Turkish President Erdogan sees off Turkish energy research vessel bound for Somalia

Source: AA, Sunday October 6, 2024
By Zeynep Rakipoglu and Mustafa Hatipoglu 





Following discoveries by Turkish ship, Somali region will be ‘recognized for economic development, prosperity, and peace,’ says President Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Saturday attended a ceremony seeing off a Turkish vessel embarking on its latest energy research mission, bound for the waters off Somalia.

“The Oruc Reis, which has provided important services to our country since 2017, will now do seismic activities in Somalia across three licensed areas, each representing 5,000 square kilometers (1,930 square miles),” Erdogan said on X.

Erdogan added that the Somali region, long associated with conflict and instability, “will now be recognized for economic development, prosperity, and peace following the Oruc Reis’ discoveries.”

The ship will do seismic surveys in Somali waters under an agreement signed in March between Türkiye’s Energy and Natural Resources Ministry and Somalia’s Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ministry.

The ship began its journey through the Istanbul Straits at around 11 a.m. (0800GMT) after entering from the Black Sea, making its way past the Presidential Dolmabahce Office, where the ceremony took place at 2.30 p.m. (1130GMT).

Erdogan greeted the ship’s crew. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar also attended the ceremony.

The vessel is scheduled to arrive off the coast of Somalia later this month to do seismic surveys for oil and natural gas in three areas where Türkiye has secured exploration licenses, said a ministry statement.

The vessel will sail through the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal and go through the Red Sea.

The ship will be accompanied by two Turkish naval frigates, as well as the Zaganos Pasa Support Ship, Sancar Platform Support Ship, and Ataman Tracking Ship.

It will carry out 3-D seismic studies in areas off the coast of Somalia.

The mission, expected to last some seven months, will involve collecting seismic data for both oil and natural gas, the ministry added. This data will be analyzed in Ankara to identify potential drilling sites.

“The Oruc Reis will do 3D seismic studies in the designated maritime jurisdiction area, which has never been done before. We anticipate the area where the ship will work is a region with oil indicators,’ Bayraktar said.

Ship has collected data across 23,000 square kilometers

Launched in 2017, the Oruc Reis was entirely designed and constructed in Türkiye, showcasing the expertise and collaboration of Turkish engineers, technicians, and workers through every stage of development, from design to production.

Specifically engineered for geophysical, geological, oceanographic, and hydrographic research, the ship is 87 meters (285 feet) long, 23 m (75 ft) wide, and 34 m (111 ft) high.

Powered by four 2,520 kilowatt diesel-electric engines, the ship is capable of conducting both 2-D and 3-D seismic surveys for offshore oil and gas exploration. To date, the vessel has carried out numerous seismic missions, collecting data across a total area of 23,000 square kilometers (8,880 square miles).

Early this year Türkiye and Somalia signed memorandums of understanding under which Turkish Petroleum, Türkiye’s national oil company, obtained licenses for three offshore areas in Somali waters. The ministry plans to do seismic surveys across the three licensed zones, each covering roughly 5,000 square km (1,930 sq mi).​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

*Writing by Seda Sevencan and Serdar Dincel

Turkish vessel set for hydrocarbon exploration in Somalia

Source: Daily News, Thursday October 3, 2024

Türkiye’s seismic research vessel Oruç Reis is scheduled to depart for Somalia this weekend, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has said.

The minister announced the deployment at a conference in the capital Ankara on Oct. 2.It follows a deal signed between Türkiye and Somalia for hydrocarbon exploration in three designated offshore blocks.

Under the agreement finalized in July, Türkiye will hold exclusive rights to explore and produce hydrocarbons in the blocks, each covering around 5,000 square kilometers.

Two of the blocks are located about 50 kilometers from the Somali coast, while the third is positioned 100 kilometers offshore.

The Oruç Reis will conduct “very important seismic research that will last for months,” which could lead exploration, drilling and possibly a discovery, the minister said earlier.

Describing the agreement as “a historic step” for both nations, Bayraktar said the vessel will be accompanied by a 50-person crew and five support ships on its journey to Somalia.

Türkiye maintains a fleet of seven vessels dedicated to hydrocarbon exploration and production at sea. This includes the Oruç Reis and the Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa, another seismic research vessel, as well as drilling vessels Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han.

South Sudan: A Road to Recovery?

 Source: Foreign Service Journal, The October 2024 issue of the Foreign Service Journal has an article titled “South Sudan at 13: Reflections on Crisis, Aid, and the Road to Recovery” by Julius Kaut.  

South Sudan remains in crisis and dependent on humanitarian aid.  The civil war in Sudan has interrupted the flow of oil and elections scheduled for December may not take place.  Yet, the author remains optimistic about South Sudan’s future.  

Addis summit raises questions about AU’s muted stance on Ethiopia rifts

For years, AU officials have refrained from addressing atrocities in Ethiopia. Analysts say this is strategic.

Source: By Zecharias Zelalem

Published On 14 Feb 202414 Feb 2024

From Thursday, African leaders will gather in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, home of the African Union (AU), for the continental body’s annual summit. According to AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, regional integration and “maintaining momentum in addressing issues of peace and security” is high on the agenda.

But in an ironic twist, the host of the summit has either initiated or been involved in multiple conflicts in the last three years. Ethiopia’s two-year civil war with the state of Tigray may have ended in November 2022 after a Pretoria pact, but federal troops are currently upping drone strikes against rebels known as Fano militia in the state of Amhara, next door to Tigray. This week, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council said “at least 45 civilians” had been killed by federal troops in Amhara.

Somalia bans plastic bags in pollution fight

Source: AFP. Wednesday October 2, 2024

 
Credit: AFP

Somalia on Tuesday imposed a long-delayed ban on single-use plastic bags to help tackle pollution, the latest African country to try to stem the tide of non-biodegradable waste.

The new law, first announced in February, prohibits the importation, production, sale and use of plastic bags, which usually end up dumped as litter or buried in landfills.

Environmental campaigners and residents of the capital Mogadishu welcomed the ban, saying it was long overdue.

“This is timely and a very good decision by the government,” said Mohamed Gure, who lives near the capital’s main Bakara market.

Environmental activist Osman Yusuf said the country was hugely dependent on the plastics bags, saying the industry was worth more than $50 million.

“There is no justification left for people to continue using this deadly material,” Yusuf said.

But others worried about a lack of environmentally friendly alternatives.

“We have no problem banning them, but we need time and replacement,” said Lul Mohamed, a shopkeeper.

Somalia joins other African countries, including neighbouring Kenya and Tanzania, that have banned single-use plastic bags.

Kenya introduced one of the world’s toughest bans on plastic bags in 2017, mandating a fine or even prison terms for using one.

The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that the equivalent of 2,000 garbage trucks of plastic is dumped into the seas, rivers and lakes every day.

Each year 19-23 million tonnes of plastic waste leaks into the world’s water ecosystems, UNEP says.

Somalia’s ban comes into effect as negotiators concluded a meeting in Nairobi on Monday hoping to reach the world’s first treaty on plastic pollution.

The treaty aims to marshal an international response to the plastic trash threatening the environment, from oceans and rivers to mountains and sea ice, and moving up food webs as it is ingested by animals.

Countries are under pressure to find common ground before final negotiations are held in December in South Korea.

At least 45 dead, dozens missing as boats sink off coast of Djibouti

A
Source: Aljazeera, Wednesday October 2, 2024

The boats were traversing a route described as one of the busiest and most dangerous in the world for refugees and migrants from Africa.

Refugees fleeing Yemen on a boat are escorted by a Djiboutian coastguard vessel as they arrive in Djibouti in 2015 [File: Andreas Stahl/AFP] 

At least 45 people have died and dozens are missing after two vessels carrying refugees and migrants from Africa sank off the coast of Djibouti, the UN’s migration agency said.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) said on Tuesday that the boats left Yemen with 310 people on board before sinking in the Red Sea.

“IOM is supporting state emergency services in search and rescue operations,” the organisation said in a post on X, adding that 32 survivors had been found.

Djibouti’s coastguard said a joint rescue effort has been under way since early on Monday, with 115 survivors now rescued and dozens still missing.

The boats sank just 150 metres (492 feet) from a beach near Djibouti’s northwest Khor Angar region, the coastguard said.

“We remain committed to finding the missing persons and ensuring the safety of the survivors,” the coastguard said in a statement on social media, along with images of white body bags.

In April, at least 38 people, including children, died after their boat sank off the coast of Djibouti as it took the same route across the Red Sea. In June, at least 49 people died, mostly from Ethiopia and Somalia, when their boat sank after setting off from Somalia.

Tens of thousands of people seeking a better future leave from Africa and cross the Red Sea each year in order to reach Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, in what humanitarian organisations have described as “one of the busiest and arguably most dangerous [migration routes] in the world”.

Known as the “Eastern Route”, human smugglers pack refugees and migrants onto overcrowded vessels as they set off from the Horn of Africa and head for Yemen. From there, they travel to the Gulf states in search of work. Those returning from the Gulf will do the same route in reverse.

As well as the threat of drowning, those risking the Red Sea crossing – often escaping conflict, political violence and climate change at home – are exposed to health risks, violence and exploitation by traffickers en route and in the Gulf countries, the IOM said.

Nearly 400,000 people were recorded making the Eastern Route crossing in 2023, IOM records show, with almost 700 dying or going missing that year. This adds to nearly 1,000 people who have died or gone missing on the route since 2014, according to the IOM.

Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 drone maker meets Somali leaders in Mogadishu

Source: Hiiraan Online, Wednesday October 2, 2024

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (left) receives a ceremonial gift from Haluk Bayraktar (right), CEO of Baykar Technologies, during a meeting in Mogadishu aimed at bolstering Somalia-Turkey defence ties.

Mogadishu (HOL) — Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of Turkey’s defence giant Baykar and manufacturer of the internationally renowned  Bayraktar TB2 drone, visited Mogadishu over the weekend, signalling the strengthening of ties in the already robust relationship between Somalia and Turkey. 

Bayraktar was greeted warmly by Somalia’s Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur and later met with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. While the specific details of their discussions remain undisclosed, Bayraktar emphasized that the visit reflects a new phase in Somalia-Turkey relations following the signing of a recent Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement.

The meeting illustrates Turkey’s deepening involvement in Somalia, particularly through its support in military and economic sectors. Bayraktar drones, produced by his company, have become the flagbearer of Turkey’s burgeoning defence industry. Baykar’s signature product, the Bayraktar TB2 drone, is a globally recognized unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that has gained international prominence in recent years after being deployed successfully in several high-profile conflicts. Haluk and his brother Selçuk Bayraktar manage the TB2 program.

In a social media post following his visit, Bayraktar highlighted Turkey’s strong ties with Somalia, noting that Turkey’s largest embassy is located in Mogadishu. He reflected on Turkey’s pivotal role in aiding Somalia during its 2011 famine, saying, “While the world was ignoring the hunger crisis in Somalia, our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia and changed the fate of the country.”

Since then, Turkish investment in Somalia has surged, with Turkish companies managing critical infrastructure, including air and sea ports, and providing essential services. 

Turkey’s military support to Somalia has been extensive, with the opening of its largest overseas military base, Camp TurkSom, in Mogadishu. Over the past decade, Turkish forces have trained thousands of Somali soldiers, including special forces units. The introduction of Turkish drones in Somalia’s military arsenal began in 2021, when the country received its first batch of Bayraktar TB2 drones. Initially used for surveillance and intelligence-gathering, the drones quickly proved crucial in Somalia’s fight against the al-Qaeda-linked militant group Al-Shabaab.

In 2022, Somalia confirmed that Turkish drones were deployed in direct combat against Al-Shabaab during a major military offensive. According to Somalia’s Interior Minister, Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, Turkish drones provided critical aerial support in operations that have resulted in the capture of dozens of villages and the deaths of hundreds of Al-Shabaab fighters.

Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of Baykar Technologies (center, in suit), poses with Somali Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur (third from the right) and Turkish military officials outside the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu during his visit to strengthen military cooperation between Turkey and Somalia.
The Bayraktar TB2, a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, has been a game-changer in modern warfare, notably for their role in the Ukraine conflict. Its cost-effectiveness—priced at $2 million to $5 million, depending on the configuration, compared to the $32 million for a U.S.-made Reaper—makes it a practical choice for countries like Somalia with limited defence budgets. 

The TB2’s advanced missile systems and ability to operate at altitudes of up to 25,000 feet and remain airborne for 27 hours provide militaries with critical intelligence and strike capabilities. Bayraktar drones have already proven their mettle in other conflict zones, including Syria, Libya, and Ukraine. Military analysts credit the drones for turning the tide in Azerbaijan’s conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Turkey’s military was the first to adopt Bayraktar’s drones, using them in operations against Kurdish militants inside and outside the country. The TB2s are now in use in 24 countries.

The increasing demand for Turkish drones extends beyond combat zones. In May, NATO member Poland signed an agreement to purchase 24 TB2 drones, underscoring their versatility and effectiveness in modern military operations. According to Reuters, Poland’s defence minister hailed the drones for their combat capabilities, and there are indications that other nations, including Saudi Arabia, are also exploring potential drone deals with Turkey. 

While the drones have become a vital tool in modern warfare, Haluk Bayraktar has expressed a degree of reluctance about their use in conflict. “War is a bitter thing,” he said, reflecting on the loss of life in warfare. However, he noted the importance of self-defence, saying, “When you’re under heavy attack, the only way to protect yourself is through advanced technology.”

Baykar’s growth aligns with President Erdoğan’s vision to make Turkey a dominant player in the global drone market, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia, where it seeks to expand its military and economic influence. 

Defence analysts have noted that Turkey’s military presence in Somalia could potentially rival that of the United States, particularly as the Turkish government seeks to solidify its position as a dominant drone power globally.

Turkey’s Rising Influence in the Horn of Africa

 Source: The UAE-based Future for Advanced Research & Studies published on 16 September 2024 an analysis titled “Analyzing the Challenges in Turkey’s Rising Influence in the Horn of Africa” by Iman Al-Shaarawy.  

In efforts to increase its influence in the Horn of Africa, Turkey has signed defense cooperation agreements, acted as a mediator in regional disputes, and invested in the energy and oil sectors.  However, its engagement raises important questions about the extent and limitations of Turkey’s role, its underlying motives, and Ankara’s capacity to fulfill these commitments in the face of numerous regional and international challenges.

Biden, PM Barre reaffirm commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty, stability

Source: Hiiraan Online, Saturday September 28, 2024

Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre poses with U.S. President Joe Biden and First Lady Jill Biden during a meeting at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The leaders discussed strengthening U.S.-Somalia relations, focusing on regional security and economic collaboration.
Mogadishu (HOL) — Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre of Somalia met with U.S. President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly.

In a joint statement, both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, principles they described as vital to ensuring peace and stability across the region.

The leaders focused on expanding U.S. support for Somalia in combating Al-Shabaab insurgency and enhancing governance reforms. Both underscored the importance of their partnership in fostering stability across the Horn of Africa, a region beset by conflict and extremism.

Prime Minister Hamse expressed gratitude for the U.S. military and economic aid in Somalia’s fight against terrorism and in rebuilding its governance structures. He added that continued support is essential for sustaining progress in both security and development.

Source: Stockholm Environment Institute

Targets and indicators of climatic change

This report is one of four listed below which are devoted to three specific aspects of the issues involved in developing policies for responding to climatic…

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8 juli 2024

Environmental Peacebuilding in Somalia

 Source: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published in September 2024 a policy brief titled “From Conflict to Collaboration: Co-funding Environmental Peacebuilding in South-central Somalia” by Kheira Tarif.  

The policy brief explores how the International Organization for Migration uses a co-funding mechanism for facilitating collaboration between groups in conflict on addressing shared local priorities in south-central Somalia.

Monday, September 23, 2024

Somalia Faces Regional Tensions

Source: The International Crisis Group posted on 19 September 2024 a 39-minute podcast titled “Somalia Amid a Swirl of Regional Tensions” with Alan Boswell and Omar Mahmood.   

Somalia is insisting that Ethiopia renounce the memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, which Ethiopia refuses to do.  Somalia signed a new security agreement with Turkey and followed this with some kind of secret agreement with Egypt, which may include training of Somali soldiers.  Turkey and Egypt seem to be working to cooperate in Somalia.

If Ethiopia does not renounce the MOU, Somalia said Ethiopian troops will no longer be permitted to participate in the ATMIS stabilization mission.  There is speculation that Egyptian troops will replace them, which would be challenging for Egypt to do.  It could also result in a short-term security vacuum.  

Both Ethiopia and Somalia are engaged in brinkmanship.  This situation leaves openings for al-Shabaab to expand its influence in Somalia.  The Islamic State remains operationally insignificant inside Somalia but is playing a larger external role.

Addressing Conflict in the Red Sea Region

 Source: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute posted on 2 September 2024 a commentary titled “Navigating the Red Sea: Addressing Threats and Harnessing Potential” by Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga, Farea Al-Muslimi, Lisa Bostrom, and Veera Tuomala.   

The Red Sea has become a major flashpoint for regional conflict.  Operationalizing the Red Sea Council, established in 2020, could help mitigate tension in the region. 

Hundreds die from cholera as war rages in Sudan

Danai Nesta Kupemba

Source: BBC News, today 2024-09-25

More than 430 people have died from cholera in the past month, Sudan’s health ministry says, as civil war continues to ravage the country.

The number of infections has risen to about 14,000, it said in a statement.

It said it was doing all it can to “combat cholera in the affected states, amid the rise in infections”.

Getting treatment to those affected areas is hugely complicated by the conflict which has killed up to 150,000 people since it began last year, according to the US special envoy for Sudan, Tom Perriello.

Medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that they are “regularly obstructed by both warring parties, the humanitarian response remains far below what is needed”.

In a new report, MSF says that Sudan’s health system has collapsed, and that pregnant women and new-born children are dying in “shocking” numbers.

Sudan has been embroiled in a war since the army and a powerful paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), began a vicious struggle for power in April 2023, leading to what the UN has called one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

Over nine million people have been forced to flee their homes and there are fears of a widespread famine as people have not been able to grow any crops.

There have also been warnings of a possible genocide against non-Arabs in the western region of Darfur.

• A simple guide to the Sudan war
• Starvation in war-hit Sudan ‘almost everywhere’ – WHO
• Who was behind one of the deadliest attacks in Sudan?

Cholera is a fast developing and highly contagious disease. It can cause diarrhoea, dehydration and death, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO).

It is relatively easy to cure, but rapid treatment is essential.

Health Minister Haitham Mohammed Ibrahim declared a cholera outbreak in mid-August.

As well as the war, heavy rainfall and floods have also contributed to the cholera outbreak, compounded by crowding in displacement camps.

Esperanza Santos, MSF emergency coordinator for Sudan, said these elements had created a “perfect storm” for cholera to spread.

In some areas schools, markets and stores have been told to close to curb the spread of the disease.

In its report, MSF said it had recorded 114 maternal deaths in the South Darfur region alone between January and August, while thousands of children are facing starvation.

“The situation in South Darfur is a snapshot of what is likely unfolding at dreadful proportions across war-torn and isolated areas of Sudan,” the report stated.

Lack of basic items such as soap, clean delivery mats and sterilised instruments has led to mothers and new-borns contracting sepsis.

“This is a crisis unlike any other I have seen in my career,” said Dr Gillian Burkhardt, MSF sexual and reproductive health manager, who is based in South Darfur.

UN head warns of ‘a rising tide of misery’ as sea levels rise

Speaking at the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, hitherto dominated by world leaders’ statements on global conflicts, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres raised the key issue of climate change.

Source: Le Monde with AFP Published today 2024-09-25 at 5:20 pm (Paris)

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned, on Wednesday, September 25, that rising sea levels threaten to create “a rising tide of misery” for millions, with intense storm surges, coastal erosion and coastal flooding increasingly likely.

“Low-lying coastal zones are home to around 900 million people. Rising seas mean a rising tide of misery,” he said at a summit on the threats posed by sea level rise. “Greenhouse gasses – overwhelmingly from burning fossil fuels – are heating our planet, expanding seawater and melting ice.”

Source: Africa File Special Edition: External meddling for the Red Sea exacerbates conflicts in the Horn of Africa
Wednesday September 25, 2024

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.


A view of the Nile and Red Sea, with a dust storm. Photo Credit: NATO

Key Takeaway: Russia and several countries in the Middle East, including Iran, are taking advantage of conflicts that have emerged in Sudan and Somalia to grow military engagement with some of the factions involved in the crises. These countries are advancing their economic, military, and political objectives in the Horn of Africa and the greater Red Sea area at the expense of the interests of the local populations and the United States. Shifting regional alliances in the Middle East have shaped some of the external engagement in the Horn of Africa as powers compete for economic, military, and political influence in the Red Sea.

Sudan. Iran, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates are backing various sides in Sudan’s civil war to advance their interests in the region, complicating peace talks and exacerbating the violence and resulting humanitarian crisis. Iran and Russia in particular are providing military supplies in pursuit of Red Sea naval bases that would enable both countries to threaten US economic and military interests in the Red Sea.

Somalia. Somalia has turned to Egypt and Turkey to help counter a naval base agreement between Ethiopia and the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in northern Somalia. Egypt and Turkey have benefited from this development to advance their own economic, military, and political objectives in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Their involvement has increased the risk of a broader regional conflict and prolonged the crisis to the detriment of US counterterrorism interests in Somalia and the local population.

Assessment:

External powers are taking advantage of conflicts that have emerged in the Horn of Africa to advance their economic, military, and political objectives in the Horn of Africa and the greater Red Sea area at the expense of the interests of the local populations and the United States. Sudan’s ongoing civil war has resulted in a growing humanitarian crisis since it began in 2023.[1] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has given military aid to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to protect its economic and political ties in Sudan.[2] Egypt, which is a historical military partner for the rival Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), has been unable or unwilling to provide decisive military support, leaving a vacuum for Iran and Russia to strengthen their ties with the SAF. Iran and Russia are giving military support to the SAF in pursuit of Red Sea naval bases, which would threaten the freedom of navigation that underpins US economic and military interests in the region.[3] External military aid has made the civil war deadlier and complicated peace efforts to the detriment of the Sudanese people.

Ethiopia and Somalia are also locked in a separate dispute over Ethiopia trying to secure Red Sea access through a deal with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region. Somalia first turned to Turkey to counter Ethiopia, creating opportunities for Turkey to advance its economic and political interests.[4] Turkey’s gains have come at the expense of the economic and political interests of the UAE, which is trying to grow influence in the Red Sea through client ports with allies such as Ethiopia and Somaliland.[5] Somalia has also increased cooperation with Egypt to counter Ethiopia, opening another avenue for Egypt to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the Nile and Red Sea.[6] Growing external military engagement with Somalia has increased the risk that the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia could escalate into a direct or proxy armed conflict and exacerbated the conflict to the detriment of counterterrorism efforts against one of al Qaeda’s strongest affiliates, al Shabaab.

Shifting regional alliances in the Middle East have shaped some of the external engagement in the Horn of Africa as powers compete for economic, military, and political influence in the Red Sea. Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia were at the core of a de facto anti-Iran and anti-Islamist coalition during the late 2010s that aimed to contain Iran and its proxies and coerce countries such as Turkey and Qatar from supporting regional Islamist factions. The Gulf states and Iran supported opposing sides in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars, and the rivalry eventually contributed to the UAE and Saudi Arabia cutting diplomatic ties with Iran in 2016 and supporting US policy to isolate and weaken Iran through a “maximum pressure” campaign in the late 2010s.[7] Egypt has a deep historical rivalry with Iran, and the two have lacked formal diplomatic ties since the Iranian revolution in 1979.

Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia also view Islamist movements as threats to their regimes, which put them at odds with Turkey’s pro-Islamist president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey and the three Arab countries took opposing sides on many issues, including the post–Arab Spring Islamist governments, the Libyan civil war, and the trio’s efforts to blockade Qatar for its links to Islamist movements and Iran.[8] Turkey maintained a tense relationship with both Gulf states and cut diplomatic ties with Egypt between 2013 and 2021 due to Turkey’s condemnation of the coup that overthrew Egypt’s Islamist government and installed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi.[9]

Competition between the Egypt–UAE–Saudi Arabia coalition and their Iranian and Turkish rivals over military and political influence in the Red Sea manifested in the Horn of Africa. Iran had a strong relationship with former Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir for decades after Bashir took power in an Islamist-backed coup inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1989.[10] The UAE and Saudi Arabia heavily contributed to Bashir abandoning this relationship in 2015 after they lured him to join their anti-Iran coalition with significant economic investment.[11] The UAE and Saudi Arabia then used Sudanese forces from both the RSF and SAF as part of their coalition against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in the Yemeni civil war.[12] Egypt quickly developed ties with the SAF after Bashir’s fall, in 2019.[13] The UAE and Turkey have also been key partners for more than a decade in Somalia, where both countries view engagement as an opportunity to grow their economic spheres of influence and expand their military footprint around the Red Sea.[14]

The Egypt–UAE–Saudi Arabia coalition has fractured since 2019 in the face of their policy failures and COVID-19–era economic shocks. Middle East political experts say Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia partially pushed for a détente because their more confrontational approach failed.[15] For example, the coalition’s efforts failed to stop Iran’s Yemeni proxy—the Houthis—from becoming the dominant faction in Yemen and launching drone attacks targeting the UAE and Saudi Arabia.[16] Qatar also never implemented any of the 13 demands of the blockading coalition.[17] Economic shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war also further pushed all countries to pursue regional de-escalation so they could give greater priority to strengthening and diversifying their economies.[18]

The fracturing of the Egypt–UAE–Saudi Arabia coalition and growing emphasis on economic power has changed how Middle East powers are interacting with each other as they continue to compete for influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are competing for economic spheres of influence in Africa through mineral access and supply-chain infrastructure, such as client ports in the Horn of Africa.[19] This impact of these changing priorities is evident in Sudan, where the coalition is no longer holding the fragile government together and instead supporting opposite sides of the war to advance their own interests.[20] The split has created the space for Iran to reconnect with Sudan without the Emirati-Saudi pressure on Sudanese actors to distance themselves from Iran.[21] Egypt is also on the opposite side of the UAE on regional issues including Sudan and Ethiopia but still finds itself constrained by its own economic reliance on the UAE to support its ailing economy.[22] Egypt has simultaneously increased diplomatic and economic cooperation with Turkey, which has created space for collaboration on now-less contentious foreign policy issues in the Palestinian territories, Libya, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.[23]

Sudan

Sudan’s civil war has resulted in a growing humanitarian crisis since 2023, with internationally backed peace talks floundering and neither side able to reach a decisive breakthrough. The paramilitary RSF and the SAF have been fighting across Sudan since April 2023 to secure control over the state. Both groups jointly ruled Sudan in a delicate and informal power-sharing structure since helping overthrow both Sudan’s former dictator Omar al Bashir, in 2019, and the subsequent civilian-led transitional government, in 2022.[24]

The resulting civil war has led to a humanitarian catastrophe. The fighting has left 25 million Sudanese civilians facing acute food insecurity, displaced more than 10.2 million people, and killed at least 150,000 people, according to UN and US estimates.[25] Both sides have committed human rights abuses against civilians, and numerous international organizations have accused the RSF of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab civilians in Sudan’s Darfur region, where the Janjaweed militias that eventually became the RSF committed similar genocidal crimes that killed 300,000 people in the same area in the early 2000s.[26] Multiple international peace efforts have failed, and neither side has achieved a decisive victory, despite some significant RSF breakthroughs in parts of Sudan.[27]

The UAE has backed the RSF to advance its economic and political objectives in Sudan and the Red Sea through its ties with the RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. The UN, United States, and other international observers have accused the UAE of funding and supplying the RSF with matériel via logistics nodes in neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Libya, and Uganda.[28] The New York Times reported in September 2024 that the UAE had recently begun using Chinese drones similar to the US MQ9 Reaper to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support based in Chad.[29]

Hemedti and the RSF cultivated strong ties with the UAE via participation in the Emiratis’ military coalitions in Libya and Yemen that have since expanded into an economic partnership.[30] Hemedti’s influence over Sudan’s gold mining industry further makes him a crucial partner for the UAE, which is the leading importer of Sudanese gold.[31] These ties make Hemedti the UAE’s preferred partner to implement a $6 billion port and agriculture project on Sudan’s Red Sea coast that the UAE announced in 2022.[32] Emirati companies own a 65 percent stake in the planned port’s profits, and the project is part of the UAE’s strategy to grow economic and political influence and power via client ports along the Red Sea.[33]

Figure 1. External Support in the Sudanese Civil War. CLICK TO ENLARGE

Source: Liam Karr.

Egypt—a historical military partner for the SAF—has been unable or unwilling to provide decisive military support, leaving a vacuum for Iran and Russia to strengthen their ties with the SAF in pursuit of Red Sea naval bases. Egypt’s poor economy and overstretched military have limited its ability to support the SAF. Multiple Africa-focused outlets and analysts reported that Egypt was considering entering the war more broadly in support of the SAF.[34] Egypt initially provided some fighter jet support, as well as intelligence and tactical support in the early days of the war.[35] However, the RSF attacked an SAF stationing Egyptian jets and pilots, causing Egypt to withdraw its assets and personnel from Sudan.[36] Egypt has seemingly not attempted to replace this support beyond a shipment of Turkish Bayraktar drones in October 2023 due to its nearly collapsed economy.[37] A $35 billion Emirati investment in February and billions more from the International Monetary Fund and EU have temporarily helped stave off the impending crisis, but the situation has greatly diminished Egyptian political capital and increased Egypt’s reliance on the RSF’s UAE backers.[38] Saudi Arabia has been a major economic partner for Sudan and has close political ties with the SAF but has never offered direct military aid.[39]

Iran and Russia have filled this vacuum by giving military aid to the SAF in pursuit of naval bases on Sudan’s Red Sea coast that would grow their power projection capabilities in the Red Sea. Iran restored diplomatic ties with the SAF-backed Sudanese government after a seven-year break in 2023, leading to several high-level meetings and the exchange of ambassadors in July 2024.[40] Iran also began sending Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to the SAF beginning in late 2023, which have helped the SAF in battles around the capital.[41] Iran has sought but failed to obtain an agreement for a naval base or dual-use port in Sudan in exchange for continued aid and a helicopter-carrying ship.[42] The SAF has rejected Iran’s overtures to avoid alienating its historical allies—Egypt and Saudi Arabia—as well as Western countries.[43]

The Kremlin increased its outreach to the SAF in 2024 to revive a dormant naval port agreement. Russia has been attempting for years to implement an agreement it signed with Bashir in 2017 to build a naval base in Sudan that would be able to station 300 Russian service members and four ships.[44] The Russian deputy foreign minister and special representative for the Russian president in Africa and the Middle East met with SAF Head Gen. Abdel Fattah al Burhan and other high-ranking officials in April 2024 and promised “unrestricted qualitative military aid” in exchange for the SAF—which controls Sudan’s coastline—implementing the 2017 deal.[45] The assistant SAF commander-in-chief claimed in late May that Sudan and Russia would soon sign a series of military and economic agreements to finalize the exchange.[46] However, Sudanese media reported in August that the sides are still finalizing aspects of the deal surrounding the conditions of the base and Russia providing fighter jets.[47]

Russia has pursued the naval port agreement despite its ties to the RSF via the Wagner Group. The Kremlin-funded Wagner Group worked with the RSF between 2017 and 2023 due to its business interests in Sudan’s gold mines and even armed the RSF following the outbreak of the civil war.[48] CTP and The Telegraph have noted that Wagner’s support for the RSF has likely tailed off and possibly ceased following the death of Wagner Group’s founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023 and the Kremlin’s growing ties to the SAF since April 2024.[49] Russia is also attempting to replace the gold smuggling arrangements it had with the RSF through mining deals with SAF after the civil war halted Wagner’s smuggling operation.[50]

Greater Iranian and Russian power projection in the Red Sea threatens freedom of navigation that underpins US economic and military interests. An Iranian naval base at Port Sudan would support Iran’s and its Axis of Resistance’s power projection and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. A Russian naval base would enable the Kremlin to better challenge the West in the Red Sea and adjacent theaters such as the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean in the event of a broader conflict.

Figure 2. Competition for the Greater Red Sea Area

Source: Liam Karr.

External military support for both sides has intensified and prolonged the civil war to the detriment of Sudanese civilians. Outside support for the factions in Sudan makes the conflict more deadly for civilians and soldiers by introducing higher-end weapon systems, such as drones.[51] The continued provision of matériel enables both sides to continue fighting and carrying out their human rights abuses without proving decisive, complicating mediation efforts.[52] For example, Iranian drones have helped the SAF regain territory in the Sudanese capital while the SAF continues to suffer losses elsewhere, meaning the support is not decisive enough to win the SAF the war but it helps it avoid a decisive defeat and continue fighting for a more optimal outcome.[53]

Egypt, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia have been pushing for peace in Sudan. A halt to the conflict would help stabilize Egypt and Ethiopia’s borders with Sudan and protect Saudi Arabia’s significant economic investments in the country.[54] Egypt and Ethiopia have used their relationship with the UAE to encourage the Emiratis to push for peace.[55] Ethiopia has also used its ties with both Sudanese factions and Sudanese civil society to facilitate increased dialogue between Sudanese and external backers.[56] The growing pressure has led to more serious peace talks after a significant lull in the first half of 2024 following failed efforts throughout 2023.[57] However, both sides remain far from common ground on even basic issues, leading to no-shows or bad-faith participation in most discussions.[58] The external parties’ self-interests also jeopardize their ability to serve as impartial mediators.[59]

Somalia

Ethiopia and Somalia are locked in a diplomatic dispute that is drawing involvement from external powers looking to strengthen their hand in the wider Red Sea theater, increasing the risk that the crisis escalates into a regional conflict. Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding on January 1 with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in northern Somalia that will give Ethiopia a lease of land for a port or naval base along Somaliland’s coast in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.[60] The port would give Ethiopia access to Red Sea shipping lanes via the Bab al Mandeb strait between Djibouti and Yemen that connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described Red Sea access in July and October 2023 as an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight for if it could not secure it through peaceful means.[61]

The Somali Federal Government (SFG) has strongly rejected the deal as a violation of its sovereignty. The SFG rejected the agreement on January 2 as “null and void” for violating Somali sovereignty and international law and threatened to “retaliate” if Ethiopia followed through.[62] The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia memorandum a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of Somalia.”[63]

Figure 3. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

Source: Liam Karr.

Somalia has turned to Turkey to counter the port deal, creating significant opportunities for Turkey to advance its economic, defense, and power projection interests in the wider Red Sea theater. Turkey and Somalia signed an economic and defense deal in February 2024 that increases its military presence in crucial waterways and gives it access to underdeveloped offshore oil reserves in exchange for reconstructing, equipping, and training the defunct Somali Navy.[64] CTP previously assessed that Somalia intends for the deal to counter or deter Ethiopia’s port deal despite the SFG officially denying the two are connected. The deal guarantees Turkey 30 percent of the revenue from resources found in Somalia’s offshore exclusive economic zone. This stake has significant potential if Turkey can develop Somalia’s “blue economy,” which refers to economic activities in the ocean and coastal areas, and offshore oil and gas extraction.[65] Turkey has already signed follow-up deals to explore and produce up to 30 billion barrels of undeveloped offshore gas and oil deposits and announced plans to send an exploration vessel in October.[66]

The agreement also boosts Turkey’s defense and general power projection aims in the Red Sea. Turkey will deploy an unspecified number of naval forces to Somalia to help the SFG protect its territorial waters as it builds the Somali forces’ capacity to counter terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and other threats.[67] Somali forces have minimal naval capabilities, which will make Somalia dependent on Turkish forces and presumably Turkish-supplied assets as part of the cooperation.[68] Turkey has already announced plans to send two warships to Somalia to protect its exploration vessel.[69] This situation will increase Turkish and pro-Turkish naval presence near critical waterways off the Somali coast, such as the Bab el Mandeb strait, enabling Turkey to increase its geopolitical influence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region.[70] Turkey has explicitly framed the deployment as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the region.[71] Turkey has also held follow-on discussions with Somalia to construct a site in Somalia to test-fire missiles and rockets in Somalia for its ballistic missile and space programs.[72]

Turkey’s agreement with Somalia comes at the direct expense of the UAE’s economic and political interests in the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea area. The SFG had been considering a similar landmark deal with the UAE for over a year before it signed the 2024 deal with Turkey.[73] The SFG may have chosen Turkey over the UAE due to the UAE’s strong ties with Ethiopia and Somaliland. The UAE has invested nearly half a billion dollars in Somaliland’s Berbera port in exchange for a 30-year concession to manage the port.[74] The UAE has also invested billions of dollars in Ethiopia since 2018 and sent arms during the Tigray war from 2020 to 2022.[75] It began building an air base in Somaliland but voluntarily scrapped the project in favor of a civilian airport in 2019 when its diminishing role in the Yemeni civil war removed the need for the base.[76]

The Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement is also in UAE’s economic interests and aligned with its strategy to create more friendly client ports along the Red Sea. The UAE helping landlocked Ethiopia gain more access to the Red Sea and establishing another potential client port would reap significant benefits for the UAE given Ethiopia’s economic and political importance in Africa. Ethiopia is Africa’s fifth-largest economy. The Emiratis already sought to get Ethiopia partial ownership in the Berbera port in 2019, but Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments on time.[77]

Figure 4. Somalia Seeks External Support to Counter Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal. CLICK TO ENLARGE

Source: Liam Karr

Somalia has also increased military cooperation with Egypt to deter Ethiopia from following through on its port deal with Somaliland. This has created an opportunity for Egypt to advance its preexisting efforts to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the vital Nile and Red Sea. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has visited Cairo twice in 2024, following strong and outspoken Egyptian support for the SFG’s position on the Ethiopia deal.[78] Egypt and Somalia signed a defense cooperation agreement during Mohamud’s most recent visit, in August, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi confirmed that Egypt will contribute troops to the revamped African Union (AU) mission in Somalia that is scheduled to begin in 2025.[79] International media reported that 5,000 Egyptian troops will deploy to Somalia around Mogadishu as part of the mission, while Egyptian media said the deployment could be as many as 10,000.[80]

Egypt recently deployed troops to Somalia as part of this new cooperation. Egypt sent 1,000 soldiers and arms and ammunition to Mogadishu between August 27 and 29.[81] Egyptian officials said Egypt would ship armored vehicles, rocket launchers, artillery, anti-tank missiles, radars, and drones as part of the defense deal. Egypt and Somalia are also planning to hold joint military exercises in Somalia sometime in September.[82] Egyptian officials said the exercise will involve ground, air, and naval forces and “send a clear and loud message about our firm commitment to co-operate and protect Somalia.”[83]

Egypt has attempted to strengthen ties with Somalia for years to court Somali support for its position on Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project.[84] Egypt has repeatedly labeled the GERD an existential threat that will degrade—or enable Ethiopia to control—its Nile water supply and argued that Ethiopia should not fill the GERD without a legally binding agreement that resolves concerns about the dam’s downstream effects.[85] The Nile is vital for Egypt’s economy and general population given that it gets 90 percent of all its water from the Nile, which it uses for electric production, agriculture, and drinking water.[86]

These efforts have become more vital since Egypt lost its ability to counter Ethiopia through Sudan after the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war.[87] The SAF had backed Egypt’s stance on the GERD as Sudan is another downstream Nile country, and the two had engaged in military drills and stationed Egyptian fighter jets in Sudan since 2020 to pressure Ethiopia towards an agreement.[88] However, the Sudanese civil war has preoccupied the SAF and nullified Egypt’s military capacity in Sudan after Egypt withdrew from Sudan following an RSF attack that hit its Sudan-based assets in the early days of the war.

Egypt also likely wants to deny Ethiopia Red Sea naval access, which would create opportunities for Ethiopia to threaten Egypt’s Red Sea rents in the far future. Egypt received roughly $9 billion annually from Suez Canal receipts before the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, which began in October, and the subsequent Houthi campaign in the Red Sea.[89] The Houthi attacks have more than halved this figure in 2024.[90] Ethiopia signed defense accords with France to reestablish its defunct navy in 2019 but has not made notable progress since.[91]

Egypt’s engagement with Somalia also creates opportunities for Sisi to rebuild international and domestic prestige. Egypt’s growing military cooperation with Somalia may signal a renewed Egyptian effort to project regional influence and save its diminished position as a regional leader after its recent economic bailout. Egypt has faced a stagnating economy and resulting economic crunch in recent years that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war have exacerbated, leading to inflation, rising poverty rates, and significant foreign debt.[92] The crisis depleted Egypt’s political capital and contributed to Egypt being unable to project decisive power outside of its borders, including places like Sudan.[93] However, more than $50 billion of investment—equal to 10 percent of Egypt’s total gross domestic product—from the EU, International Monetary Fund, and UAE in early 2024 has presumably alleviated Sisi’s economic concerns and created more bandwidth for more assertive foreign policy.[94] Using this bandwidth to increase its role in Somalia helps restore Egypt’s prestige as a regional military power and creates opportunities for cooperation with Somalia’s other security stakeholders, including the EU, Turkey, and the United States.

Egypt’s participation in the AU peacekeeping mission will also help Sisi domestically by helping fund his vital military powerbase and potentially create profit. International funders directly pay troop-contributing countries an estimated $940 per soldier each month.[95] The contributing governments typically keep at least $200 of the per-soldier monthly rate for administrative uses, such as uniforms and training, and give the remaining amount to soldiers. For reference, Kenya received $48 million in funding in fiscal year 2023.[96]

Egypt’s military buildup in Somalia is heightening tensions and growing the risk of a regional conflict. The timing and nature of Egypt and Somalia’s recent military cooperation indicate that the collaboration is not tied purely to the mandate of the AU peacekeeping mission and is meant to threaten Ethiopia. Egyptian troops have arrived months before the planned AU transition at the end of 2024. Furthermore, the AU and UN will not finalize the new mission’s funding, concept of operations, and other troop-contributing countries until October.[97] This timing discrepancy indicates that the soldiers are not primarily there as part of the planned peacekeeping mission. The anti-tank missiles Egypt plans to send are also more geared for a conventional conflict, as al Shabaab does not use sophisticated enough vehicles to require anti-tank weapons.

Plans for an Egypt-Somalia military exercise further underscore the partnership’s anti-Ethiopian intentions. Egyptian officials announced a future military exercise with Somalia one day after their September 1 warning about Ethiopia’s GERD activity.[98] Egypt previously used military exercises with Sudan to pressure Ethiopia on GERD negotiations.[99] Egyptian officials also said the exercise aims to “send a clear and loud message about our firm commitment to co-operate and protect Somalia.”[100] This framing is consistent with Egypt’s previous promises to protect Somali sovereignty from Ethiopia throughout 2024, indicating that the exercises are a message to Ethiopia and not counterinsurgency operations.[101] Military exercises in regions of Somalia that border Ethiopia would further indicate the anti-Ethiopian nature of the exercises by putting Egyptian forces within range of Ethiopian soldiers and outside of their reported AU peacekeeping area of responsibility around Mogadishu.[102]

Ethiopia has strongly warned that the growing Egyptian military presence on its border poses a national security threat. The Ethiopian foreign affairs ministry released a statement on August 28 implicitly warning Egypt and the international community against Egyptian military involvement in the new AU mission and Somalia more broadly.[103] The statement repeatedly accused external actors—presumably Egypt—of destabilizing the region and said that it “must shoulder the grave ramifications” of doing so. Ethiopia framed these concerns as potential threats to its national security and actions that it “cannot tolerate.” Multiple local reporters have reported that Ethiopia began building up its military forces in the Ogaden region, which borders Somalia, in August.[104] Ethiopia also captured several airports in Somalia’s Gedo region, presumably to deny Egyptian and SFG access to the areas.[105]

The AU peacekeeping transition at the end of 2024 could trigger growing tensions into a regional conflict. Ethiopian officials have implied that Ethiopian troops will stay in Somalia past 2024 if Ethiopia has international and local support regardless of the SFG’s actions.[106] Local leaders and politicians in parts of southwestern Somalia have spoken out against the SFG’s plans to expel Ethiopian soldiers.[107] Ethiopia’s position is consistent with CTP’s previous assessment that Ethiopian forces will almost certainly try to remain in Somalia to maintain a buffer zone against al Shabaab and prevent an al Shabaab offensive into Ethiopia, as the group launched in 2022.[108] Ethiopia’s stated national security concerns about the Egyptian military buildup in Somalia further incentivize it to maintain this buffer zone.

Ethiopian forces remaining in Somalia past 2024 would provide a clear pretext for the SFG, with Egyptian support, to attack Ethiopian soldiers on Somali soil or along the border. The SFG has repeatedly condemned Ethiopia for violating its sovereignty throughout 2024 and threatened to retaliate.[109] Sisi has warned that Egypt would protect Somalia from any threats to its sovereignty on multiple occasions and explicitly threatened Ethiopia to “not try Egypt, or try to threaten its brothers especially if they ask it to intervene” after meeting with the Somali president in January.[110] Egypt’s GERD concerns also give it internal reasons to support military intervention against Ethiopia. Egypt wrote to the UN Security Council on September 1 that Ethiopia’s unilateral policy on the GERD “threatens the stability of the region” and that Egypt is “prepared to take all measures and steps guaranteed under the UN Charter” to defend itself after Ethiopia began the fifth stage of filling the GERD.[111]

The dispute may also lead to proxy conflicts in both countries between local actors and the federal governments. Ethiopia’s strong ties to various local actors in Somalia also increase the risk of an armed proxy conflict in Somalia between the SFG and pro-Ethiopian regional Somali administrations, even if Ethiopian forces withdraw. Multiple leaders and politicians in Somalia’s Jubbaland and South West states have spoken out against the SFG’s plans to expel Ethiopian troops.[112] Many of the Somali forces that operate in these states alongside Ethiopian soldiers respond to their clan and regional leaders, not federal entities, such as the Somali National Army or the SFG.[113] Disagreements between the federal government and these local factions have historically led to clashes between local and national forces, often the local factions receiving external backing from Ethiopia or Kenya.[114]

Tensions over the dispute have grown between the SFG and the South West State (SWS) government in September, which may lead to a military clash. The SFG has already begun retaliating against local politicians speaking out in favor of Ethiopia, marginalizing these communities and increasing the risk of an internal conflict.[115] Somali officials including the prime minister and president have also increased outreach to local leaders to try to find a peaceful solution.[116] A senior regional official and local journalist denied Somali media reports that the SFG deployed Turkish-trained special Haramcad special police and Gorgor commandos to the de jure SWS capital, Barawe, on September 16.[117] Such a deployment would be a clear precursor to infighting given that the SFG typically deploys special forces during conflicts with regional governments due to the command and control issues the SFG has with local forces and their allegiance to shared clan ties.[118]

Figure 5. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute Threatens to Spark Proxy Conflicts

Note: “DRC” stands for Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

The SFG has also threatened to support ethno-nationalist insurgents in Ethiopia. Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi said in mid-September that the SFG would consider establishing contact with rebels if Ethiopia followed through on its agreement with Somaliland but that the crisis had not yet “reached that stage.”[119] Ethiopia is facing several ethno-nationalist insurgencies across the country. A loose collection of decentralized Amhara militias known as Fano have been waging an insurgency against the federal government in northern Ethiopia since August 2023 and captured several key points along the Sudanese border and near Ethiopia’s second-largest city in September 2024.[120] The Fano insurgency overlaps with a conflict between federal forces, and Oromo insurgents that also sometimes fight Fano in central Ethiopia.[121] The federal and regional governments in Tigray are also still working to implement the 2022 peace agreement that ended the Tigray war, which has caused clashes and threats of violence over disputed areas between Amhara and Tigrayan militias.[122] Former insurgents in the majority ethnically Somali region in eastern Ethiopia have also claimed that the Ethiopian government’s retaliatory actions against Somali citizens are threatening a 2018 peace deal that ended their over 30-year insurgency.[123]

The Ethiopia-Somalia dispute has weakened the SFG’s counterterrorism efforts, undermining US counterterrorism goals to weaken al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab. The SFG has given priority to these issues over its counterinsurgency campaign against al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab, undermining the fight against the group and contributing to its retaking territory in central Somalia that the SFG had captured in 2022 in a US-backed counterterrorism offensive that top US officials called “historic” and “impressive.”[124]

The fallout surrounding the port deal has weakened counterterrorism cooperation with critical counterterrorism partners such as Ethiopia and the UAE. CTP assessed that Somalia’s agreement with Turkey alienated the UAE, contributing to the UAE decreasing its financial and training support for Somali forces.[125] The SFG’s threat to expel Ethiopian troops could lead to opportunities for al Shabaab by either creating a force gap if Ethiopian forces leave or decreasing the SFG’s legitimacy and increasing popular anti-Ethiopian sentiment if they stay, which would boost al Shabaab recruitment.[126]

Figure 6. Al Shabaab Area of Operations: As of April 3, 2024

Note: “S. Sudan” stands for South Sudan.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database Project.

The growing tensions surrounding the Egyptian military buildup have also jeopardized Turkish-led peace talks between Ethiopia and Somalia. Turkey is the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021, and also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to the Ethiopian government during the Tigray civil war.[127] Turkey has used its leverage with Ethiopia and Somalia to mediate talks between the two sides in July and August.[128] The effort has failed to yield a breakthrough, both sides have accused each other of wanting to destabilize the other, and a third round of talks scheduled for September 17 was postponed days prior.[129] The Somali minister of foreign affairs left the August meeting blaming Ethiopia for the talks’ collapsing.[130] Ethiopia also blamed Somalia for “colluding with external actors aiming to destabilize the region” instead of pursuing the peace talks.[131]

Turkey also risks alienating Ethiopia and diminishing its status as a negotiator due to its growing ties with Egypt and Somalia. Sisi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on September 5 for the first time since Sisi took power in 2013, which led Turkey to cut ties with Egypt and shelter the Muslim Brotherhood leaders that Sisi overthrew.[132] Turkey has also been a steadfast supporter of Ethiopia on the GERD issue in recent years.[133] Egypt and Turkey signed 17 bilateral agreements during Sisi’s visit and discussed the need to “preserve the unity and territorial integrity” of Somalia among other issues.[134]

How China Can Finance African Projects

 Source: The Center for Global Development published on 12 September 2024 a proposal titled “At FOCAC, China Renewed Commitments to Africa. Here’s What Needs to Happen Next” by W. Gyude Moore.  

The author proposes that China expand the $2 billion Chinese-created Africa Growing Together Fund (AGTF) administered by the African Development Bank and embrace a wider slate of participants to enable continued and sustainable lending from China to Africa.  More specifically, he suggests that China expand AGTF capital to $5 billion and reauthorize it for another 10 years. 

External Meddling Exacerbates Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

 Source: The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Africa File published on 23 September 2024 an analysis titled “External Meddling for the Red Sea Exacerbates Conflicts in the Horn of Africa” by Liam Karr.

Russia, Iran, UAE, Turkey, and Egypt are taking advantage of conflicts in the Horn of Africa to advance their economic, military, and political objectives in the greater Red Sea area at the expense of the interests of the local populations and the United States.  

Ethiopia calls for deliberation on Somalia’s security after ATMIS exit

Source: Hiiraan Online, Wednesday September 25, 2024

New York (HOL) – Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister, Ambassador Taye Atske-Selassie, met with Catherine Molly Phee, U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, on Tuesday during the 79th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

During the meeting, Minister Taye emphasized Ethiopia’s commitment to ensuring sustainable peace and security, highlighting Ethiopia’s role in combating terrorism, especially in Somalia.

The Minister stressed the need for careful deliberation before any post-ATMIS (African Union Mission in Somalia) arrangements are finalized, signalling Ethiopia’s concerns about maintaining stability in the region.

Tensions have risen between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ethiopia’s agreement to lease a portion of Somaliland’s coastline, an autonomous region of Somalia, in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence. The deal has caused diplomatic friction, as Somalia strongly rejected the agreement, accusing Ethiopia of undermining its territorial integrity.

Ethiopia’s plans to establish a port in Somaliland have further strained relations with Mogadishu and brought Somalia closer to Egypt, which has long been in dispute with Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River.

Somalia recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia in January following the port agreement, underscoring the growing diplomatic rift between the two nations.

Ethiopia worried over arms shipments to Somalia

Source: Reuters, Wednesday September 25, 2024

Security helicopters hover above the Mogadishu Sea Port after an Egyptian warship docked to deliver a second major cache of weaponry in Mogadishu, Somalia on September 23, 2024. PHOTO | REUTERS

Ethiopia’s foreign minister has warned that ammunition supplied to Somalia could exacerbate conflict and be diverted to terrorists, Ethiopia’s state news agency reported on Tuesday.

His statement came a day after an Egyptian warship unloaded heavy weaponry in the capital Mogadishu, the second arms shipment in the space of a month following the inking of a joint security pact by Egypt and Somalia in August.

Landlocked Ethiopia, which has thousands of troops stationed in neighbouring Somalia to fight al Qaeda-linked Islamist insurgents, has fallen out with the Mogadishu government over its plans to build a port in the breakaway region of Somaliland.

The spat has drawn Somalia closer to Egypt, which has quarrelled with Ethiopia for years over Addis Ababa’s construction of a vast hydro dam on the headwaters of the Nile River.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Taye Astke Selassie said he was concerned that the supply of ammunition by “external forces would further exacerbate the fragile security and would end up in the hands of terrorists in Somalia,” Ethiopia News Agency reported.

There was no immediate response from Somalia’s government to Taye’s remarks.

“The potential for weapons landing in the wrong hands is high. Al Shabaab is a major beneficiary and in 2023 harvested massive quantities of weapons by conducting raids on enemy (bases),” said Rashid Abdi, an analyst with the Sahan Research think-tank.

The UN Security Council lifted its arms embargo in December, more than 30 years after it was first imposed as Somalia plunged into civil war.

In January, Ethiopia agreed to lease 20km (12 miles) of coastline from Somaliland – a part of Somalia which claims independence and has operated with effective autonomy since 1991 – in exchange for possible recognition of its sovereignty.

In response, Somalia threatened to expel by the end of the year Ethiopia’s troops, who are there as part of the peacekeeping mission and under bilateral agreements, if the port deal was not scrapped.