of the countries. In Sudan, there is a government, which has been at war with rebel groups. In Somalia, it is on-going discussions to form an interim- government, maybe composed by warlords. In Eritrea and Ethiopia, the governments were responsible for the war against each other.

For a successful conflict resolution with justice and reconciliation to sustain, it must be room for human rights. But, what does human rights mean to the Horn of African countries? What role and place does it have? Can justice be built and reconciliation be promoted while being at the mercy of leaderships with failing human rights records.

We need to define what building justice means. How should it be designed? What does it include? What should it be based on?

We also need to define what reconciliation means for the people in the region. We need to take a closer look at each country and learn what the people want, and what they expect from the future.

Professor Robert Rotberg pointed out the role of third party intervention, and together with Professor Mammo Muchie they argued for the importance of an African capacity to play a peace-building role on the African continent.

As we set out for this conference to initiate a dialogue between international scholars and practitioners, the discussions should be continued and materialized into the framework, encompassing the two-folded approach with responses to social justice,



leadership, and human rights as an adequate platform for peace building.

We are only at the beginning of our quest to understand the complexity and the dynamics affecting the process towards sustainable peace. We will therefore welcome future conferences to elaborate on key issues related to justice and reconciliation, as well as women participation.

The conference has welcomed the recommendations to:

- Establish Euro-Horn Civic Network
  - Carry out local programs to strengthen the capacity building for women issues
  - Carry out programmes for Horn of Africa peace building
  - Increase Swedish Governments' role in the Somali peace process.
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# APPENDIX I

## CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

The conference was chaired by Ambassador Count Pietersen, and co-chaired by Ms Bethlehem Araya, Mr. Nicklas Svensson, and Mr. Liban Wehlie.

There were more than 150 Participants each day at the conference with a wide range of backgrounds. The conference participants among others were included:

- **Larry Andow**, Mayor of City of Lund
- **Sonto Kudjoe**, South African Ambassador to Sweden
- **Anders Wijkman**, Vice Chairman, EU Parliament Committee for Development and Co-operation
- **Lars Ronnås**, Director, Africa Department, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- **Karin Johansson**, Desk Officer, Horn of Africa, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- **Berhanu Kebede**, Ethiopian Ambassador, Sweden
- **Peter B. Marwa**, Director, Conflict Prevention for East African Countries, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
- **Yonas Manna Bairu**, **Counsellor Embassy of Eritrea in Sweden**
- **Daniel Tanui**, Kenyan Charge di' Affairs, Sweden
- **Dr. Robert Rotberg**, Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution, Harvard University
- **Staffan Holmqvist**, Secretary for International Relations, City of Lund
- **Dr. Tarekegn Adebo**, Research Coordinator, Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala
- **Dr. Gudmundur Alfredsson**, Director, Raoul Wallenberg Institute, Lund University
- **Bethlehem Araya**, Co-chair, conference organizer, WePot AB, Ideon Research in Lund
- **Dr. Arne Ardeberg**, Professor, Vice Chancellor of Lund University
- **Dr. Salah Al Bander**, Director, Sudan Civic Foundation, Cambridge University
- **Angela Bystrom**, European Union Co-ordinator, Lund
- **Dr. Ole Elgström**, Professor, Department of Political Science, Lund University
- **Dr. Martin Hill**, Senior Researcher, Horn of Africa, Amnesty International
- **Julie Ikomi-Kumm**, Chairman of All African Congress, Sweden
- **Dr. Ali Moussa Iye**, Program Officer, UNESCO, France P.
- **Abdillahi Jama**, Chairman, Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre
- **Gunnar Kraft**, Program Officer Horn of Africa, Forum Syd
- **Jaime Barrios**, Program Officer, Forum Syd
- **Shiyan Sun**, Visiting professor, Raoul Wallenberg Institute
- **Prof. Oredsson**, Institute of History, Lund University

- **Dr. Mehari Gebre-Medhin**, Professor, Uppsala University
- **Gultie Berhanu**, 3<sup>rd</sup> Secretary of Ethiopian Embassy in Sweden
- **Salinda Biyana**, First Secretary of the South African Embassy in Sweden
- **Duale Amin**, 3<sup>rd</sup> Secretary of the Kenyan Embassy in Sweden
- **Prof. Göte Hansson**, Dean Faculty of Social Science, Lund University
- **Dr. Mammo Muchie**, Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark P.
- **Gillian Nilsson**, Head International Secretary, Social Democratic Party, Lund
- **Dr. Abdi Ismail Samatar**, Professor, Department of Geography and MacArthur Program on International Peace and Co-operation, Minnesota University
- **Petra Andersson**, Horn of Africa Program Officer, Olof Palme International Center
- **Joes Frans**, Swedish Member of parliament
- **Nicklas Svensson**, Board Member and Co-chair, Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre
- **Liban Wehlie**, Board Member and Co-chair, Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre
- **Dr. Håkan Wiberg**, Professor, Copenhagen Peace (p) Research Institute, Denmark
- **Count Pietersen**, Former South African United Nations Ambassador, Board member and co-chair, Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre
- **Dr. Bereket Yebio**, Assistant Professor, Malmö University
- **Abdullahi Elmi Mohamed**, PhD candidate, Institute of Technology, Stockholm
- **Dr. Abdalla Mohamed Jama**, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm
- **Ahmed Ali**, Chairman, Ethiopian Riskförbundet, Stockholm
- **Dr. Yokoub Abdi Aden**, Karolinska Hospital and Chairman Somali Reksförbundet in Stockholm
- **Engineer Nasir Badawi Hassan**, SIRC
- **Dr. Saida Jama**, Medical Doctor, SIRC
- **Engineer Ishael Siroiney**, SIRC Consultant
- **Engineer Martin Holmen**, Lund University, SIRC Consultant
- **Dr. Redeie Bereketab**, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala
- **Prof. Abdi Jama Ghedi**, Chariman of Daryeel Association
- **Nadia Guled**, SIRC
- **Ali Said Hassan**, Chairman of Golol Art Gallery, Germany
- **Mohsen Abtin**, Head S-Association International and Member of Lund City Council
- **Associate Prof. Ferrow Embaie**, Lund University
- **Girma Awake**, Chairman of Ethiopian Association in Lund
- **Hannan Awad**, Board Member Sudanese Association in Lund
- **Dr. kamal Jamil**, Board member Sudan Association in Lund, Lund University Hospital
- **Dr. Diya Awadi**, Chairman Sudanese Association in Lund, Malmö General Hospital

- **Ahmed Zarouk**, Board Member Sudanese Association In Lund
- **Nadia Osman**, Sudan Association in Lund
- **Engineer Mohamud Boss**, Chairman Center for Maritime, Reconstruction & Rehabilitation – Somalia
- **Mustafa Nasradin**, Chairman Ertrean Association in Lund
- **Kemesgen Belay**, Board Member, Eritrean Association in Lund
- **Howida Eid**, Board Member, Sudan Association in Lund
- **Rahel Haile**, Director Deab Travels in Lund
- **Sadio Haseinnin**, PhD Candidate, Center for Migration & Ethnic Relations (CIEFO), Stockholm
- **Dr. Bebiker Al Oboid**, political scientist, Uppsala
- **Dr. Zufan Araya**, Research Scientist, BioInvent International AB
- **Mahdi Ali**, businessman, Göteborg
- **Abdullahi Sh. Hussien**, Journalist Somaliweyn, Göteborg
- **Jörgen Strömberg**, Foreign Editor, Sydsvenskan
- **Dr. Abdulhadi Khalaf**, Assistant Professor, Lund University
- **Subair Warsi**, (M.A/M.LL) Chairman Urdu Academy Lund
- **Associate Prof. Alia Ahmad**, Lund University, SIRC Consultant
- **Marcus Glader**, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law
- **Tove Klette**, Kommunalråd City of Lund
- **Johan Hallenborg**, Program Officer, Raoul Wallenberg Institute
- **Associate Prof. Bertil Egero**, Lund University
- **Omar Ahmed**, Student, Lund University
- **Ahmed Abdulkadir**, Lund University student
- **Muse Abraham**, Chairman Shabia Eritrea in Lund
- **Dr. Abdimunim Babu**, Swedish University of Agricultural Science
- **Elhadi Bashir**, Lund University student
- **Tedros Mehretu**, The National Museum of World Cultures Advantage Göteborg
- **Maka Omar**, Lund University Student
- **Abdalla Awad**, Board member Ethiopian Association in Lund
- **Elongima Meama-Kajue**, Academic
- **Sahel Aden**, Lund university student
- **Emma Sandahl**, Lund university student
- **Mattataa Sinkolongo**, academic
- **Björn Kumm**, Freelance Journalist
- **Prof. Omar Mohamed Adow**
- **Sebhat Habteab**, Eritrea Association Lund
- **Hussien Barkad**, SIRC
- **Yonus Sium**, Eritrean Association,
- **Adan Suldan**, SODA
- **Per Lindqvist**, GIS-Centre, Lund University
- **Khaled Bayomi**, Department of History, Lund University
- **L. Mladenovic**, LIFS Lund
- **Sofie Allen**, Lund University
- **Ana Rocha**, IWGIA, Lund
- **Lulseged H. Yohannes**, Advantage Göteborg (NMWC)

- **Fikru Mekonnen**, Advantage Göteborg (NMWC)
- **Yohannes W/Selassie**, Advantage Göteborg (NMWC)
- **Ali Abou-Zeinab**, Economic History, Lund University
- **Jorge Capelan**, LIFS Lund
- **Shawqi Badri**, Academic
- **Asli Abraham**, Lund
- **Melaku Negash**, Eritrean Association Lund
- **Mickiel Woldemariam**, Lund
- **Mohamed Elmi Sabrie**, Norska Somalisk Selvhjelp
- **Abdinasir Omar Kahiye**, Norska Somalisk Selvhjelp
- **Getachew Darge**, Research Engineer, Lund University
- **Suad Mohamed**, Secondary school student in Lund

## Appendix II: Speeches delivered at the conference

### 1. Introduction speech by SIRC Chairman Abdillahi Jama

Dear distinguished ladies and gentlemen, We thank you all for accepting our invitation.

Last May, 2002, Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre (SIRC) based in Lund in co-operation with Horn of Africa scholars and Eritrean, Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese associations in Lund arranged a two-day conference entitled *Co-operation Instead of Wars and Destruction on Horn of Africa*.

The conference launched an Initiative to arrange future conferences, seminars, and meetings with the Horn of Africa in focus. The 2002-conference successfully brought together more than 300 participants from ten countries, including all the countries from the Horn of Africa.

The overall objectives with the Initiative were to create trust and confidence among the people from Horn of Africa, and to bring stakeholders from Horn of Africa together to coordinate lessons learned and best practices in the field of peace-building for Horn of Africa.

The Initiative was designed to generate recommendations in the fields of economic co-operation; social and cultural co-operation; democracy and human rights; and peace-building. It also aimed to produce an informal and a formal network of practitioners in the above mentioned fields. Through these recommendations, the Initiative aimed to formalize a number of activities for the participants in their efforts to create sustainable and peaceful solutions in the Horn of Africa.

A wide range of issues was discussed in the course of the two-day conference, and many participants shared experiences and stories that illustrated the need for regional co-operation and international attention. One conclusion underlined many of the discussions: the vital importance to integrate the grassroots level into the peace-building process. Over the course of the two-days, participants discussed at length different aspects of rebuilding the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular.

It was agreed among the participants to launch a second conference in May 2003 in Lund entitled **No Development Without Peace** in order to study more Horn of Africa problems and produce specific recommendations that can be implemented in the short term and long term.

I am therefore greatly honoured to introduce this second conference on behalf of SIRC and my dear friends, Horn of Africa scholars, as well as on behalf of Sudanese, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali associations in Lund.

This conference would not have been possible without the support from City of Lund, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Forum Syd/Sida, Lund University, Olof Palme International Center, ABF, and Folkuniversitetet.

As we soon will hear from many speakers with many years of experience in the field of peace-building and in the region of Horn of Africa, let us be reminded of the objectives with this conference, **No Development Without Peace**.

Our aim is to promote a dialogue between international scholars and practitioners on issues related to the region's development, such as, good governance, democracy, and human rights. Our ambition is that this conference will seek to establish a forum of scholars and practitioners for co-ordination and consultation, and to develop regular channels of communication on peace building issues.

We aim to address the deep-rooted social -economic, cultural, environmental, institutional, political and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of conflicts. Our second ambition is therefore that this conference will establish repertoires of best practices and lessons learned in functional areas of peace building.

Last but not least, we aim to raise public awareness of this sometimes forgotten region. We also hope that, we can offer you, my dear friends, a taste of a very rich and abundant culture from this war-torn region.

Working along these objectives, Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre believes together with our partners, we can contribute to a development in the right direction for the people in the Horn of Africa.

**Dear distinguished ladies and gentlemen**, as the program shows, the three-day conference consists of five parts:

**Part one:** Guests speakers from EU Parliament, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, IGAD, diplomats from South Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Horn of Africa scholars, Forum Syd, Lund University, Harvard University, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, and Amnesty International.

**Part two:** deals workshops on issues of peace and development and moderated by professors from Lund University, Rauol Wallenberg Institute, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, and Harvard University.

**Part three:** Cultural activities: exhibition of art, handcraft & literature as well as Horn of Africa cultural songs, music and dance.

**Part four:** Presentation of the conference recommendations

**Part five:** Closing remarks

I have now the honour to welcome Mayor of the City of Lund, honourable Larry Andow, to open the conference.

Thank you!

**2. Welcoming and Opening remarks**  
**By Mayor of the City of Lund, Honorable Larry Andow**  
At Horn of Africa conference 23-25 May 2003 in Lund Sweden

Your Excellencies,

Distinguished guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As Mayor of Lund, it is an honour and a pleasure for me, to welcome you all to our City and to the “Horn of Africa Conference”.

You will discuss “No Development without Peace”. This is an extremely important matter and I wish you all success.

Through centuries, Lund and its surroundings, was the battlefield between Sweden and Denmark. In fact the bloodiest battle in Nordic history took place here: The battle of Lund 1676 with more than 10.000 dead soldiers. Unfortunately that battle is better known than the Peace in Lund, three years later, 1679.

On the other hand side, I think that Sweden today has had a longer period of peace than any other nation. Since 1814 –during almost 200 years- we have enjoyed the peace in our country. I know that most of you come from nations with difficulties in this matter. From my full heart I wish peace in your country and a successful development for your nation.

Lund is one of the oldest cities in the Nordic Countries –more than 1.000 years old! From the mediaeval history we have many memories. The greatest is of course our Cathedral that I hope you will have a time to visit.

Today Lund is a charming city of past and present. Wander through the city centre and you will feel the “spirit of Lund”. Our University is the biggest in the Nordic Countries with about 40.000 registered students including those from many different countries. With this constant inflow of students and researchers from near and far, Lund is known for its young atmosphere.

Lund is very often referred to as “The City of Ideas”. It is a multicultural city full of life, with an innovative trade and industry. It is a meeting place of artists, writers, actors and musicians. It is a wonderful place to discover, live in and meet in. Here you can with success exchange thoughts, ideas and knowledge.

International well-known companies like Tetra Pak, Ericsson, Gambro and Alfa-Laval are situated here. The Research Park Ideon has generated over 500 companies, mainly within information technology, telecommunications and biotechnology.



For an international Conference, such as your “Horn of Africa Conference”, I think Lund can offer very good conditions. We appreciate very much your presence and we hope you will have successful discussions.

However, the last two weeks our city has been affected by a strike among the cleaning staff. I therefore very much regret, that Lund for the moment is not that nice and clean city as it use to be. I hope for your kind understanding for the situation.

I will personally, with the greatest interest, follow your discussions and conclusions.

Good luck with your Conference,  
Welcome to Lund and enjoy your visit in our city!

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### 3. Collective Patterns and Individual Behaviours: Questioning our Responsibility in the Moral Crisis of our Region.

By  
Dr. Ali Moussa Iye.

I will not make today another presentation on the necessity of co-operation, integration and peace in the Horn of Africa. First, because I am sure you are familiar with these critical issues that have been extensively addressed in numerous meetings and in the literature. Second, because I have nothing new to add so far to this debate since my paper of last year on the new regional vision to develop in order to build a genuine peace and sound co-operation between peoples of the Horn of Africa.

After decades of reflection and discussions, I think that there is a certain consensus among scholars about **what to do, how to do it and why things are not done** to concretise our aspiration for peace, democracy and development. As you know, what is really lacking is not “the want lists” but political will and persevering acts. In Africa in general and in our region in particular, rhetoric about solutions has even become a part of our problem.

Instead, I would like to share with you my concerns about the moral crisis affecting the peoples of the Horn of Africa. I wish to examine with you the logic behind the disastrous heritage of violence, famine, poverty and massive human rights abuse, which seems to characterise our region. I would like to interrogate the cultural and mental processes, which push us to accept and participate in the elaboration and implementation of catastrophic policies in our respective countries.

Why did a country like Somalia, which seems to fill the usually required conditions to build a nationhood fail so dramatically and fall in a devastating civil war, beating the Guinness record of the longest absence of a central government in recent history?

Why did Ethiopia and Eritrea, two allied countries impoverished by decades of war that were expected to inaugurate a new partnership and era of peace in the region surprise most of observers by engaging their peoples into another massacre ? A terrible war combining the vulnerability of trenches of the First World War with the efficiency of weapons of mass destruction of the Second World War.

Why does a country like Sudan, despite its interesting experience of democracy and tolerance continue to be devastated by a conflict driven by religious fundamentalism and ideology of race superiority?

Why is Kenya, the only country in the region that avoided civil war and armed liberation fronts, hunted to this point by social violence and banditry ?

Why did Djibouti, a country that had less problem in the power sharing between its different communities and witnessed the dramatic consequences of armed conflicts and instability in the region permit the conditions of a civil war ?

Considering the long history of confrontations in the region, these questions may look naïve to some of you. But they have the advantage of permitting us to reconsider the responses that are usually given to justify the fatality of war in the Horn of Africa.

Indeed, God has nothing to do with the chronic disasters in our region, they are man made calamities whose causes are well documented : colonial time bombs, violent power race between local rulers, venal conflicts of interests among fortune seekers, religious and ideological manipulations, unequal sharing of meagre resources, foolish dreams of illegitimate leadership. Of course, the list is not exhaustive.

This causal analysis has the advantage of avoiding the subjective and anecdotal version of our past as generally transmitted by national mythologies. It helps transcend the reductive vision of history that equates the complex evolution of societies with the petty intrigues of palace politics.

But this rational approach presents a problem: it has the tendency to reduce us to the position of objects of history. It overvalues the external causes and neglect the psychological and personal dimensions in the dramatic events of our region. The systematic search of external causes leads to overlook the need to understand the crucial notion of individual responsibility and ignores our role as subject in the making of our own fate.

Paradoxically, this rational approach seems to meet the irrational expectation of the peoples of the Horn. It satisfies our mentality of victimised peoples who prefer to consider “the Hell as product of the Others” as observed by the famous French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. We have the tendency to believe in discourses that designates and stigmatises for us the source of our trouble: the evil One, the barbarian neighbour, the vicious foreigner, the rampant internal enemy. The list is long here, too.

We do not like to disturb our soul and to question our conscience in order to determine our part of responsibility in the moral crisis of our society. I know, this is true for most of the peoples of the world. But in our case, this resistance to examine our role has reached a psychopathic level. Running away from responsibility has become a national sport in our communities. We are very good in such kind of Marathon, too.

Beyond the need to find escape goats to transfer our culpability, I think that peoples of the Horn do not like the shameful side of their social patterns to be analysed and exposed in public. We overvalue ourselves and feel degraded by accounts detailing our weaknesses and our sins in the face of the world. We prefer looking for more “serious” reasons to the decadence of our nations. Instead of discussing about the inner reasons of our complicity in the horror of the region, we prefer cultivating the nostalgia of our lost innocence.

It is instructive to notice that the peoples of the Horn have not produced any significant novel literature. It is not only because of the importance of oral tradition in our culture. I think that our reluctance to accept inner descriptions and free and core pictures of our psychology may explain this. This may be also true for the absence of any significant cinematography in our region.

The few famous novelists we have in the region are much more known and read abroad than in their own country. Instead of a tradition of novels, we have developed a culture of poetry, tales, epics, essays, a kind of literacy that put the focus on the abstract and metaphorical aspects of messages. We generally disregard the methodical reports of facts and appreciate the lyricism of declaratory statements.

These attitudes are aggravated by the fact that the Intellectuals of the region rarely exchange and confront their analysis and visions in a direct way. Most of the time, they prefer to dialogue through foreigners, mainly Westerners. Each of our countries has created its own circles of studies like Ethiopian studies or Somali studies but scholars of the neighbouring countries are rarely invited to participate in the debate. We do not like to take the risk of hearing another version of our history and refuse to listen to the antithesis of our beliefs. Specially if these questionings come from intellectuals of the neighbouring countries.

Now let us come back to the main concern of my paper : the moral crisis that we are facing today in the Horn of Africa. I know that our region has already gone through different period of decadence and that our peoples have overcome many moral regressions. But the crisis we are witnessing today is shaking the fundamental values of our societies.

What is happening in our respective countries in terms of social patterns and individual behaviours calls for new intellectual and psychological approaches, new literacy tools, new forms of expression. We need to find new ways and new words to tell the true stories of our history. We need group therapies to understand ourselves and face our ugly images in the mirror of reality.

I don't think I will have the time here to recall all the pillars that have been destroyed during these last decades of violence, dictatorship and lawlessness. I let this task to our Sheikhs and priests who are better equipped than me to report on the decadent behaviours of their communities. Even they are today confronted with new sins that they have not yet integrated in their redemption or “born again” strategies.

Many of religious leaders affirmed to have identified more signs than necessary to announce the End of the world.

I would just like to mention three examples, which are symptomatic of this moral crisis.

The first case concerns the loss of the ethics of war in our region.

We know that most peoples of the Horn could not be considered as exemplary peaceful peoples. But we used to have our own code of ethics in wartime to control the level and the nature of violence.

The Somali pastoral culture that I am more familiar with have developed a remarkable set of war rules, which were used to protect the dignity and the life of some vulnerable categories of populations such as women, children, elders, knowledge people during armed conflict. This sort of pre-Geneva Convention was serving as a watchdog to discourage barbarian acts that the fear and spectacle of death may trigger.

When you see what is happening in Somalia, you cannot imagine that the clan militias who took control over the country had ever had such ethics in their tradition. They seem so proud to kill, robe and rape their own peoples that you wonder what kind of parents, of culture gave birth to such monsters.

These Mad Max killers are the product of the terrible moral failure of the whole Somali society. A moral crisis that is prior to the collapse of Somali State. A contagious crisis that continue to affect even those in the Diaspora who escaped from the pestilence of the battle fields.

The other example I would like to mention concerns Ethiopia. During the armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, I was working in Addis Ababa and I witnessed incredible scenes of immorality. I have seen very close friends and relatives influenced by the propaganda from each side taking hard position against each others and becoming irreducible enemies over night. I have seen neighbours who used to eat, to laugh and to celebrate religious ceremonies with their Eritrean friends participate in the looting of their belongings when the latter were suddenly expelled in the middle of the night. I have heard that the same also happened in Eritrea.

You can find some kind of rationale, even if it is unacceptable from a Human rights point of view, for State brutality against peoples who are unjustly accused of collaboration with enemies. But for the violation of family ties, friendship and neighbourhood obligations, there is only one explanation : the moral crisis that decades of war cruelty and cynic dictatorship have developed in the mind and the heart of people.

The third example also concerns Somalia. It a combination of the different attitudes that I mentioned earlier. It is a true story that happened recently in this war-torn country. A Somali refugee living in a Western country came back in Mogadiscio to see his old mother and give her the money he saved for her. An elder uncle of him who got informed about this operation, has contacted one of those armed bandits operating in the city to kidnap the visitor and ask for a ransom to liberate him. The uncle then proposed his service to the poor mother to negotiate with the bandits and advised her to pay the ransom if she wanted to see his son alive. In this immoral operation, the uncle gained a small part of the money from the bandits who obliged their victim to leave urgently the country. This sad story illustrates the level of deterioration of one of the essential pillars of Somali society: the family solidarity and mutual obligations, the respectability of elder.

Beyond the enumeration of examples of our decadence, what is interesting here is to ask ourselves why this moral crisis is deeper and more alarming than the previous ones. While trying to answer this question, we should keep in mind the point I made earlier on the

necessity of shifting from an explanation based on external causes to an approach centred on the inner motivations of the actors of the crisis insisting on our role as subject of history.

Even if it is not easy, in the chain of historical events, to determine what comes the first, the Chicken or the Egg, it is important to understand the origin of this moral crisis. I think that it is not only a consequence of economic hardship, socio-political turmoil and war. It is also a pre-existing factor, which facilitated the causes and conditions of the tragedies in our region.

The question of our individual responsibility in the collective moral crisis of the region is in itself a **moral question**, which needs to be discussed. Each of us should face the situation by asking himself three sorts of critical questions:

**What did I do during the crucial moments at my personal level ?**

**What am I doing to prevent the same things to happen again ?**

**What would I like to leave after me for the coming generations ?**

We should ask these questions to ourselves each time we discuss about the tragedies of our region. Because this exercise has the virtue of facilitating the necessary humility and tolerance we need to understand what really happened.

But we should, at the same time, be aware of the limits of our personal responsibility in the fate of our country. We should not replace our tendency to put the guilty on others by an obsession of our culpability. Because our personal responsibility in the moral crisis is mitigated by the laws of the mass psychology.

Individuals are capable to commit the worse or to accomplish the best, all depends on how their mood is captured in the movement of crowds in which they are involved. Individuals may have noble aspirations but it depends on how these good sentiments are collectively managed in the historical process.

A collective behaviour is never the sum of individual attitudes. It is a different reaction that transforms individual actions into an new dynamic, which transcends the will or control of each of us taken separately.

In other words, personal moods can, in a given historical context, lead to collective attitudes driven by a dynamic independent from individual will, which could be analysed later as external causes.

The moral crisis of our region is a perfect example of this complex combination between individual acts and collective dynamic. We all share the responsibility of what happened in our country by having successively or even simultaneously played the role of spectator, victim and of author of the horror.

To illustrate this notion of “shared responsibility” in the moral crisis of our region, let me now discuss the ethical cynicism that seems to affect the peoples of our region.

It became very difficult today to discuss seriously with fellow countrymen or with neighbours about visions and projects aimed at overcoming the disasters of our region and change the situation. If you speak about values of equality, solidarity, brotherhood, at best you are seen as naive dreamer who has not drawn any lessons from the history , at worse you are considered

as a manipulator who has a hidden agenda. Very few people will give credit to the sincerity of your vision and trust you. This loss of confidence in discourses of good will is a consequence of the series of ideological and political betrayals that we experienced in the Horn of Africa in the seventies.

I would take two well known cases in Somalia and Ethiopia.

The Somali people living all around the world once had a big dream : the dream of Great Somalia, which was supposed to liberate them from all foreign oppression and assemble the different Somali provinces in one country. We all have adhered to that dream and were sincerely ready to sacrifice some of our important traditions such as clan solidarity, personal autonomy and local particularities. We were even ready to sacrifice our family and our life to see this dream come true.

A clique of political leaders understood the importance of our attachment to this dream and offered us the speeches we were expecting. We easily signed a blank cheque authorising them to buy the dream at any cost. They pushed their people to clean the country from all the traitors to the project of greatness: the reactionary intellectuals, the deviant artists, the obscurantist elders, the fundamentalist religious leaders. While the country was suffering against one of the worse famine in his history, they convinced their people to go to war against Ethiopia where a sister revolution was going on.

After the disaster of the war, Somalis begun to realise the gravity of the trickery. While they were paying heavy sacrifices, the regime was violating one by one all the values and principles for which they were suffering. Instead of the Great Somalia belonging to all Somalis around the world, they realised that the country has been sold to clan-based interests. The great leadership of the great dream betrayed the common cause and showed the pettiness of his vision. Somali people discovered, but very late, the hideous face of Syad Barre, the monster for whom they sold their soul. While they were running behind the promised lands, they left what they had, the Independent Somalia, to a regime, which institutionalised the lowest human attitudes : layer, racket, corruption, clan intolerance and privilege.

The ethical traumatism produced by this betrayal of Somali dream has a far-reaching impact in Somali people. It is at the heart of the cynicism and collective madness that we are witnessing in Somalia today.

This disillusion, which affected every Somali individual has become itself a collective problem and a cause of further betrayal of ideals. Somali people are today kept in this vicious circle.

We can mention the case of Ethiopia where the dream to get rid of an archaic feudalism and achieve an egalitarian revolution has raised the enthusiasm of the people of this country. Here also, the ideals of freedom, solidarity and progress have been betrayed by a military regime who replaced it with terror while the propaganda was continuing to preach those ideals. A whole generation has lost confidence in those betrayed values and today the humanistic aspirations of the Ethiopian revolution left the place these generous aspirations to narrow discourses of selfish ethnicity.

Most of the people of our region has passed through such kind of traumatism, which nourishes the cynicism that perpetuates the moral crisis in our countries. How can we get out of this vicious circle?

Of course, I have not the pretension to offer an appropriate answer. But I think this is one of the serious questions that we should discuss each and every time we meet for debate. For so many years, we peoples of the Horn of Africa have perhaps spent our time and energy by asking the wrong questions in settling our problems. I hope that the alarming moral crisis we are going through could at least have the therapeutic effect to make us ask the right questions in the search for solutions.

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#### **4. PEACE, GROUP RIGHTS, AND DEVELOPMENT**

##### *A Political Ecology Approach*

Dr Salah Al Bander, Director, Sudan Civic Foundation

In the departure section at Heathrow Airport was a collection box for African children. It was half filled with coins: British pences, marks, guilders, francs and dimes—the rich world’s small change! The message was clear: When you have bought your duty-free shopping and still have some coins to spare, leave them there. I resisted the invitation and put my loose change back in my pocket and left for Lund. I know that most of you will quickly wonder as to how does this selfish attitude on my part will affect our deliberation today. But, I request your kind patience. I hope that the issue will become clearer at the end of this meeting.

As it is recognised by all of us after a year of our last gathering in this very hall to share our concerns and hopes, that we are yet to find a feasible exit out of our troubles in the Horn of Africa. The period between May 2002 and yesterday was again one of political turbulence, spiralling inter-communities violence and concomitant economic problems. Much of the conflicts in our region in fact resemble medieval power plays between local warlords more than it does 21<sup>st</sup> century clashes of ideologies. Since then it seems nothing has changed in our region. The same elements of conflict are continuing to undo the slow moves towards a sustainable peace, sustainable democracy and sustainable development. Unfortunately, most of the problems we explored then are still with us today **and** many of the issues we discussed at that time are still being discussed now.

However, few things are emerging: more recognition of the role of civic forums, and more recognition that shifting the focus from our region to different areas where oil and big business are prime interests are not going to stabilise international security. Fortunately, the invasion of Iraq, and the continuous destabilisation of Arabia are bringing our region to the attention of the international strategic planners. I mentioned this less recognised or acknowledged fact in our meeting last year. Here, I remind ourselves again that we cannot think about our future without confronting this issue in its widest form.

The role of Arabia in our search for peace, democracy and development is substantial. Again, as I have argued elsewhere, we rarely stop and quantify the precise links. Middle East finance, arms, intelligence support to the conflicts parties and manipulations of our Diaspora communities in the Gulf States are still playing a very significant role in our drive for peace and stability. Yet, neither our civic leadership nor our international partners are interested in dealing OR confronting such a sensitive issue.

In the Gulf States, political Islam intensely supports the divisions in the Horn, which they perceive as a frontier of Islam and Arab culture since our region provided political asylum to the pioneer converts to Islam. Today, the Horn of Africa is viewed as a backyard to safeguard

a legitimate interest within an unaccepted sphere of influence. The webs of business relationship between elites in the Horn of Africa and the Arabia bind ties of ideology and culture even closer. Religion, culture and economic interests have therefore combined in support of aggressive and uncompromising covert policies that promote further conflicts and instability in the region. **We cannot deal with our immediate challenges without extending a hand to any efforts to democratise Arabia.**

On the other hand, to the Horn of Africa politicians, the bloody events of the last three decades have been less than triumphs. To the interested circles in the West they have been another chapter in the history of the region's inter-tribal and intra-communities conflicts that is being written in our history books. But, worst of all are the continuing dominance of the myopic views of our privileged elites. It seems that historical knowledge plays no significant role in their thinking, despite the very critical venture upon which they are engaged.

In consequence, the regional and international efforts to reach peace are not coming to a positive conclusion. Sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa is still as elusive as ever, while the despair of the people is consistently being reinforced. Everything has been in turmoil and in instability and yet appears to have stayed the same ---- with the **exception** of the alarming factor of the growing oil wealth in the Sudan and its implication on intensity of the civil war, and destabilisation of the whole region.

The prevailing situation in our region, no doubt, began in earnest two centuries earlier. It was accelerated during the Scramble for Africa after Berlin Conference of 1884. The current conflicts are, indeed, **bitter** harvest for **bitter** seeds. Hence, the better understanding of the PAST is a major component in developing any strategies for any future political and socio-economic change. The 4Rs **reconciliation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reforms**, the buzzwords of present day discourse, no doubt, are depending at large on this factor.

Although our elites, for short-term political leverage, have manipulated the past, there has been little space opened up constructively to scrutinise our region's history. This must be done if long-term, sustainable peace and development are ever to be accomplished. In the meantime, and despite the hope that can be gleaned from some efforts here and there, the conflicts will continue.

The most obvious fact of our survival in the Horn today is the critical interdependence between our people, their institutions and the ecological zones of the region. Almost all of the conflicts are taking place along ecological borders not the political boundaries. Until a better understanding to the transformational nature of the conflicts is reached, their costs will continue to limit any attempts at the successful resolution of them. The dominant approaches at present rely almost entirely on diversity divide. It confuses causes, perceptions, impacts, manifestation and triggers.

In this direction, the Sudan Civic Foundation is still trying. The serious issue here this time is an urgency to deal with our ordeals through innovative perspectives. A political ecology approach might be one of many tools, and I have discussed this issue in details elsewhere. However, I will focus here on the serious implications of it on our deliberation in Lund from now onwards. Yesterday and this morning many contributions pointed, often indirectly, that the understanding and interpretation of the evolution of our difficulties in the Horn required a model shift in our socio-political thinking since no external model is valid.



In all cases of group rights violations in the Horn of Africa it is clear that the issue of **access** to resources expressed in terms of equitable sharing, fairness, and social justice is the central concern for fighting groups. With this factor all our efforts to understand or resolve conflict depends largely on dealing specifically with the triangle of the state, who is controlling the resources, and access available to whom?

Out of this effort we published a book in Arabic. The first of its kind to target Arabic-speaking people in the Horn of Africa and our cousins in the Middle East. We tried to introduce them to the political ecology roots of the African conflicts in general and in our region in particular. At the same time, we stated that we are fully recognising that the Horn's conflicts have multiple roots. Organically, it was largely a response to the continuing marginalisation of the majority of the people, first through officially-mandated policies, and on parallel through a powerful socio-economic, political and informal actions. At present it is clear sign that the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are moving towards **RESOURCE-BASED** ones.

Yet, many analysts still believe that the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are oiled by competing conceptions of nationalism. In the Sudan, the privileged elite view the frontiers of Afro-Arabian relation as sacred rights where their responsibility to preserve Islam expansion and linked concepts of land, race and nation. Slightly modified forms are introduced in other parts of the Horn of Africa.

I believe that conflicts are processes, not static events. It is clear from the developments over the last three decades that time have gradually if consistently changed the nature of the conflicts from being regarded as a classic ethno-religious conflict to one primarily over resources, with the twin of economic and resource crisis emerging as the driving force in all its conflicts.

To understand the turmoil of violence and dislocation, a differentiation between **structural** and **direct** causes of conflict is useful. Structural problems are responsible for making the whole region at risk of destabilisation, while the direct causes are the ones that actually ignite violent conflict.

The five Countries of the Horn of Africa are overwhelmed with intrinsic **structural** problems that are conducive to violent conflict, whenever immediate causes arise. These major structural factors are amplified and reinforced by ever more shrinking resources and exploitation of identity dichotomies. They collectively influence the state of war and peace in the region. For example poverty, the governance system, urbanisation, ecological collapses, ...and the rest.

The state as a tool failed to implement whatever development plans agreed on, and failed to bring sustainable peace or establish democracy. Instead it has become highly politicised, often a one-party clientelist state (like EPLF in Eritrea, EPRDF in Ethiopia and NCP in the Sudan). Such states are incapable of meeting the challenges of sustainable peace, sustainable democracy, and social justice.

As a result of our mutilated development and increasing density of our population Horn of Africa's outward appearance is experiencing a profound patterns. In 20 years time the population of this region will be more than the total population of USA and Canada combined, and more than half of them will be under 15 years of age. However, the difference

is that the Americans are living in an area larger by five times and much more richer and advanced in all aspect of socio-economic and political terms than our region.

It is true that such changes are taking place all over the world, but for the Horn the transformation has a particular significance. What is at stake is a land deeply imbued with culture part of which has been almost eradicated through centuries of exploitation – the visible sign of a unique history. Contrary to the urbanisation process during the industrial stages in the West and Asia, the **urbanisation** in our region meant displacement of people from areas of hunger and physical insecurity to urban centres, where things are relatively better. At the same time the majority of the young are unemployed and are thus available for other forms of exploitation, for example, criminal ventures, recruitment by warlords, in *jihād* and other military campaigns.

In the words of my mentor Dr Mohamed Suliman, the problem in the Horn of Africa is that most people are doing the same things. Most peasants plant the same crops and take care of the same livestock and there is little structural differentiation in the regional economy. This means that in time of crisis, very little help can be expected from other sectors of the economy.

The too-many-people-doing-the same-thing-syndrome means that damage to the natural environment is being reinforced and aggravated year in, year out. **Degraded land** is promptly abandoned and tractors are moved into adjacent and far away lands. There is however, scarcely any more land left. The indigenous owners resist the advance of mechanised agriculture and often-violent conflicts erupt between absentee landlords supported by the state and the local people. If the tractors fail, tanks move in. The clear examples are from the Sudan: continuous movement of intensive commercial mechanised farming into south of the Blue Nile, into the Nuba Mountains, into Darfur and towards the South proper.

The overall situation is further compounded by **uneven** distribution and sharing of resource endowment. Land is scarce in the Horn of Africa and is identified as the most critical “Resources Battleground”. On top of all these structural problems, which plagued the region, deep rooted, traditional **identity dichotomies** (ethnic, cultural and religious differences) started to surface and play an important role in inspiring violence in the land. Then, the public perception of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa as **identity** wars began to take root in the minds of many observers. Identity inverted from being a perception of the conflict into an inherent cause of it; from being an abstract social and political category into a concrete social force. Effect has inverted to a cause. That is why malignant conflicts are difficult to resolve because the initial causes are constantly being amplified by the inversion of feelings (perceptions) into the **causal** sphere.

To highlight what we mean by this inversion case we look again at the Sudanese experience. Many people concerned about the human cost of the civil war in our country are continuing to perceive it as a war between African Christians and Arab Muslims. Here are some curious facts that may help dismiss misconceptions about the war and should show at the same time the degree of complexity of an African internal war.

**The majority of foot soldiers of the Sudanese army some 90% are Southerners, Nuba and Westerners, more than 60% of them are non-Muslims.**

Though a by-product of the war, South/South conflict is often more violent and devastating than the Civil War itself. For example, the Dinka/Dinka, Nuer/Dinka and Nuer/Nuer conflicts.

**Many Southern politician, army officers, and civil servants are allied with the Khartoum government and are supporting it in all its policies without reservation. In fact, the supporters of the current government from the Southern region are more than any previous ones in the history of the conflict.**

**Almost 3 million Southerners live and work in the North. The majority of them attributed that to the relative safety and security of the place.**

The only way forward must lead to lasting and just peace, respect of law and practice of democracy and human rights and the pursuit of sustainable development for all. One of the obstacles slowing the realisation of these aims and objectives is the weakness of civil society. The situation is further complicated by the role of the controlling elites in dividing the forces of socio-political changes in the region. The state of affairs is further complicated by the attempts of international initiatives to influence the events in the region.

At present, the influence of outside powers is growing in proportion to the decline of regional power. While most external players support the development of the region, they hold different visions for the direction of its strategic progress. At the same time, the West, supporting both governments and rebels, plays a dual role. Far more significant, however, has been the role of the international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank. Overseas interests are therefore to be regarded as one root cause in the continuation of the conflict in the region.

So what is going to happen?

Well.....It is very difficult to foresee future developments. Too many subjective and objective factors are in interplay in the region now. Major stakeholders continue to misunderstand the transformation of the internal conflicts and in consequence misconstrued their policy choices. They chose coercive rather than accommodationist options. Official policies, in all of the Horn of Africa, can be pointed to as classic cases of how irresponsible, zero-sum leadership decisions so often lead to national disasters and continuous missed opportunities.

No transition towards sustainable peace, sustainable democracy and sustainable development are value-neutral. Indeed, there is general consensus that these objectives are achievable. But there are divergent positions about HOW to achieve the desired end: social justice. This requires an organic change in the current balance of power. The whole process is a dialectical one between the privileged elite controlling the state, the armed opposition forces and civil society. A more comprehensive approach that takes into account the region's diversity, as a microcosm of Africa's reality, the transformation of conflicts to a resource-based one, and more attention to the interdependence between group rights and political ecology of the region. Without focusing more on these elements the conflicts will continue for another century.

A lack of adequate understanding about this perpetual "conflict keeping forces" will continue to undermine any attempts at the political resolution of the conflict and the socio-economic reconstruction of the region. Those forces include a powerful military establishment, high degree of militarisation, the politically destabilising potential of oil production in the Sudan, the continuous avoidance of the marginalised majority needs including women etc.

All efforts towards a stable region that will facilitate the formation of a collective consciousness to live in peace, to share a destiny and re-enforce the will to remain together

need to consider these forces. All these factors show to the ruling elites in each of the region's countries, their warlords, their regional backers and the international community that peaceful co-existence between communities is unavoidable. The people of the Horn are interested in "living together" not as "living side by side". Communities in the Horn, as I mentioned in my last year's presentation, know that living together is an irrevocable fate, cemented by the emerging political ecology of the region. They have no alternative but to find a workable solution.

As far as the European experience is concerned, it is of critical importance that the states give up part of their sovereignty. The experience shows they are less defensive towards each other, and collaboration is increasingly taking place. It is not surprising that we are looking with great interest to the development of the IGAD as a model for peace making forum for sustainable development. It shows, also, that emphasis is shifting to group rights, autonomous arrangements, devolution of power to the local people and the importance of regionally developed conflict resolution approaches.

Last, but not least, it is my firm conviction that in all the uncertainties that cloud the political sky of our region, **one** thing is becoming increasingly reliable. The future stability of the Horn of Africa depends on the reciprocal goodwill of each of its countries towards others as much as on the determination and growing strengths of networking between its civil society components. Our participation in this forum here in Lund affirms what we are trying to do about the region.

Trust and confidence are virtues, which cannot be created or sustained in the abstract. They can only be structured through direct contacts if there is a common will amongst us the citizens of the Horn. The role of our international partners is to facilitate our efforts. I can see an excellent role in the one made possible for the second time by the Swedish sponsors of this meeting. Our gathering here in Lund is living proof of this opportunity. To the organisers and the supporters of this meeting our unreserved gratitude.

Thank you for listening

Cambridge  
May 2003



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## 6. Statement by

H. E. Kebede Berhanu

Ambassador of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

To the Scandinavian countries

At the Horn of Africa conference under the theme

No Development Without Peace

25 May 2003 in Lund, Sweden

Mr. Chairman  
Honorable Delegates Ladies  
And Gentlemen,

At the outset, let me seize this opportunity to extend my sincere thanks to the organizers of the conference, who have made possible for all of us to discuss and exchange views on an issue of paramount importance to the people and Governments of the Sub region.

The Horn of Africa, a region that has repeatedly witnessed the horrors of fratricidal conflicts requires a serious commitment both at national and international level to squarely address the cause of these conflicts. Confronted with armed conflicts and the ensuing human, financial and material costs, our task is two folds, on the one hand, we must strengthen our capacity to provide relief and support to people who are displaced as the result of the conflict, and on the other hand devise effective strategies to prevent conflicts from arising in the first place.

Mr. Chairman,

Devising preventive strategies requires that we first have clear understanding of the underlying causes. The causes of war are inherently more difficult to explain than those of natural events. Social behavior is not subject to physical laws. People make their own history often violently and sometimes inexplicably. Causality is therefore, complex and multi dimensional and it differs often fundamentally from conflict to conflict.

We can, however, identify some conditions that increase the probability of war. In recent years poor countries have been far more likely to become embroiled in armed conflicts than rich ones. It is therefore, central for the countries of the region and development partners to take concrete measures to eradicate poverty through the implementation of sustainable development programs.

In addition to this fundamental approach to preventing conflicts, there are certain strategies, which we need to effectively implement. We have to consistently make the best use of preventive diplomacy. Preventive deployment, and preventive disarmament are also instrumental to prevent non-violent conflicts from escalating into war, and earlier wars from erupting. The objective reality in our region has made it clear to us that preventive diplomacy need not be restricted to officials. To be effective private individuals as well as national and international civil society organizations have a role in conflict prevention, management and resolution. Early warning is also an essential component of preventive strategy and in this regard we have to steadily improve the capacity of our sub regional organization, the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Mr. Chairman,

Our sub regional organization IGAD should also embark in close collaboration with its member states, the United Nations and the African Union on preventive deployments and preventive disarmament. Experience of other countries confirms that preventive deployment is pivotal in containing conflicts by building confidence in areas of tension or between highly polarized communities. In view of the excessive presence and flow of small arms in our sub region, serious effort has to make to curtail the trafficking of these weapons. As a region affected by this lethal trade, we have to be active partners of the various initiatives being pursued with in the United Nations, at the regional level and by non Governmental organization coalition.

Mr. Chairman,

Present reality pertaining to our sub region dictates that post conflict peace-building action should become part of our long term preventive strategy. A study of the United Nations University underscores that inclusive government is the best guarantor against internal violent conflicts. Inclusiveness requires that all the major groups in a society participate in its major institutions -government, administration, police and the military. Generally what is involved here is to ensure good governance. Promoting the rule of law, tolerance of minority and opposition groups, transparent political policies, an independent judiciary, an impartial police force, a military that is subject to civilian government control, a responsible free press, vibrant civil society institutions and respect for basic human rights need to be given the utmost priority.

In countries with fragile economy the above stated post conflict peace building measures can not be implemented smoothly. It requires consistent economic support which creates enabling environment for people engaged in conflict to appreciate the dividend of peace. Greater effort should be put by development partners and International financial institutions to ensure that development programs that promote sustainable peace and security in post conflict society are implemented.

Mr. Chairman,

The protracted conflict in Somalia remains as one of the major hurdles to the peace and stability of the sub-region. The Government and people of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, deeply concerned of this difficult situation that is faced by the fraternal people of Somalia and the people of the whole sub-region since the collapse of the Government structure in 1991, has been relentlessly working for the restoration of peace and stability in that neighboring country. In this regard, as a front line state directly affected, Ethiopia has continued to discharge its responsibilities in the regional context and is currently fully engaged in contributing to the Somalia peace and reconciliation conference under the auspices of IGAD.

It is the earnest hope of the people and government of Ethiopia, that the ongoing Somalia National Reconciliation process in Kenya will achieve its lofty objective of restoring peace and stability in Somalia. It is only the strict acceptance and implementation of the declaration of hostilities and the structures and principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation processes by all political forces that can ensure the emergence of Somalia that has its proper place in the international arena. We believe very strongly that it is only the people of Somalia that should assume the sole responsibility of leading the peace process. The role of the countries of the region and development partners is to give the necessary support to the constructive engagement of the political forces in Somalia.

Mr. Chairman,

It is incumbent up on me to give clarification to this august assembly on some baseless allegations directed against my country by destructive elements in Somalia bent to sow the seeds of misunderstanding between the fraternal people of Somalia and Ethiopia. These groups have accused Ethiopia of having military presence in Somalia and at times supporting some Somali factions. Ethiopia does not have military role in Somalia nor does Ethiopia ever invaded Somalia or occupied parts of Somalia. These allegations are completely false. They are merely echo's of the allegations made by destructive elements in Somalia. Ethiopia fully respects the territorial integrity of the country and favors no one group in Somalia and totally rejects the allegations, which are completely false and unfounded.

Mr. Chairman,

However, Ethiopia did engage in a military hot pursuit against all. Al-Itihad Al Islamia, terrorist group that carried out indiscriminate attacks inside Ethiopia. This is a legitimate action undertaken under international law. This limited legitimate measure taken by Ethiopia to defend the security of the country against the network of international terrorism should not be construed as a direct interference in the affairs of Somalia. Terrorists attack indiscriminately to achieve their political ends. Al-Itihad carried out terrorist attacks against Ethiopia causing a large number of civilian casualties and destruction of property and permanent disability on innocent civilians. The existence of a terrorist group with an international network in Somalia, where there is no central

government authority is a serious concern not only to Ethiopia, which has a long porous boundary with Somalia, but also to the sub region and to the international community at large.

Mr. Chairman,

What we are witnessing currently in our sub region the atrocities of this irresponsible group. Ethiopia had appealed repeatedly to the international community to take decisive action against this group before it becomes a menace to the peace and stability of the sub region but to no avail.

The actions taken by Ethiopia therefore should not be characterized as a direct interference in internal affairs of Somalia. Ethiopia strongly believes that it would benefit more from the emergence of strong Somalia with a vibrant political and economic system. It is with strong Somalia that Ethiopia could engage in a constructive dialogue for a mutually beneficial cooperation between the brotherly people of Somalia and Ethiopia. It is against this backdrop that the people and government of Ethiopia fully support the resolution of the Security Council aimed at bringing peace and stability in Somalia and would continue to work relentlessly for the establishment of an all inclusive government under the auspices of the IGAD-initiated Somalia peace and reconciliation conference.

Mr. Chairman,

Ethiopia as one of the IGAD member countries and sharing common boundaries with five of them is committed to enhance a comprehensive regional cooperation arrangement. In this regard, Ethiopia attaches paramount importance to the mission of IGAD to achieve regional cooperation and economic integration through the promotion of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, inter regional trade and development of important communication and infrastructure. Ethiopia, to extricate itself from chronic poverty and to live upto its responsibility of promoting this sub regional vision has under- taken a broad spectrum of reform measures at a national level. The reforms are designed to address the immediate need of economic recovery and reconstruction as well as to jump-start the economy to ensure sustainable development. The major thrust of Ethiopia's Sustainable Development and Poverty reduction program consists of: -

The improvement of the Agricultural sector which has an over riding primacy in the improvement of the welfare of the rural population and generating primary surplus to fuel the growth of other sector of the economy.

Strengthening the private sector growth and development especially in industry as means of achieving off farm employment and out put growth.

Rapid export growth through the production of high value agricultural products and increased support to export oriented manufacturing sectors.



Undertake major investment in education and strengthen the on going effort on capacity building to over come critical constraints to the implementation of development programs.

Deepen and strengthen the decentralization process to shift decision-making closer to the grass-root population, to improve responsiveness and service delivery.

Improvement in governance to make forward in the transformation of society and the promotion of a pluralist political system.

Agricultural research, water harvesting and small scale irrigation to ensure food security.

The overall target is to register an average growth rate of 7% during the program period and meet the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

Finally, Mr. Chairman I would like to underline that, in this global village we benefit more from our mutual effort and vision and let us build our future on our interdependence than on our differences and misunderstanding.

Thank you,

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## 7. The IGAD Somali Peace Process: Incubating Inept or Illegitimate Dispensation

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### **Introduction**

Somalia's civil war has been difficult to contain due to the destruction of national morals and the complete disintegration of public authority. The demise of national government since 1990 ensured the country's fragmentation into warlord dominated fiefdoms. Consequently, the edicts of tyrants have become tantamount to the law of the land. The brutality and dysfunctionality of the old regime pales in comparison with the nightmare and disorder warlord dominance has induced in the south. Warlord rule has turned Somalia, particularly the southern region, into a living hell for the country's citizens. Life expectancy has declined as precipitously as some of the AIDS devastated countries in southern Africa and literacy rates and educational enrollment have plummeted to the lowest in the world at seven percent.

Many societies have fought civil wars, but none became stateless. Somalia's statelessness over the past thirteen years is unique in contemporary world history. Even Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of Congo who endured long and wicked civil wars maintained some semblance of national government institutions. It seems that the total breakdown of state structures and utter disappearance of public authority makes Somali reconciliation exceptionally arduous. Many attempts have been made since 1991 to reconcile Somalis and reconstitute a national center of gravity, but all became fruitless. This essay assesses the most recent Somali reconciliation conference held in Kenya. It is based on the author's field notes and observations of the process. The author attended the first and second phase of the conference as an observer. He later worked with the Chair, Ambassador Kiplagat, of the Conference.

The paper is divided into three parts. Part one reviews the most successful Somali reconciliation conference held in Djibouti in 1999-2000. It examines the reasons the Transitional National Government, which was formed in Arta, failed to live up to its mandate and the people's expectation. Part two is a narrative of the first phase of the IGAD sponsored Somali reconciliation conference, in the western Kenyan city of Eldoret. The account shows how the Kenyan Chairman mismanaged the process by allowing the Ethiopian representatives (one of the mediators) to gerrymander the negotiation in favor of their warlord clients. The third part appraises the role of Kenya's new envoy in restoring confidence to the conference. The evidence presented illustrates how he wasted several opportunities to remedy previous problems and allowed Ethiopia and its clients to continue to dominate the conference. Further, the discussion reveals the ineptitude of those representing the TNG and how they failed to defend the conference's original terms of reference and maintain their unity as a negotiating team. The concluding

section prognosticates what might be expected from the conference and what that could mean for Somali reconciliation and national reconstruction.

## **Arta: Defrauding the Miracle**

Thirteen reconciliation conferences have been organized since 1991 to restore national authority and peace in the country. Warlords and factional leaders dominated eleven of these conferences. These eleven conferences failed to produce national consensus due to the fact that each self appointed warlord wanted to claim the presidency of the country. This stalemate seemed insurmountable given the contumacious stance of each contender. Most Somalis were reconciled to the prospect that they might never see a national government in their lifetime. The hopelessness of the Somali predicament so troubled the newly elected President of neighboring Djibouti Republic, Ismail Omer Geeleh that he decided to jumpstart Somali reconciliation and national revival. Geeleh, an ethnic Somali, realized the warlord-centered reconciliation formula would invariably lead to a dead end. Having perceptively recognized how marginalized the Somali public has been in these attempts, he envisioned a reconciliation method that would situate the public at the center of the peace process. President Geeleh announced his surprising initiative at the United Nations' General Assembly meeting in 1999 where he declared that all Somali leaders and civil society representatives would be invited, including the warlords. He welcomed the latter group to attend the conference, but he warned them that they would not have a veto power as they did in previous meetings.

The conference started with a series of workshop attended by different groups of Somali civil society (intellectual, business people, women and traditional elders). The purpose of these meetings was to lay the foundation for the reconciliation process. Shortly thereafter, the delighted public poured into Djibouti. Nearly five thousand Somali representatives came to the small resort town of Arta from every region of Somalia to deliberate over the future of their nation. Most of the major warlords stayed away complaining that they were not treated as their communities' patrons. The Djibouti Government provided modest facilities and acted as the impartial broker. Somali "traditional" leaders, civics, and former politicians were the conference's key actors. They managed the deliberation and directed the reconciliation process. Djibouti did not impose a technical committee that set the agenda for the deliberations, as has been the case in Kenya. The government underwrote all the costs, but it did not behave as kingmaker and patron, thus empowering the delegates. The absence of a conference patron that distributes favors to particular clients is a key feature that distinguishes Arta from the IGAD conference in Kenya.

Djibouti's President intervened at two critical moments of the conference. His first engagement which participants vividly remember occurred when the negotiations were deadlocked over the distribution of delegates among communities. Fearful that the conference might collapse without his intervention he directly appealed to the delegates to consider their people's collective interest. In an emotionally charged tone, the President pleaded "Waar Somaliyey ii heeleya aan idiin heeleyey" (O Somalis, help me so I can help you). The plea impelled the delegates and broke the logjam. The conference participants agreed and divided the nation into 4.5 communities. The president's second intervention came when the conference was deadlocked over the distribution of parliamentary deputies within communities. Perhaps, justly parceling out the parliamentary seats within each community was the most daunting task. The President requested the privilege to distribute twenty posts to those communities who felt that their parliamentary quota was insufficient. He used these seats to appease disgruntled communities.

In the meantime one of the working committees produced a draft national charter that proposed a new parliament of 245 deputies. The traditional elders and member of each community present in the conference consensually selected their parliamentary representative. Somalia's first "democratically" *selected* parliament was in place once the delegates voted in the deputies. The selection of members of parliament was a major watershed that distinguishes the Arta conference from all previous reconciliation attempts. Deputies then elected parliamentary speaker, Abdalla Derow, and an interim president of the republic, Abdulqasim Salaad, from several competing candidates. These developments took place without a *significant* interference from the Djibouti government. None of the defeated candidates accused Djibouti of favoring one group or candidate against another. The Djibouti organized Somali reconciliation conference achieved things that seemed unattainable only a few months earlier and the Somali public's response was one of relief and anticipation.

What would become of this initial success depended on the caliber of the new leadership? The loud chorus that received the newly elected President's unplanned trip to chaotic Mogadishu illustrated how eager the public was for a peaceful era. While the public's mood was one of hope, the warlords were concerned that their era might be over. But the promise suffered a slow death due to the defects of the TNG leadership and Ethiopian-cum-warlord subversion.

The first signal of trouble for the peace process was the conspicuously unhappy presence of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, among the dignitaries during the inaugural ceremony for the elected Interim President. In retrospect, Zenawi's presence belied his calculus about what should become of Somalia. The Interim Somali president, Salaad, sensed Ethiopia's unhappiness and immediately dispatched an envoy to Addis Ababa to convey the new Somali government's commitment to collaborate with its neighbors and strengthen friendly relations between the two countries. Later, several other emissaries were sent to reassure Addis Ababa, but every delegation met the same Ethiopian skepticism.

Ethiopia's strategy became clear within six months after the TNG's formation. It at once started to stress the incompleteness of the process since the warlords were absent and declared that Islamists of the Al-Itihad orientation dominated the interim government. In response Salaad and his colleagues made several attempts to demonstrate otherwise. The dice was finally cast when the Ethiopian Foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin, demanded from his visiting Somali counterpart, Yusuf Deeg, that the TNG must replace its premier (Hassan Abshir) with Col. Abdullahi Yusuf, a close Ethiopian ally. The Somali minister told his Ethiopian colleague that the TNG would consider the *demand* but only within a context of a national conference. The Ethiopian minister insisted that the change must be consummated immediately. The Somali Foreign Minister declined to honor the Ethiopian ultimatum. Consequently, communications between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa broke off.

Once Ethiopia accused the Interim government to have Al-Itihad members, Salaad included, a political rubicon was crossed. Authorities in Addis Ababa adopted three pronged strategy to destabilize and de-legitimize the TNG. First, Ethiopia convened a meeting for the warlords and, in the process, helped establish an umbrella organization for them to be named Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC). Second, Ethiopia intensified its military support for members of this group. In spite of this development, Ethiopia's client warlords could not agree on a united political dispensation for the areas of the country they controlled. Third, Ethiopia actively lobbied the OAU (AU) and other international organizations to unseat the TNG. In this context, Ethiopia gave more encouragement to the self-proclaimed "Somaliland Republic" to enhance the latter's search for recognition as an independent

country. Simultaneously, it repeats platitudes about the unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic at public forums, such as the assembly of IGAD presidents and Prime Ministers in Eldoret at the opening of the current reconciliation conference. Finally, Ethiopia intensified its campaign at the IGAD forum to convene an IGAD sponsored conference to “complete” the Arta process.

In the meantime, the TNG leadership’s weakness began to unravel. First to the fore was the fact that the interim President and the Prime Minister, Ali K. Galyedh, as well as much of the cabinet appointees were remnants of the old regime. Having failed to publicly atone for that association undermined any popular hope for a new beginning. Second, no broad vision, let alone a specific one for national mobilization fit for the challenge of the interregnum, was articulated. Third, hardly any attention was paid to competence and to integrity in the appointment of a new team, reviving memories of vulgar and cheap horse-trading that crippled the old order. Fourth, no immediate tactics, never mind a strategy, to reach and win over the large and relatively talented diasporic communities, were thought of. Fifth, no quick advantage was taken of the international community, though admittedly tired of Somali insensibility about their national wellbeing, which may have become genuinely responsive to a mature, collective, and intelligent plea from a new and legitimate Somali leadership. Sixth, Salad and Galyedh clashed. Salad accused Galyedh of ineptness, arrogance, and, most damagingly, malfeasance, while the latter labeled the first as power-hungry and dictatorial. With barely half of the three-year term of the TNG gone, and after a parliamentary vote of no confidence, Galyedh was unceremoniously dismissed, while abroad. As of this writing, the TNG has all but withered, and with it has vaporized the gift from the Djibouti people and Government and the exceptional but fleeting promise of Arta.

### **Edoret: Corruption and the Ethiopian Warlord Axis**

Ethiopia’s lobby at the OAU/AU and the UN failed but its efforts in IGAD paid off. Members of the organization agreed to launch a Somali conference managed by what came to be known as the frontline states, comprised of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, the last country acting as the chair. The TNG and the Djibouti Government agreed to this proposal under tremendous international pressure. Further, the TNG assumed the neutrality of Kenya. Sadly, this naïve presumption enabled Ethiopia and representatives of the international community to change the nature of the conference from one of reconciling the TNG and the warlords to a completely new one. The conference was scheduled to begin in March 2003 but was postponed several times until Mid-October. The generation of the lists of three groups of participants, i.e. the TNG, warlords, and civil society-and, and the appointment of a former Kenyan foreign minister, E. Mwangi, well known for his proclivities towards venality set the stage for a chaotic and Ethiopian dominated process.

The first clear indication that this was not a neutral approach was when the IGAD Technical Committee (TC) began to draw the list of conference delegates. Three groups of delegates were invited: members of the TNG, SRRC and Civil Society. The most contentious of the three lists was that of the civil society group. The TNG and SRRC selected their own representatives. Since Somali civil society lacked an umbrella organization, the conference's international partners draw up the initial list of civil society delegates. Although this list did not represent members of genuine civil society organizations in Somalia, it was *not* deliberately skewed to favor particular factions or the TNG. However, the organizers left out important civic individuals as some of them were deemed to be members of religious organizations such as Al-Islah. Nevertheless, Ethiopian members of the TC felt that the list

must be redrawn to fit their agenda. They deleted the names of individuals deemed unfriendly to Ethiopia's agenda. Further, the creation of a civil society group explicitly undermined the TNG's claim that it represented civil society as the latter created the TNG in Arta. Ironically, the regime in Addis Ababa supported the inclusion of a separate civil society group in the conference that detracted from the TNG, however, it aimed to mold the civic representative to suit its purpose. The TNG also failed to take account of this development and consequently ceded this important negotiating point without contest. The inclusion of a separate civil society group in the conference signaled that the Arta process was over and this IGAD peace conference was a new endeavor.

Second, the formation of what the conference organizers called the "leaders' committee," warlords and faction leaders dominated, ensured that Ethiopia and its clients had numerical superiority. Nearly 3/4 of the committee's members was Ethiopia's clients and other warlords. Each warlord and faction leader was represented as an independent unit. In contrast, the Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament represented the TNG. In addition, the civil society group had three representatives. The warlords' numerical superiority in this committee meant that if the group failed to reach consensus, the warlords and faction leaders would then have a commanding majority vote. The TNG's initial anxiety about representational imbalance in the leaders' committee was assuaged when the conference organizers "assured" them that the committee decisions would be based on consensus. The TNG was warned not to accept this distribution as it could allow the warlord, faction leaders, and Ethiopia to push for decisions based on voting if the conference was deadlock. The TNG acted in similar fashion when the list of plenary delegates was re-done to favor the warlords and faction leaders. This pattern of indecision and feeble resistance marked the TNG's behavior through out the conference. Third, when the international community partners suggested the conference's need for Somali resource persons, the chairman (Kenya's Special Envoy) submitted the list to the warlords for their approval. They rejected it, and, consequently, this act gave them confidence to thwart conference suggestions that were not to their liking. The international representatives reintroduced the list to the IGAD Technical Committee. Once the Ethiopian delegation realized that the list could not be vetoed, they argued for an expansion by adding five names they felt were amenable to their agenda. Djibouti countered the Ethiopian move by submitting five names of its own. As a result of these additions, the list of resources persons grew to nearly twenty. This proved to be quantitatively too cumbersome and, therefore, it was agreed that both Ethiopia's and Djibouti's additions would be dropped. In spite of this consensus, the Chair, Kenya's special Envoy, made no attempt to invite the resources persons to the conference. Moreover, he never convened a meeting for those, among the group, who were already in Eldoret.

Fourth, after the conference commenced, non-Somalis set the conference's agenda. In one instance, for which the author was present, an American doctoral student, who the EU hired to advise the chairman, presented points, which comprised the key items in the rules of procedure and the declaration of the cessation of hostilities. Among these was the establishment of a federal system of governance, a crucial issue that Somalis did not have say. Furthermore, the "mediator," created "leaders' committee," dominated by the warlords, as paramount decision-making organ of the conference. Again, there was no input from Somalis (outside of the warlords) or those who study Somali society. The upshot of all these compounded occurrences was this: Ethiopia and its allies continued to try to gerrymander both the composition, the quantity and quality of the delegates, and the conference's agenda. The final list of participants of the conference's plenary was consummated as a newly elected Kenyan government appointed a new envoy (and Chair) to the conference. European Union

representatives and other observers have confirmed that Ethiopia single-handedly controls two-third of the list of participants. Furthermore, in January, the conference's site was moved to Mbagathi (on the outskirts of Nairobi.)

### **Mbagathi and the New Envoy: From Liberation to Betrayal**

Ambassador B. Kiplagat served in senior diplomatic posts as well as top civil services positions in Kenya. He came with relatively clean reputation. That is a modicum of professionalism in a post-colonial Kenya synonymous with corruption. His appointment injected a sense of hope into the proceedings and the Somali public expected him to be an honest mediator; one who will correct past misdeeds. He moved quickly to restore propriety to the process by relocating the conference from an expensive Eldoret hotel to the much cheaper college facilities at Mbagathi.

The first real test came with a contest over the nature of the list of participants, and the differentiation between legitimate individuals who represented civic communities and the pirates. Further, the TNG's proportion of the delegates was reduced while those of the warlords were increased. Kiplagat convinced the TNG that he would sort out this matter before the conference enters its final and power-sharing phase. The Ambassador overlooked this pledge and the gerrymandered delegates came to haunt the TNG and the civics. At the end of the conference's phase two the plenary delegates *voted* (instead of working by consensus as the parties agreed earlier), to approve the warlords' and faction leaders' agreement pertaining to the modalities of the third phase of the conference. Ambassador Kiplagat conveniently forgot his earlier promise.

The second expectation (of the international partners) was that he would use the move to vet the participants' list and remove illegitimate individuals and bring in those who genuinely represented communities. Kenya's new envoy failed to take action by accepting an expanded and corrupted list of 361 plenary delegates. He did not take time to study the process nor assemble a team of experts to advise him. As another Kenyan involved in the process suggested, the special envoy depends on his common sense rather than knowledge. The Special Envoy seemed to think that he could find a clever way to legitimate the plenary but the final opportunity to do so was missed. His inaction emboldened those whose project was to have their own instrumentally advantageous way. Most significantly, the warlords and their Ethiopian backers felt ensconced in their dominant role.

But the issue of legitimacy could not be easily avoided, and Kiplagat had to find a way to come to terms with it. Subsequently, he took the initiative to bring forth a list of "traditional leaders" he intended to invite to the third phase of the conference. The warlords rejected this proposition, demonstrating three pivotal points: 1) the Ambassador's lack of knowledge about Somali culture - traditional leaders are not subjects of anyone in communal affairs, let alone warlords, 2) the degree of power ceded to the warlords, since the inception of the conference, and 3) Ethiopia's partisan involvement in the conference and the Ambassador's unwillingness to confront it.

The warlords and Ethiopia dominance of the conference took *a slight dip* when the special envoy appointed an independent Somali group to harmonize the documents the conference's six working committees produced. A necessity to symmetrize arose due to the paucity of professionals, among committee members, who could compose an coherent, accurate, and readable record of each committee's proceedings. The Ethiopian envoy and his deputy were

alarmed when the Chairperson (the author) of the harmonization committee was introduced. The Ethiopian ambassador claimed that professor Samatar was "partisan," and, therefore, ought to be excluded. This line of argument did not convince the rest of IGAD's Technical Committee, which forced Ethiopia to change its tactics. The Ethiopian Ambassador's deputy, who is believed to be the real Ethiopian authority in the conference, appealed to Kiplagat that Ethiopia should be given the opportunity to name the chair's deputy. This demand, which was turned down showed beyond any shadow of doubt Ethiopia's partisan nature in the *Somali* peace process. Neither Kenya nor Djibouti, other member of the TC, demanded similar privileges. From here on, Ethiopian and its clients doubled their efforts to derail the work of the harmonization committee. Moreover, once the members of the harmonization team were named, they publicly disclosed that they would never accept the committee's report. Kiplagat found himself in a tight spot. He tried to mend fences with the Ethiopia and the warlords by suggesting that the Chairs and vice Chairs of the six committees join the harmonization group. But soon, the Ambassador realized that the quality of the work would suffer, as these additions were bound to bring their partisan political disagreements into the task of harmonizing the documents.

The harmonization committee produced its report and presented it to the chairman of the IGAD technical committee. Kiplagat, after suggesting two minor changes, requested that the document be presented to a full gathering of the entire TC and official representatives of the international community. Immediately, the Ethiopian delegation walked out of the room before they read the document or heard the committee's oral presentation. Nonetheless the discussion proceeded and the rest of the TC and international partners commended the overall professional quality of the harmonization report and, more particularly, a draft charter that could cater to the Somali people's common interest. Despite the news that, once it became public, Somalis inside and outside the country were enthusiastically receptive of the document, Ethiopian representatives began to discredit the draft charter and egged on their clients to resist it.

Later, the warlords sought to produce their version of charter, but brought out a one page document that addressed only three articles (the harmonization document is 50 pages long). This proposal was not credible and consequently, they resuscitated a version of the charter favorable to their interest. This document has 60 articles. Eighteen warlords and faction leaders signed a cover letter addressed to Kiplagat in which they openly stated that their version alone should be presented to the plenary of the conference. If not, they threatened, they would walk out of the peace process altogether. A keen observer paraphrased their remarks:

“The faction leaders (18 out of 24) developed this (4<sup>th</sup>) version of the charter and insist it should be the only one to be debated in the plenary. They informed Chairman Kiplagat upon submission on 31 May 2003, that if the version developed by (Prof. Samatar's) harmonization team is presented in the plenary, they will completely leave the process. As of 2 June 2003, out of the 24 leaders committee members 18 signed this version and 6 boycotted. The 18 insist they *constitute two third of the Leaders Committee and hence have a majority.*” (Italics mine)

There were six major issues that distinguish the warlords and harmonization draft charters. First, the warlords' charter stipulates that the proposed interim parliament should have 450 members; the harmonized committee suggested 171. Second, the warlords' charter stipulates



an open ended cabinet size; the other specifies that cabinet appointments should be limited to 13 portfolios. Third, the warlords demanded that a federal governmental structure must be adopted immediately and without the existence of the regions that will constitute the federal system; the harmonized team suggested that a national constitutional commission should be responsible for developing the federal constitution and for identifying the constituent units of the federation. Fourth and most critically, the warlords proposed that they appoint themselves to select members of the new parliament. The implication of such an idea would include that unelected delegates in the conference's plenary would automatically become parliamentarians, and, moreover, the warlords would nominate the remaining 59 MPs. In contrast, the harmonized charter suggested that communities ought to select their representatives in the interim parliament. Fifth, the warlords asserted that the interim government's tenure be a period of five years; the harmonized document designated three years. Finally, The warlord charter has 60 articles compared to the 120 articles contained in the harmonization document. Whatever the relative merits of the two documents might be, it is incredible to witness the audacity of Ethiopia and its clients to demand that their crudely self-serving draft charter *alone* should be debated in the plenary session. What is even more enigmatic was the fact that Ambassador Kiplagat succumbed to their demand even though he described "the SRRC as clients of Ethiopia."

The puzzling question, then, was this: *why would a civic-minded and religious man allow people loyal only to their caprices, with criminal records to boot, and their patrons to gain so much potency under his gaze?* A plausible explanation was revealed when, on one occasion, the Ambassador confided in another diplomat that he "did not want to fight Ethiopia" This sentiment was reinforced by another statement he shared with the author to the effect that the interests of Ethiopia and Kenya should be looked after during the conference.

In an attempt to gain legitimacy for the conference, Kiplagat tried appeasing Ethiopia and its clients. He made an unannounced visit to Addis Ababa, in June, to consult with senior Ethiopian officials. A confidential EU report produced after his visit to Addis Ababa indicated that "Kenya is getting closer to Ethiopia and a common approach could be envisaged towards Somalia." The Ambassador's visit to Addis Ababa in May reinforced Ethiopian intransigence. This heightened the growing sense that Ethiopia and the warlords had Kiplagat's tacit support. The admission, that he desired to avoid confronting Ethiopia, dovetails with an earlier remark he made to the author that the interests of Ethiopia and Kenya should be seriously considered in the conference. A third incident reinforces these claims pertaining to his perceived willingness to sanction Ethiopia and the warlords commandeer the conference. The American diplomat, Glenn Warren, at the conference pleaded with Kiplagat to use the international partners' substantial diplomatic influence to ease the intransigent parties' stance. The special envoy's response was astounding. He declared that "he did not want to impose anything on Somalis". The special envoy failed to comprehend that warlords and tyrants imposed a murderous civil war and lawlessness on the Somali people since the late 1980s. Kiplagat reluctance to use international diplomatic muscle motivated Ethiopia and its clients as progress nearly came to a standstill while the frustrations of the international partners, particularly the USA and the EU deepened.

In the midst of these tactical struggles the TNG fell apart due to internal squabbles between its three senior leaders. The TNG's conference delegation has been in Kenya since October 2002 without returning to Mogadishu to brief their colleagues. The TNG President, who had openly expressed his misgivings about the IGAD peace process, summoned TNG leaders at the conference to Mogadishu for consultation. The Prime Minister and Speaker of the

Parliament declined to heed the President's call. They insisted that their immediate return to Somalia was unnecessary since they have telephonically informed their colleagues in Mogadishu. Further, the Prime Minister and the President recently met in Dubai where they discussed the process. The President threatened to call parliament into extraordinary session to explore the prospect of dismissing those who refuse to return to Mogadishu. The Prime Minister and Speaker remained defiant. This stalemate virtually paralyzed the TNG and slowed negotiations.

The Special Envoy sent an emissary to Mogadishu to explore if the TNG President would visit Kenya. The latter responded affirmatively to the request but underscored that the invitation should come from Kenya's President. President M. Kibaki gave his blessing to the visit after several weeks of negotiation between Kiplagat and the Kenyan Foreign Ministry. The long delay of the invitation exasperated the Prime Minister who hoped his President's visit would defuse the TNG crisis. The slow pace of processing the invitation magnified the TNG President's suspicions about the "sinister" motives of the conference. The delay eroded whatever little trust TNG leaders had in one another. Much energy and effort that could have been productively deployed to push the conference forward was ill spent. Finally, the Prime Minister went to Mogadishu after the President withdrew his threat to fire them. Shortly thereafter, TNG president came to Nairobi on an official visit. The Speaker who was estranged from the rest of the group called a press conference the day before the President's visit and announced that he intended to start impeachment proceeding against the President as the latter has infringed on the duties of other leaders? The President's visit did not have the positive effects on the conference many hoped for and it did not help too reunify the TNG.

The EU, USA, AU, IGAD, Kenya and other diplomats involved in the conference knew Ethiopia's partisan involvement. Despite this awareness no diplomat challenged Ethiopian interference. The Special Envoy kept telling everyone that "Somalis will have to learn to manage Ethiopia." Others, such as the Swedish Foreign Ministry, simply stated that Ethiopia was an important factor in the process. None of the so-called international partners pressed the Kenyan envoy and IGAD Technical Committee to curtail Ethiopia's illegitimate involvement in the conference. The partners funded the conference but had little input in its mismanagement. The height of the international partners' impotence was demonstrated on June 24 when they were invited to speak with the so-called leaders' committee. The partners intended to directly impress on the Somalis the appropriate size of the interim parliament for the country, the legitimate mechanism for selecting its deputies, and the length of the transitional period. Kiplagat changed his mind in the midst of the meeting and decided to deny the partners the opportunity to present their concern to the Somalis.

The TNG rift gave Ethiopian and its' associates great opportunity to try to short-circuit the negotiation process. The International partners' feebleness, the absence of sufficiently strong Somali counter force, and the ease with which the envoy caved in to their wishes, emboldened Ethiopia and the warlords to discretely win the Prime Minister over to their negotiating position. The Speaker had shifted his political allegiance to the Ethiopian camp earlier on. Once the Prime Minister altered "his" position without prior consultation with the TNG's decision-making committee, Kiplagat organized a meeting for the leaders' committee to seal the agreement. The Special Envoy fully knew that the Prime Minister's sudden change of mind contradicted the TNG's official (written and on file) position. The Ambassador exploited the TNG's split and rushed to organize a poorly announced plenary meeting. Many conference delegates were not informed of the importance of this plenary session except the warlords and

their allies who came in force as they knew the meeting's agenda. The special envoy called members of the international community to attend the plenary.

The crucial plenary session was held on July 5, 2003. Ambassador Kiplagat declared that the leaders' committee had reached an agreement on four troublesome issues. These were: the size of parliament of 351 members; immediate adoption of federalism; an interim period of four years, and warlords, faction and political leaders, in consultation with traditional leaders, selecting members of parliament. Once this was announced the supporter of the Warlord-Ethiopian agenda went into frenzy celebration. The Ethiopian Ambassador openly stoked the fever by signaling to supporters to sustain their exuberance. Others who did not have forewarning were shocked at turn of events. They objected to what they saw as a mendacious stampede. Subsequently, they demanded that the issues be discussed. Ambassador Kiplagat responded that the decision was final and immediately adjourned the meeting. Representatives of the international community watched the circus. Some of them privately expressed their dismay at Kiplagat's behavior, but none of them publicly objected to what he did. The TNG Prime Minister and the Speaker were delighted as they openly hugged each other without showing any sign of betrayal.

Ambassador Kiplagat's behavior contravened the letter and spirit of reconciliation and fuelled a growing mistrust that he was predisposed from the outset towards a warlord-Ethiopian pact. Kiplagat's action on July 5 fed this suspicion. The Chair willfully disregarded the plenary's function as the supreme center of final debate and decisions (through consensus) duly stipulated by the conference's rules of procedure. In such a late hour, unless he regains his role as an impartial mediator, the entire process was likely to become illegitimate; Kenya's perceived role as a neutral Somali neighbor fatally damaged; and the peace conference doomed to the same fate as the many others that preceded it. For Ethiopia and its client warlords, their long-term project is clear: the warlord's desire to take either total control of the country without the bother of the niceties of representations and democratic legitimacy or to remain in command of separate fiefdoms. On its part, Ethiopia seems bent on either helping establish a weak client state in Somalia led by a favorite warlord, or, perhaps better, fragmented and Bantustan-like territories in which Addis Ababa would call the shots more directly. In brief, the last scenario Ethiopia would welcome is a united and reinvigorated country, led by independent-minded and able Somali leaders.

### **The Deadly Transition**

What, then, are the prospects for reconciliation and national redemption? The Eldoret-Mbagathi process will presumably produce a national dispensation but the germane question is whether that will serve the interest of the Somali people. The first thing a keen observer of the IGAD conference detects is that the process made minimal progress in reconciling Somalis. On the contrary, the entire operation has focused on power sharing and the number of delegates representing different factions and groups rather than issues that brought Somalia to its dismal predicament. Neither the current envoy nor his predecessor had invested any meaningful effort in reconciliation. As a matter of fact, Ambassador Kiplagat's action on July 5<sup>th</sup> violated the conference's rules of procedure and exacerbated the rift within the TNG. Second, the dominance of warlords and faction leaders (some are illiterate and others are known for exceptional incompetence) in the conference bodes ill for Somalia's post-conflict dispensation. For instance, one of the two power sharing formulas calls for the warlords and faction leaders, in consultation with traditional leaders, to appoint parliamentarians. If this method prevails, it is certain that the merchants of violence and their supporters will constitute

the majority of deputies in parliament as well as take up position of the new provisional administration. Alternatively, traditional leaders in consultation with warlords, and factions and political leaders will select members of parliament. Such an assembly could have a broader representative base. However, it is implausible that the ability of the MPs will be significantly greater than those appointed through the other approach. In addition, the major rivals in Mbagathi are of the same mind that parliament should be composed of 351 deputies at the least; and that cabinet portfolios be unnecessarily numerous, as in the case of the TNG or Northwest (Somaliland) administration. The cost of such an operation will not only be prohibitive, but underscores the total preoccupation with the politics of the belly and civic disarray. In the end, whether warlords or traditional leaders appoint members of parliament, the fact remains that the likely confluence of an imprudently expansive assembly and government, destructive Ethiopian influence, and propensity for low quality of political leadership is bound to cripple the promise.

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1. A different version of this paper, authored by Ahmed and Abdi Samatar was published in Bildhaan, vol.3, 2003. Some section of this paper draw heavily from that earlier version.
  2. Apart from being troubled by the Somali people's deplorable condition, President felt that Djibouti owed a great deal to the Somali Republic. Somalia gave moral and material assistance to the Djibouti during the latter's struggle for independence from France.
  3. In the IGAD conference, Ethiopia who is *supposed* to be a member of the mediating team is the founder and supporter of the SRRC warlord group. Such patron client relations between one of the mediators and some of the contestants engender conflict of interest and breed mistrust among the negotiating parties.
  4. The so-called 4.5 formula for community representation is based on a fiction that alleges Somali genealogical groups to consists of four major groups and "minorities." The latter is falsely presumed to constitute one half the population size of a major group. The irony is that there has not been a census based on genealogy.
  5. For a discussion of some of the issues, see Maraim Arif Gassim, *Somalia: Clan Vs. Nation (Sharjah, UAE, 2002)*.
  6. Hassan Abshir, Interview, Nairobi, April 24, 2002.
  7. Interviews with the Ethiopian members of the technical committee confirmed the regime's official view that the TNG president, Salaad, is a figurehead but the real power behind him is Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi. Dr. Dasuuqi is a practicing medical doctor and a member of the Transitional parliament. He is also an important member of a Muslim organization called Al-Islah that is active in providing education for Somali children across the country. The Ethiopian regime confounds Al-Itihad with Al-Islah. Medhane Tadesse, a key advisor to the Ethiopian leader, ineptly demonstrates this confusion. M. Tadesse, *Al-Itihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia* (Addis Ababa: Meag Printing Enterprise, 2002).
  9. Yusuf Deeg, Interview, Nairobi, May 15, 2003. It is ironic that the Somalis Foreign Minister and his Ethiopian Counterpart were old friends. When members of the TPLF were in Sudan fighting the dreaded Mengustu regime, Yusuf was the Somali ambassador to Sudan. There, he gave top EPLF leaders Somali diplomatic passports and other forms of military and moral support.
  10. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1425* (2002) (New York: United Nations, 2002). This report unambiguously illuminates that Ethiopia is the key supplier of weapons to the warlords in contravention to the Security Council resolution.
  11. Ethiopia is the only country where the Somaliland passport is accepted as an official document. Ironically, many of Somaliland's officials including ministers travel on the old Somali passports or Djibouti passports. For Ethiopia's contradictory statements, see Meles' remarks at the opening of the Eldoret conference. At the opening session of the IGAD conference in Eldoret, Prime Minister Zenawi said "We have failed the Somali people and this conference must not repeat past failures." The irony is that his government continued to deliver weapons to the warlords who have held the Somali public hostage for the past decade. The asymmetry between its actions and word has become the hallmark of the Ethiopian regime.

12. We discovered that Kenyan and Ethiopian intelligence officers met during the early days of the conference. It is reported that the Ethiopian officers told the Kenyans that the conference affords a rare opportunity for their two countries to deal with Somalia.
13. The IGAD Technical Committee (TC) consisted of delegates from Kenya (Chair), Ethiopia and Djibouti. The TC's mandate was to manage, mediate, and facilitate the negotiation. As it began to prepare for the conference strong disagreements surfaced between Ethiopia and Djibouti over the schedule and preparations. The Kenyan chairman openly favored the Ethiopian position. For instance, Djibouti delegate maintained that the conference was between the TNG and the opposition but Ethiopia favored the opposite scenario that did not particularly acknowledge the TNG as government. This also seemed the position of the Kenyan chair.
14. Interview with three people well informed about the selection process. Eldoret, October 20, 2002.
15. The SRRC, which was supposed to be a bloc, was now split into its constituent units in order to give these clients majority representation in the leaders' committee.
16. This is exactly what happened when the warlords decided to push through the conference their self-serving draft charter in July.
17. One of the strangest developments in re-making the list of delegates is when the so-called civil society group who claim to be leaders changed names of participants to favor their relatives and uncivic political agenda. Over time, the un-elected leader of this group and his affiliates became a strong supporter of the SRRC and Ethiopia.
18. The government dismissed Kenya's first Special Envoy for mismanagement.
19. This was done just before Kiplagat took over the chair of the conference.
20. The committees worked on the following issues: a) land and property, b) charter, c) economic recovery, d) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, e) regional and international relations, f) conflict resolution and reconciliation.
21. Although Kiplagat was Kenya's special envoy to Somali, his position as the chair of the TC virtually left Kenya un-represented in the TC. Other Kenyans involved in the process said as much. Consequently, Kenya appointed a new ambassador to Somalia in July who represents Kenya at the TC.
22. The British Ambassador, at the end of the presentation, asked why the Ethiopian delegation was so hostile to the harmonization team. The American envoy responded that the Ethiopians are hostile because the harmonization team is a professional Somali group they can not control or manipulate. Later, over lunch, the British Ambassador lamented that he has not experienced such diplomatic ill manners in his 30 years of diplomatic service. He added, that the Ethiopian delegation should at least read the document before walking out or rejecting it.
23. As noted earlier, two-thirds of the plenary delegates are beholden to Ethiopia and its clients.
24. It is worth noting that the parliament size proposed by the warlords would give Somalia a legislative assembly that is proportionally several times larger than Ethiopia. Ethiopia has nearly nine times Somalia's population.
25. At least 14 of 60 articles in the warlord's charter are contradictory. The two documents were posted on the internet (Hiraan.com) with a voting facility. Eighty percent of those who read and voted online favored the harmonization draft charter as of June 25, 2003.
26. The Special envoy noted, on June 24, 2003, that the Somalis might fire him. He said all key Somali leaders are angry with him. He complained that it is difficult to deal with people (faction leader or warlords) who can not honor agreements they signed. He told several of us that he could easily tell, in yesterday's meeting with faction leaders, that one of the warlords and the Ethiopian Ambassador did not have enough rest the night before as they were agitated. He noted the reason the warlord changed his mind was that he was told to do so by the ambassador. He added that it is difficult to make any progress in the conference as these people change their minds according to the instruction Ethiopia gives them. June 24, 2003
27. Kiplagat had difficulties with the regime in Addis Ababa due to his stance on the Oromo question. At one point he was detained at the Addis Ababa airport. One wonders if he wanted to make up to Ethiopia and the Somali issue gave him a chance to repair relation

with Ethiopia. The Ambassador informed the author about his relations with Ethiopia. At a later date, Kiplagat remarked one morning that Ethiopia's manipulation is wrecking havoc. In spite of this recognition he seemed to lack ideas to deal with the problem other than further appeasement.

28. EU Confidential Report, *Concerns and Options*. June 26 2003.

29. The author was at the meeting in which this exchange occurred. The Ambassador's reaction underscores how little he knows about Somalia and more critically that he does not seek or heed advice of knowledgeable people. The Special Envoy's management style seems to undermine the possibility of the conference leading to a legitimate outcome. People close to the process have indicated that the Ambassador does not consult with anyone and he takes decisions without consultation. One associate noted that Kiplagat runs "one man show."

30. The Ambassador's stance would not be the last as he repeatedly failed to utilize the international community to push the peace process forward. He later ignored the proposal of the international partners when they proposed that deputies in the interim parliament should be not have more than 200 deputies and the interim period be limited to three years. Given Kiplagat's experience, one wonders if his unwillingness to use international support is deliberate so that the Ethiopia-Kenya interest is protected.

31. The author met with the Prime Minister and the Speaker during this period. The two leaders' remarks manifested that they and the President were at war with one another. Tragically, neither the President nor the other two paid any attention to their actions' ill effects on the national interest and the negotiation as developments demonstrated later on.

32. Kiplagat is unlikely to change his strategy unless his government forces him to shift gears. The TNG could have been a strong Somali counter force but its leaders killed Arta's spirit early in their tenure.

33. We are able to assert these conclusions as they run parallel to the ways in which the Tigray dominated regime in Addis Ababa tightly manages regional affairs while pretentiously proclaiming the regional autonomy of the country's ethnic provinces. See Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Ethiopia's Forced or Federated Ethnic: A Somali Reality Check" (work in progress).

34. *In spite of the IGAD TC's poor performance, the Kenyan Envoy has convinced the UNDP office for Somalia (Nairobi) the TC's tenure should be extended for at least six months after a Somali interim government is formed. The UNDP report estimates that the TC will need at least one million dollars for the duration. It seems to us that since the TC has been dysfunctional and partisan in the reconciliation process, it does not deserve such a handsome reward. We are concerned that lengthening the life of the TC and giving it a platform will only be counterproductive. Moreover, the million dollars could easily be put a better use, as supplying medicine to the children's hospital in Mogadishu.* See United Nations Development Programme, *Initiating the Process of a new Somali Government Inside Somalia: Let's Get Started - Draft* (Nairobi: UNDP, 2003).

35. For un-civil politics, see J-F, Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (London: Logman, 1993).

36. On dysfunctional regimes creating disorderly societies see Evans, P. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

37. For an idea what might be done to use the transition to empower the Somali public see our editorial in *Bildhaan: International Journal of Somali Studies*, volume 3, 2003

## 8. HORN OF AFRICA II: NO DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT PEACE: SOMALI AND SUDAN PEACE PROCESSES

By

**Peter B. Marwa**, Director, Conflict Prevention for East African Countries, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development

What is IGAD and what does it have to do with the Horn of African and specifically what does it have to do with the Somali and Sudan peace processes?

IGAD stands for Intergovernmental Authority for Development. It comprises countries which come under the general geographical location of the Horn of Africa, namely Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. It has been classified as a Regional Economic Community covering the Horn of Africa.

IGAD was born out of IGADD which was primarily founded in 1985 to deal with the encroachment of the desert in six countries neighboring the Sahel region of Africa. But soon the leaders found themselves consulting on issues of security more often than expected. Because at that time developmental issues seemed to come second to security problems. It became necessary to resolve the political problems of conflicts before moving to developmental matters. Consequently in 1995 IGAD was revitalized and took on board a mandate to tackle conflict problems. Thus the IGAD the region have resolved by the region. The Somali and Sudan peace processes going on now in Nairobi is primarily in response, pursuit and fulfillment of this mandate.

The Horn of Africa currently stands out a region plagued by conflicts. It is only region of Africa where an interstate war has taken place in recent past. There are over 17 active intra-state conflicts currently going on in the region. The conflict in Sudan is one of the longest in Africa having gone on for almost two decades. As is often said there are over five million small arms in illegal hand and arms, which help to exacerbate conflicts. The region above all is just about the only place with a collapsed state. More disturbing however is that it the only region witnessing a huge deployment of one of the largest international coalition forces ever seen in Africa ostensibly to track down terrorists.

As a result IGAD has had to have a strong conflict resolution policy to deal with the situation. The Sudan and the Somali Peace process are both being dealt with under the IGAD initiatives. My discussion will inform on the status of the two processes and attempt to assess on the prospects and agreement in both cases. First and befitting the occasion I shall start with Somalia.

### **SOMALI PEACE PROCESS**

The Somali National Reconciliation Conference going on in Nairobi has entered the final part of the second phase to adopt the committee's report. When I left , the Conference approved a set of rules of procedure of the plenary. Two weeks have been located for debate and adoption of the report. Immediately to follow will be the third phase around about June the 3<sup>rd</sup> or there about . The third phase will essentially be to determine the when, how and what of

an interim administration to be installed in Mogadishu. Much of what will happen in the third phase has been left to the Somalis themselves. What we know is the outcome will have to lead to a formation of an interim structure to take over from the TNG whose mandate expires sometimes in August this year.

In the meantime AU has offered to station in Somalia an Observe Mission not only observe and violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement the Somali Leaders signed in October 2002 in Eldoret but will also be able to investigate and identify the offenders. As we speak now a AU fact finding Team is in Somalia to assess and identify where to locate the observers. The IGAD Council of Ministers declaration of February 2003, which created a monitoring mechanism, provides for a number of punitive actions to be taken against those who violate the cessation of hostilities agreement. The AU observer mission will be able to provide to IGAD a properly investigate work upon which the IGAD can act against those who violate the agreement.

The road to the stage reached now has not been easy. Planning started in May 2002 and it was not until October that the conference was convened. The Technical committee created by the IGAD Council of Ministers which met in Nairobi on the 14<sup>th</sup> February exhibited divisions among its members on account of national interests and this of course had the effect of delaying the process. How many Somalis were to be invited to the first phase caused problems and the formula devised to address representation was heavily criticized. Consequently invitation to the delegates became controversial. In the end more delegates invited or simply some people turned up at the venue than earlier envisaged. Pruning them proved hard and all the time controversial.

Despite many flaws the conference opened witnessed by the regional leaders of IGAD. An important milestone of the Conference is the attendance of all armed factions Leaders and being to remain in Eldoret and listen to ordinary Somalis' accusations against them. That more than anything else promised hope in this process. Even after some of them went back to Somalia word was quietly put round that they were still going to come back. Recent rumors that the TNG was planning a parallel conference proved speculative when most of the leaders claimed to have gone to Mogadishu for the conference assured the Kenya hosts that they will come back. When I left Nairobi on the 21<sup>st</sup> May word had been received that Omar Farah, Musa Sudi and others had confirmed to return to Kenya. With the third phase now almost known to take place in June those leaders outside the conference will trek back.

The standard of the conference was set by the IGAD summit in January 2002 in Khartoum. The conference was to bring together the TNG and all opposition groups to form a broad-based, all-inclusive government of national unity. This is the standard by which Ambassador Kipligat led TC will be judged by. This does not mean that IGAD does not care about the crimes against humanity committed by some of the warlords but what IGAD has said is the priority now is to return Somalia to stability and remove the vestiges of war in that country. What Somalia later do with those who have committed crimes against their people should come in the next stage and should be shouldered by Somalis themselves.

The conference has faced several challenges. Disagreement on representation was the most serious of them all. Somali society is polarized along clan, a clan balance of the ratio of 4.5 was agreed. However no soon was this effected more groups turned up claiming to have been left out. I am not sure that this problem has been resolved. An arbitration committee established to deal with the problems has not quite helped to calm the situation. Other



challenges to the conference have been overcoming donor fatigue and managing the trickling donor recourse. The hosts have had to contend with discontents and lack of steady flow funds and occasional strikes and boycotts. Hotels too demonstrated their strengths by refusing to give food to the delegates to force the Kenya hosts to pay their outstanding debts. The sheer large number of Somalis who turned up at the conference baffled the hosts.

Despite the many problems that have afflicted the conference, the process has continued to inch forward and now we think we shall get somewhere. We are optimistic that come June Somalis will go from Mbagathi armed with an interim authority to be installed in Somalia.

In IGAD, our expectation is an interim structure or authority acceptable to the majority of the Somali and supported by the international system can be agreed upon in Mbagathi and set up in Somalia and then strengthened on the ground by variety of mechanism such as the DDR process, continuation of the reconciliation process and monitoring of the cessation of hostilities.

We want to appeal to the international community on behalf of the Somalis to come forward to support the government which will be formed from the national reconciliation process now going in Nairobi and to take bold steps to engage in post agreement reconstruction of the country. Of importance to IGAD is if one country can take a lead nation role in mobilizing and coordinating such post agreement reconstruction activities.

### **The Sudan peace process**

The negotiations that have been going on in the small up country town of Machako, between the government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLM wound up on the 21<sup>st</sup> may and will resume in mid June. No major breakthrough on the four remaining issues: power and wealth sharing, security arrangement and the three conflict areas was made.

The conflict in Sudan has gone on for two decades. The current IGAD initiative started four years ago and in a bid to avoid failing like previous initiatives the two parties agreed to a set of principles called Declaration of Principles (DOP). Rhew DOPs divided areas of negotiations into four: state and religion, self- determination, power and wealth sharing.

The round of negotiations which started on the p May was a follow up from negotiations which started in earnest in June 2002 yielding into three most important milestones: the Mackakos Protocol on Self-determination by the South as it was on the 1-1-56 through a referendum within the six and half years of interim period and on agreement on state and religion. The second milestone was the signing on the cessation of hostilities agreement in October 2002 and the third being the signing of an addendum to strength the MOU on cessation of hostilities by creating verification and monitoring team (VMT) to monitor compliance of the agreement the VMT began operations in March and as we speak now the Team composed of military officers from IGAD region, USA, Norway, Italy is preparing to go Sudan to visit the Bentiu Akobo area where there have been reports of troop movements on both sides in violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement producing accusations and counter accusation by each side.

A parallel negotiations covering three conflict areas of Nuba Mountains, Upper Blue Nile and Abei continue to be hosted by the IGAD although the parties have only agreed to use the good

offices of Special envoy but in a strict sense the issue of the three conflict areas is being negotiated differently, no progress have been made so far.

In the current negotiations there has been a change of approach. In the previous sessions negotiations were undertaken on each of the identified areas in the DOP, sign an agreement where agreement is secured and move on. But a weakness of this approach was the amount of time wasted in intra-delegation consultations and consultations with the principals back home. Thus an important decision is never reached as quickly as is hoped.

The wholistic approach used in this last round of negotiation was parties were encouraged to negotiate on all remaining issues on the of what they can live with or not live with. The idea is to get the very minimum in substance and in semantics of both parties and then the negotiations come up with a draft. Armed with this draft on which negotiators and parties generally agree and move to involve the principles as much as possible. The Special Envoy will shuttle to the principals to get their agreement.

There are a number of factors that have been responsible for the current status of the Sudan Peace. First, the leadership and management of the process. Since the removal and replacement of Mr. Mboya with General Sumbeiywo, there has been complete change in the management of the process for the better. Consequently support is now forthcoming from the international community. Funds have been made available for process. The presence and participation of the international community has forced the parties to be serious. Advice and behind scene mediations and reconciliation being executed by international community has had a huge impact on the way the parties see issues.

Important also is the unanimity of the region towards the Sudan problem. In the IGAD summit of January 2002, the Heads of States and Government of the region resolved to back the IGAD process and rejected parallel initiatives. The summit advised the other actors interested to help to co-ordinate their initiative with that of IGAD.

The challenges facing IGAD initiatives are enormous. First the mistrust between the parties is deep rooted and even what would appear a simple issue becomes complicated once it seen in the light of the North and South perspective. Elements of racialism and religious differences play a role in the differences that emerge during negotiations and these seem to influence how movement in positions at the negotiations are viewed and understood providing a problem for the negotiators.

### **What prospects are there in this peace process?**

If you consider that the current IGAD peace process has gone on for almost four and half years now, on one will blame you for being pessimistic about can really be achieved in the process. But we in IGAD hold a contrary perception. We believe that now more than any other time before there is a really chance that we could have an agreement by July 2003. Why do I say so? A number of factors mitigate it. First, the momentum has been maintained. Second, there is an attitude change on the part of negotiators on how they perceive each other. We see more and more attempt for accommodation that ever before. This coupled with various other innovations such as new approach to negotiations, international participation in a more proactive role and a whole international community out look has convinced the parties to be more serious this time around. But, the most important factor of all is the Leadership that has been provided by General Elijah Sumbeuywo. His style of management which

includes financial transparency, good relations with the negotiating parties, working together with co-chairing envoys of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda, the recognition that the initiative is a regional collective effort, espousing the international community participation in contributing and strengthening the process and the enabling environment created by the host Kenya Government all have combined to produce the momentum we witness in this process. If the current momentum and good will continues to prevail, we will have an agreement by July.

Thank you!

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## 9. Peace and Development in The Horn of Africa: A Swedish Perspective:

Statement by  
Mr Lars Ronnås  
Director, Africa Department  
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

First of all, let me welcome the holding of this Conference, which is now becoming a regular spring feature in Lund. We attach great importance to this type of opportunity for exchange, dialogue and learning. And that is why the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has provided some financial support to the organization of this Conference. I would also like to forward personal greetings from the Minister for International Development Co-operation, Asylum Policy and Migration, Mr Jan O Karlsson, who had planned to attend this conference, but unfortunately had to cancel at a late stage.

Sweden has special relations and a long history of co-operation with the Horn of Africa region. Swedish missionaries, travelled to the region already in the late 18-hundreds. Since then, we have had a variety of contacts – through development assistance, migration, trade/commercial, civil society and through participation in peace efforts.

In this statement, I would like to share some of the present Swedish priorities in relation to the Horn of Africa region. In that context, I will also take the opportunity to highlight some of the overarching priorities of Swedish foreign policy, and in particular the new policy for Global Development that is presented to our parliament today. I will also assess how these priorities relate to efforts for peace and development in the Horn of Africa.

The heading for this conference "**No Development without Peace**" reflects the central priorities for the Africa policy of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Our main focus is development and conflict resolution. The aim for our work is to serve as partners to African countries in implementing policies to support peace and development – something we believe is also of benefit to ourselves in an increasingly globalised world.

Today, the Swedish Government presents a new bill to the Parliament on the theme Global Development. For the first time, **Swedish policy for Global Development** will not be limited to providing development assistance. Instead, the Government has presented a comprehensive approach, stating clearly that global development and eradication of poverty will be a goal in all policy areas, and therefore, a responsibility for all ministries. The challenge is to promote

equitable and sustainable development. This means that a global poverty perspective from now and onwards will influence Swedish policies for trade, environment, labour, agriculture, social services, security, and so on. And not least, it will bring into open any conflicts of policy goals that my Government is pursuing.

An important point of departure for the new Swedish policy for Global Development is the internationally agreed development agenda, with the Millennium Declaration, and the Development Goals that followed, as the central common platform. The new policy is based on the conviction that it is possible to halve the proportion of people living in absolute poverty by 2015, if we all work together and enforce consistent policies in all sector areas.

Over the years, we have learned that development challenges cannot be solved by remote control. Donors cannot and should not pursue their own development policies. Instead, development will be achieved by people in their own communities. Sweden aims to support poor countries in their own processes to fight poverty and promote sustainable development. The best and most effective way to do this will be by ensuring that Swedish actions in one context are coherent with our policies in other areas. This means, for example, that Sweden will increase its efforts in pushing for reform of the EU agriculture and fisheries policies, so as to ensure that they are consistent with our objective to promote global development.

Financing development serves as another tool in supporting efforts by poor countries to achieve equitable and sustainable development. Sweden will continue to vigorously promote the 0.7 % target for development financing by rich countries, and Sweden will strive towards 1 % of GDP. Development cooperation financing is increasingly provided to support the strategies adopted by poor countries themselves to fight poverty, through sector programmes as well as through direct budget support. To achieve this, Sweden will aim to engage in a dialogue with our cooperating partners on what we perceive as important issues.

Sweden is a small country, but we like to think that we can have an impact. Through the new policy for Global Development even greater emphasis will be placed on multilateral cooperation and international efforts. Working through the international system, the United Nations and also the International Financial Institutions, will allow Sweden to contribute to poverty eradication efforts in a number of countries, including where we do not have long traditions of bilateral development cooperation. Sweden will also continue to spearhead efforts for harmonisation to the administrative requirements of our partner countries. Coordination and harmonisation are central features if we are to reduce transaction costs and ensure an owner-based as opposed to donor-driven cooperation.

The participation in this seminar is an important reflection of the new world we share. Migration and mobility are key features in our "global village". It is well known that the remittances sent to family and relatives from immigrants and guest workers in the West amount to almost twice the figure of global development cooperation financing. However, this process is often constrained by high transaction costs – something Sweden will strive to change in order to enhance the development effects of such support and relations.

The links between peace, democracy, poverty reduction and development are increasingly visible. Support for the United Nations and for international law is another cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy, and also part of our policy for Global Development. This commitment is borne out of a belief that we are all members of an international community. And there is no way to escape common responsibilities. The mandate set out in the United

Nations Charter presents a challenge to us – to achieve cooperation in solving economic, social and humanitarian problems, as well as in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights. These are guiding principles for us.

Other areas of continued importance to the Swedish policy for Global Development include gender equality, free trade and sustainable management of natural resources and protection of the environment.

This broad development agenda also involves a recognition that development will never be achieved by governments alone. I would like to highlight the need for cooperation and close partnership with civil society organisations as well as with the private sector. The new Swedish policy for Global Development places cooperation with these actors high on the agenda. We look forward to deepened and strengthened partnerships – with Swedish actors as well as in the Horn of Africa. And again, we welcome independent initiatives such as this Conference as important opportunities to develop and further elaborate our own development agenda.

"No development without peace" is the heading for this Conference. The same approach is a foundation in the new policy for Global Development. Peace is an essential prerequisite for any development efforts, and conflict resolution and reconciliation are central elements in processes to that end.

Turning our attention more specifically now to the situation in the Horn of Africa, it is abundantly clear that this region has suffered from a long history of conflict. The countries have close links with each other, with a potential for positive cooperation in areas such as trade. At the same time, it is no secret that there are also conflicting geopolitical interests among, within and between the countries. However, today, for the first time in many years, there is emerging hope for peace.

The peace process in the **Sudan** looks increasingly stable, although a number of central and thus difficult issues remain to be resolved. The prospects for a comprehensive peace agreement this summer is still there, and if not, to be reached within this year. After years of violent conflict and immense suffering for the Sudanese people, the IGAD-led peace negotiations in Machakos appear to lead toward a real transition and a new era in the Sudan. The issue of self-determination has been addressed, and based on the Machakos principles, agreement seems to be possible. General Sumbweiyi who has led the negotiations has managed to move the parties forward at the negotiation table, while monitoring of the cease fire agreement has been carried out on the ground. I will come back to the essential role played by IGAD, but here I would also like to emphasise the importance of the international community and to give credit to the troika of observers namely Norway, the United Kingdom and the USA, that have played a crucial role.

In addition, to resolve issues of security arrangements, power and wealth sharing, Sweden believes that the issue of human rights needs to be given a prominent place in any transitional arrangement. It is essential for the long-term sustainability of any peace treaty that respect for and the promotion of human rights are an important part of the deal.

Sweden presently participates with three military observers and two civilian police officers in the Joint Monitoring Commission in the Nuba Mountains. The international community will continue to play a central role in the years to come – including in providing support in

monitoring the expected peace agreement. Sweden would like to see a Security Council mandate for such monitoring, regardless of whether it will be carried out through the AU, the EU or the UN or some other party. The continued cooperation of both parties to the conflict will naturally be essential, and a precondition for any international efforts.

The peace and reconciliation conference for **Somalia** being held in Mbagathi has not yet reached quite as far. A well coordinated approach by the members of IGAD, and in particular the three countries most involved, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, will do much to facilitate the process. There are many outstanding issues, and the sheer number of actors and interest groups reflect the complexity of the process. Sweden has recently joined the group of active international observers that closely follow the negotiations. There is also a need for enhanced international involvement in the efforts for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. Sweden will work to that end, and we are stepping up our contacts with partners in the international community on the Somalia peace process.

Ambassador Kiplagat, the chief negotiator, has highlighted the need for conflict resolution and reconciliation on the ground, at the local community level. The Uppsala-based Life and Peace Institute has worked for many years in Somalia and will now endeavour to enhance its involvement in such efforts. Sweden will aim to assist in linking the lessons learned and results achieved at the community level back to the national peace negotiations taking place in Mbagathi. Combining a bottom-up approach with efforts at the national level may hold the solution to many of the long term Somali problems.

A central component in the peace making effort must be to prevent the influx of arms. The embargo pronounced by the United Nations Security Council some years ago, and then strengthened by a monitoring mechanism through an additional resolution last year, is of vital importance. The international community, including the neighbouring countries carry a strong responsibility to ensure its effective implementation.

There has been some concern on the issue of representation at Mbagathi. However, at present ambassador Kiplagat is making a clear effort to enhance participation of traditional and religious leaders. Sweden welcomes these efforts. Sweden also sees merit in the ambition by ambassador Kiplagat to gradually transfer focus of the peace process back into Somalia. This will be essential if progress is to be made.

It is of critical importance to the whole region that peace is maintained between **Ethiopia and Eritrea**. The Algiers Agreement provides the foundation to this end, including through its provision that the two parties recognise the authority of the Boundary Commission. It is of course of paramount importance that its rulings be respected and allowed to be implemented. It is time to move ahead with demarcation and we believe that this should be possible. UNMEE, which is mandated by the Security Council, continues to play a key role in this regard. Sweden participates in this Mission with six military observers. It is essential that focus in both countries can be moved towards development, poverty reduction and improved livelihoods for people – especially in view of the present drought and acute food shortage in both countries.

The contributions by Sweden outlined above, involving support to peace building and conflict resolution in the different countries in the Horn of Africa, illustrates Sweden's commitment to peace and development in the region. Peace work and development efforts cannot be separated, but are different sides of the same coin.

In both the Sudan and the Somalia peace processes the **Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, IGAD**, plays a key role. It is high time that the benefits of regional cooperation be fully exploited in the Horn of Africa. In areas such as conflict resolution and peace building it has been demonstrated that cooperation between neighbouring countries can play a crucial role. IGAD could further develop this potential in the years to come.

More broadly, regional cooperation on the continent at large can also play an essential role in efforts for peace and security. We are very encouraged by recent moves to strengthen the **African Union**, in particular the establishment of a Peace and Security Council. We take note of the ongoing efforts towards this end. An important discussion around a common defence and security policy is set to top the agenda this week at the extra-ordinary session of the African Union Executive Council being held in Johannesburg, with the participation African Ministers for Foreign Affairs. At that meeting, details of a draft policy document will be elaborated, which thereafter will be presented to AU heads of state at their next meeting in July in Maputo, Mozambique. Other efforts to strengthen the African Union are also underway, and we are certain that further progress will be made in July – in setting up new important African institutions, like the election of the African Commission, and in agreeing on the composition of the African Peace and Security Council. The Council will have an important role in enhancing African capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region.

Sweden is an active member of the **European Union**, not least in formulating its Common Foreign and Security Policy towards Africa. One important part of EU-relations with African countries is the political dialogue mandated by the Cotonou Agreement article 8. The EU carries out a regular dialogue on political issues with the countries that are party to this agreement. Meetings are held on a regular basis with the local EU troika in the respective countries, and these meetings are occasionally supplemented with meetings at the political level. Issues of importance in this context include human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance. In the Horn of Africa, this type of dialogue is carried out with the Governments of Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Sudan and others.

Sweden is also involved with more **traditional development assistance financing** in the Horn of Africa. A main focus in the region is **humanitarian**, and support is channelled through the UN system and through NGOs. In this way, Sweden has been an active donor both in Somalia and the Sudan for many years, supporting efforts by for example Unicef, the World Food Programme or the Red Cross-family towards for instance access to water and sanitation, or in programmes for health care and food security. Sweden also provides humanitarian assistance to both Ethiopia and Eritrea during the present food crisis, based on the UN appeals. In this context, I would like to highlight the need for donors to contribute non-food support. Efforts for water and sanitation are equally urgent, and supplement food aid in this type of emergency. When providing food assistance, purchasing from local markets is always our first option and an approach that Sweden believes should be pursued.

Through the EU, Sweden is also one of the donors supplying resources to the development cooperation provided by the **European Commission**.

**Sudan** is now moving towards a phase of **post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation**. Sweden is pleased that the situation in the Sudan has received ample international attention. We took part in the recent donor conference in the Hague, at which the international

community, together with the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, begun to address the enormous task ahead after all these years of violent conflict. The importance of "quick start projects", that can demonstrate the benefits of peace in conflict ridden areas, has been noted. The term "peace dividend" must be given concrete meaning. However, also in this situation, it is clear that it is the Sudanese who must take the lead. Naturally, there is a need for capacity building and support, in particular in the South. Sweden will continue to provide support through the UN-system in the sensitive post-conflict reconstruction phase.

Sweden recently signed a bilateral agreement for development cooperation with **Ethiopia**. With a long history of **development cooperation**, this agreement provides the framework for deepened and strengthened relations. Sweden will support Ethiopia's efforts to implement its Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme. An area of particular interest to Sweden in this regard, is the planned legal sector reform. In order to ensure progress in the area of respect for human rights, a modern and effective legal sector is of vital importance.

I have dwelled at length now on three aspects on Swedish relations with the countries in the Horn of Africa:

- Conflict resolution/peace efforts;
- Regional cooperation including through the EU; and
- Development assistance.

In conclusion, I would like to highlight some of the other areas where our co-operation with the region is gaining increased importance:

- Migration
- Trade and other commercial relations
- Environment
- Fight against terrorism
- International co-operation and global governance (strengthen UN)

These different policy areas are inter-linked and connected in many ways, which we will continue to explore at this Conference. Sweden will work towards an equitable and sustainable global development, and promote poverty eradication as an overriding goal, through increasingly coherent policies in all of these sectors. This is also an interest we share with the governments and people of the Horn of Africa. I look forward to continued deliberations here on these difficult but centrally important issues.

Thank you.

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10. ADDRESS BY SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR  
H. E. SONTOKUDJOE  
AT A CONFERENCE BY EXPATRIATES FROM THE  
HORN OF AFRICA  
ON FRIDAY, 23 MAY 2003 in  
Lund, Sweden

The Mayor of Lund Mr Larry Andow  
Members of the Diplomatic Corps  
Representatives of the European Union  
Representatives of Government of Sweden  
Distinguished guests,  
Ladies and gentlemen

It is an honour for me to address this important Conference On the Horn of Africa, and in so doing to set the tone for the deliberations that will follow. The Conference is taking place at a critical time in the history of the African continent as a whole. At a time when the people of Africa have made an unequivocal statement that Africa is taking its own destiny into its own hands and wants to put itself on a path of sustainable growth and development. At a time when the forces of change and renewal are blowing all over the continent. I would also add that the theme of this conference namely "No Development Without Peace" is most appropriate as it brings into the open new insights in our quest for growth and sustainable development, which we cannot achieve without peace.

The African Union was launched in Durban last year with South Africa as its first Chair. The main responsibility of the African Union is to drive the New Partnership for Africa's Development programme. A program that is aimed at extricating the continent out of dire poverty, underdevelopment, hopelessness and marginalisation. It is therefore important that in addressing all these issues, the African continent has a degree of peace.

In developing NEPAD the African leaders, had to provide answers to critical questions. It is easy for any reasonable person to understand and agree that there can be no development without peace. The most critical question, however, is how do we bring peace to the continent? how do we bring peace to the world? These are some of the questions that Africans had to provide answers to.

In order for the NEPAD to succeed it became clear that there should be peace and stability. For peace and stability to prevail it became clear that only democracy, human rights and good governance can sustain that peace and stability. It is only then that development can take place in partnership with ourselves as Africans and also in partnership with the rest of the world.

I think we can all agree that the Horn of Africa is the most trouble torn region in the whole continent. With the exception of a few, the rest of the countries are rife with internal and external tensions and conflicts.

### **ETHIOPIA:**

For Instance Ethiopia, although seemingly peaceful and stable on the surface, the internal political situation is inherently unstable as the country is going through a transition to full and participatory democracy. However, since all the constitutional processes are still intact and the government holds out hope for proper democratisation, Ethiopia can be regarded as stable in the region in its evolution towards full democracy.

### **SUDAN:**

Ladies and gentlemen!

Normal socio-political and economic developments in the Sudan are hamstrung by the 20 year-old civil war between the Arab Muslim government in the North and the African Christian opposition(SPLM/A) in the South. The exploration of the Sudan's oil wealth in the South has complicated the efforts finding peacefull solutions. However, the Machakos Peace Process, currently underway in Kenya, seems to be yielding results, with both sides having agreed to certain key principles for reconciliation.

### **ERITREA:**

We know of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Currently, Eritrea seemed to be at loggerheads with all its neighbours, except Djibouti. Its conflict with Yemen stems from sovereignty claims by both sides over a set of islands in the Red Sea. The islands possess substantial fishery resources. Although there seems to be less tension between them these days, the issue has not been resolved. Internal political tensions reign as Parliament was suspended two years ago.

### **SOMALIA:**

With no effective government in place, and the Transitional National Government (TNG) barely in charge of certain sectors of Mogadishu, developments in Somalia cannot be gauged in the same light as the other countries in the region. The so called warlords control various parts of the country and despite the ongoing peace talks in Kenya among the various political factions, there is no indication yet of an imminent breakthrough in the peace process.

**SOMALILAND:**

In December 2002 Somaliland held its first local elections since 1969. Presidential elections were held on 14 April 2003. The elections are said to have been very peaceful and smooth.

**DJIBOUTI:**

Djibouti can be said to be stable and peaceful in the region as it enjoys relations with all other countries.

**REGIONAL DYNAMICS:**

Ladies and gentlemen!

It is important to understand that the region is also prone to volatility because of tensions that exist between neighbours.

It is therefore important that a lasting solution is found to all ongoing conflicts in the horn of Africa.

I am confident that deliberations in this conference will help shed light about the sad realities of the Horn of Africa. I am also confident that resolutions taken at this conference will provide us with an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the situation in the Horn of Africa and possible answers to the critical questions. The following are areas that I presume deliberations will also focus on.

How to revive dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the issue of their border dispute, which paralysed the use of strategically located seaports such as Assab and Massawa. Scarce resources have to be allocated to military spending by two of the poorest countries in the world to maintain large defence forces in peace time.

How to resolve tensions between countries in the region over the issue of support for exiled opposition groups based in each other's territories which is not conducive for trade and development.

The 20-year old civil war in the Sudan between the north and the south, which inhibits economic growth and development in the country, especially in light of the country's oil wealth.

The unresolved internal situation in Somalia that excludes the country from playing its rightful role in the development of the Horn region and Africa as a whole.

How can international scholars :

- Make a meaningful contribution towards dialogue on these issues, which are pertinent to the development of our continent.
- Address deep rooted socio-economic, cultural and political cause of the conflicts.
- How can women contribute to the resolution of these problems

In conclusion I wish to thank the organisers of this important conference, the Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre, the Horn of Africa Scholars, and the Horn of Africa Associations in Sweden. This is yet another proof that a lot can be achieved for Africa through the combined efforts of the Diaspora and other interested partners.

I also wish to express our sincere appreciation to the partners who supported this conference; the City of Lund, ABF Lund, Folkuniversitetet in Lund, Forum Sida, the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the Lund University and the Olof Palme International Center. I wish to assure you that Swedish involvement and assistance to Africa, which dates back many years, will not be in vain and will be remembered. Africa is on its way to peace and prosperity but the road is long and can be steep. We need persistence, perseverance and patience.

I thank you

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11. Statement By Counsellor Mr. Yonas Manna Bairu on behalf of the  
Eritrea Ambassador to Sweden

H. E. Araya Desta

At the Horn of Africa conference

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am honoured and privileged to be among you today at this well-organized conference that has in the last two days discussed in depth the important concept of 'No Development without Peace'. I have attended this conference on behalf of H.E. Mr. Araya Desta, the Ambassador of the State of Eritrea, who unfortunately could not attend the conference because of other commitments related to the celebration of our Independence Day in Stockholm.

May I then join my colleagues in thanking Mr. Adbillahi Jama, Chairman of the Somali International Rehabilitation Centre, and his group for organizing this conference and to Mr. Larry Andow, the Mayor of Lund, for hosting this conference and for the generous hospitality extended to us.

Excellencies and distinguished Delegates:

The Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, but other Nile Valley countries such as Kenya and Uganda are inseparably linked to the Horn of Africa. With a population of nearly 100 million, our region is of immense significance to Africa as a whole and to the international community as well. Moreover, the Horn of Africa is located in a highly sensitive and strategically significant zone that could significantly facilitate or disrupt global logistics and commerce. Peace and stability in this region has, therefore, more than regional implications.

The cold war era was characterized by the denial of civil and political rights to the people of the Horn, undermining their fundamental rights to freely determine their political status and pursue independent economic, social and cultural developments. Although the end of the cold war seemed to bring conflict resolution and the prominence of growing awareness of the people's basic rights, particularly those pertaining to choosing their governments and making them accountable to the people, we still witness conflicts and destabilization of societies. The Horn problems, aggravated by lack of development, heavy foreign debt, border conflicts and inter-state wars, have become the source of the largest number of refugees, displacement of population, drought, famine and disease. Since the countries of the Horn of Africa are related geographically, historically and demographically, a lot can be done jointly to improve the quality of life for the population of the region and improve its tarnished image.

We need to co-operate with governments, multilateral organizations, and especially with the AU, which is on the process of re-organizing itself to enhance stability, maintain peace and encourage democratic developments in all African countries, including the Horn of Africa.

Past devastating wars and ongoing tensions among the countries of the Horn of Africa continue to wreak havoc on the economy and block foreign investments in the region. It is time to

consider new and bold approaches that could bring peace and prosperity to the region. As Mr. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, stated in his report to the Security Council, *'Conflict and peace could not be addressed in isolation, but must be approached with a more comprehensive perspective. Such a perspective would take into account not only the complex roots of conflict, but also the need for good governance and sustainable development, which help provide the conditions for lasting peace.'*

Regarding the issue of Somalia, the Eritrean government has always argued that solutions to the crisis in the country could come only from the Somali people themselves. The details of any agreement made must respond to the needs of the Somali people and must be owned by all parties involved in the search for a lasting solution. It has been stated on several occasions that colonial and cold war politics were the major contributors to the institutional structures that led to the collapse of the Somali state. However, external influences in the past have contributed in accelerating the crisis and still constitute constraints in resolving the conflict. The argument that any new structure installed in the country must reflect the priorities and needs of the Somali people should constitute the cornerstone for searching a lasting solution.

With regards to the Sudan, it is my government's belief and wish that the Machacos agreement be accepted in full and implemented by all parties concerned. The Government of Eritrea shares the initiative taken by IGAD to end the civil war in the Sudan.

The idea of establishing Horn of Africa Confederation (HAC) might be noble, but establishing a confederation per se does not bring peace to the region. The emerging suggestions of establishing a confederation between the Horn of Africa states to achieve stability and encourage development in the region is something that has to be carefully studied in the future. There is currently a dire need for mutual tolerance, understanding, respect and non-interference between the Horn states.

Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates:

Before the time allocated to me elapses, allow me to say a few words on the present situations in my country, Eritrea. While the drought in 2002 in southern Africa and the Horn has received proper media coverage, most reports have overlooked that Eritrea is also a victim of the prevailing drought. The harvest of 2001 was the lowest in the last ten years. Following the poor harvest in 2001, insufficient rainfall in 2002 contributed to yet another catastrophic year for Eritrean farmers.

During 2002, Eritrea harvested only 10% of its needs. Of the 500,000 tones of food required to cover the needs of the country only 57,000 was harvested. According to the figures given by the Eritrean government and the UN some 2.3 million Eritreans will need food aid in 2003. The majority of the population is involved in agricultural activities and yet agriculture makes up to only 16 % of Eritrea's gross national product. The low level of productivity achieved last year is the main cause of the widespread food shortage experienced by the country. Low agricultural output is partly due to the reliance on rain-fed agriculture and partly due to the fact that farmers

work in harsh, arid to semi-arid environments where drought is common. For example, 6 of the last 10 years were marked by a serious lack of rainfall that led to crop failure.

The Government appealed to the international community for assistance in averting a major food crisis. The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator visited Eritrea in October 2002, and on November UN agencies launched a consolidated appeal, stating that over 2 million people would need food aid in Eritrea in 2003. The challenge is, however, not just to provide immediate food aid to fill the gap, but to ensure that there is food available over a longer period.

Another needy group of some 65000 internally displaced people (IDPs) who remain in camps in Eritrea, is unable to return home until mines are cleared from their fields and villages, the boarder demarcation is completed and war damaged infrastructure rehabilitated. Until then, the World Food Program and the Eritrean Relief and Refugee Commission will continue to provide food assistance to the IDPs.

The future of farmers living in the war-affected areas will depend not only on sufficient and regular rainfall, but also on the progress of the physical demarcation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Based on the peace treaty signed by both parties in Algiers in 2000, a final and binding decision was given by the Boundary Commission on 13 April 2002 in The Hague. However, with the delay of the implementation of the findings of the Commission the 65,000 IDPs will remain in camps and live on food aid for most of 2003.

Excellencies and Distinguished Delegates:

Before I conclude my brief presentation, I would like to bring to your notice the latest developments on the border demarcation in particular and the peace process in general. It has now become evident that Ethiopia has refused to abide by the April 2002 delimitation decision by the UN Court in The Hague, accusing the Commission of violating the spirit and content of the Algiers Peace Treaty. Among other sovereign Eritrean territories, the Ethiopian government is demanding that the Commission award it Badme, the village that was the pretext for the war of aggression launched on Eritrea in 1998, for it to respect the decision of the Commission. Eritrea, on the other hand, has accepted the decisions of the Boundary Commission, knowing very well that the April decisions in The Hague awarded Ethiopia indisputable Eritrean territories. Eritrea considers its border conflict with Ethiopia closed and sealed and urges the guarantors of the Algiers Peace Treaty, including the UN, EU, AU, USA and Algeria, to exercise their role and responsibility as witnesses and guarantors of the peace treaty to make Ethiopia abide by the findings of the Border Commission. A refusal to accept the verdicts of an International Court set up by the UN will only prolong the sufferings of the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia and thereby contribute to destabilizing the region as a whole.

Excellencies and Distinguished Delegates

As the theme of this conference states, and as all of the contributors to this conference pointed out, there will be no development without peace in the Horn of Africa. Unless all concerned parties in a conflict, be it the Somalis in Machacos, the Sudanese in Mbagathi or the Ethiopians

and Eritreans in Algiers and The Hague, uphold and honour the agreements reached, treaties signed and court decisions given, then it is unconceivable to hope for a lasting peace and all the dividends that follow with it to be realized.

Thank you.

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## 12. Partnership or Self-reliance: Does NEPAD Provide the Strategy for African Development?

BY

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Integration, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa

“The emancipation of Africa is the emancipation of man.” K.F. Nkrumah, *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization*: Panaf, London, P.78

*“The hand that receives is always under the one that gives” African Proverb*

“Not Economic Exploitation, as often assumed, but the disintegration of the cultural environment of the victim is the cause of the degradation. The economic process may, naturally, supply the vehicle of the destruction, and almost invariably economic inferiority will make the weaker yield, but the immediate cause of his undoing is not for that reason economic; it lies in the lethal injury to the institutions in which his social existence is embodied. The result is loss of self-respect and standards, whether the unit is a people or a class, whether the process springs from so-called ‘culture conflict’ or from a change in the position of a class within the confines of a society.”

Karl Polyani, *The Great Transformation* “Class Interest and Social Change” Ch.13, 1944

### Introduction

Like many contradictory processes, the demise of colonialism brought mixed blessings to Africa. It led to the formation of multiple states while fragmenting the ex-colonial entities from their much wider territorial and trade extent into many mini and micro states. Bar for a few states (perhaps?), hardly most of the African states can sustain a credible national development strategy without major inputs from outside. Fragmentation has one overriding consequence: It left the existing states vulnerable to outside help. If they cannot access outside assistance, they came to believe that they might not undergo profound transformation. Unfortunately outside help has not been given (or perhaps may not likely to be given) on a scale to bring fundamental change in Africa. Instead it created an unhealthy competition for limited donor funds, loans and grants



amongst African states. Nearly every African State has suffered from a constraint akin to something like a prisoner's dilemma for this external assistance. As the foreign assistance in the form of ODA and foreign direct investment declined after the cold war, the foreign policy of the heavily indebted states of Africa has become largely an unimaginative posturing to solicit foreign aid. The African states reel under the power of aid.

While donor involvement functioning within a nationally framed and specified strategy can be made probably productive, the current pattern leaves a lot to be desired. What States win in terms of cash and funds comes with a heavy price by sacrificing social capital that is needed to overcome the fragmentation of Africans. One of the key principles to advance African integration is to reduce such destructive competition with co-operation and trust. Independent industrial, technology and innovation strategies cannot be carried out without inviting the donors to drive the process. Most of the fragmented African states lack independent agency to carry out policies to transform their economic structure.

It is from this failure that the need for African integration has been proposed as a possible alternative. Even the re-grouping of African states into regional blocs has not diminished but intensified regional rivalry for external assistance. The prisoner's dilemma will not go away with the mere institution of a regional concept. It matters how regional arrangements are conceptualized, framed and activated. How stakeholders articulate their interests, aspirations and influences in shaping any regional economic reconfigurations has also a major influence on how a regional concept is articulated.

The rationale for African integration should emerge from the desire to activate and mobilize Africa's agency for undertaking and managing effectively the development process (understood as comprehensive structural transformation). Development must be anchored in the principle to remove ill being and promote and habituate well-being development and human security. There is a need to identify how to counter the degradation of people, nature and knowledge by ventilating arrangements, structures, actors, activities and practices for their subtractive and additive qualities to human well-being development. The subtractive or additive outcome to human wellbeing is the chief criterion to assess any regionalisation process. Thus African integration can make sense if it is designed to respond to the needs and aspirations of ordinary people.

One of the main reasons for embarking on African integration is thus to expand the opportunities and identify the problems in orienting development from being elite driven to one being driven by the people. It is part of the strategy to help undo the current mismanagement of African development. There is no merit in hankering for a wider African trade and economic regime, if the majority ordinary people (the workers and farmers) are made to lose in the process. The emancipatory underpinning to the regional integration project must not be lost. By the ordinary people I mean the productive social classes such as the workers, farmers, innovators and producers. I do not mean external donors, foreign business interests and local ruling elites with aspirations to connect with external interests and create their own materially comfortable world with callous indifference and moral abandon in the midst of massive poverty in their own societies.

One of the reasons in arguing for regional integration is to undertake an internal mobilization of resources and finance through a combination of trade creation, diversification and diversion to connect the regions. Africans need resources that can be harnessed from regional integration. The latter will assist or deter the revitalization of development in Africa depending on whether the people and the localities enjoy much latitude by employing something like the subsidiarity principle. That is to say within the regional framework self-action by different communities and actors can be expressed with freedom and self-determination

### **1. NEPAD and the Problem of Deepening and Broadening African Integration**

Africa has experienced a number of regional integration traditions. As a regional integration project, which tradition does NEPAD wish to build upon? This is an important issue for the elaboration of the concept, strategy and policy of African structural transformation through integration.

There are two main types of integration and five approaches to African integration. The two are voluntary and involuntary integration. An example of deliberative and cooperative schemes that have been formed and undone is the East African Community. The states drove and broke the regional cooperation and are trying to re-make it. Market driven regional cooperation tend to be cross-border mostly informal trade corridor linkages.

The approaches to African integration have come from:

- The Pan-African movement (whose source is the US and Caribbean-UK Diaspora)
- The colonial enlarged estates (UK, France and so on)
- The post-colonial state driven continental unity aspiration (e.g., OAU, AU, NEPAD)
- Actual sub- regional groupings based on the policies and laws of the existing states (e.g. ECOWAS, COMESA, SADAC and so on)
- Cross-border flows through refugees, pollution, wars and other disaster induced migrations (as a result of conflict, violence, social and nature degradation.)

There is a need to evaluate the merit of the different models of integration. I shall do this in another paper. The movements, states, trade and trans-African migrations via war and refugees are creating novel re-arrangements of economic transaction and may create the new trans- state-national African citizen .New hybrid identities are being formed that may dissolve petty loyalties and narrow regional and ethnic ties. It is not true that Africans think through tribal and clan association, units and entities. Tanzania provides a very good example of the fallacy of such casual and superficial observation. The most enduring legacy of Nyerere era in Tanzania is the de-ethnicisation of that society. That augurs well to suggest that provided there is an enlightened political project that is pursued with integrity and sincerity an African national citizen can be made.

## 2. NEPAD and African Integration

It will be useful to relate NEPAD to the different types of integration described above. NEPAD is a state driven process. It came as an initiative of the leaders of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Senegal. It shares in the optimism of the millennium to wish for a better African future. African leaders converted the Organization of African Unity into the African Union (AU) in 2000, claiming that the OAU had accomplished its mission by ending colonialism and apartheid. A year later the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) came on the scene. But there seem to be contradictions in the approaches taken by the two initiatives.

The European Union appears to serve as a model for the new AU, whose constitutive act suggests that the AU aims to fight poverty and establish a regime of human rights and government by law, citizen participation and accountability. There are plans for a single currency, a common African market and even a peace, security and cooperation council.

While the AU aspires to “pull fragmented sovereignties together” by building political unity and solidarity among African states and peoples, NEPAD aspires to capture and to define the continent’s developmental agenda. It thus gives priority to the economic, technological and business strategy for the transformation of African economic structures. NEPAD is thus the latest proposal amongst a series of earlier plans such as the Lagos Plan of Action having a go at trying to dent the problem of structural transformation of African economies. The NEPAD document describes Africa’s unacceptable marginalized position in today’s world economy and puts forward a programme of action. The NEPAD document recognizes that the private sector and the partnership of the private and public sectors in forging the African public economic sphere forms one of the key strategies for transforming the structure of African economies. In addition, while NEPAD does not ignore the importance of mobilizing domestic finance, it expects the bulk of the finance to come from the outside. This formula of stressing the role of the private sector and donor funding to define the African development agenda has been questioned. Some analysts suggest that NEPAD represents a “class project.” Some say that South Africa and Nigeria are using NEPAD to express their hegemonic aspirations in Africa. (Private communication from the Research Director, Nordic Africa Institute)

Although NEPAD is not mentioned in the AU constitutive Act, it was clearly stated at the Durban founding meeting of the AU that NEPAD is the economic programme of the AU and not a rival to it. It appears that NEPAD has been endorsed by the “trade union” of African heads of states. The charge that it has been smuggled by a few elite leaders has now been overcome by its endorsement by the assembly of heads of states. In terms of African integration, the AU is like a prefigurative imagined African national community while NEPAD becomes the economic arm in deepening and widening the integration process. The problem is whether the two processes can reinforce each other or create further obstacles to the prospect of African integration. This issue cannot be settled in the abstract.

### 3. NEPAD<sup>1</sup> as a Development Agenda and its Problems

Forty years has gone by, since an externally imposed development model, based on grants, loans, scanty foreign investment and unequal trade involving extraction of African agricultural and mineral rights for foreign exchange to buy foreign manufactures replaced the direct colonial system. There is now recognition that far from this externally orientated development model denting growing poverty and inequality, it has produced debt (including debt servicing) in Africa, that has become both the highest in the world, and, more importantly, has foreclosed Africa's right to independent development.<sup>2</sup>

How can Africa earn its right to develop and structurally transform? What future; what destiny for Africa: a free future or an externally manipulated future? That is the 'to be or not to be' question- the so-called 'Hamletian dilemma'- that fiercely confronts as a challenge to anyone that cares about Africa. When one looks at Africa through the mirror of its history, one finds it is not Africa that has failed, but the external development model and the way it has been imposed on African politics, economics, society, governance and culture by others. It is their project of development, their specific remedies and strategies that have been unjust. Should Africa rectify or justify the unjust system and its ideas that have failed her or not? Given the current convergence or confluence of information technology and financial services that have together formed speculative or casino capital on a global scale, it is important to ask can Africa ever make it to the promise land by playing dice in the fast globalising casino world economy?

I shall start by according the benefit of doubt to African leadership. Let us assume their intention is good and let us give NEPAD a generous read.

The authors of NEPAD think that Africa can pursue a self-reliant strategy while integrating in the globalised world economy. To put the point across in the leaders' own language:

“The New Partnership for African Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of development and exclusion in a globalising world”(NEPAD Document, 2001:1)

No one can fault the sincerity with which the leaders made their pledge to “eradicate poverty”, and/or defined NEPAD to occupy the center stage of Africa's “sustainable development “agenda. The problem lies at the same time in their assignment to NEPAD to provide the framework for Africa's participation and inclusion in the world economy. Given the bad record of Africa's participation and inclusion in the world economy since the time of slavery, what is new in “NEPAD” that will make a difference? Can the leaders' expressed deontological commitment to “eradicate poverty” and embark on “sustainable development” be attained while participating in

a world economy whose *modus vivendi* has not changed, in the main, in relation to Africa since the fifteenth century?

One can also understand that autarchy for Africa is not an option. Engagement with the world economy is unavoidable. However, it is the terms of that engagement that has been fudged by the leaders' eagerness to pledge to the people of Africa to deliver on poverty eradication, while assuring the transnational actors that NEPAD is far from being a subversive pledge. The deontological commitment by the leaders to "eradicate poverty" suggests that NEPAD aspire to carry out an emancipatory project. However, the willingness to play with the rules of the game within the world economy subjects the emancipatory ambition to the vicissitudes and impersonal interplay of economic forces shaping the world economy. It depends how much African social actors play the game and succeed. And that is the question? Is there no alternative to this uncertain custody of poverty eradication to the logic and working out of the games played by impersonal forces of the world economy? Does the world economy that operates with logic of the world law of value- where there have to be losers and gainers- tie or free African efforts to eradicate poverty rapidly? What is there to offset Africa from being a loser once more? How can it join the gainers in this game? We are dealing with an economic system that builds wealth through widening inequalities and poverty. And Africa becomes included or participates in the world economy without any affirmative action or equal opportunity provision to compete with well-established players. Where does Africa's support come from? How would the desire for a new partnership with the "international community" help precisely? What is the 'international community' any ways? There is a world order under the unipolar management or mismanagement of the Anglo-Saxon Empire led by the USA. How does this world order treat Africa? As a partner or a region to be dealt with and to keep open its source of raw material and market provision at dirt- low prices dictated and driven by the buyer power in the global value chain?

To quote Karl Marx may not be in fashion now, but what he said about capitalist production and the institutions for enforcing its expansion is relevant:

"Capitalist production, by collecting the population in great centers, and causing an ever-increasing preponderance of population, destroys at the same time the health of the town labourer and the intellectual life of the rural labourer...Moreover, all progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time, is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of the fertility. The more a country starts its development on the foundation of modern industry, like the United States for example, the more rapid is this process of destruction. Capitalist production, therefore develops technology, and the combining of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth- the soil and the labourer."

The importance of this debate is this: capital's economic expansion (the thing it can still do best) is said to be purchased by a dialectical co-relate of the expansion of massive social waste and destruction, radical inequalities and poverty (the thing it is not good at correcting in space and time). Capital embodies in its mode of existence and dynamics social waste and economic

expansion. It is so ontologically insecure that it needs to control the social fallout from the rigours of accumulation by employing more and more prisons, more and more military organization, employing more and more controlling personnel and technology against the possible crimes of the losers and their supporters.<sup>3</sup> The international institutions for capital expansion and social regulation on a planetary scale such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO are implicated in this dialectic of capital's economic growth and social waste. Their spokespersons bemoan through various international fora that the social inequities that keep growing as capitalist production is expanding is not inherent to the logic of capitalist production and keep proposing anti-poverty and anti-environmental degrading measures without touching the foundations of capital's systemic logic. This has prompted angry retorts by activists:

The IMF and the World Bank, far from bringing economic stability and reducing poverty, are destroying the environment and impoverishing people. Their calls for dialogue are just a public relations ploy and the announced reforms are cosmetic. The Bretton Woods institutions should be abolished and all the Third World debt cancelled. Moreover, the entire political and economic system of global capitalism needs to be overhauled. This is to be achieved by a global movement of solidarity opposed to the neoliberal model imposed by multinational companies, the rich countries, and their minions at the World Bank and the IMF.<sup>4</sup>

Can Africa eradicate poverty without some reform of the capitalist world economy? Is it an illusion to desire poverty eradication while wishing fully to participate in the system that is known to increase poverty and inequalities especially in the most vulnerable territories of Africa, Latin America and Asia? This is an important issue that NEPAD has not fully addressed. The terms of engagement with the capitalist global economy are too important to leave out. It is important to specify with what agency and options one engages and how Africans engage with such a system. Seeking partners is fine, but partners to reform the system or simply to sympathize and increase the aid budget? NEPAD should have clearly stated, like the proposal of the NIEO in the 70s, that what Africa requires are partners that will struggle to reform a system that has become synonymous with injustice itself in relation to the poor people of the world including workers and farmers.

Perhaps the leaders of Africa may have made a different appraisal of the world economy different from what is now conventional wisdom. Is there a window of opportunity in the post-cold war US dominated empire to include Africa on better terms than, say, what Africa had during the Cold War? Is today's unipolar moment/conjuncture favorable to Africa's inclusion and participation in the world economy on beneficial terms? Is that what the leaders have premised NEPAD upon?

The current debate on globalization has taken a variety of forms. At the core is whether there is fundamentally a new logic to the capitalist system different from that suggested by K. Marx (see quote above!) capable of self-generating economic advance by preventing regression into social decay and destruction including in certain circumstances war. Is globalization the latest version of "imperialism" in the classic way those socialist-radical thinkers such as Kautsky, Hilferding, Lenin –Stalin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, Bukharin and Mao Tse Tung and non-socialists such as Schumpeter and Hobson have described? Or is globalization an extra-capitalist phenomenon

inaugurating a different political economy to capitalist development by resolving the bifurcation of simultaneous economic progress and social regress with new bridges and new spaces? Has globalization modified the workings of capital sufficiently to imagine and realize economic gains without sacrificing social and environmental security? Or, is globalization an expression of the facilitation owing to digital, molecular and advanced material technology and telecommunications, of the fast movement of capital in bewildering and proliferating varieties? Has the unstable features of capital been attenuated by the creation of global capital and global markets? Is the capital logic still there with its uneven territorial concentration of wealth and poverty? Is the capital logic given way to a new integrated and even development of the system? Following Max Weber's the Spirit of Capitalism, is there a NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM characterized by even development territorially and socially?

I ask these questions because if Capitalism can expand economic activity while at the same time expanding social inequality, need Africa integrate into this economic structure without demanding changes in the first place? Does NEPAD have a neutralizing safety net to provide a beneficial integration of Africa into the world economy?

If on the other hand the capital logic bifurcates economic expansion with social waste, NEPAD may be spreading an illusion to pledge poverty eradication within a system known to exacerbate poverty and inequality by its systemic creation of winners and losers territorially and socially.

If the type of neo-liberal capitalism that dominated the last twenty years is anything to go by, according to the World Bank, some 80 percent of world income is known to be concentrated where 20 percent of the world population lives. The same 20 % of the world population occupies 80 % of the world environmental space. That does not augur well for NEPAD's expressed desire to eradicate poverty while playing by the rules of the capitalist game or spirit. Territorial and social inequalities are still inherent features within present day world economy. Unfortunately, much as one wishes to see it, Africa may not see the number of its poor people grow less. On the contrary the number of the poor may likely grow unless there are robust social policies to make sure the number of poor people is reduced. A pro-poor social policy implies that one cannot let ones hands to be tied behind ones back by joining lock, stock and barrel within the capitalist global economy. Africa needs to evolve a selective intervention strategy where it retains the initiative for social policy making by pursuing strategies of defense and offence to eradicate poverty and to embark on sustainable development.

However African leaders wish to play it, the larger context of the state of the dynamics of the capitalist system cannot be ignored to pursue any development strategy nations wish to follow to eradicate poverty. If they wish to develop policies to eradicate poverty, they may come up against the interests of powerful debtors who will insist that Africans produce minerals and primary commodities to pay and service debt. They will be coerced to abandon industrial, economic, technology, innovation and social policy. If they refuse, they will be denied budget substitution and other funds. If they go it alone, one by one, without a common strategy of defense or offence to deal with structural inequities of the world economy, they will be victimized one by one. It is this catch 22 situation that they must avoid by pooling their sovereignties together to plan the eradication of poverty across Africa.

The most interesting lesson for Africa about the Lagos Plan of Action is not whether its implementation would have been smooth sailing. It would not. They would have been problems had it been uptaken and implemented. But it was shunted aside due to the internal fact that African states were too fragmented to deal with the challenges from the Bretton Woods Institutions. The other important consideration was the fact that the structural adjustment policy adoption by each African Government was rewarded with loans whilst the Lagos Plan of Action was largely looking to self-finance Africa's development and long-term structural transformation.

NEPAD faces the same challenges as the Lagos Plan of Action: can it overcome internal fragmentation by promoting an African shared national project; and can it overcome the temptation to surrender the policy independence for cash?

To give credit to African leaders, they call for a "new partnership" with the industrialized world. Does it mean a call for systemic reform or is it a desire to prevent their conditionities from subverting any policy independence the leaders wish to pursue?

This is how they put it in their own words:

"[NEPAD] is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised countries to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations."(NEPAD, 2002; 2)

But what does it mean to say "a new partnership" with the industrialized world. Does it mean a call to reform the global economy? Does it mean to rescue policy independence and initiative in the face of expected demands from powerful external actors like the international financial institutions? How much are those who benefit from the world economy and who have helped themselves to Africa's rich minerals and agricultural commodities at favorable terms of trade willing to negotiate a new deal for Africa? This confusion is very important to clarify.

If "new partnership" means that Africa can re-negotiate the rules of the game of the world economic system, then there is something "new" to and in NEPAD. If it means inserting Africa in the unequal world economic division of labour, it would mean back to the old scoreboards. Africa's hands will be tied and carrying out any meaningful anti-poverty eradication measures would become a long haul.

Who drives NEPAD? Here African leaders clearly state that they are in the hot seat and only desire for the rest of the world to "complement" and not lead in setting Africa's development agenda: In their words:

"We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope. Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights, people centered development and market-orientated economies are



on the increase. African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership.”(NEPAD Document, 2002:2)

I take the statement by the leaders that, “We will determine our destiny” to mean a striving to reveal African independent agency in international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy. There is at once a desire to form an African will to make African perspective to guide Africa’s interest in international relations and a willingness to deal with problems by mobilizing Africa’s combined energy. The making or claiming of the 21<sup>st</sup> century as Africa’s century means nothing else other than inscribing at the center Africa’s interest, aspiration and perspective in the emerging world arrangement or international social contract.

If putting Africa at the center is the new benchmark, this can be certainly taken as a positive aspect to the leaders’ intention. Putting together market -orientated economies with people-centered development appears to show another confusion. In a document like NEPAD such conceptual confusion should have been clarified before release to the public.

While Africa’s leaders’ understanding of the political economy of the global economic system is contentious, on the whole NEPAD resonate a positive tone echoing very much the upbeat talk of the African renaissance. The development plan and agenda is supposed to have been owned by Africans, which means that African leaders will take responsibility for the failure and success of NEPAD. The leaders seek a new partnership that may or may not mean a diplomatically couched demand for reforming the existing structure of global power. The leaders pledge to democratize society and respect human rights and this is meant to be monitored through a peer-review mechanism. Poverty eradication is an essential foundation to protect human rights. They also pledge to ensure macro-economic stability, accountability and transparency of both leaders and institutions and the institutional and policy support to market relations. They pledge to pursue regional integration at both the regions and the level of the continent. They seemed to take Pan-African integration more as a step- by -step, incremental geographical, economic and political integration from the sub-regions to the continent. The danger of sub-regional incremental evolution in relation to the option of a big-bang burst into continental integration remains real. In addition, they have not addressed the issue of the historic African Diaspora and the recent Diaspora that migrated after the creation of the largely authoritarian post-colonial system of African Government.

The leaders have put forth four initiatives to address the programmatic implementation of the NEPAD concept: a) the Peace and Security Initiative, b) Democracy and Governance Initiative, c) Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative and d) the Sub-regional Approaches to Development. It remains how effective these initiatives will be and whether they will be consistent and lead to overall synergy and social innovation.

4. The critics of NEPAD: selecting the seed that will grow from tha, that will not

There are broadly two types of critical commentaries. The first is the ideological driven critique.<sup>5</sup> It is understanding NEPAD as a class project that we can fully understand its

import.<sup>6</sup> And the second is related to those who wish to identify positive and negative features in the NEPAD document.<sup>7</sup>

The criticism of NEPAD that it is a neo-liberal document is too sweeping and simplistic. There is confusion in the document, but it does not merit an outright dismissal as a neo-liberal document. Critics that dismiss NEPAD outright have been primarily driven by ideological impulse. It is difficult to make contribution to the debate if the critique is so pitched at an immanent level. It is difficult to engage African leaders with such criticisms.

Some question the sincerity of the leaders that propose NEPAD. Betrayal and sell-out has been attributed to the leaders. There was also a peroration suggesting that NEPAD may have been influenced by the G8.

The main reason why so many criticisms were leveled against NEPAD is the confusion in the document that I pointed out above. It opens the floodgate for all sorts of criticism. Had the people of Africa owned NEPAD and not by some of the African leaders, there would have been an opportunity to raise all these issues. That opportunity was not available and the document claims to define and own Africa's development agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Hence the interest and the sharp criticisms that ensued.<sup>8</sup>

Some of the scholarly criticism has come from within civil society by pointing out the contradictions, especially in the NEPAD document. Critics take to task the authors of NEPAD for calling for self-reliance while relying on external finance and support. It accuses the 'new international partnership' initiative of ignoring past and existing efforts by Africans to resolve Africa's crises and move forward, describing NEPAD as 'a top-down programme driven by African elites and drawn up with the corporate forces and institutional instruments of globalization, rather than being based on African peoples' experiences, knowledge and demands'.

They even question who will benefit by NEPAD: they claim that the main beneficiaries of the new approach to African economic development would be largely foreign businesses and those local actors working with them. There are those who claim African development should lift the underdogs – what Fanon called in his book 'the Wretched of the Earth'. They say that efforts to date to give prominence and voice to Africa's ordinary people have made little real difference. If we are to develop a strategy for African development where local, regional, national and continental combinations can take place, the starting point for evolving a shared purpose and action emanates from a commitment to change the prevailing ill-being state of the population into a well-being state for the large majority of ordinary people.

Thabo Mbeki appears to have heard or read some of the criticisms on NEPAD. His response which appeared as a South African Foreign Ministry release was picked up by the Harare based SEATIN and NEW African October 2002 end-tail piece. Mbeki took a broad swipe at all the critics declaring:

“It is important that we study both the NEPAD and Africa Action Plan closely, to understand and act on the possibilities they open up for African development, eschewing easy, routine, uninformed and cynical conclusions and the lazy and expensive option of disengagement.”(Thabo Mbeki, Building Africa’s Capacity Through NEPAD, reprinted in New African October 2002, p.66)

Mbeki has picked up the weakness of much of the criticism on NEPAD that falls far short of offering practical alternative. He mentioned 120 specific actions that the G8 action plan and the EU have committed themselves without specifying some of them. He advises against a counter-productive campaign against “Governments and institutions” of the North, while keeping the right and the duty “to protest against an unjust world order.” The need to engage “our development partners in the true NEPAD partnership” must balance “the necessary exercise” to keep the right to protest against the unjust system open.

Mbeki said that NEPAD tries to break the unwholesome relationship between hapless African aid-seekers and benevolent Donors. Mbeki challenged criticism directed at the shortfall of aid that would flow to Africa from the June G8 meeting in Canada as broadly uninteresting because it reflects the “demeaning view of Africans.”

Mbeki mentions that resource mobilization will ensue from “our own partnership” and affirms Africa’s rejection (and the Donor’s endorsement of such rejection) of Donor aid to fill Africa’s “begging bowl”. He mentioned specific areas where the G8 have promised in their action plan (to be reviewed in 2003 to assess implementation):

- Capacity building for peace support operations at regional and continental levels
- Generate larger inflows of foreign direct investment,
- Support to increase agricultural production and productivity
- Help in building infrastructure project proposals
- Open their markets to African products
- Increase funding to relieve debt
- Support in securing affordable drugs and medicine and in building a health infrastructure
- Clean water, sanitation and management of water resources

Mbeki positively appraises the G8 Africa Action Plan issued from their June 2002 meeting in Canada.

Though Thabo Mbeki wishes Africa not to extend its begging bowl in the form of grants, the suggestion that the G8 will generate foreign direct investment and warrant Africans to raise funds from the private capital market; they will increase funds for debt relief- all these continue the old relationship. There is nothing new in this relationship. The problem is that their promise may or may not be honoured. Most likely it will not. Whilst there is much to appreciate to reject the demeaning view of Africans as beggars, there is still that old relationship in the way the G8 will relate to Africa if they continue to donate and Africans also expect them to donate to them.

If the US and EU do not over-subsidize their farmers, African agriculture would have increased its productivity and Africa can potentially build the capacity to feeding Europe. But at the WTO the EU and the US always support their protectionist farmers while preaching trade liberalization on the weaker developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The expectation that the EU and US will support African farmers can be misguided. These powers seem to say: do as preach, but not as we do! Even if the subsidies and tariffs were to be lifted, other non-tariff barriers have to be surmounted. A concrete example is how cheese from camel milk from Mauritania was blocked from the German market. The German consumer loved the cheese and continued to purchase despite high tariff barriers, which reached until 70 %. When customer preference beat the authorities, they brought in methods of production, quality, standard, health and safety barriers to block the cheese from being exported to Germany. What this example shows is that there will be a lot of tariff and non-tariff barriers that will be imposed on the African farmer or agro- manufacturer. Thabo Mbeki may be too optimistic about the possibilities regarding G8 promises. Talking is one thing delivering is another?

Whilst Thabo Mbeki's rejoinder is very interesting, much of the concerns about NEPAD and the relationship with G8, private capital market, opening the markets of the North for African products, support for building Africa's physical, intellectual, social and financial infrastructure and so on still stands. There must be a practical way of changing the unjust world order in order to make the G8 and others recognize Africa's interest and aspirations.

##### 5. NEPAD and the Misguided Search for BIG Financial Assistance from the WEST

In constructing an African transformation agenda, it is necessary to identify two main issues that have attracted sharp rebuke to the NEPAD initiative. The first is funding African development and the second is the commitment to overcome African fragmentation with a shared approach and value to launch an African development strategy.

I shall deal with these two key problems first and offer a constructive outline of an alternative funding strategy and the basis for overcoming Africa's humiliating fragmentation.

Africa is already inside the loan-grant and debt regime. Asking for more of the same is to lack imagination, to surrender hope that there is no better way for Africa to constitute its own wellbeing. Aid including foreign direct investment comes with conditions that often contradict domestic social policy to eradicate poverty and spend for the wellbeing of ordinary people. The World Bank has recently decried that aid to Africa is falling. Not only does the aid become mis-directed by stringent conditions, but also it has been too scant and falling to matter. Our leaders' expectation expressed in NEPAD that this will change may be to nurse illusions, if not simply foolhardy. At any rate, unless the aid is under the strict control of domestic public policy, it will be difficult to direct it productively to meet basic human needs. The aid giver knows this and often the conditions of distancing and neutralizing the state by trumpeting the free market theology are stated before the amount is announced and the committed resources disbursed. This is precisely what transpired in Monterrey. The conditions were stated loud and clear. And the new pledge of 5 billion dollars from Bush no.2 and 7 billion dollars from EU fell far short of the UN target of raising an additional 50 billion dollars! Constant in the equation: Western Aid =

conditions that divert policy to impact on development + scant pledges + maximum press self-advertisement. The IFIs enforce this equation holds using the stick of aid against African countries.

The hand that receives is always under the hand that gives. It is this African saying or proverb that should provide the logic for creating a new framework of interaction by Africa with the rest of the world. Aid, loans, trade and investment can all help, but they can also hurt. In this context, the Pan-African revival is not merely an option. It is a necessary alternative to get out of the trap of dependence and attain Africa's self-reliance and independent voice in the world.

5. Crystallize an African National Project to Anchor Development through Self-reliance  
It is important to crystallize a new African synergy beyond the current de-colonized fragments. The Western world that feels it has much to lose including the local groups associated with external interest have often castigated the Pan-African vision as a daydream. But after 40 years of political independence, the case for constituting a Pan-African national project is more compelling now than in the 60s when it was unfurled by the first generation of some of the thinking leadership of Africa. There is a clear need to forge an African nation going beyond the existing fragile, ineffective and fragmented state system. All nations are imagined communities. The Italian nation and the German nations that emerged as a consequence of national unification were also imagined Communities. Africa's unity has been aborted by the historical compromise of the national liberation movement in accommodating and retaining colonial interests in independence. The abandonment of Pan-African directions meant that the ex-colonial powers retained colonial like presence in partnership or alliance with the local ruling elites. They instituted a loan-grant and debt regime to rule Africa indirectly.

While unity has been an easy rhetoric on the lips of Africa's post-colonial leadership, it has been, nevertheless, elusive and difficult to forge for the last forty years. Unity is a rich concept in Africa as it is the necessary foundation for Africa's free future. It is thus more than a territorial agglomeration of the existing states. African unity is first and foremost the development of an African national consciousness to transform, build, guide and finally realize an African national project by thinking beyond the existing state frontiers. It represents above all the African conquest of a unity of purpose and unity of action to confront the many challenges Africans face in today's fragile and chaotic world. Unity will be the way for Africa to reclaim fairness in dealing with others in an unequal world. Such unity can be said to be made when Africans evolve a collective identity and platform and a common conception for collective action in relation to four major matters:

- A shared conceptual framework on how to bring an integrated and comprehensive structural transformation of Africa.
- A common and united conception and approach in dealing with a system which continues to have a logic and modus operandi that is massively unjust and unfair to Africa
- A compelling moral clarity, intellectual confidence and political commitment to assist ordinary
- Africans to be the main beneficiaries of Africa' wealth, resources and environment.

- A united approach to bring to bear a coordinate political, executive, legislative, judicial and scientific authority to prevent nature degradation.

Together the above will assist Africa to define and set its own agenda and deal with hostile environments while learning to respond to the friendly in the world. At the moment Africa is neither fully free nor fully self-reliant. It needs to reveal and build a collective independent agency to put African transformation and perspective at the center of international relations.

Why unity at a Pan-African level is selected to any other level is this. The reason is that unity on any other basis will not bring to birth emancipated or free Africa. Is there any other social Africa's unity in freedom? I can enumerate a number: the family, the clan, the tribe, the community, the church, the trade union, social movements, political parties, the nationality, the institution that can serve as the organizing principle to bring the fullness or richness of ethnic group, the existing artificial states or the current neo-liberal inspired creations such as the growing and conflicting or competing number of NGOs, civil society, the private sector (businesses), new regions and so on. While these institutions, identities and hybrids are important and may be necessary; none of them can become the institutional primitive for bringing about a broader conception of Africa's role and place in the wider and larger scheme of things. The reason is simple: They are too dispersed, discrete and difficult to transform their specific interests and aspirations into a general interest. Each of these social units or arrangements leave the door open for division and for others who do not mean well to Africa to get in and sow discord and distrust. We must wake up to the fact that Africa's long history from ancient Egypt to the present day provides a clarion call and a compelling case for its unity. It is easier to unite on the basis of an African identity than on any other. It is all-inclusive and does not exclude on the basis of territorial, religious, regional, ethnic, linguistic and other criteria. Since 1963 there has been official rhetorical lip service to Pan-African unity. What is absent is not the rhetoric for this need of Africa's unity. There is an inflation of rhetoric inversely proportional to the deflation in action. All the Governments of the OAU have signed to some notion of Pan-African ideal. But a large number of states have been named and shamed by NEW AFRICA for not having paid their dues. They thus pay lip service to the organization. Most now have ratified the AU. But judging by the way they treated the OAU, the future of the AU is uncertain. AU may be, as one analyst quipped- OAU without the "O."

What is disturbing is that there is massive hypocrisy played by the leaders: talking Pan-African and acting anti-Pan-African and, at the same time, excluding those with committed interest to realize the political and economic unification of the continent. There is a great need for a moral and intellectual resolution and clarity to make free or emancipated Africa. Africa as a civic nation based on the emancipated citizen must be forged. Free Africa needs a new kind of being- a citizen of the African world with a globalised African soul free from petty allegiances and labels, possessing a revitalized sense of a civic-African self and personality as a premier identity. We have Africa. It is high time to make the Africans.

## NOTES

.NEPAD's priority areas are agriculture, the private business sector, infrastructure and regional integration.

The figure of US\$64 billion for the year 2002 was flaunted at the G8 meeting in Canada and expectation that seems unrealistic in view of the G8's greater interest in good governance than in dishing out the cash.

.For example, the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the Abuja Treaty (1991), the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs (AAF-SAAP, 1989), the African Charter for Popular Participation and Development (Arusha Charter, 1990) and the Cairo Agenda (1994).

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### 13. H. E. Daniel Tanui, Charge di' Affaires of the Kenyan Embassy in Sweden

Your Excellencies,  
Distinguished guests,  
Ladies and gentlemen.

I have great pleasure to be with you today in this conference.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the organizers for their efforts in bringing together such a wide array of eminent persons to address this conference.

Africa for a long time has been characterized by conflicts; disease and poverty, but there are positive indications that the leadership of the continent is increasingly taking initiative to address these challenges.

Peace and stability are a pre-requisite to social and economic development. In this regard therefore Kenya is very active in several regional initiatives that are geared to conflict prevention and resolution. Such organizations include the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in which Kenya is an active member. Cooperation in this regional body is borne out of the realization that the development and prosperity of Kenya are intimately tied with that of her neighbours in the region.

Kenya believes that peace initiatives are significant tools for peace restoration in Africa. Dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflict are the only ways to guarantee enduring peace and stability. Currently Kenya is hosting two peace initiatives under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Machakos town, East of Nairobi and between the warring factions in Somalia.

Kenya has played and will continue to play its role in mediation for peace in the horn Africa. Right now she is fully engaged in the Somali and Sudan peace processes. The Sudan peace process negotiations have been continuing since June 2002 in the town of Machakos outside Nairobi. The participation of all IGAD member states and international observers has made it possible for the belligerents to make fundamental milestones. This has led to the narrowing of the gap between the government of Sudan and the Sudan people's Liberation Movement on major issues of forming a unitary government.

Further to the Sudan peace process I am glad to say that a memorandum of understanding on cessation of hostilities was signed on 15<sup>th</sup> October 2002. A subsequent addendum provided for a verification mechanism.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2003, President Mwai Kibaki and President Omar Hassan Ahmed el- Basher of Sudan met in Nairobi. During the meeting the two presidents underlined the importance of maintaining peace and stability as a pre-requisite for development in the region. The two leaders agreed that the resolution of the conflict in the Sudan was crucial for peace and stability

The fifth session of the political committee task force began on 10<sup>th</sup> May 2003 in Machakos, Kenya. This is the first part of the last phase of the Sudan negotiations. It is hoped that a comprehensive peace settlement in Sudan would be reached by end of June this year.

On the Somali peace process the long awaited Somalia national reconciliation conference was finally convened in October 2002 first in Eldoret 500km west of Nairobi and later shifted to Nairobi. The process is Somali owned and Somali driven and IGAD only facilitates the process of reconciliation. The IGAD frontline states are committed towards ensuring that there is a government of national unity, which is broad, based and all-inclusive.

The delegates attending the Somalia national reconciliation conference signed the declaration of the cessation of hostilities on October 27<sup>th</sup> 2002. The declaration included structures and principles of the Somalia national reconciliation process. The declaration was hailed as the most inclusive ever signed by the Somali factions. The leaders solemnly undertook to create federal governance structures for Somalia, embodied in a charter or constitution and endorsed the principle of decentralization as an integral part Somalia governance structures. The declaration binds the signatories to implement fully the United Nations Security Council Resolution 733 of 1992 on arms embargo for Somalia and guarantees security for all humanitarian and development personnel and installations as well as ensuring safe access to aid for all people of Somalia.

The declaration of the cessation of hostilities has however met some set backs. There have been reported cases of violations. Such violations undermine the ongoing reconciliation conference. The violations have occurred when all efforts are being made to put into place a monitoring mechanism.

In conclusion, I would like to say that in order to ensure peace and security in the Hon of Africa, the African capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management should be strengthened. The International Community can contribute more to this by supporting peace-keeping training and regional conflict resolution mechanisms.

Thanks

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## 14. WAR AND POVERTY - A DEADLY SPIRAL

Håkan Wiberg

Former Director at Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Denmark

Wars and poverty both kill people, to an extent that depends much on how they are shaped. Wars, the ultimate form of physical violence, appear in different combinations of three main types. The first type is "pre-modern war", when armed bands perambulate in a region for years, sometimes fighting each other and more often hitting the civilian population, which is also killed of by the diseases these bands carry around and the starvation they create by plundering or destruction. There is "modern war", with attrition between mass armies at fronts, perhaps combined by mass bombing behind them. And there is post-modern war, mainly fought by guided missiles and (sometimes) guided bombs, with very few casualties on one side and one hundred to one thousand times as many on the other side, many of them civilians, out of which many more still then die as a result of the destroyed infrastructure. What is conventionally called civil wars normally combine the two first types, whereas international wars tend to combine the last two. It has, however, become increasingly difficult to distinguish sharply between civil and international wars, since not a few contain components of both.

Poverty also kills people, as does in particular what we call "structural violence", the measure of which is the extent to people die or get disabled from shortages that could have been avoided if existing availability of food, public hygiene, medical attention, etc. had been differently distributed. The Gini index of income or land ownership in a country is one of the statistics that can be used to assess the extent of structural violence, but not alone - the same distribution is of course far more deadly when the average income is low than when it is high. To assess the extent, such indicators as life expectancy at birth or the level of infant mortality are superior to GDP per capita, precisely since the latter indicator does not tell us about distribution. We may thus have deadly poverty without much structural violence, in cases when the shortages are too great to permit any distribution to give everybody enough for healthy survival, but in reality there is often an element of structural violence. In fact, the estimates that have been made indicate that the annual number of deaths by structural violence in the world exceeds that by physical violence by the magnitude of more than ten.

Poverty and war often compound each other as causes of suffering and death; they may also engender each other. A first indicator of this is, as the Horn of Africa tragically exemplifies, that the areas in the world that are suffering worst from poverty also tend to be among those that are worst stricken by war. What the causal relations in either direction look like is a more moot point, depending inter alia on what perspective we take and what direction we look at.

The relationships that are most thoroughly studied is those from poverty to war. Anthropological studies, taking a culture as unit, have concluded that the more contact a culture has with other cultures and the higher its level of technical and political development is, the more wars does it

tend to have the more contact it has. The former relation contains at least an element of tautology: after all, war is also a form of contact. The latter relationship may have as a part of its explanation that it takes at least some level of development to have the resources and organisation necessary to be able to be involved in war (as distinct from minor skirmishes) at all. It should be noted, however, that the highest level we find in these studies are agrarian societies. When we go beyond that level, we must rather take states (ranging between agrarian and postindustrial) as units and there we find a different pattern: there is virtually no relationship between the GDP per capita of a state and the total extent to which it is involved in war. Japan is highly peaceful nowadays, the USA very belligerent. The proportion of its resources that a state spends on military preparations predict its involvement in war better than whether it is rich or poor. When we look specifically at international war, the most belligerent combination is a Great Power with many boundaries and a higher level of military expenditures than average for its size, whereas the most pacific combination is a smaller state with few boundaries and military preparations below the average for its size.

Even if the two kinds of wars cannot always be kept strictly apart, there is considerable evidence that wars between states have causes and dynamics that differ from those of wars (and minor armed conflicts) within states. To start with, there is virtually no statistical relation between occurrences of these two kinds of wars. In addition, the same features have different effects for international and domestic wars.

One example of this is democracy. It has no significant statistical relation to the participation in international war of single states, but is nevertheless important when we look at pairs of states: two democracies never, or hardly ever, fight each other. Inside states, by contrast, the relation is a complex and A-shaped one: the most peaceful states are stable democracies, which are followed by stable autocracies, with much higher risks of war in states that are inbetween these extremes. This seems to be both because they are inbetween and because they are in a process of change (whether towards or away from democracy).

The ethnic composition of a state has little relation to its participation in international war. Inside states, however, the risk of war is higher in those that are ethnically heterogeneous, in particular if the biggest group is not a solid majority and if the groups are heavily mixed in territorial terms.

And whereas there is little relation between wealth as such and participation in international wars, we find a very different and J-shaped pattern for domestic wars. The poorer a country is, the more war do we find, with the exception that the very poorest countries have slightly less war than very poor ones. Why this is so can have several explanations, including such effects of scarcity as greed (trying to monopolise existing resources) and grievances (trying to counteract that).

Only recently has more systematic research been carried out on the other direction of the relationship: that leading from war to poverty. There are several avenues for such effects that wars tend to combine, such as destruction of fixed capital; flight of the manpower necessary to keep up production; debilitated markets and increasing trading costs; and reduced external input into the economy by export incomes, investments, loans and grants.

Behind these effects we find several macroeconomic and microeconomic mechanisms. One effect at macro level is inflation (unless the government is able to withstand the temptation to finance part of the war by printing more currency). Another is lower government revenues: there is less to collect because of shrinking production, trade, etc. - and it becomes more difficult to collect them, by lack of territorial control, deteriorating administration, etc. Military expenditures increase however, sometimes drastically. In the ensuing redistribution of expenditures, it is normally the production of public goods - health, education, welfare - that suffer from this combination. This is not necessarily so however: if - as was the case in Sri Lanka, Mocambique and Nicaragua - there is a government that is both strong (efficient) and firmly committed to them, these public goods may remain largely unaffected.

The microeconomic decision makers, i.e. the households, face several decisions that have to be made in the light of the macroeconomic changes, the security situation, etc.: whether to remain at their work or flee elsewhere; whether to save to have reserves or spend to provide for immediate survival; whether to continue trading labour force and products at the market, go over to bartering them or to subsistence production; and whether to remain within legal activities or go over to such illegal ones as smuggling, black market operations or plain robbery. In each case, the first alternative tends to be undermined in wartime, which in turn contributes to a further worsening of the macroeconomic phenomena just reviewed: less investments, less trade, less government revenues, etc. And this, finally, becomes one instance of a more general phenomenon: quite apart from the causes that started a war, it tends to produce additional causes by its own effects, such as (increased) poverty, which may eventually become more important than the causes of the initiation of the war.

Obviously it is better to have no war than to have a war. It is less obvious how this is can be achieved without creating more harm than the harm thus avoided. Military interventions mean even more war, at least in the short run; and even if they are successful in ending (or, more often, just postponing) the war, the great destruction of infrastructure that they often include also has negative long term effects.

Nor is it obvious what are the effects of external economic measures. Arms embargoes may suffocate the war but may be difficult for political reasons, when the great powers behind them have hidden agendas. More general economic sanctions have little if any proven effects in ending wars, at the same time as they may kill more people than the war itself, so they are also questionable and at least have to be justified (or not) case by case, rather than used as a vademecum. Humanitarian aid is often provided during the war (but will also have to be looked at case by case, since it may "feed the war" or even become pretext for military interventions). On the other hand, loans, grants, trade, etc., are often frozen or postponed until the war is over. This has understandable reasons, but also needs rethinking: in order to limit the war's effect on (current as well as postwar) poverty, such input is needed already while the war is going on.

15. Lund University Perspectives                      on the Horn of Africa  
 ~ necessities and possibilities ~  
 Prof. Arne Ardeberg, Vice Chancellor of Lund University

**An Important Conference**

First of all, my sincere thanks to the organisers of the conference for inviting me to address this highly important audience and meeting. There can be no question that the present conference is dealing with a subject of utmost priority for the people of the Horn of Africa as well as for the international community. It is essential to note that we, in Sweden, are part of this world-wide community.

Let me very specially mention Abdillahi Jama. He has been, is and, I am sure, will continue to be the inspiring enthusiast guiding all of us and to whom we all owe a lot of gratitude. Please allow me to propose a loud applause for him. He is worth this many times over.

**Warfare versus Welfare**

Large investments are since a long time and continuously made in arms, in the Horn of Africa, as in so many other places of the World. Correspondingly generous investments in the strengthening of peace are disappointingly small, as are the resources for security and a dignified life for the general population. Regrettably, we seem to be much more interested in promoting warfare than welfare.

This should be a statement hardly controversial and, of course, easy to defend. However, this does not, in itself, help the people of the Horn of Africa. It is always easy to criticize, while it is much harder to do something constructive. Words are sometimes of importance but they do not, as such, change the world and its miseries.

**Action Needed**

No doubt, we all strongly feel that something has to be done to promote and support peace in the Horn of Africa. Action in this direction is a necessity. However, who can we name to promote this action and its adequacy? As so often, we all tend to look for Somebody. Let me propose, that we try really hard to realize, that we, all of us, ought to be and simply have the human obligation to be Somebodies.

Only by actively being involved and, even more important, taking action can we claim to be serious in our concern for the fate of the Horn of Africa and its people. At Lund University, we feel very much Somebody. Now, what can we at the University do in practice? How can we make a meaningful contribution?

**The Role of the University**

The question concerning the role of a university is highly sobering. The magnitude of the task ahead of us is enormous. At the same time, we have to realize that a university is, in this context, a small player. However, while feeling humble is rather adequate, it is not a valid excuse for not being active. So, what can we do?

The programme heading of the present Conference says “No Development without Peace”. Our Chairman elucidated this further, noting “No Sustainable Development without Peace”. It is easy to agree both with the programme heading and with the chairman and his complement. In addition, we may well add “No Sustainable Peace without Hope”. Further, and as a way to get our university clearly involved, we can add “No Real Hope without Sustainable High-Class Education” as well as “No High-Class Education without a University”.

### **University Reconstruction**

As a life-time scientist and university employee, I probably tend to over-emphasize the role of universities and, not least, that of my own university. Still, for the Horn of Africa to regain not only peace but also hope, dignity and a competitive place in the world, we must ask if it is possible to proceed in a positive and convincing manner without the involvement of universities of high standards? Personally, I do not believe that this is realistic.

Consequently, we have, in collaboration between Lund University and SIRC, drawn up some rather optimistic plans for a reconstruction of a highly important university of the Horn of Africa. I am referring to the National University of Somalia in Mogadishu. While we have decided to give highest priority to this university, it goes without saying that similar considerations are logical and must be followed up concerning many other universities of the region.

Friday evening, at dinner time, I had the pleasure to discuss this matter with our Co-Chair, Bethlehem Araya. She strongly supported our optimistic university plans. But then, examined from one of the most prestigious engineering programmes of Lund University, she might not be much less biased concerning the importance of universities than the undersigned. Recognizing many university colleagues and friends in the audience, I suppose that we are many that find it easy to agree very much on the necessity of high-class academic education as well as on research, fundamental as well as applied. Even more important, I know that all of you are willing to invest high efforts in a reconstruction programme.

### **Support rather than Export of Solutions**

For many reasons, it seems to me exceedingly important to stress the fact, that we should not make any attempt to export our own academic solutions to the Horn of Africa. That would, first of all, be highly presumptuous but also, and more important, rather misdirected. Instead, we should, as efficiently as possible, assist and support the local specialists such, that they, themselves, can produce the solutions. We, from Lund University, should mainly act as a resource in this procedure. Then, and only then, will the solutions defined be genuinely local and suited to local conditions.

### **An Attempt**

Together with Abdillahi Jama and his colleagues in SIRC, we have, for three years, tried to launch a programme for a timely reconstruction of some of the faculties of the Somali National University. We have chosen the activity units most urgently needing reconstructive measures. We have had people lined up both from Lund University and from the general Somali university

community in Sweden. We have had very positive contacts and tentative agreements with SIDA, Forum Syd and other potential funding agencies.

Sadly, new surges of stunning violence in Somalia have, for the time being, efficiently ended our attempts. An optimistic fact-finding mission to Mogadishu was very recently conducted by Abdillahi Jama. The intention was to identify and document local university resources. Potential resources comprised university teachers and other university staff still active in their professions. Other resources to be inspected were premises earlier owned and used by the university, literature and laboratory material. In addition, the fact-finding mission included inspection of the general situation in Mogadishu and its surroundings concerning schools, education, hospitals and medical care as well as general safety.

As the situation sadly evolved, the results of the mission were rather limited. Civilian disorder and brutal violence dominated much of the scene. Most of all, we are happy that Abdillahi Jama returned alive. Naturally, for our university renovation plans, the chaotic and highly lawless situation in Mogadishu implied a severe set-back. Still, we did not, should not and will not give up. That would clearly be to surrender to the violent movement.

### **The Impact of a University**

A highly useful exercise is to stop and ponder on the possible final results of a university reconstruction in Mogadishu. We should try to take a view as representative as possible of that of the people of the country and the region. Then, what can a reconstructed National University offer the people of the Horn of Africa?

First of all, the university can act in a general manner. It can create a new foundation for research and higher education. In this process, it can promote the intellectual dimension and the status and importance of reflection and critical thinking. This will have an important influence on education in general, its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects.

### **A Range of Positive Results**

In a manner similar to that regarding research and education, the university will set the scene for improvements in other social activities dependent on an intellectual and responsible dimension. Important examples are health care, social care, child care and old-age care. Other necessities concern legal institutions, courts and a range of public institutions. A reconstruction of a functioning public administration is an essential part of the total endeavour.

The over-all importance of a support for free ideas and their uninhibited circulation can hardly be overemphasized. This is tightly linked to the promotion of general justice and fairness as well as of welfare and security. These are all values that have suffered badly from the chaotic and violent nature of the recent years.

Somewhat more specifically, a reconstructed university will strengthen the social dimension in terms of a support for a more fair distribution of possibilities and wealth. An important aspect is a promotion of gender equality. Equally essential is the protection of the rights of children. In a more general context, the aim is a society with a higher degree of maturity and social awareness



and responsibility. Further, it is of fundamental importance to clarify that these values need not only acceptance and promotion but also an active, determined and vigorous defence.

### **Education as a National Strength**

Inherent in much of the items discussed but also very important in itself is the educative aspect of a university. The various faculties will educate academics for a large range of purposes. Especially among the first groups of examined people, many will, most probably, continue at the same university. While this may be easy to predict, it is also essential for the stability and strengthening of the emerging academic institutions. However, rather soon, the university will reach a situation of equilibrium, examining people both for its own functions and, more abundantly, for that of the general society.

Already among the first groups of people examined from the new university, the diversity of directions will be large. While some will continue at the university as teachers, researchers and in administratively and technically oriented positions, many will leave the university for other occupations. Some of them will continue as teachers in colleges and schools. This will imply an important strengthening of the total educative system of the country, a measure of fundamental necessity for an improved future and implementation of more equal opportunities for all people. This pattern will also establish a large number of bridges between the school system and the university, to the advantage of all parties.

### **Health and Social Care**

Many of the examined people will continue their carriers in hospitals and other institutions dedicated to various forms of health and social care. As a consequence, the hospital, health-care and social-care areas will expand and, at the same time, improve their quality. This tendency will be further strengthened through personal links between the institutions and the corresponding faculties of the university. Frontier methods will, through public hospitals and institutions, be commonly and affordably available also to people with limited personal resources. For the citizens, this will mean an increased life quality with higher security as an important part.

### **Jurisprudence, Law and Order**

Other people with fresh university degrees will take up positions in courts and other institutions dedicated to the national system of jurisprudence. This system will be enriched through the contacts with the university at the same time as the university benefits from a dialogue with the work environment of its former students. The rights and independence of the common citizens will be better protected. Daily life will be guarded and guaranteed by law rather than by rifles.

Academically educated people will also enter the institutions responsible for daily local and national law and order and for the defence of the country. Brutal force and enforcement will be replaced by protection and support for peaceful and respectful behaviour. The citizens will be the central players and actors rather than the victims of armed bands caring for their own interests only.

### **Public and Private Administration**

Well-educated people will join and help to build up a new and efficient system of public administration. National and local services will improve. Civil rights will get a new support. Public services will increase in quantity as well as in quality. Chaos will give way to a much more ordered life, in which citizens will be given help, not being harassed.

A smooth and efficient operation of banks, public and private alike, is essential for the function of a modern country. Bank services of high quality are crucial parts of the daily life of citizens. In parallel, they are of fundamental importance for the state, community services, industry, business and foreign trade and relations. A proper function of modern banks requires employees with solid academic education.

Public and private organizations will benefit from administrations led by people with solid university education. This will support the development of social and cultural life and promote a new dimension of the society. The life of the common citizen will get richer and more diversified.

### **Agriculture and Environment**

A large range of public and private enterprises will take advantage of employees with a university education. Agriculture will be guided to better methods, improved use of land and enhanced ways of selection of crops and cattle. People working in agriculture will be able to use their resources more efficiently at the same time as they can improve their own situation. In addition, agricultural products will be handled more rationally, in the interest of both producers and consumers.

Seen from a natural-resources point of view, the Horn of Africa has a number of advantages but also some restrictions. For a prosperous future, adequate care for the environment is a necessity. With the present level of research and development concerning environmental issues, the university will be in an excellent position to offer both skilled staff and a range of measures to protect the environment. It will be possible to take advantage of the natural resources available in parallel with a firm protection of the quality of the environment.

### **Water Resources**

A crucial item for the future of the Horn of Africa is the management of its water resources. This is a fact the seriousness of which has been demonstrated sadly often and clearly. There can be no doubt that the situation can be handled very much better than what has been done so far. At the same time, it must be emphasized that a solution to the water-resource problem cannot wait but has to be addressed with highest priority. Modern research offers a wide range of solutions to both the economic use of water and to the treatment of water for different purposes, with special emphasis on drinking water. This is an area in which the university will make a determined effort and in which it will be able to provide essential help, both with adequate measures and well-educated staff.

### **Energy**

Crucial for the future of the Horn of Africa and its inhabitants, as for so many other regions of the World, is the care for best possible use of local resources of renewable energy. Like the water-resource problem, the issue of energy production and distribution has to be approached as a matter of urgency. While timely action is a pressing necessity, there is, on the very positive side, every reason to believe that, at least in the long run, the prospects for a sustainable local energy management in the region are rather positive.

Again like for the supply of water, regarding the production, saving and distribution of energy, the university will be a prime resource of knowledge, development and provision of well-educated staff. The same will be the situation concerning the crucially important relation between production and use of energy and, on the other hand, the protection and promotion of the quality of the environment.

### **Infrastructure and Communication**

Arrangements for implementation of a modern regional, national and local infrastructure will, to a considerable degree, enhance the development of society and its progress. A well-designed infrastructure should be outlined at an early stage of development. In an iterative process, it should define the guideline for future developments and installations of tools and means for communication, physical as well as electronic. Infrastructure and large-scale logistics will be items of high priority for the university, in terms of research and development and, in parallel, concerning education.

Streets, roads and highways of solid quality are obvious necessities for the development of a modern society and for the unification of communities and states into nations and a regional collaborative entity. Regional, national and local master plans should be elaborated and defined as soon as possible and in orchestration. This will enhance their collective and individual utility and, at the same time, limit the total expenditure. The university can provide expertise, solutions and staff with solid education.

Also regarding air communications and airports, early planning is important. Adequate interfacing with international air traffic is urgent as is the corresponding co-ordination with surface transport. Arrangements for and implementation of public transport should include air traffic as well as surface traffic. The planning for the flow of public transport should be aiming at travel possibilities being, at the same time, easy to access, swift and well co-ordinated, and affordable for common citizens.

Equally important for the development of the region are systems for surface mail, telephone connections and electronic communications. In all cases, safety of delivery and easy access should be important targets while maintaining the use of the systems commonly affordable. An integrated regional system for telephone and electronic messages should be a natural part of the international internet arrangements. High-quality international connections for the university as well as for the school, health and other fundamentally important public institutions must be given special priority, albeit not at the cost of exclusion of firm development of other parts of the

system defining the connectivity level of the society. In several aspects, the university will provide resources and knowledge for the development of these items and their accessibility.

### **Industry**

A successful development of the region, the countries and the local communities will be strongly linked to and dependent on the emergence of industrial enterprises, public and private, local and national, regional and international. An industry well functioning and a corresponding regional industrial structure will promote production of a large range of essential items. At the same time, it will provide employment and international links and connections. Further, the developing industry will boost the economy on all levels and act as a lever for general development and growth. Promoting industrial development coupled to public utility and progress will be an attractive challenge for the university as will the education of high-level and specialized staff for the emerging industrial market.

### **Business**

For local, national and regional enterprises to thrive, competitive production of goods and commodities is fundamental but not sufficient. The production has to be accompanied by and coupled to systems supporting management, distribution and marketing. A modern society needs a modern business system. This system has to be both efficient and sufficiently and conveniently regulated and interfaced to the sources of production as well as to the consumer markets. The university can provide help and solutions as well as staff with modern, internationally oriented education.

### **The Over-All Perspective**

It seems rather obvious that a reconstructed national university can contribute forcefully to a large range of activities serving the development of the Horn of Africa. However, it is equally important to keep in mind the more general impact of the different types of development supported by the university. It is strongly believed that the ensemble of actions will define a stabilizing factor, serving as a support of the strengthening of society and as an over-all motor of the emergence of a sustainable modern regional community. This way, the university will enhance the growth and power of peace, progress and prosperity, while maintaining ethical aspects high on the agenda.

As a result, the new development will assist and empower common citizens in taking an effective yet highly controlled and democratically oriented command of their communities and nations. At the same time, common interests coupled to the necessity of collaborative efforts can contribute to the maintenance of regional understanding and peace. Such a development together with the presence of a university and an educational system of high international level will attract bright and active people and counteract the brain drain currently plaguing the region.

In other words, the region will present an attractive offer of intellectually based career options as clear alternatives to those based on warfare and violence. A reconstructed national university can be an efficient instrument in offering peaceful solutions, in situations currently ruled by threat and gunfire. The university can support and develop local and national democratic solutions and ruling.

### **Less Sweeping, More Factual**

Being guided by a combination of indignation, enthusiasm and optimism is often adequate as a starting position for action. However, positive talk has to be followed up by detailed and forceful handling. Otherwise, the programme will be limited to merely an exercise in rhetoric. Thus, as an essential complement to the sweeping statements made above, it seems useful and important to have a more detailed look at what a restored national university can offer the region and its people in terms of factual contributions. In this context, we should not limit our perspective to that of research and higher education but take a more general approach from the perspective of the general society.

To make the discussion as concise and factual as possible, it will be detailed in terms of faculty endeavours. A comprehensive university must be a natural target for a restoration of a national university. Such a university is foreseen in the discussion. It is understood as comprising several faculties. These have been taken to represent arts and humanities, theology, social sciences, economy, law, (natural) science, engineering, medicine and performing arts. This is the faculty structure of Lund University and a structure close to that of many leading international universities. It is naturally not the only structure possible and probably not exactly the one finally emerging in Mogadishu. However, it should serve as an option for our discussion.

It must be stressed that the faculty endeavours discussed are only some examples. They form part of much richer programmes, together defining a wealth of opportunities, academically as well as for the citizens in general. Many of the activities not mentioned may well be much more important than the ones chosen for discussion.

### **Arts and Humanities**

Under the auspices of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, the Department of History can promote and restore national and regional pride. It can, further, support the general understanding and discussion of the past developments and problems, their causes and roots. With this as a point of departure, current development can be discussed and handled in a new and more enlightened context. The improved historical perspective will serve as a help to decrease irrational reactions and tensions and widen the possibilities for broad and foresighted solutions.

The Department of Ethnology will have an important role concerning a number of questions of key character for peace and understanding. The concept of ethnic diversity and its implications are most essential for the region. It is a major challenge to explain and describe the origin of these and other sources of conflict and discrepancies between different groups of the population. Ultimately, the goal will be to explain how the region can turn its ethnical, cultural and other diversities into an advantage.

In parallel, the Department(s) of Language(s) and Linguistics can adopt a fundamental role in the language policy of the region and its nations. Local languages will be supported and strengthened. Linguistic pride can be restored and confirmed. The fostering of the understanding of linguistic diversity can be improved at the same time as that of abilities in the use of foreign languages are stressed and supported. The efforts will improve the general appreciation of the

value of the common cultural heritage and the linguistic richness of the region, while, in parallel, an increase in the ability to handle foreign languages will get more mature, bringing the region more firmly into the international community.

### **Theology**

Conflicts between groups of inhabitants with different religious faith are abundant and often sadly serious. The Department of Theology will have a vital role in the easing of the corresponding tensions and in working for improved religious understanding and tolerance. This will act to diminish religious violence and support adoption of common ethical codes, all to the benefit of the citizens. At the same time, the deep value of religious liberalism will be more obvious and contribute to a natural openness and wide-mindedness in terms of religion and religious values.

### **Social Sciences**

The Departments of Social Science hold, in collaboration, the keys to a series of radical and badly needed improvements of a lengthy list of socially oriented items crucial for a qualitative growth of the society. Reconstruction of an open public administration is a fundamental requirement. Rebuilding and strengthening the power of and respect for general democracy and democratic values are matters of highest urgency. The same is true concerning the respect for and protection of equal opportunities, irrespective of social and ethnical origin, gender and wealth.

Gender equality urgently needs and merits very special efforts in a society aiming at construction of a region characterized by high human and intellectual equality and values. Efforts towards a truly participatory society can and should be strengthened as should the construction of systems supporting social welfare for all inhabitants. Peace research will act as an important partner and supporter of the maintenance of peace.

### **Economy**

The development of a national fair and peaceful trade will be supported by the Faculty of Economy. At the same time, the work of the faculty can contribute to the creation and maintenance of both small-scale and large-scale business. This, in turn, will mean an enlarged total offer of employment for the population. Entrepreneurial skills and innovations can be boosted and the creation of new work markets be enhanced. A result of this will be an increase of the general growth and competitive strength on a regional as well as on an international level.

### **Law**

New and firm legislations protecting social security, the rights concerning family and property and the regulation of business and trade are urgently required. Legal protection is also needed for individual human rights as well as for development and assurance of gender equality. Legislations concerning the protection of the environmental and international relations will be of fundamental value for a new and open society. The rights of minorities need legal protection and a national penal law is an obvious necessity. All these endeavours will be major challenges for the Faculty of Law.

### **Science**

For a sustainable and competitive society, the Faculty of Science can offer support in a variety of urgent lines of development. The emergence of clean and renewable sources of energy sets the scene for safe energy provision, environmental protection and a sound energy basis of industrial development. Safe water treatment, water-resource management and provision of clean water are one of the fundamental prerequisites for a peaceful and welcoming society. Protection of and support for a sustainable biodiversity are essential for the long-term stability of the region.

Reforestation and promotion of a sustainable forestry are items necessary for large parts of the rural, agricultural and commercial parts of the growth of society. A sound and balanced programme of food-crop genetics is important for agriculture and its sustainability in a climate of pronounced variations. It is also a necessity for a programme assuring the feeding of the population as well as for export possibilities.

Environmental monitoring and corresponding quality assurance, including corrective measures, are important parts of social growth, of agriculture, of energy production and of resource management. Regional development of affordable medicines is a necessity for several reasons. It will guarantee the population access to important medication at the same time as it enhances the balance of trade.

### **Engineering**

Given the large surface and the varying population density of the Horn of Africa as well as its current deficiency concerning roads and highways, development of new systems of infrastructure is an important challenge. These efforts have to be coupled to the development of a foresighted traffic planning and engineering. Closely related is the enforcing and construction of infrastructure and tools for electronic communication. Logistics and automatic control are other fields of large importance for the development of society, industry and commerce.

Technical tools for safety purposes and general hazard prevention have to be developed. The same is true for the handling of a range of hazards and for risk minimization. In the climate prevailing in the Horn of Africa, urgent development has to be conducted concerning food preservation and corresponding hygiene. In all these matters, the Faculty of Engineering will have a very important role.

### **Medicine**

A firm policy of co-operation between the Faculty of Medicine, national and local hospitals and other health-care institutions, public and private, is of crucial importance for the health and security of the population. Reorganisation of national and local hospitals will need urgent attention and substantial resources, in the form of well-educated staff as well as concerning construction and technical and administrative measures. A revision and strengthening of the public programme for general health care is a matter of high general priority.

Educative measures regarding health care are urgently needed. Education and re-education of physicians and nurses as well as of corresponding administrative employees define important and impressive priorities. Similar needs are obvious for a range of other specialists in health care.

Examples are physiotherapists and speech therapists. The challenge for the Faculty of Medicine will be immense.

### **Performing Arts**

For the general quality of life, for the sustainability of rural and other life and for the support of many citizens, the Faculty of Performing Arts can give essential contributions. Faculty staff can support and develop regional and local art and handicraft. They can encourage, develop and support regional and local music and performance. Further, the faculty can foster sound commercialisation of local and regional art, music and performance. This will not only improve the general quality of life but also support corresponding pride.

### **A Very Concrete Possible Project**

Taking one further step in concretion, let me mention a special item as an example of a field in which a reconstructed national university as well as the region may be able to play an important role. We will concentrate on production, storing, distribution and consumption of energy and the corresponding effects of impact on the environment. In addition, attention will be given to a possible international key role of the region. The item chosen for special discussion further refers to research given high priority at Lund University and in Sweden and thereby possible to give forceful support.

### **Types of Energy**

Normally, we distinguish between different categories of energy. We discuss renewable and non-renewable energy, small-scale energy and large-scale energy, threatening energy and friendly energy. Being more specific, we often list the sources of energy as fossil energy from gas, oil, coal and peat, as nuclear energy from uranium, as geothermal energy from bed-rock, as hydroelectric energy from the flow of water, as wave energy from the sea, as tidal energy from tides, as wind energy from the flow of air, as biomass from vegetation, and as solar energy from sunlight. In addition, we discuss energy consumption, storing of energy and saving of energy.

Ultimately, very much of the energy available on Earth comes from the Sun, not only that captured directly from solar radiation. Fossil energy comes from rest products of the flora and fauna, the energy content of which stems from solar flux. Hydroelectric energy results from water flowing downwards after being evaporated and carried upwards due to solar heating. Biomass comes from vegetation storing solar energy obtained from solar flux. Nuclear energy results from energy stored in heavy elements produced in massive stars and ejected in supernova explosions. Geothermal energy comes from stored energy in the interior of the Earth. Wave and tidal energy as well as wind energy has its origin in the rotation of Earth and the orbiting Moon but also, partly, in heating effects due to solar radiation.

### **Safe yet Efficient**

We want an energy source that is as safe as possible but also as efficient as possible. An excellent process producing renewable energy is that of photosynthesis as proven by common vegetation. A correspondingly excellent carrier and storage agent of energy is hydrogen. When combined, photosynthesis and hydrogen define an attractive solution to our challenge of energy production.



Simply speaking, the process wanted has been well alive and active for billions of years. Trees, bushes, plants, flowers and weeds continuously convert sunlight into energy. The process utilized is called photosynthesis. When this, or a similar, process is driven in an industrialized manner, we label it artificial photosynthesis.

The recipe is rather simple, at least in principle. Plants catch sunlight, the energy of which they use to decompose clean water into hydrogen and oxygen. The chemical energy obtained through the process is converted into energy-rich products for the survival and reproduction of the plants. The photosynthesis process is the explanation of the fact that everywhere on Earth, where sunlight and water are available, we also find vegetation. For us, the production of wood is of special interest.

While wood is an important product in the form of biomass, the hydrogen is even more interesting in our search for clean energy sources. The hydrogen gas can either be used directly or be stored for later employment. Burning the hydrogen gas, we get energy plus water. The resulting water plus sunlight can produce more hydrogen, which, again, can be burned to produce energy and water.

The process is, at least in principle, clean. It is, again in principle, efficient, and it is highly sustainable. It might well sound like a perpetuum mobile, but it is not. The process is fed by the solar flux, the energy of which is not lasting forever. It will, at least for practical photosynthesis purposes, be exhausted in another around five billion years. Again for our more immediate energy needs, that may, however, be an acceptable limitation.

### **Artificial Photosynthesis in Practice**

From nearly all practical points of view, the process of artificial photosynthesis is a beautiful example of clean, safe and renewable energy. There is just one snag. While it works excellently well in theory, it does not, yet, in practice. The obvious challenge is to get it to do just that, to perform in practical life as it does in modelling and simulations.

Large amounts of work, theoretical as well as based on laboratory experiments, are invested in the promotion of practical ways to promote a running energy source built on artificial photosynthesis. Sweden is a strong promoter of the field, with the centre of the consortium co-ordination located in the Faculty of Science of Lund University. Here, a large amount of specialists are constantly busy with new improvements and new ideas.

### **When it Works ...**

Once the practical process of artificial photosynthesis works, a new paradigm has taken over in the field of energy production. At that stage, arrangements for daily running of the process should not give any serious problems. We will be able to convert sunlight into useful energy, in a manner similar to that employed by vegetation.

For reasons of maximum efficiency, we will just have to select some place with generous sunlight conditions for large-scale production of hydrogen energy. The Horn of Africa has much

more sunlight than necessary for all its needs, current and future, of energy. It might well turn into a friendly but efficient energy superpower.

### **Aiming High**

The aim of our plans and actions should be maintained at a high level. An adequate standard of daily life, safety, well-being and hope for the future are all highly essential. All these qualities should, as a matter of urgency, be approached and secured. However, they should not be seen as anything like the real and final goal of our efforts. The ultimate aim must be to convert the Horn of Africa into a competitive region with high standards of living and education, all with a clear international character and impact.

There is every reason to see a high-level over-all goal as a realistic approach and target. The region has old traditions as an intellectually and commercially important power. It has a population that has proven its endurance and eager to meet also rough challenges. In addition, the region has a wealth of natural resources and a commercially strategic position. Clearly deficient qualities are, currently, peace, well-founded hope and financial resources. It must be our challenge to provide help in restoring these essentialities and in injecting new hope and means for new progress into a region all too long plagued by meaningless violence and misery.

Thank you!

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## **Human rights, conflict resolution and reconciliation in the Horn of Africa**

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*This paper should not be taken as the final position of Amnesty International on all the issues discussed. Anyone wishing to quote from it is requested to check with the author, mhill@amnesty.org.*

### **1. Introduction**

This paper links conflict resolution and peace-building to one of the unfulfilled objectives of last year's conference - to generate recommendations in the field of human rights. These recommendations are based on Amnesty International's experience of human rights research and campaigning in the Horn of Africa, although the organization itself does not engage in peace-making or mediation.<sup>1</sup>

The various conflicts in the Horn have various backgrounds in human rights issues and abuses. Amnesty International does not take any position on the use of armed struggle to address them, though, like international law, it differentiates between treatment of violent and non-violent opponents and victims in relation to rights to freedom of expression and association, though not in regard to rights not to be tortured, arbitrarily killed or treated inhumanely in custody. It criticises violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions) whoever commits them, whether a government, an armed opposition group holding territory or other kinds of non-governmental entities, or non-state actors.

Amnesty International nevertheless has a role as commentator and advocate for human rights in conflicts and peace processes, and with regard to post-conflict reconstruction. It may sometimes be the only voice talking about human rights when others do not look further than the need for peace at any cost. To Amnesty International, a lasting peace can only be achieved when there is respect for human rights, and measures to address human rights grievances which were the cause of the conflict. This does not mean accepting the political agenda of any particular government or opposition organization, which may seek to use human rights concerns for political ends.

This paper is about conflicts in the Horn of Africa, and contains a special focus on the Somalia conflict and current peace talks, with some comments on conflict-related issues in other countries of the Horn - Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, but not including Sudan - which would deserve specialist treatment beyond my own field of work.

## **2. Conflict in the Horn**

In Africa in the past decade since the end of the polarized conflicts of the Cold War, there are estimated to have been over 80 significant armed conflicts of different levels of intensity and duration, not including smaller inter-communal conflicts or outbreaks of political violence. The vast majority were fought within a state in the form of armed insurrection, civil war or "warlordism". In many cases they flowed across state boundaries or were instigated or fuelled by exiles in a neighbouring country whose government and security forces, pursuing their own policy interests, gave them political, administrative or military support. International political and economic interests, including the arms and extractive industries, were involved in causing or perpetuating some of the conflicts.

There have been various conflict resolution initiatives, not well-documented and probably with only limited success generally, to try to resolve these conflicts, whether multi-laterally by the UN, regional groupings (such as the Organization of African Unity/African Union, Arab League, European Union, or concerned frontlines states), sub-regional groupings (such as the Inter Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa, ECOWAS in West Africa), or bilaterally by the state and the opposition group. There was usually involvement by historically connected states such as former colonial rulers (Italy in the case of Eritrea and Somalia, France in Djibouti) or other governments (the US in Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Djibouti in Somalia). International

NGOs or faith groups, regional or national NGOs, and more informal groupings of diaspora communities, academic institutions or think-tank institutions, or Aeminent persons@ initiatives, also sought to mediate.

The international and regional media also followed these disputes, with dramatic coverage at times which brought them into international focus, if briefly, and out of their supposed neglect. No conflict, however long-lasting - a few have been continuing on and off for decades, probably most others were settled more quickly - is totally unknown or forgotten. They are all followed closely by the political actors, the people affected and the victims (especially through internet websites, many run by political groups), specialist journalists, researchers and NGOs.

The UN Secretary General ritually delivers powerful rhetorical denunciations of conflict and the arms trade supporting it, wishing for the swords to be turned into ploughs and for world poverty and global inequality to be the real agenda. Human rights violations are frequently identified as the root cause of conflict, as well as the cause of the mass flows of refugees across state boundaries and onward throughout the world, and of internal displacement within states, which are characteristic of warfare. The victims are preponderantly the most vulnerable groups - women, children and persecuted minorities.

The consequences of conflict are summed up in the following NGO priority-setting document presented to the European Community on conflict resolution:

*Violent conflict causes massive humanitarian suffering, undermines development and human rights and stifles economic growth. In situations of conflict, political democracies are unable to mature and conflict creates conditions where terrorism and organized crime thrive.<sup>ii</sup>*

The Horn of Africa has been embroiled in numerous conflicts in recent decades. The Ethiopia-Eritrea border war of 1998-2000, a rare modern example of inter-state warfare, engaged the world's major powers and international organizations in mediation attempts but displayed intense and bitter recalcitrance on both sides despite the human and development disaster it was for both populations. The smaller-scale Djibouti insurrection by the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy, FRUD, based on grievances felt by political leaders of the Afar ethnic group, took several years to resolve.

The cost of conflict has been crippling to the economies of these countries which are all at the very bottom of the world's Least Developed Countries. They have purchased weapons from western countries, bought them secretly from eastern Europe, or managed to keep in use arms never paid for predecessor governments. Some of the arms have also been used to suppress internal dissent and expand internal security forces. Their opponents have used captured weapons to fight them, but have also bought them on the international private arms market through neighbouring countries. The whole region has frequently been described as being awash with small arms, which are easily available,

especially from the collapsed state of Somalia, and among rural and nomadic peoples accustomed to carry weapons for their own security.

It might be superfluous in these circumstances to say that peace is a condition of successful development but it is worth stressing that development can proceed to different degrees and within obvious limits even without full peace. In Somalia, the UN eventually recognized that its humanitarian work should continue even before there was full peace and even if there was no normal state framework for development. The UN at first maintained the position of the state being the body solely responsible and able to protect human rights, but finally accepted that this was untenable and that humanitarian work should proceed within the framework of security measures but working with local political factions and sub-state communities, allocating new responsibilities to NGOs and community-based organizations.

In the Horn there are long histories of population expansionism, conquest and subjugation of peoples, trans-national slavery, and disruptions often accompanied by assimilation's practices regarding women and children captives, as well as periods of peace and reconciliation, with generosity to enemies, exiles and refugees. In many cases, where warfare was frequent between peoples who were also related to each other in peaceful cross-ethnic political and economic transactions, there were mechanisms established to limit warfare, mediate between the warring parties, arbitrate claims and facilitate return to peace, including through relationships of forced marriage and other social payments. Apart from cases of blatant and abusive expansionism, there were generally also cultural and political institutions regulating conflict which bear similarities to those which led to the development of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, which were indigenous laws of war.<sup>iii</sup>

The major recent wars in the Horn have included:

- The 30 year fight for the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia
- the struggle to overthrow the Dergue in Ethiopia
- ethnic nationalist armed struggles by Oromo, Somali and other groups in Ethiopia against the post-Dergue federal government
- mainly clan-based armed groups fighting the Siad Barre government in Somalia
- an ethnic-based rebellion in Djibouti opposing discrimination against Afars
- a Sudan-supported radical Islamist group fighting against the new Eritrean government, now in alliance with other political opponents
- "warlordism" in Somalia based on clan or subclan in many parts of the disintegrated state
- localized inter-communal fighting between neighbouring groups in southern Ethiopia
- a two-year border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998 involving national sovereignty
- hot pursuit and cross-border military operations by Ethiopia into Somalia to eliminate radical Islamist groups bringing political violence to Ethiopia
- armed foreign intervention by Cuban forces in the Ethiopia/Somalia war in 1977, and by UN and US forces in Somalia in the 1990s

There have also been politically-motivated bombings and assassinations, as in Djibouti in the 1970s and 1980s, and in Ethiopia in the 1990s.

A pattern developed, characteristic of the Horn probably more than any other part of Africa, involving what has been described as a "chequer-board" scenario of conflict. In each country of the Horn, conflicts have been fuelled from neighbouring countries in the form of providing political support or weapons. This pattern of conflict has dominated regional state relations in recent decades and is still a major obstacle to regional stability. In several of these current conflicts, there seems to be no conflict resolution or mediation in process, either regionally or internationally.

At local community levels, traditional/cultural dispute settlement mechanisms were often utilised, as in Somalia and Ethiopia, and these had some success. Lower-level conflict requires grass-roots community conflict resolution if no outside force or wider movements are involved. This "bottom-up" approach has limitations, however, if applied to conflict involving higher-level actors and where there is a developed national-level civil society affected by it and able to contribute to resolve it. The converse, an exclusively "top-down" approach seeking only an internationally-backed agreement between political leaders, would not work in Somalia, given the extent of political and factional fragmentation that has occurred

### **3. The Somali Peace Talks**

Through this case-study of the current Somali peace talks I will try to illustrate a human rights approach to conflict and conflict resolution. It leads directly to a discussion on reconciliation and transitional or restorative justice, in relation to dealing with abuses of the past for the sake of the future protection of human rights.

In October 2002 the 14<sup>th</sup> Somali peace talks since the 1991 disintegration of the Somali state opened in Eldoret in western Kenya. The Somalia Peace and Reconciliation Process was sponsored by IGAD and funded by the EU and Arab States. The aim was to bring together all the relevant actors - the political factions, international partners, and civil society in a three-phase initiative: to attain a cease-fire, discuss the key issues facing Somalia, and create a new interim government to replace the Transitional National Government, whose 3 year term of office ends in August 2003.

The process itself has been open-ended, to the extent that often no-one really knew what was going to happen from day to day and it took considerable ingenuity on all sides to analyse and handle the constant mini-crises, ranging from the logistical to the political. Previous peace talks which had failed to greater or lesser degrees had taken place in different venues and with different sponsors and participants but this was the most inclusive so far and seemed to be the most politically neutral and realistic at the outset. It was built on general recognition of the failure of the TNG to deliver most of its mandate and the need for a new solution having seen the outcome (not all a failure) of the previous

peace arrangements of the earlier major peace and reconciliation conference held in Arta in Djibouti in 2000.

The conference succeeded in obtaining the presence and participation of all the faction leaders, representatives of the TNG (though the President stayed away), and large numbers of “civil society”. One major logistical and political issue was recognition and funding of delegates. The agreement reached was for a 4.5 quota system overall for attendance and future government participation. This consisted of the three main nomadic southern clans (Darod, Dir and Hawiye), the agricultural/riverine Digil-Mirifle (or Rahenwein) clan or community, and a half-share for the non-clan minorities (principally the Bantu/Jarir landless farmworkers, the Benadiri/Rer Hamar urban traders, and the Midgan, Tumul and Yibro occupational caste groups, although there are other smaller minorities including the Ashraf and Shikhal Muslim communities, Bajuni fishing people, and small hunter-gatherer groups).

“Civil society” was a label for all delegates (self-appointed) except the leaders, as they were called - the TNG and faction-leaders, all ranking the same, despite UN and EU recognition of the largely power-less TNG as a government. NGOs in Mogadishu, such as the Peace and Human Rights Network, Coalition of Grassroot Women Organization and Dr Ismail Jumale Human Rights Organization, were not given any status or special representation, though some members attended, and even ex-officials of the Siad Barre government claimed to be “civil society”.

This arrangement inevitably strengthened clannism, since the factions were clan-based and it marginalised NGOs, but at the same time it offered an opportunity for clans (as well as business and religious leaders) to pressure faction-leaders to adopt non-military objectives. The number of civil society delegates was cut down, both for financial and political reasons, from over 1000 to 460 and later to 360, despite complaints from those excluded.

As expected, the Somaliland Government and Somaliland civil society boycotted the conference, as it denied Somaliland its desired independence although it took care not to move discussions into this area so as not to damage the possibility of Somaliland and its clans later being invited or drawn back into a unified federal Somalia. Somaliland, de facto independent since 1991, continues to press its demand for international recognition, and continues to complain at being excluded from the much-vaunted peace dividend policy of the international community and donors - rewarding peaceful areas with development aid as a means of conflict control. Government institutions have developed steadily in Somaliland, with a peaceful transfer of power to the vice-president when President Egal died in May 2002; peace (despite two brief outbreaks of clan fighting); respect for human rights (with some exceptions); and a substantial degree of democracy (with multi-party elections in December 2002 for local councils and in April 2003 for the presidency).

The conference “leaders” broadly belonged to one of two rival alliances: on the one hand the TNG and its allies, backed by Djibouti and several Arab states, and on the other hand

the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC), backed by Ethiopia, the major sub-regional power, which has substantial political interests in the nature of any new government. Ethiopian is constantly said to dominating the conference.

Phase I, obtaining a signed cease-fire declaration, was achieved in two weeks, on 27 October 2002. However, cease-fire violations have occurred frequently where a region, faction or clan was divided or alliances shifted. The international partners informally threatened "Smart sanctions" against cease-fire violators or any leaders who withdrew from the talks but this has not yet been implemented. In Mogadishu, faction fighting or fighting between the TNG and factions reduced substantially but violence and insecurity intensified. In Bay region there was new fighting between new factions of the Rahenwein Resistance Army (RRA). The two rival claimants of the Puntland Presidency were both present at the peace talks but Abdullahi Yusuf was treated as the de facto leader, especially as he had the main military force and headed the SRRC. Puntland had declared itself a "regional federal state of Somalia" in 1998 but it has been a separate entity akin to Somaliland in some respects, not recognizing the TNG. The presidency crisis in Puntland in 2001-3, with the sad failure of the highly-regarded Puntland Peace Mission initiative (one of whose negotiators gave an account of it at last year's conference) substantially set back the region's development. However, a recent reconciliation agreement appears to have a good chance of success. No other similarly credible regional "building block" of a federal structure has developed in the south.

Phase II of the peace talks commenced in late 2002 with 6 "technical committees" (civil society getting one-third of places) set up to discuss key policy issues which would be principles of future government policy:

- (1) a provisional federal charter
- (2) economic recovery
- (3) land and property rights (and their recovery)
- (4) disarmament and demobilization
- (5) regional and international relations
- (6) conflict resolution and reconciliation (including human rights).

Each committee had an international resource-person to assist, except for the last one - efforts had unfortunately failed to find a human rights specialist to assist and give human rights a higher profile in this committee or across all committees.

In January 2003 the talks moved from Eldoret to Mbagathi near Nairobi, for a cheaper and more suitable venue and under a new and more experienced Kenyan chair, Bethwell Kiplagat, than the former Foreign Minister Elijah Mwangale. In May 2003 the six draft reports were "harmonised" by an outside committee headed by Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar (who is due to give his own paper at this conference), which were referred to the leaders' committee, and were to be presented to the conference plenary of all delegates on 19 May. This is the last part of phase II, expected to take possibly a month. There will be intense discussion and lobbying on these six issues, when Somali civil society delegates and NGOs might have some chance to influence the outcome for human rights.



Phase III, to start possibly in late June 2003, is planned to form an new all-inclusive interim government of Somalia, supposedly by consensus of the political leaders and civil society, to replace the TNG by August 2003. The procedure for this is not yet known or agreed. A two-year term for this provisional government has been broached, during which time elections would be held, national institutions created (especially as regards the security and police forces) and an international pledging conference for reconstruction held. This phase will need to overcome obstacles from particular leaders, including the TNG president who has boycotted the conference so far, and to ensure democratic process and acceptability to Somalis and the international community.

Peace and security will be a central issue, requiring international support and monitoring. There will be issues of clan and minority representation, ensuring a transparent process without corrupt buying of support, representation of women in government and attention to gender issues (particularly violence against women), guaranteeing fair and free political campaigning and multi-party elections with freedom of the media, establishing an independent and effective system of administration of justice consistent with international human rights law and standards, recognition and involvement of civil society and NGOs in the process of human rights monitoring and protection, familiarising communities all over Somalia with the process and gaining their support, facilitating the involvement of diaspora Somali refugee communities (who are already closely involved through sending remittances to their families or funds to political factions), and leading to an eventual return of refugees when the security and humanitarian conditions are sufficiently stabilized.

Will this bring a real and lasting peace? A UN Panel of Experts in April 2003 exposed arms flows to Somalia in violation of the UN arms embargo but no action has been taken so far, although the panel has been extended for another 6 months. An African Union mission is planned to visit Somalia to monitor the cease-fire, but without a clear mandate or inclusion of elements of policing or human rights monitoring. The international partners are reportedly about to conclude plans for “targeted sanctions” against leaders who violate the ceasefire or withdraw from the process, such as visa refusals, residence and passport withdrawals and freezing of foreign bank accounts. Somali exiles or some NGOs might also try to prosecute leaders in foreign countries.

Ten years ago, Somali intellectuals might say that the absence of a state was tolerable in view of the existence of Somali cultural institutions at non-state level, and that plenty of time was needed to achieve a viable re-institution of the state. The disadvantages of state collapse are now seen more starkly, and international concern at the risks this poses for international and regional peace and stability have risen. The need to resolve the conflicts and achieve reconciliation has become even more apparent.

#### **4. Reconciliation and Transitional Justice**

One key issue in the background of the Somali peace talks is whether those who have committed human rights abuses in the past, during the Siad Barre government or the civil conflicts since 1991, will be allowed to hold office with impunity in a future government.

At first leaders were reportedly planning a general and unconditional amnesty for themselves, since most had been involved in human rights abuses and faction fighting and the international partners were not directly opposing this, with a “peace at all costs” line. The “blanket amnesty” notion, criticized by Amnesty International and many international lawyers, seems to have been pulled back but without any clear idea emerging yet of a way forward which would still keep all political leaders inside the process.

Reconciliation has in different places meant reconciliation between individual perpetrator and direct victim, between an oppressive majority or minority and its victim community, to bring closure or reparation for a great historical wrong (slavery, colonialism, apartheid, genocide of “first peoples”), or between different political groups in a new dispensation. To most people in Somalia it probably means reconciliation between opposed political factions or clans, or between perpetrators of abuses and their victims, and in the context of a political settlement and reparations. One point of tension is the reclaiming of land and property, where the technical committee recommended procedures for return of illegally and violently acquired property, whether as a result of Italian colonial-era confiscations, land confiscations and seizures under the Siad Barre government, or land theft and looting by faction militias.

These issues of “transitional” or “restorative” justice, meaning “justice for the victims” and “no impunity for perpetrators”, have been widely discussed in Somali civil society but fearfully, and rarely directly and openly, due to intimidation by faction-leaders who might visit reprisals on their accusers. Even outspoken media and NGOs campaigning against political killings, abductions and rape by faction militias in Mogadishu do not dare to name the factions or individual commanders or militias responsible, although they are believed to possess such information and evidence available for any future inquiry or prosecution. Faction leaders are reputedly “scared” when there is talk of war crimes inquiries and would take any steps necessary to guarantee their own impunity and safeguard illegally-acquired gains.

It is Amnesty International’s view that it is up to the Somali people to decide how to approach the question of past abuses and when. Various possibly acceptable options are available ranging from conditional amnesty to truth-telling mechanisms or criminal prosecutions. For war crimes and crimes against humanity, the International Criminal Court could be the means to try offenses committed after the establishment of the court in mid-2002 but not retroactively for offences before then. Prosecutions in Somali courts would only be possible and acceptable when there is a well-established and competent criminal justice system to guarantee fair trial – which is not the case now - since there would be nothing gained for future protection of rights through unfair trials. Anti-death penalty groups would also demand the non-application of the death penalty so as to prevent another human rights violation.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is widely cited as an example of a successful reconciliation mechanism, agreed by both sides, to resolve conflicts and abuses of the apartheid regime to complement and strengthen the political

transition in 1994 to majority rule through free elections.<sup>iv</sup> The main elements of the TRC were:

- To make a record of the abuses of the apartheid era and prevent future abuses, through open “victim hearings” (some televised) which were often emotional but not always resulting in repentance and forgiveness;
- To grant amnesty for politically motivated crimes to individual applicants on a limited and conditional basis, where they made full and open disclosure of their crimes, which could be challenged by the victim or victims’ relatives, although prosecution for gross abuses could be recommended instead;
- To make reparations to victims, recently announced to amount to \$85m state payments in total to 19,000 applicants, which fell far short of the TRC’s recommendations.

The whole process is not yet complete and has raised several controversial problems and issues. The TRC by the time its mandate expired at the end of 2001 granted amnesty to 1160 of 7094 applicants, rejecting most of the others, which were made particularly by convicted prisoners, as not meeting the amnesty criteria. There have been a small number of successful (and some unsuccessful, possibly bungled) prosecutions for gross abuses of human rights, and possibly more to come. The government has been considering pardons for ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party members and others. Many oppose this as disrupting a truth and reconciliation process, which should be impartial and even-handed.

In other moves to punish war crimes and crimes against humanity, special International Criminal Tribunals were set up for war crimes and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Some countries such as Belgium have launched prosecutions in an international jurisdiction basis. There have been over 20 Truth Commissions established in different countries, including Sierra Leone and Nigeria in Africa.<sup>v</sup> Rwanda also established traditional-type *gachacha* courts to deal with over 100,000 genocide suspects held in harsh and over-crowded prisons for several years. These courts, which cannot impose the death penalty, allow for some plea-bargaining but do not provide for fair trial according to international standards.<sup>vi</sup> In other countries, trials have been long delayed or suspected of defective charges or unfairness, with opposition groups alleging that they are being used as a cover-up for new abuses by the new government.

In Ethiopia, reconciliation between the new government and the former one, which overthrew it, was never considered. The Government chose the route of “no impunity” - to punish past abuses by Mengistu’s brutal 17-year regime, while developing a new federal constitutional framework designed to remove the ethnic (“nationality”) discrimination and exclusion issues. It held a large conference of international experts and lawyers to discuss the best process (though many NGOs were excluded) and went ahead with prosecutions. The government has detained over 2000 people accused of “genocide” and other charges, with over 2000 more charged in absentia, though none has been extradited, partly because some host countries refused to extradite without assurances that the death penalty will not be used. So far, death sentences have only been pronounced in absentia - there would be fresh trials in the event of extraditions. Amnesty

International supports the “no impunity” policy but is concerned about the delays and certain questions of fair trial, although trial procedures mostly conform to international standards. It remains to be seen whether the special prosecutor’s promise that all trials will be completed in 2004 is fulfilled. Currently less than a half have been tried, with a half of these being convicted. In the trial of the Dergue leaders, where any death sentences to be imposed could be expected, the prosecution case has been completed but the defence cases have not yet commenced. Ex-president Mengistu Hailemariam is still being sheltered from extradition by Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe, in return for his previous support for Mugabe’s liberation war.

In Eritrea in 1991, the victorious EPLF detained Ethiopian soldiers and security officials and later returned many of them to Ethiopia, though it imprisoned about 200 others after secret trials without defence or appeal rights. It declared a general amnesty for Eritreans linked to the Ethiopian government unless they had committed gross crimes. Unlike Ethiopia, it made no move to make an international issue of past abuses. It did not hold any open trials, excavate mass graves or collect victim testimony. As regards reconciliation with the ELF, it allowed individuals to return freely and gave them government positions if they abandoned opposition to the EPLF, but did not allow any opposition organization to exist.

As phase III of the Somalia peace talks draws nearer, there is a range of options for Somalia which could be put forward for truth commissions, amnesties or prosecutions in different political and cultural circumstances. There is no perfect model or system providing all the answers without any disadvantages. What would work in Somalia would depend on cultural acceptability and the needs of the situation. Information could be collected on faction leaders or Puntland or TNG officials who have committed the worst abuses, and eye-witnesses would be available to give evidence. Some documentation is said to have been hidden away for use when the time is ripe and when safety for witnesses, investigators and judges can be guaranteed. This kind of documentation has not yet started in earnest, apart from material published by international NGOs at the time, such as Africa Watch in particular, some of which would be useful as background for truth-telling by victims and witnesses, or in more precise form for criminal prosecutions.

The principle burning question at the moment is whether those who have committed gross human rights abuses should be allowed to be part of a new interim government. Some perpetrators are among the leaders or other delegates at the peace talks - a peculiar situation where they may be daily in the sight of people whose relatives have been killed by them, as well as international human rights observers who would want to see them on trial. They appear to have the protection of their clans, irrespective of their crimes against those of other clans.

Amnesty International has already given its view:

*Amnesty International would find it unacceptable for those responsible for such crimes to be included in any new government, which would be expected to be wholeheartedly*

*committed to the rule of law and respect for human rights. Granting total impunity through a general amnesty would not bring lasting peace to Somalia. In practice it would open the door to new violations by the same perpetrators, who would make sure they continued to silence their accusers, and it would encourage others to hope to go unpunished...Any new government must ratify the statutes of the International Criminal Court so that new war crimes and crimes against humanity could be reported to it... To the extent that it is possible, an interim government should comprise only members with a clean human rights record and non-involvement with abuses..<sup>vii</sup>*

Recognizing that the international community would probably not be willing to support an ad hoc tribunal for Somalia, in view of the cost and slowness of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda examples, and as it might be some years before an effective criminal justice system is established in Somalia to judge cases competently, Amnesty International recommends that investigations and documentation should start during the interim period and at the international level to document past abuses, and should work closely with Somali witnesses and human rights defence NGOs. The model for such an inquiry, where some preliminary work has been done by UNDP-Somalia, could be the independent Panel of Experts established by the UN Security Council on violations of the arms embargo.

Amnesty International's position of "no impunity for perpetrators" does not mean that all members of Siad Barre's security apparatus and government officials responsible for abuses, or all faction leaders and their militias should be charged and tried. That would be logistically impossible and lead to the same problems as the mass detentions in Rwanda. The impact would be achieved if the most senior were prosecuted. At the least, those responsible for abuses should be barred from being proposed or proposing themselves as members of the interim government.

It might be asked what incentive the leaders might then have to cooperate in the peace process. The incentive would be that rather than pursuing power and ill-gotten financial gains they would be recognized to have contributed to peace and reconciliation and the rescue of the Somali state. This would give them grounds for applying for clemency or amnesty, particularly if they could genuinely claim to have committed no ceasefire violation of human rights since the October 2002 ceasefire. In a South Africa-type Truth and Reconciliation Commission, they could apply for amnesty and immunity from prosecution if they made the appropriate disclosures.

An alternative would be for all candidates for government office to be obliged to present themselves before the peace conference delegates for approval and election, and to give an account of their past record and a pledge for the future. The crimes are known to delegates. The difficulty with this position would be overcoming clannism, where clans protect their own members and promote them to office, whatever crimes they might have committed against others. So long as this principle of absolute clan solidarity remains a powerful divisive factor in Somali society, clannism would prevail over and defeat nationalism.

## **5. Conclusion and general human rights recommendations**

My focus has been on Somalia but the general human rights principles applicable to conflict are similar for all countries of the Horn, adjusted to the particular political and cultural circumstances and the particular kind of conflict involved. The following recommendations reflect the analysis above and apply particularly to Somalia.

### **5.1 Conflict prevention**

Governments have the responsibility to protect the rights of their citizens in accordance with their constitution, laws and international treaties and standards. They should also recognize and protect the legitimate role of human rights defenders in civil society, in accordance with the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (1998). If a government allows its security forces to commit human rights violations with impunity, and if it impedes democratic avenues to dissent or fails to provide fair and free elections and equal opportunities for participation in government, then it may risk opponents considering (rightly or wrongly) that peaceful avenues to change are blocked so that they engage in violent opposition. The government has the duty to enforce the rule of law, providing the laws are consistent with international law, and to punish crime, but at the same time political disputes require political resolution. The number of protracted conflicts in the region makes it obvious that delays in dealing with conflict only exacerbate it. Conflict prevention is easier and cheaper than conflict management and crisis response, which may involve serious threats to regional and international peace and stability. The lack of international attention to preventing conflict at the time of the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 is a prime example of extremely costly neglect (when the international community was focused on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the crisis of the imminent defeat of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia). There were also serious failures of political judgment in the UN intervention in Somalia.

States are often reluctant to consider international assistance in resolving their internal conflicts and insurrections. In the Horn, these conflicts have regional impact through the checker-board relations described above, and the potential for conflict escalation should make it imperative to opt for mediation rather than a military solution. This is the case now for the internal conflicts in Ethiopia in the Oromo and Somali regions, and the new armed Eritrean opposition alliance based in Sudan and Ethiopia. The UN and AU also have responsibilities arising from the 2000 Algiers Peace Accord between Ethiopia and Eritrea to ensure that the border conflict does not revive following the International Border Commission's ruling.

Conflict prevention starts with monitoring human rights observance and pressing for remedies for violations by the government. Early warning signs of escalating conflict should not be ignored, and measures taken to respond in a timely way to alerts. The human rights causes of the conflict need addressing, in particular, if these are genuine, such as extreme identity discrimination against an ethnic or regional group or sub-ethnic (clan or sub-clan) or minority community.

## 5.2 Conflict control

When conflict breaks out, a two-track human rights approach is needed - to try to move the conflict to the negotiating table, and to ensure all parties comply with international humanitarian law governing armed conflict (the Geneva Conventions, which apply to both inter-state and internal conflict). The outbreak of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998-2000 was marked by aerial bombings of civilians but international (US) pressure successfully prevented further attacks of this kind until at least later in the war.

Wars of all kinds, international or civil or inter-communal, generally start with a grievance or perceived abuse, flare up through some often confused incident, and are the culmination of a breakdown of normal dispute-settlement mechanisms. Wars have always impacted more on civilians than fighters, on lower ranks more than officers, and on military rather than political leaders. The casualty rates are usually highest among the most vulnerable non-combatants - women and children, often when they are fleeing to reach safety within their communities or in other communities, or as the collateral outcome of the fighting. War crimes against civilians are frequent – killings of prisoners of war and civilians, rape of women, torture and mutilation, forced recruitment of child soldiers or labourers, sexual slavery, looting, destruction of property and the means of livelihood and survival - up to the levels of a policy or practice of genocide to destroy the whole or part of a population. Early limitation of conflict is essential.

## 5.3 Peace agreements - with reference particularly to Somalia

The importance of making human rights part of peace talks and agreements is that if the grievances for which the conflict began are not settled, and if the new grievances arising from the conflict are not settled, the peace will not be lasting. It is common that peace treaties aim to strike a political deal between the parties or their leaders - the “peace at all costs” line: but this is inadequate and is not likely to work for even a short period of time. Post-conflict reconstruction must be an aim of any damaging conflict, and this has to be included on peace talks agenda and agreement. If the grievances remain unsolved, there is always a risk of resumption of war or renewed political violence.

The particular elements are different in each case, but the human rights agenda would include the following:

- Guarantee of ending of abuses
- Investigation of past abuses with the aim bringing to justice those responsible, holding of all forces of any kind responsible for violations of human rights and humanitarian law in areas they control or claim to control, as well as ensuring that the rights of the accused are respected, for example the right to fair trial, no torture, humane treatment and access to humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC, and the non-application of the death penalty
- Promising no impunity for war criminals and human rights abusers, and ensuring that they are not allowed to hold public office again where they could commit the same abuses again

- Monitoring of the peace to prevent new abuses, for example by deploying international military, police and human rights field monitors or advisors
- Providing humanitarian assistance and ensuring the safety of humanitarian agency staff to assist victims impartially
- Protecting refugees and internally displaced persons and creating conditions for safe return
- Integrating militias into a disciplined national or regional force and stopping new recruiting, demobilizing child soldiers in the faction militias, restoring them to their families and rehabilitating them into civilian life
- Providing international support for post-conflict reconstruction, e.g. rebuilding the socio-economic infrastructure (schools, roads, health facilities, water and other utilities)
- Rebuilding the justice and administrative system
- Offering a democratic system of inclusion of all groups
- Setting up guarantees of all kinds of security - protection of the state and its institutions from attack; establishment of the rule of law and protection of basic human rights; humane treatment of prisoners; protection of NGOs, human rights defenders and humanitarian workers, and allowing local and international human rights organizations access; ensuring the protection of vulnerable groups, especially women and minorities, and providing war-trauma support; protecting political opponents and their families and communities from reprisal actions; protecting businesspeople - though at the same time regulating business activities so as to end illegal arms trading and criminal enterprises obstructing peace and reconstruction.

#### 5.4 Social reconstruction - with reference to Somalia

In general, there is an important need to promote a cultural of peace throughout Somalia and ensure it is supported by all political authorities and communities from top to bottom. There are also social rights issues of post-conflict reconstruction beyond peace and political agreements. In the Somali peace talks some of these issues have been raised but without being given sufficient weight, particularly as regards gender issues and minority rights issues. These underlie many human rights violations and acts of violence and need to be addressed so as to ensure they do not recur. Gender issues have been presented substantially by women NGOs with the support of UNIFEM , NOVIB and many Somali NGOs and individuals. But there is a long way to go before they are fully recognized and measures taken to provide for women's equal human rights.

Awareness of minority rights issues has also substantially increased to the extent that minorities have been allocated quotas among the delegates, which may be translated into quotas within the new interim government. However, two factors hold back the process of recognizing and implementing equal rights for the various different minorities: (i) the weakness of minority organizations, where those most influential in the peace talks are said to be unrepresentative and insufficiently active for minority rights - this will become most apparent when the election process begins, and unless there are fully-developed programs for minority rights advancement, it is likely that elections will result in the absence of minority representation; and (ii) the myth of Somali ethnic homogeneity.



This myth of a pastoralist-based unified culture ignores the existence of subordinate non-pastoralist groups with different linguistic, economic and cultural features. The agro-pastoralist Digil-Mirifle (or Rahenwein) clan-group now has equal recognition as a clan alongside the three dominant pastoralist clans and therefore does not claim minority status or press identity discrimination issues any more. Past discrimination is not so much an issue in this circumstance and it can expect regional autonomy in a federal structure as well as shared status at the federal centre.

The minorities mentioned above (page 6), who have not established common ground or political unity with each other, or even within their own communities, have still a long way to go to achieve similar equal citizen rights and recognition. This is easier for the wealthier traders of the Benadiri or Rer Hamar “coastal” communities, which resemble other foreign-origin trading communities elsewhere, through sharing religion and most cultural features with the clans. The two Islamic religious minority communities have a special status of respect, where the absence of clan protection rights is compensated by religious respect. The main problems remain where minority status intersects with social exclusion, poverty and severe discrimination on the basis of indigenous “first people” origin or slave origin, as with the “African” Bantu/Jarir, or “pariah” occupational groups, as with the artisan “castes”, who are subject to social prohibitions of inter-marriage with clans. The consequent exclusionary absence of protection which clan members provide for each other had its compensation in clientage relations and protection by families of clan patrons, but these protection mechanisms, possibly benevolent in some measure, broke down in the civil war, when minorities were specially targeted victims, and in any case provided little benefit in the modern social, economic and political environment.

Somali society is thus pluralist in essence, at the same time as possessing a high degree of cultural unity based on the dominant pastoralist clans, who are called “nobles” and comprise possibly two-thirds of the population. Somali society is a plurality of clans and sub-clans, sub-divided at many genealogical levels, but also a plurality of inequal social groups. Recognition of this would go far towards providing the base for social reconstruction, if based on a new recognized equality of groups and individuals viii.

### Foot notes

i. See various articles in Amnesty International=s annual reports, [www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org).

ii. Ensuring progress in the prevention of violent conflict: priorities for the Greek and Italian EU presidencies 2003: Saferworld & International Alert, London, April 2003

iii. For example, “Spared from the spear: traditional Somali behaviour in warfare”, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997

iv. Truth and Justice: unfinished business in South Africa, Amnesty International, February 2003

v. International Center for Transitional Justice, [www.ictj.org](http://www.ictj.org).

vi. Rwanda - Gacaca, a question of justice, Amnesty International, December 2002

vii. Somalia: no lasting peace without human rights - an open letter to the peace talks participants, November 2002, and Somalia: Amnesty International calls on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to support human rights reconstruction, April 2003 ([www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org))

viii. This argument is more fully developed in my seminar paper, A state disintegrated homogeneity, plurality and political violence in Somalia, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1997.

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