Source: Africa File Special Edition: External meddling for the Red Sea exacerbates conflicts in the Horn of Africa
Wednesday September 25, 2024

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.


A view of the Nile and Red Sea, with a dust storm. Photo Credit: NATO

Key Takeaway: Russia and several countries in the Middle East, including Iran, are taking advantage of conflicts that have emerged in Sudan and Somalia to grow military engagement with some of the factions involved in the crises. These countries are advancing their economic, military, and political objectives in the Horn of Africa and the greater Red Sea area at the expense of the interests of the local populations and the United States. Shifting regional alliances in the Middle East have shaped some of the external engagement in the Horn of Africa as powers compete for economic, military, and political influence in the Red Sea.

Sudan. Iran, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates are backing various sides in Sudan’s civil war to advance their interests in the region, complicating peace talks and exacerbating the violence and resulting humanitarian crisis. Iran and Russia in particular are providing military supplies in pursuit of Red Sea naval bases that would enable both countries to threaten US economic and military interests in the Red Sea.

Somalia. Somalia has turned to Egypt and Turkey to help counter a naval base agreement between Ethiopia and the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in northern Somalia. Egypt and Turkey have benefited from this development to advance their own economic, military, and political objectives in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Their involvement has increased the risk of a broader regional conflict and prolonged the crisis to the detriment of US counterterrorism interests in Somalia and the local population.

Assessment:

External powers are taking advantage of conflicts that have emerged in the Horn of Africa to advance their economic, military, and political objectives in the Horn of Africa and the greater Red Sea area at the expense of the interests of the local populations and the United States. Sudan’s ongoing civil war has resulted in a growing humanitarian crisis since it began in 2023.[1] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has given military aid to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to protect its economic and political ties in Sudan.[2] Egypt, which is a historical military partner for the rival Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), has been unable or unwilling to provide decisive military support, leaving a vacuum for Iran and Russia to strengthen their ties with the SAF. Iran and Russia are giving military support to the SAF in pursuit of Red Sea naval bases, which would threaten the freedom of navigation that underpins US economic and military interests in the region.[3] External military aid has made the civil war deadlier and complicated peace efforts to the detriment of the Sudanese people.

Ethiopia and Somalia are also locked in a separate dispute over Ethiopia trying to secure Red Sea access through a deal with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region. Somalia first turned to Turkey to counter Ethiopia, creating opportunities for Turkey to advance its economic and political interests.[4] Turkey’s gains have come at the expense of the economic and political interests of the UAE, which is trying to grow influence in the Red Sea through client ports with allies such as Ethiopia and Somaliland.[5] Somalia has also increased cooperation with Egypt to counter Ethiopia, opening another avenue for Egypt to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the Nile and Red Sea.[6] Growing external military engagement with Somalia has increased the risk that the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia could escalate into a direct or proxy armed conflict and exacerbated the conflict to the detriment of counterterrorism efforts against one of al Qaeda’s strongest affiliates, al Shabaab.

Shifting regional alliances in the Middle East have shaped some of the external engagement in the Horn of Africa as powers compete for economic, military, and political influence in the Red Sea. Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia were at the core of a de facto anti-Iran and anti-Islamist coalition during the late 2010s that aimed to contain Iran and its proxies and coerce countries such as Turkey and Qatar from supporting regional Islamist factions. The Gulf states and Iran supported opposing sides in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars, and the rivalry eventually contributed to the UAE and Saudi Arabia cutting diplomatic ties with Iran in 2016 and supporting US policy to isolate and weaken Iran through a “maximum pressure” campaign in the late 2010s.[7] Egypt has a deep historical rivalry with Iran, and the two have lacked formal diplomatic ties since the Iranian revolution in 1979.

Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia also view Islamist movements as threats to their regimes, which put them at odds with Turkey’s pro-Islamist president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey and the three Arab countries took opposing sides on many issues, including the post–Arab Spring Islamist governments, the Libyan civil war, and the trio’s efforts to blockade Qatar for its links to Islamist movements and Iran.[8] Turkey maintained a tense relationship with both Gulf states and cut diplomatic ties with Egypt between 2013 and 2021 due to Turkey’s condemnation of the coup that overthrew Egypt’s Islamist government and installed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi.[9]

Competition between the Egypt–UAE–Saudi Arabia coalition and their Iranian and Turkish rivals over military and political influence in the Red Sea manifested in the Horn of Africa. Iran had a strong relationship with former Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir for decades after Bashir took power in an Islamist-backed coup inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1989.[10] The UAE and Saudi Arabia heavily contributed to Bashir abandoning this relationship in 2015 after they lured him to join their anti-Iran coalition with significant economic investment.[11] The UAE and Saudi Arabia then used Sudanese forces from both the RSF and SAF as part of their coalition against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in the Yemeni civil war.[12] Egypt quickly developed ties with the SAF after Bashir’s fall, in 2019.[13] The UAE and Turkey have also been key partners for more than a decade in Somalia, where both countries view engagement as an opportunity to grow their economic spheres of influence and expand their military footprint around the Red Sea.[14]

The Egypt–UAE–Saudi Arabia coalition has fractured since 2019 in the face of their policy failures and COVID-19–era economic shocks. Middle East political experts say Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia partially pushed for a détente because their more confrontational approach failed.[15] For example, the coalition’s efforts failed to stop Iran’s Yemeni proxy—the Houthis—from becoming the dominant faction in Yemen and launching drone attacks targeting the UAE and Saudi Arabia.[16] Qatar also never implemented any of the 13 demands of the blockading coalition.[17] Economic shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war also further pushed all countries to pursue regional de-escalation so they could give greater priority to strengthening and diversifying their economies.[18]

The fracturing of the Egypt–UAE–Saudi Arabia coalition and growing emphasis on economic power has changed how Middle East powers are interacting with each other as they continue to compete for influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are competing for economic spheres of influence in Africa through mineral access and supply-chain infrastructure, such as client ports in the Horn of Africa.[19] This impact of these changing priorities is evident in Sudan, where the coalition is no longer holding the fragile government together and instead supporting opposite sides of the war to advance their own interests.[20] The split has created the space for Iran to reconnect with Sudan without the Emirati-Saudi pressure on Sudanese actors to distance themselves from Iran.[21] Egypt is also on the opposite side of the UAE on regional issues including Sudan and Ethiopia but still finds itself constrained by its own economic reliance on the UAE to support its ailing economy.[22] Egypt has simultaneously increased diplomatic and economic cooperation with Turkey, which has created space for collaboration on now-less contentious foreign policy issues in the Palestinian territories, Libya, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.[23]

Sudan

Sudan’s civil war has resulted in a growing humanitarian crisis since 2023, with internationally backed peace talks floundering and neither side able to reach a decisive breakthrough. The paramilitary RSF and the SAF have been fighting across Sudan since April 2023 to secure control over the state. Both groups jointly ruled Sudan in a delicate and informal power-sharing structure since helping overthrow both Sudan’s former dictator Omar al Bashir, in 2019, and the subsequent civilian-led transitional government, in 2022.[24]

The resulting civil war has led to a humanitarian catastrophe. The fighting has left 25 million Sudanese civilians facing acute food insecurity, displaced more than 10.2 million people, and killed at least 150,000 people, according to UN and US estimates.[25] Both sides have committed human rights abuses against civilians, and numerous international organizations have accused the RSF of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab civilians in Sudan’s Darfur region, where the Janjaweed militias that eventually became the RSF committed similar genocidal crimes that killed 300,000 people in the same area in the early 2000s.[26] Multiple international peace efforts have failed, and neither side has achieved a decisive victory, despite some significant RSF breakthroughs in parts of Sudan.[27]

The UAE has backed the RSF to advance its economic and political objectives in Sudan and the Red Sea through its ties with the RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. The UN, United States, and other international observers have accused the UAE of funding and supplying the RSF with matériel via logistics nodes in neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Libya, and Uganda.[28] The New York Times reported in September 2024 that the UAE had recently begun using Chinese drones similar to the US MQ9 Reaper to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support based in Chad.[29]

Hemedti and the RSF cultivated strong ties with the UAE via participation in the Emiratis’ military coalitions in Libya and Yemen that have since expanded into an economic partnership.[30] Hemedti’s influence over Sudan’s gold mining industry further makes him a crucial partner for the UAE, which is the leading importer of Sudanese gold.[31] These ties make Hemedti the UAE’s preferred partner to implement a $6 billion port and agriculture project on Sudan’s Red Sea coast that the UAE announced in 2022.[32] Emirati companies own a 65 percent stake in the planned port’s profits, and the project is part of the UAE’s strategy to grow economic and political influence and power via client ports along the Red Sea.[33]

Figure 1. External Support in the Sudanese Civil War. CLICK TO ENLARGE

Source: Liam Karr.

Egypt—a historical military partner for the SAF—has been unable or unwilling to provide decisive military support, leaving a vacuum for Iran and Russia to strengthen their ties with the SAF in pursuit of Red Sea naval bases. Egypt’s poor economy and overstretched military have limited its ability to support the SAF. Multiple Africa-focused outlets and analysts reported that Egypt was considering entering the war more broadly in support of the SAF.[34] Egypt initially provided some fighter jet support, as well as intelligence and tactical support in the early days of the war.[35] However, the RSF attacked an SAF stationing Egyptian jets and pilots, causing Egypt to withdraw its assets and personnel from Sudan.[36] Egypt has seemingly not attempted to replace this support beyond a shipment of Turkish Bayraktar drones in October 2023 due to its nearly collapsed economy.[37] A $35 billion Emirati investment in February and billions more from the International Monetary Fund and EU have temporarily helped stave off the impending crisis, but the situation has greatly diminished Egyptian political capital and increased Egypt’s reliance on the RSF’s UAE backers.[38] Saudi Arabia has been a major economic partner for Sudan and has close political ties with the SAF but has never offered direct military aid.[39]

Iran and Russia have filled this vacuum by giving military aid to the SAF in pursuit of naval bases on Sudan’s Red Sea coast that would grow their power projection capabilities in the Red Sea. Iran restored diplomatic ties with the SAF-backed Sudanese government after a seven-year break in 2023, leading to several high-level meetings and the exchange of ambassadors in July 2024.[40] Iran also began sending Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to the SAF beginning in late 2023, which have helped the SAF in battles around the capital.[41] Iran has sought but failed to obtain an agreement for a naval base or dual-use port in Sudan in exchange for continued aid and a helicopter-carrying ship.[42] The SAF has rejected Iran’s overtures to avoid alienating its historical allies—Egypt and Saudi Arabia—as well as Western countries.[43]

The Kremlin increased its outreach to the SAF in 2024 to revive a dormant naval port agreement. Russia has been attempting for years to implement an agreement it signed with Bashir in 2017 to build a naval base in Sudan that would be able to station 300 Russian service members and four ships.[44] The Russian deputy foreign minister and special representative for the Russian president in Africa and the Middle East met with SAF Head Gen. Abdel Fattah al Burhan and other high-ranking officials in April 2024 and promised “unrestricted qualitative military aid” in exchange for the SAF—which controls Sudan’s coastline—implementing the 2017 deal.[45] The assistant SAF commander-in-chief claimed in late May that Sudan and Russia would soon sign a series of military and economic agreements to finalize the exchange.[46] However, Sudanese media reported in August that the sides are still finalizing aspects of the deal surrounding the conditions of the base and Russia providing fighter jets.[47]

Russia has pursued the naval port agreement despite its ties to the RSF via the Wagner Group. The Kremlin-funded Wagner Group worked with the RSF between 2017 and 2023 due to its business interests in Sudan’s gold mines and even armed the RSF following the outbreak of the civil war.[48] CTP and The Telegraph have noted that Wagner’s support for the RSF has likely tailed off and possibly ceased following the death of Wagner Group’s founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023 and the Kremlin’s growing ties to the SAF since April 2024.[49] Russia is also attempting to replace the gold smuggling arrangements it had with the RSF through mining deals with SAF after the civil war halted Wagner’s smuggling operation.[50]

Greater Iranian and Russian power projection in the Red Sea threatens freedom of navigation that underpins US economic and military interests. An Iranian naval base at Port Sudan would support Iran’s and its Axis of Resistance’s power projection and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. A Russian naval base would enable the Kremlin to better challenge the West in the Red Sea and adjacent theaters such as the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean in the event of a broader conflict.

Figure 2. Competition for the Greater Red Sea Area

Source: Liam Karr.

External military support for both sides has intensified and prolonged the civil war to the detriment of Sudanese civilians. Outside support for the factions in Sudan makes the conflict more deadly for civilians and soldiers by introducing higher-end weapon systems, such as drones.[51] The continued provision of matériel enables both sides to continue fighting and carrying out their human rights abuses without proving decisive, complicating mediation efforts.[52] For example, Iranian drones have helped the SAF regain territory in the Sudanese capital while the SAF continues to suffer losses elsewhere, meaning the support is not decisive enough to win the SAF the war but it helps it avoid a decisive defeat and continue fighting for a more optimal outcome.[53]

Egypt, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia have been pushing for peace in Sudan. A halt to the conflict would help stabilize Egypt and Ethiopia’s borders with Sudan and protect Saudi Arabia’s significant economic investments in the country.[54] Egypt and Ethiopia have used their relationship with the UAE to encourage the Emiratis to push for peace.[55] Ethiopia has also used its ties with both Sudanese factions and Sudanese civil society to facilitate increased dialogue between Sudanese and external backers.[56] The growing pressure has led to more serious peace talks after a significant lull in the first half of 2024 following failed efforts throughout 2023.[57] However, both sides remain far from common ground on even basic issues, leading to no-shows or bad-faith participation in most discussions.[58] The external parties’ self-interests also jeopardize their ability to serve as impartial mediators.[59]

Somalia

Ethiopia and Somalia are locked in a diplomatic dispute that is drawing involvement from external powers looking to strengthen their hand in the wider Red Sea theater, increasing the risk that the crisis escalates into a regional conflict. Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding on January 1 with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in northern Somalia that will give Ethiopia a lease of land for a port or naval base along Somaliland’s coast in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.[60] The port would give Ethiopia access to Red Sea shipping lanes via the Bab al Mandeb strait between Djibouti and Yemen that connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described Red Sea access in July and October 2023 as an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight for if it could not secure it through peaceful means.[61]

The Somali Federal Government (SFG) has strongly rejected the deal as a violation of its sovereignty. The SFG rejected the agreement on January 2 as “null and void” for violating Somali sovereignty and international law and threatened to “retaliate” if Ethiopia followed through.[62] The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia memorandum a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of Somalia.”[63]

Figure 3. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

Source: Liam Karr.

Somalia has turned to Turkey to counter the port deal, creating significant opportunities for Turkey to advance its economic, defense, and power projection interests in the wider Red Sea theater. Turkey and Somalia signed an economic and defense deal in February 2024 that increases its military presence in crucial waterways and gives it access to underdeveloped offshore oil reserves in exchange for reconstructing, equipping, and training the defunct Somali Navy.[64] CTP previously assessed that Somalia intends for the deal to counter or deter Ethiopia’s port deal despite the SFG officially denying the two are connected. The deal guarantees Turkey 30 percent of the revenue from resources found in Somalia’s offshore exclusive economic zone. This stake has significant potential if Turkey can develop Somalia’s “blue economy,” which refers to economic activities in the ocean and coastal areas, and offshore oil and gas extraction.[65] Turkey has already signed follow-up deals to explore and produce up to 30 billion barrels of undeveloped offshore gas and oil deposits and announced plans to send an exploration vessel in October.[66]

The agreement also boosts Turkey’s defense and general power projection aims in the Red Sea. Turkey will deploy an unspecified number of naval forces to Somalia to help the SFG protect its territorial waters as it builds the Somali forces’ capacity to counter terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and other threats.[67] Somali forces have minimal naval capabilities, which will make Somalia dependent on Turkish forces and presumably Turkish-supplied assets as part of the cooperation.[68] Turkey has already announced plans to send two warships to Somalia to protect its exploration vessel.[69] This situation will increase Turkish and pro-Turkish naval presence near critical waterways off the Somali coast, such as the Bab el Mandeb strait, enabling Turkey to increase its geopolitical influence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region.[70] Turkey has explicitly framed the deployment as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the region.[71] Turkey has also held follow-on discussions with Somalia to construct a site in Somalia to test-fire missiles and rockets in Somalia for its ballistic missile and space programs.[72]

Turkey’s agreement with Somalia comes at the direct expense of the UAE’s economic and political interests in the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea area. The SFG had been considering a similar landmark deal with the UAE for over a year before it signed the 2024 deal with Turkey.[73] The SFG may have chosen Turkey over the UAE due to the UAE’s strong ties with Ethiopia and Somaliland. The UAE has invested nearly half a billion dollars in Somaliland’s Berbera port in exchange for a 30-year concession to manage the port.[74] The UAE has also invested billions of dollars in Ethiopia since 2018 and sent arms during the Tigray war from 2020 to 2022.[75] It began building an air base in Somaliland but voluntarily scrapped the project in favor of a civilian airport in 2019 when its diminishing role in the Yemeni civil war removed the need for the base.[76]

The Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement is also in UAE’s economic interests and aligned with its strategy to create more friendly client ports along the Red Sea. The UAE helping landlocked Ethiopia gain more access to the Red Sea and establishing another potential client port would reap significant benefits for the UAE given Ethiopia’s economic and political importance in Africa. Ethiopia is Africa’s fifth-largest economy. The Emiratis already sought to get Ethiopia partial ownership in the Berbera port in 2019, but Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments on time.[77]

Figure 4. Somalia Seeks External Support to Counter Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal. CLICK TO ENLARGE

Source: Liam Karr

Somalia has also increased military cooperation with Egypt to deter Ethiopia from following through on its port deal with Somaliland. This has created an opportunity for Egypt to advance its preexisting efforts to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the vital Nile and Red Sea. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has visited Cairo twice in 2024, following strong and outspoken Egyptian support for the SFG’s position on the Ethiopia deal.[78] Egypt and Somalia signed a defense cooperation agreement during Mohamud’s most recent visit, in August, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi confirmed that Egypt will contribute troops to the revamped African Union (AU) mission in Somalia that is scheduled to begin in 2025.[79] International media reported that 5,000 Egyptian troops will deploy to Somalia around Mogadishu as part of the mission, while Egyptian media said the deployment could be as many as 10,000.[80]

Egypt recently deployed troops to Somalia as part of this new cooperation. Egypt sent 1,000 soldiers and arms and ammunition to Mogadishu between August 27 and 29.[81] Egyptian officials said Egypt would ship armored vehicles, rocket launchers, artillery, anti-tank missiles, radars, and drones as part of the defense deal. Egypt and Somalia are also planning to hold joint military exercises in Somalia sometime in September.[82] Egyptian officials said the exercise will involve ground, air, and naval forces and “send a clear and loud message about our firm commitment to co-operate and protect Somalia.”[83]

Egypt has attempted to strengthen ties with Somalia for years to court Somali support for its position on Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project.[84] Egypt has repeatedly labeled the GERD an existential threat that will degrade—or enable Ethiopia to control—its Nile water supply and argued that Ethiopia should not fill the GERD without a legally binding agreement that resolves concerns about the dam’s downstream effects.[85] The Nile is vital for Egypt’s economy and general population given that it gets 90 percent of all its water from the Nile, which it uses for electric production, agriculture, and drinking water.[86]

These efforts have become more vital since Egypt lost its ability to counter Ethiopia through Sudan after the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war.[87] The SAF had backed Egypt’s stance on the GERD as Sudan is another downstream Nile country, and the two had engaged in military drills and stationed Egyptian fighter jets in Sudan since 2020 to pressure Ethiopia towards an agreement.[88] However, the Sudanese civil war has preoccupied the SAF and nullified Egypt’s military capacity in Sudan after Egypt withdrew from Sudan following an RSF attack that hit its Sudan-based assets in the early days of the war.

Egypt also likely wants to deny Ethiopia Red Sea naval access, which would create opportunities for Ethiopia to threaten Egypt’s Red Sea rents in the far future. Egypt received roughly $9 billion annually from Suez Canal receipts before the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, which began in October, and the subsequent Houthi campaign in the Red Sea.[89] The Houthi attacks have more than halved this figure in 2024.[90] Ethiopia signed defense accords with France to reestablish its defunct navy in 2019 but has not made notable progress since.[91]

Egypt’s engagement with Somalia also creates opportunities for Sisi to rebuild international and domestic prestige. Egypt’s growing military cooperation with Somalia may signal a renewed Egyptian effort to project regional influence and save its diminished position as a regional leader after its recent economic bailout. Egypt has faced a stagnating economy and resulting economic crunch in recent years that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war have exacerbated, leading to inflation, rising poverty rates, and significant foreign debt.[92] The crisis depleted Egypt’s political capital and contributed to Egypt being unable to project decisive power outside of its borders, including places like Sudan.[93] However, more than $50 billion of investment—equal to 10 percent of Egypt’s total gross domestic product—from the EU, International Monetary Fund, and UAE in early 2024 has presumably alleviated Sisi’s economic concerns and created more bandwidth for more assertive foreign policy.[94] Using this bandwidth to increase its role in Somalia helps restore Egypt’s prestige as a regional military power and creates opportunities for cooperation with Somalia’s other security stakeholders, including the EU, Turkey, and the United States.

Egypt’s participation in the AU peacekeeping mission will also help Sisi domestically by helping fund his vital military powerbase and potentially create profit. International funders directly pay troop-contributing countries an estimated $940 per soldier each month.[95] The contributing governments typically keep at least $200 of the per-soldier monthly rate for administrative uses, such as uniforms and training, and give the remaining amount to soldiers. For reference, Kenya received $48 million in funding in fiscal year 2023.[96]

Egypt’s military buildup in Somalia is heightening tensions and growing the risk of a regional conflict. The timing and nature of Egypt and Somalia’s recent military cooperation indicate that the collaboration is not tied purely to the mandate of the AU peacekeeping mission and is meant to threaten Ethiopia. Egyptian troops have arrived months before the planned AU transition at the end of 2024. Furthermore, the AU and UN will not finalize the new mission’s funding, concept of operations, and other troop-contributing countries until October.[97] This timing discrepancy indicates that the soldiers are not primarily there as part of the planned peacekeeping mission. The anti-tank missiles Egypt plans to send are also more geared for a conventional conflict, as al Shabaab does not use sophisticated enough vehicles to require anti-tank weapons.

Plans for an Egypt-Somalia military exercise further underscore the partnership’s anti-Ethiopian intentions. Egyptian officials announced a future military exercise with Somalia one day after their September 1 warning about Ethiopia’s GERD activity.[98] Egypt previously used military exercises with Sudan to pressure Ethiopia on GERD negotiations.[99] Egyptian officials also said the exercise aims to “send a clear and loud message about our firm commitment to co-operate and protect Somalia.”[100] This framing is consistent with Egypt’s previous promises to protect Somali sovereignty from Ethiopia throughout 2024, indicating that the exercises are a message to Ethiopia and not counterinsurgency operations.[101] Military exercises in regions of Somalia that border Ethiopia would further indicate the anti-Ethiopian nature of the exercises by putting Egyptian forces within range of Ethiopian soldiers and outside of their reported AU peacekeeping area of responsibility around Mogadishu.[102]

Ethiopia has strongly warned that the growing Egyptian military presence on its border poses a national security threat. The Ethiopian foreign affairs ministry released a statement on August 28 implicitly warning Egypt and the international community against Egyptian military involvement in the new AU mission and Somalia more broadly.[103] The statement repeatedly accused external actors—presumably Egypt—of destabilizing the region and said that it “must shoulder the grave ramifications” of doing so. Ethiopia framed these concerns as potential threats to its national security and actions that it “cannot tolerate.” Multiple local reporters have reported that Ethiopia began building up its military forces in the Ogaden region, which borders Somalia, in August.[104] Ethiopia also captured several airports in Somalia’s Gedo region, presumably to deny Egyptian and SFG access to the areas.[105]

The AU peacekeeping transition at the end of 2024 could trigger growing tensions into a regional conflict. Ethiopian officials have implied that Ethiopian troops will stay in Somalia past 2024 if Ethiopia has international and local support regardless of the SFG’s actions.[106] Local leaders and politicians in parts of southwestern Somalia have spoken out against the SFG’s plans to expel Ethiopian soldiers.[107] Ethiopia’s position is consistent with CTP’s previous assessment that Ethiopian forces will almost certainly try to remain in Somalia to maintain a buffer zone against al Shabaab and prevent an al Shabaab offensive into Ethiopia, as the group launched in 2022.[108] Ethiopia’s stated national security concerns about the Egyptian military buildup in Somalia further incentivize it to maintain this buffer zone.

Ethiopian forces remaining in Somalia past 2024 would provide a clear pretext for the SFG, with Egyptian support, to attack Ethiopian soldiers on Somali soil or along the border. The SFG has repeatedly condemned Ethiopia for violating its sovereignty throughout 2024 and threatened to retaliate.[109] Sisi has warned that Egypt would protect Somalia from any threats to its sovereignty on multiple occasions and explicitly threatened Ethiopia to “not try Egypt, or try to threaten its brothers especially if they ask it to intervene” after meeting with the Somali president in January.[110] Egypt’s GERD concerns also give it internal reasons to support military intervention against Ethiopia. Egypt wrote to the UN Security Council on September 1 that Ethiopia’s unilateral policy on the GERD “threatens the stability of the region” and that Egypt is “prepared to take all measures and steps guaranteed under the UN Charter” to defend itself after Ethiopia began the fifth stage of filling the GERD.[111]

The dispute may also lead to proxy conflicts in both countries between local actors and the federal governments. Ethiopia’s strong ties to various local actors in Somalia also increase the risk of an armed proxy conflict in Somalia between the SFG and pro-Ethiopian regional Somali administrations, even if Ethiopian forces withdraw. Multiple leaders and politicians in Somalia’s Jubbaland and South West states have spoken out against the SFG’s plans to expel Ethiopian troops.[112] Many of the Somali forces that operate in these states alongside Ethiopian soldiers respond to their clan and regional leaders, not federal entities, such as the Somali National Army or the SFG.[113] Disagreements between the federal government and these local factions have historically led to clashes between local and national forces, often the local factions receiving external backing from Ethiopia or Kenya.[114]

Tensions over the dispute have grown between the SFG and the South West State (SWS) government in September, which may lead to a military clash. The SFG has already begun retaliating against local politicians speaking out in favor of Ethiopia, marginalizing these communities and increasing the risk of an internal conflict.[115] Somali officials including the prime minister and president have also increased outreach to local leaders to try to find a peaceful solution.[116] A senior regional official and local journalist denied Somali media reports that the SFG deployed Turkish-trained special Haramcad special police and Gorgor commandos to the de jure SWS capital, Barawe, on September 16.[117] Such a deployment would be a clear precursor to infighting given that the SFG typically deploys special forces during conflicts with regional governments due to the command and control issues the SFG has with local forces and their allegiance to shared clan ties.[118]

Figure 5. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute Threatens to Spark Proxy Conflicts

Note: “DRC” stands for Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

The SFG has also threatened to support ethno-nationalist insurgents in Ethiopia. Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi said in mid-September that the SFG would consider establishing contact with rebels if Ethiopia followed through on its agreement with Somaliland but that the crisis had not yet “reached that stage.”[119] Ethiopia is facing several ethno-nationalist insurgencies across the country. A loose collection of decentralized Amhara militias known as Fano have been waging an insurgency against the federal government in northern Ethiopia since August 2023 and captured several key points along the Sudanese border and near Ethiopia’s second-largest city in September 2024.[120] The Fano insurgency overlaps with a conflict between federal forces, and Oromo insurgents that also sometimes fight Fano in central Ethiopia.[121] The federal and regional governments in Tigray are also still working to implement the 2022 peace agreement that ended the Tigray war, which has caused clashes and threats of violence over disputed areas between Amhara and Tigrayan militias.[122] Former insurgents in the majority ethnically Somali region in eastern Ethiopia have also claimed that the Ethiopian government’s retaliatory actions against Somali citizens are threatening a 2018 peace deal that ended their over 30-year insurgency.[123]

The Ethiopia-Somalia dispute has weakened the SFG’s counterterrorism efforts, undermining US counterterrorism goals to weaken al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab. The SFG has given priority to these issues over its counterinsurgency campaign against al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab, undermining the fight against the group and contributing to its retaking territory in central Somalia that the SFG had captured in 2022 in a US-backed counterterrorism offensive that top US officials called “historic” and “impressive.”[124]

The fallout surrounding the port deal has weakened counterterrorism cooperation with critical counterterrorism partners such as Ethiopia and the UAE. CTP assessed that Somalia’s agreement with Turkey alienated the UAE, contributing to the UAE decreasing its financial and training support for Somali forces.[125] The SFG’s threat to expel Ethiopian troops could lead to opportunities for al Shabaab by either creating a force gap if Ethiopian forces leave or decreasing the SFG’s legitimacy and increasing popular anti-Ethiopian sentiment if they stay, which would boost al Shabaab recruitment.[126]

Figure 6. Al Shabaab Area of Operations: As of April 3, 2024

Note: “S. Sudan” stands for South Sudan.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database Project.

The growing tensions surrounding the Egyptian military buildup have also jeopardized Turkish-led peace talks between Ethiopia and Somalia. Turkey is the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021, and also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to the Ethiopian government during the Tigray civil war.[127] Turkey has used its leverage with Ethiopia and Somalia to mediate talks between the two sides in July and August.[128] The effort has failed to yield a breakthrough, both sides have accused each other of wanting to destabilize the other, and a third round of talks scheduled for September 17 was postponed days prior.[129] The Somali minister of foreign affairs left the August meeting blaming Ethiopia for the talks’ collapsing.[130] Ethiopia also blamed Somalia for “colluding with external actors aiming to destabilize the region” instead of pursuing the peace talks.[131]

Turkey also risks alienating Ethiopia and diminishing its status as a negotiator due to its growing ties with Egypt and Somalia. Sisi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on September 5 for the first time since Sisi took power in 2013, which led Turkey to cut ties with Egypt and shelter the Muslim Brotherhood leaders that Sisi overthrew.[132] Turkey has also been a steadfast supporter of Ethiopia on the GERD issue in recent years.[133] Egypt and Turkey signed 17 bilateral agreements during Sisi’s visit and discussed the need to “preserve the unity and territorial integrity” of Somalia among other issues.[134]

How China Can Finance African Projects

 Source: The Center for Global Development published on 12 September 2024 a proposal titled “At FOCAC, China Renewed Commitments to Africa. Here’s What Needs to Happen Next” by W. Gyude Moore.  

The author proposes that China expand the $2 billion Chinese-created Africa Growing Together Fund (AGTF) administered by the African Development Bank and embrace a wider slate of participants to enable continued and sustainable lending from China to Africa.  More specifically, he suggests that China expand AGTF capital to $5 billion and reauthorize it for another 10 years. 

External Meddling Exacerbates Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

 Source: The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Africa File published on 23 September 2024 an analysis titled “External Meddling for the Red Sea Exacerbates Conflicts in the Horn of Africa” by Liam Karr.

Russia, Iran, UAE, Turkey, and Egypt are taking advantage of conflicts in the Horn of Africa to advance their economic, military, and political objectives in the greater Red Sea area at the expense of the interests of the local populations and the United States.  

Ethiopia calls for deliberation on Somalia’s security after ATMIS exit

Source: Hiiraan Online, Wednesday September 25, 2024

New York (HOL) – Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister, Ambassador Taye Atske-Selassie, met with Catherine Molly Phee, U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, on Tuesday during the 79th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

During the meeting, Minister Taye emphasized Ethiopia’s commitment to ensuring sustainable peace and security, highlighting Ethiopia’s role in combating terrorism, especially in Somalia.

The Minister stressed the need for careful deliberation before any post-ATMIS (African Union Mission in Somalia) arrangements are finalized, signalling Ethiopia’s concerns about maintaining stability in the region.

Tensions have risen between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ethiopia’s agreement to lease a portion of Somaliland’s coastline, an autonomous region of Somalia, in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence. The deal has caused diplomatic friction, as Somalia strongly rejected the agreement, accusing Ethiopia of undermining its territorial integrity.

Ethiopia’s plans to establish a port in Somaliland have further strained relations with Mogadishu and brought Somalia closer to Egypt, which has long been in dispute with Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River.

Somalia recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia in January following the port agreement, underscoring the growing diplomatic rift between the two nations.

Ethiopia worried over arms shipments to Somalia

Source: Reuters, Wednesday September 25, 2024

Security helicopters hover above the Mogadishu Sea Port after an Egyptian warship docked to deliver a second major cache of weaponry in Mogadishu, Somalia on September 23, 2024. PHOTO | REUTERS

Ethiopia’s foreign minister has warned that ammunition supplied to Somalia could exacerbate conflict and be diverted to terrorists, Ethiopia’s state news agency reported on Tuesday.

His statement came a day after an Egyptian warship unloaded heavy weaponry in the capital Mogadishu, the second arms shipment in the space of a month following the inking of a joint security pact by Egypt and Somalia in August.

Landlocked Ethiopia, which has thousands of troops stationed in neighbouring Somalia to fight al Qaeda-linked Islamist insurgents, has fallen out with the Mogadishu government over its plans to build a port in the breakaway region of Somaliland.

The spat has drawn Somalia closer to Egypt, which has quarrelled with Ethiopia for years over Addis Ababa’s construction of a vast hydro dam on the headwaters of the Nile River.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Taye Astke Selassie said he was concerned that the supply of ammunition by “external forces would further exacerbate the fragile security and would end up in the hands of terrorists in Somalia,” Ethiopia News Agency reported.

There was no immediate response from Somalia’s government to Taye’s remarks.

“The potential for weapons landing in the wrong hands is high. Al Shabaab is a major beneficiary and in 2023 harvested massive quantities of weapons by conducting raids on enemy (bases),” said Rashid Abdi, an analyst with the Sahan Research think-tank.

The UN Security Council lifted its arms embargo in December, more than 30 years after it was first imposed as Somalia plunged into civil war.

In January, Ethiopia agreed to lease 20km (12 miles) of coastline from Somaliland – a part of Somalia which claims independence and has operated with effective autonomy since 1991 – in exchange for possible recognition of its sovereignty.

In response, Somalia threatened to expel by the end of the year Ethiopia’s troops, who are there as part of the peacekeeping mission and under bilateral agreements, if the port deal was not scrapped.

Can tensions between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Egypt be tempered?

Source: Tuesday September 24, 2024


Photo illustration by John Lyman
In recent months, tensions have flared dramatically across the Horn of Africa, with the arrival of Egyptian troops in Somalia signaling what could escalate into a regional war. The friction between Ethiopia’s contentious sea access agreement with Somaliland and the decades-long disputes over the Nile River between Ethiopia and Egypt have all contributed to a growing sense of unease in the region.

Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, issued a stark warning to potential aggressors: Anyone planning on invading this country should “think 10 times” before doing so. Meanwhile, Turkey and other neighboring nations are scrambling to mediate, with Djibouti even offering Ethiopia control over the critical Tadjoura port in a bid to reduce hostilities. Despite these efforts, the threat of a broader conflict looms ever larger.

A fractured history

Egypt and Ethiopia share a long, complicated history. As two of Africa’s first independent nations and founding members of the United Nations in 1945, their diplomatic ties stretch back decades. Yet, this shared history is riddled with fractures, exacerbated by Cold War dynamics and conflicting geopolitical allegiances.

While Egypt aligned with the Soviet Union during the Camp David Accords, Ethiopia sided with Israel and the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflicts. At the heart of this rivalry lies the Nile River, an essential lifeline for both nations. Ethiopia’s control over one of the river’s primary tributaries—and its recent dam project—threatens Egypt’s water security, adding historical weight to the current crisis.

The roots of Egypt’s fears run deep, dating back to the 1950s when Ethiopia first considered building a dam. Despite its capability, successive Ethiopian governments refrained from such projects, wary of provoking Egyptian retaliation. In the 1970s, Egypt threatened military action if Ethiopia moved forward. Even into the 21st century, the threat persisted, with former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak reportedly stating that Egypt would be ready to fight any new dam construction on the Nile.

A military standoff in the making?

The situation has deteriorated further with the deployment of Egyptian troops to Somalia, a move widely perceived as a bid by Cairo to assert its dominance in a region where it has long clashed with Ethiopia’s interests.

At the core of this confrontation is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt views as a direct challenge to its share of the Nile waters. Cairo has issued warnings for years, insisting that any reduction in its Nile water supply would be intolerable. Now, with over 10,000 Egyptian troops in Somalia, it seems Egypt is prepared to back its rhetoric with force.

Ethiopia has expressed grave concern over Egypt’s military presence in Somalia, particularly as it edges closer to their shared borders. Although reactions among the neighboring communities vary, the deployment has sparked widespread criticism, especially in regions where suspicion of Egyptian motives runs high. While bracing for the worst, Ethiopia has so far adopted a cautious stance, emphasizing its readiness to defend its interests at any cost.

Diplomacy on the brink

Amid escalating tensions, Ethiopia has intensified its diplomatic outreach, particularly with Somaliland and Turkey. Turkey has emerged as a crucial player in the crisis, facilitating two rounds of indirect talks between Somalia and Ethiopia. However, concrete progress remains elusive. A third round of negotiations is scheduled for next month, but with the situation rapidly deteriorating, hopes for a peaceful resolution appear dim.

Djibouti, an important regional hub and long-standing ally of Ethiopia, has extended a potentially game-changing offer: granting Ethiopia full sovereignty over the Tadjoura port. This strategic asset would provide Ethiopia with an alternative to the contested Somaliland port, potentially easing some tension. Yet, whether this gesture will be seen as a timely intervention or a belated offer remains to be seen.

A region on the edge

The Horn of Africa is teetering on the brink of a full-scale regional war, with the potential to draw in other powers with vested interests. Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf States have stakes in the region, and their involvement could further complicate the conflict. Moreover, the presence of proxy groups like Somalia’s Al-Shabab insurgents or the Yemeni Houthis could ignite a broader, more chaotic war, escalating the human and economic toll.

The stakes could not be higher. If the crisis continues unchecked, it risks becoming one of Africa’s most volatile and dangerous flashpoints. The people of Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and the broader Horn of Africa may face devastating consequences. The situation demands urgent, sustained diplomatic efforts from regional and international actors to prevent a descent into widespread violence and instability

Kenya to send 600 more police officers to Haiti

Will Ross
Source: BBC, Africa regional editor, BBC News
Monday September 23, 2024

President William Ruto also promised the Kenyan police officers deployed to Haiti that he would try to get them better equipment

Kenya has pledged to send 600 more police officers to Haiti in the coming weeks to help fight gangs controlling much of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and nearby areas.

This would bring the Kenyan contingent, deployed incrementally since June to help the Caribbean nation’s beleaguered police force, up to 1,000.

During a visit to the country, Kenya’s President William Ruto also said he supported turning the current Kenya-led security mission into a full United Nations peacekeeping operation.

A handful of other countries have together pledged at least 1,900 more troops.

Violence in Haiti is still rife and a UN human rights expert has warned that gangs are targeting new areas, causing further displacement.

The UN Security Council is due to meet by the end of the month to decide whether to renew Kenya’s current mandate for another 12 months, paving the way for a full UN mission in 2025.

This would lead to increased funding and resources for the operation, which has been hampered by a lack of equipment.

Addressing the Kenyan police officers at their base in Port-au-Prince, President Ruto commended the force for their successes over the last few months.

“There are many people who thought Haiti was mission impossible, but today they have changed their minds because of the progress you have made.”

He said they would succeed against the gangs and he promised to try to get them better equipment.
The nearly 400 Kenyan officers on the ground were going out on patrol “working hand-in-hand with Haitian forces to protect the people and restore security”, Ruto said.

“Our next batch, an additional 600, is undergoing redeployment training. We will be mission-ready in a few weeks’ time and look forward to the requisite support to enable their deployment,” he added.
But there has been some criticism in Haiti at the lack of a decisive move against the gangs.

A UN human rights expert who has just been there said the mission was inadequately equipped and needed helicopters, as well as night vision goggles and drones.

“The Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), authorised by the UN Security Council in October 2023, has so far deployed less than a quarter of its planned contingent,” William O’Neil said on Friday.

Despite an international embargo, arms and ammunition continued to be smuggled into the country. allowing the gangs to extend their control to new territories, he said.

The UN expert had visited the south-east of the country, where he said the police lacked the logistical and technical capacity to counter the gangs.

He quoted a policeman in Jérémie as saying: “The situation borders on the impossible. We have to learn to walk on water.”

Sexual violence had drastically increased and more than 700,000 people were now displaced, Mr O’Neil said.

“This enduring agony must stop. It is a race against time.”

He said the solutions already existed, but efforts had to be “redoubled immediately”.

“It is crucial to stifle the gangs by giving the MSS Mission the means to be effective in supporting the operations of the Haitian National Police, as well as to implement the other measures provided for by the United Nations Security Council, including the sanctions regime and the targeted arms embargo.”

Somaliland urges Somali government to address al-Shabab-Houthi alliance threat

Source: Hiiraan ONline, Monday September 23, 2024

Hargeisa (HOL) – Somaliland’s Minister of Internal Affairs, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, called on the Somali government to address the emerging relationship between the militant group al-Shabaab and Houthi fighters in Yemen.

In an interview with Al Arabiya TV, Ahmed warned that the alliance between the two groups could destabilize regional security and urged immediate action.

“There is a strong relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, and that poses a threat to peace in the region. The Somali government must take control of the situation and prevent further cooperation between these groups,” the minister said.

Ahmed also called on the international community to intervene, stressing that Somaliland alone cannot handle security threats in the Red Sea region. He highlighted the need for broader efforts to prevent the alliance from disrupting regional trade routes.

In June, U.S. intelligence revealed that Houthi fighters were discussing providing weapons to al-Shabaab. American officials are investigating whether Iran, which supports the Houthis militarily and financially, is involved in facilitating this weapons transfer.

“ A nation in the Horn of Africa will disappear by 2050”.

Aqoonyahan kasoo jeeda Geeska Africa wuxuu qoray 2011 Article  lagu magacaabo “ A nation in the Horn of Africa will disappear by 2050”. Dalka maabka addunka ka bixi doona waxuu ka dhigay Somalia. Arrintaas cid kubaraarugtay ma jirin.

Muxuu qoraalkiisa saldhig uga dhigay:

1. Waxaa dhismi doona maamul gobaleedyo (regional states”
2. Regional states waxay ku dhawaaqi doonaan ineysan aqoonsaneyn dawladda dhexe ee federaalka ah Somalia.
3. Dawladda federaalka meesha ayey ka bixi doontaa gabi ahaan
4. Maamul goboleedyadu  waxay u qaybsami doonaan labo:
5. Qaar ku biira Ethiopia iyo
6. Qaar ku biira Kenya

Halkaasna waxaa kuburburi doona dawladnimadii iyo midnimadii Somalia.

Dawr  sano ka hor, shir ay yeesheen maamul gobaleedyada hadda jira waxay shir ku jeesheen mid ka mid ah mamuul-gobaleedyada,  waxayna ku hanjabeen iney kalsoonida kala laaban doonaan dawladda dhexe Somalia.  Arrintaas wawal weyn ayey abuurtay.  Somaliyeey heshiiiya oo cudurka qabiilka  oo laidiin adeegsanaya meesha ka saara.

Somaliyeey Qabiilku waa kii jiritaankiina iyo Somalinimdadiina khatarka weyn ku haya!!!

The Challenge of Declaring Famine in Sudan

 Source: The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 11 September 2024 a question and answer titled “Conflict, Hunger, and Famine in Sudan” with Zane Swanson, Anita Kirschenbaum, and Caitlin Welsh.  

This piece discusses the challenges of making a formal declaration of famine in Sudan, which must come from an independent state or international body, like the United Nations.

Photo Essay on Sudan’s Humanitarian Crisis

 Source: The Council on Foreign Relations posted on 19 September 2024 a photo essay titled “Crisis in Sudan, War, Famine, and a Failing Global Response” by Mariel Ferragamo and Sabine Baumgartner.

Making widespread use of photos and maps, the article describes a failing aid response and unsuccessful peace process in efforts to end the tragedy in Sudan

International peacekeepers, others survive military helicopter crash in Somalia

Source: AA, Friday September 20, 2024

Several military personnel aboard helicopter, including 3 Ugandan soldiers serving with African Union Transition Mission in Somalia survived the crash, say security sources

A military helicopter carrying international peacekeepers crashed on the outskirts of Somali capital Mogadishu on Thursday.

Several military personnel aboard the helicopter, including three Ugandan soldiers serving with the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), survived the crash, according to security sources.

The incident resulted in no deaths, a military official told Anadolu over the phone, requesting anonymity because he was not authorized to speak with the media.

So far, neither the Somali National Army (SNA) nor the ATMIS have released a statement regarding the incident.

However, sources said all of people on board the helicopter were rescued.

It is unclear whether the crash was caused by a technical issue or a hostile fire.

The helicopter was flying from Mogadishu to Ballidogle airfield, where US forces and Somali army commandos Danab are stationed.

Balidogle is 90 kilometers (55 miles) south-west of Mogadishu.

Is South Sudan First Case of Permanent Mass Displacement Due to Climate Change?

 Source, The Conversation published on 10 September 2024 a commentary titled “South Sudan Floods: The First Example of a Mass Population Permanently Displaced by Climate Change?” by Liz Stephens, University of Reading, and Jacob Levi, Institute of International Health, Berlin University of Medicine.  

Floods have engulfed much of South Sudan.  Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced from the Sudd due to flooding along the White Nile.  The floods seem to be getting worse each year, raising concerns that many South Sudanese will be permanently displaced.

Wednesday September 18, 2024
Source: theSTAR By BRIAN ORUTA



Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Executive Secretary Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu and the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on September 17, 2024. IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Federal Government of Somalia have reaffirmed their commitment to advance regional peace, security and economic cooperation.

This was announced during a meeting between IGAD Executive Secretary Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu and the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

The IGAD boss was in Mogadishu, Somalia for high-level consultations with the Federal Government of Somalia.

Workneh in his remarks highlighted the critical role Somalia plays in ensuring the region remains safe and stable.

“Somalia is not only a founding member of IGAD but also a critical partner in our shared mission to promote peace, stability, and development in the Horn of Africa.

“We stand with Somalia as it navigates its path towards sustainable peace and prosperity, and we will continue to support the government’s efforts to build a resilient nation,” he said.

The meeting also explored avenues for enhancing cooperation on cross-border initiatives that contribute to the broader vision of regional integration.

President Hassan Sheikh reaffirmed Somalia’s commitment to strengthening ties with IGAD for the development of the region.

IGAD and Somalia signed an agreement to further enhance relations.

“A key element of the agreement is the establishment of a Regional Centre of Excellence in Blue Economy, marking a significant milestone for both Somalia and the region,” IGAD said.

He also reaffirmed IGAD’s continued support for Somalia’s efforts to address challenges such as countering violent extremism, responding to climate-induced displacement, and fostering inclusive governance.

The Executive Secretary also met Somalia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Fiqi and later on IGAD staff in Somalia.

The IGAD boss was in Mogadishu, Somalia on Monday.

Six men, five from same family, killed in Ethiopian mosque attack

Source: Hiiraan Online, Wednesday September 18, 2024

Jigjiga (HOL) – Gunmen killed six men, including five from the same family, inside a mosque in Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State on Tuesday night in what residents described as a suspected clan revenge attack.

The victims, identified as Bishar Baalul, Omar Aw Ahmed, Mahad Mohamud Abdullahi Waanis, Mahdi Sheikh Adan Wali, and Mohamed Dheere, were all devoted followers of Islam, dedicated to living pious lives in service to Allah.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, and while security forces arrived at the scene, no arrests have been made.

The town of Warder and the surrounding Dollo region have been grappling with ongoing conflict between local communities, which has escalated in recent weeks.

After Somalia, Egypt Looks to Eritrea to Isolate Ethiopia

Source: Nova news, Wednesday September 18, 2024

Last weekend, the head of Egyptian intelligence and the Foreign Minister met in Asmara with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and delivered a direct message from Al Sisi aimed at “strengthening and developing bilateral relations in all fields”

Egypt’s diplomatic activism in the Horn of Africa continues. After the military cooperation agreement signed with Somalia to send 10 Egyptian soldiers to Mogadishu, which infuriated neighboring Ethiopia, the government in Cairo is now considering a similar agreement with Eritrea, which would also include bilateral measures to protect shipping in the Red Sea. The Emirati newspaper “The National” reports this, underlining that at the same time Egypt is also discussing with Asmara a possible Egyptian mediation in the ten-year conflict between the Eritrean government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), protagonist of the war that ended two years ago that pitted it against the Ethiopian army. The talks between Egypt and Eritrea follow a surprise visit made last weekend to Asmara by the head of Egyptian intelligence Kamal Abbas, very close to the president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and accompanied by the Foreign Minister Badr AbdelattyThe two delegates met with the Eritrean President, Isaiah Afwerki, and according to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, they delivered a direct message from Al Sisi aimed at “strengthening and developing bilateral relations in all fields”.

The senior Egyptian officials, the statement continued, “also listened to President Afwerki’s views on the developments in the Red Sea regarding the importance of finding the right circumstances to restore normal maritime navigation and international trade through the Bab el Mandeb Strait,” which connects the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea. Together, the territories of Egypt and Eritrea cover about 5 kilometers of the Red Sea coastline, including the Egyptian coasts of the Gulfs of Suez and Aqaba, as well as 355 islands under Eritrean sovereignty. Egypt controls the northern areas of the Red Sea, including the Suez Canal that connects it to the Mediterranean, while Eritrea is located near the strategic Bab el Mandeb Strait. Sisi and Afwerki last met in February, when they met in Cairo. Three months earlier, they had met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

If confirmed, the military cooperation agreement with Eritrea would be the latest to be signed between Cairo and countries in the Horn of Africa, East Africa or the Nile Basin. These include Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and, most recently, Somalia. Analysts have long suspected that such agreements were designed primarily to pressure Ethiopia to show flexibility in its dispute with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the mega-project nearing completion on the Nile River that Cairo considers an existential threat to its water supply. This was particularly the agreement with Somalia, signed on 14 August during the visit to Cairo by the Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, exacerbating the already bitter tensions between Somalia and Egypt, on the one hand, and Ethiopia, on the other.

Under the agreement, a total of 10 Egyptian soldiers will be sent to Somalia: half of these (5) will be integrated into the African Union Stabilization and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) – which will replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) on 1 January 2025 – while the other 5 will be deployed bilaterally. The Ethiopian response, announced with a fiery statement released the day after the arrival in Mogadishu of the first Egyptian soldiers who will be deployed in the regional states of Hirshabelle, Southwest and Galmudug, was not long in coming: it first came with the deployment of armored vehicles and hundreds of men on the border with Somalia, then with the seizure of several key airports in the Somali region of Ghedo, including Luq, Dolow and Bardere, in an attempt to prevent the possible air transport of Egyptian troops to the area. The airports are the only access points to the cities in the Gedo region, since the main roads are controlled by the jihadist group Al Shabaab.

Tensions with Ethiopia have had the effect of further bringing the positions of Somalia and Egypt closer, already significantly improving after the election of President Mohamud in May 2022. Long at loggerheads with Addis Ababa over the Gerd dam, Egypt has been a key player in Somalia’s security since early 2023, contributing to the training of Somali army recruits and the supply of weapons and ammunition and the care of wounded Somali soldiers in Egyptian military hospitals. Also last year, Mogadishu and Cairo began talks for closer strategic cooperation, and press rumors have been circulating for some time – so far unconfirmed – according to which Mogadishu is considering granting Egypt a military base in the center-south of the country.

In addition to the common Ethiopian threat, the thaw in relations between Cairo and Mogadishu’s historic ally Turkey has also brought Egypt and Somalia closer together. This thaw was confirmed by the recent visit to Ankara by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi (the first since 2014). A visit that clearly and unequivocally indicated the renewed closeness between the two countries after the years of frost experienced since 2013 due to divergent positions on political Islam, but also on regional geopolitical issues. In the years following 2013, specifically in 2021, the thaw between Qatar – the main point of reference for the Muslim Brotherhood – and the Gulf bloc formed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, together with Egypt, has in fact opened new opportunities for relations between Cairo and Ankara.

Somalia joins International Atomic Energy Agency

Source: AA, Tuesday September 17, 2024

Somalia has joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Monday at the General Conference in Vienna.

Somalia said the joining is a significant milestone reflecting the country’s commitment to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
“A landmark moment for our country, highlighting our dedication to peaceful nuclear engagement and sustainable development,” the office of the Somali prime minister said in a statement on Monday.

Somali Information Minister Daud Aweis said as a member of the UN nuclear watchdog, “Somalia looks forward to collaborating with the international community to harness nuclear technology for the benefit of our nation and to ensure the highest standards of safety and security.”

He said Somalia is dedicated to utilizing nuclear energy responsibly to support sustainable development and improve the quality of life for the citizens of Somalia.

Somalia is the newest and 179th member of the UN nuclear watchdog.

AfDB approves $6.6m grant to strengthen Somalia’s financial sector

Source: Daily News, Tuesday September 17, 2024

The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) has approved a $6.6m grant to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in strengthening state capacity to build its financial architecture, aiming to promote inclusive and equitable growth.

The Somalia Financial Sector Development Project will focus on improving the capacity of financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Somalia, Somalia Development and Reconstruction Bank, and the Financial Reporting Center (FRC), to formulate efficient credit delivery, and implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing measures. It will also enhance financial sector expertise through targeted training and assistance.
“This is a timely intervention that will enhance governance, accountability, skills, and technology development while fostering private sector growth through regulatory improvements and financial sector development,” said Ahmed Attout, AfDB’s Director of Financial Sector Development. “This will also build robust national financial systems that offer increased long-term finance availability, reduced intermediation costs, and improved financial infrastructure.”

The reforms seek to build a competitive and globally connected financial sector in Somalia, enhancing stability, trust, and financial inclusion, and attracting private investment.

Somalia has long grappled with security threats from armed groups that depend on illicit financing. Strengthening its financial institutions is therefore crucial for its stability and that of the wider Horn of Africa region. Integration into the global financial system has been hindered by insecurity as well as institutional barriers. The absence of intermediary and correspondent banking services has further isolated the country from international financial networks, limiting critical remittance inflows.

Strengthening the country’s Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) response, and bringing it in line with international standards will enable the integration of Somalia into the global financial architecture.

The project will directly benefit the country’s financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Somalia, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Bank, and the Financial Reporting Center. The grant will also support training programs and technical assistance initiatives for financial sector professionals.

Sudan’s Killing Fields

 Source: The Washington Post posted on 9 September 2024 an article titled “Videos from Sudan’s Killing Fields Reveal Ethnic Hatred Behind Massacres” by Katharine Houreld, Hafiz Haroun, Lucy Provan, Klaas van Dijken, and Maud Jullien.  

The videos underscore the vitriol of Arab militiamen affiliated with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces toward their Black African victims and the toll of that bigotry.  

South Sudan postpones December election by two years

Government says it needs more time to complete a census, draft a permanent constitution and register political parties.

Source: Source: South Sudan’s government Published On 14 Sep 202414 Sep 2024

South Sudan’s government has announced it is postponing long-delayed general elections until December 2026, citing a lack of preparedness.

This is the second time the country, which gained independence in 2011, is postponing elections and extending a transitional period that started in February 2020.

Keep reading

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South Sudan on the brink after oil exports derailed by Sudan’s civil war

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What’s behind the renewed violence on South Sudan’s border with Sudan?

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Dozens killed as violence flares in region disputed by Sudan, South Sudan

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President Salva Kiir and his former rival turned deputy, Riek Machar, signed a peace agreement in 2018 that ended a five-year civil war which killed an estimated 400,000 people, triggered a famine and led to a massive refugee crisis.

“The presidency, under the chairmanship of President Salva Kiir Mayardit, has announced an extension of the country’s transitional period by two years as well as postponing elections, which were initially scheduled for December 2024 to December 22nd, 2026,” Kiir’s office said on Friday.

The government said it needed more time to complete processes such as a census, the drafting of a permanent constitution and the registration of political parties before an election could be held, according to the presidential adviser on national security, Tut Gatluak.

Cabinet Affairs Minister Martin Elia Lomuro said the extension followed recommendations from both electoral institutions and the security sector.